4. 11. 91

PARRHASIANA:

OR,

THOUGHTS

UPON

Several Subjects;

AS,

CRITICISM, HISTORY, MORALITY, AND POLITICS.

By Monsieur *Le Clerk*, under the feigned Name of *Theodorus Parrhasi.*

Done into *English* by ****

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THE PREFACE OF THE AUTHOR.

THIS an Obſervation made long ago, That the World is pleaſed with Miſcellany Thoughts upon ſeveral Subjects, as appears not only by the kind reception the Thoughts of Monſieur Paſchal *and Monſieur* de la Bruyere's *Characters have found, but likewiſe by the* Scaligerana, Perroniana, Sorberiana, Valeſiana, Menagiana, *&c. ſome of which have ſeen ſeveral Editions. This gave me Encouragement to ſet down in Paper ſeveral Reflexions which I had made upon very different Subjects, and now to venture them abroad.*

* This was our Author's Modeſty: However, for the eaſe of the Engliſh Reader, we have divided it into Chap.

I have not divided the Thoughts into ſeveral * *Chapters, but only by ſome Marginal Notes, becauſe I never pretended to give any thing finiſhed upon any of the Matters I treat of. However I may affirm that, generally ſpeaking, they*

are better connected than any of those I have mentioned above. If I had so thought fit, I cou'd have swell'd each of them into several little Tracts, by making a few Additions to them, and some of them I might have distinguished by Chapters: But before I cou'd bring them to this Regularity, I must of necessity say many Things, which have been deliver'd by others in so exact and perspicuous a manner, that there was no occasion to repeat them after them. My Design was only to touch upon those Things, which to the best of my Knowledge were never said before, or if they have been, were not so fully handled and supported, as now you find them. For Instance, there are several compleat Treatises of Rhetorick, and the Art of writing History, to which a Man may have recourse in order to form in his Mind an exact Idea of these Sciences; but I never read or saw any of those Matters so fully handled as they deserve. And therefore the Reader may if he pleases join what I have said concerning them as a Supplement to those Treatises of Rhetorick and History that are extant, or else furnish himself out of others what is deficient in mine.

The principal Thing I aim'd at in this Collection of different Thoughts, was to say something that might be serviceable to the present Age: I leave it to the Reader to judge whether the Advertisements I give him are well grounded. For my part, I am persuaded that there was a necessity of saying something like it, that Men of

Parts

Parts may improve these Hints, and inlarge upon at their leisure.

Perhaps it may be objected that there is too great a Freedom in my Thoughts and Expressions; but unless I am mistaken, they can find nothing which in the least offends against Religion and Good Manners. No Man living is more persuaded of the Truth and Importance of both these things than my self, and I should never engage so heartily as to defend them against those that attack them. The Obedience that is due to Sovereigns and Magistrates is not at all violated by this Liberty, and 'tis no hard matter to be persuaded of this Truth, in the Country where I live: Since there is not a Man here that has not reason to bless the Gentleness of the Government, and of its excellent Maxims, one of the chief of which is To suffer all that are Subjects to it to speak freely, so long as they obey the Civil Laws. In effect let Men carry Liberty as high as they please, provided this Liberty be accompanied by a Love of Justice and of Order, it will only better discover the excellence of this Government, and oblige those that live under it to obey it with more cheefulness.

As for the rest, the Liberty I have taken in this Collection was never intended to create any Quarrels. I have only made use of it to speak general Truths, which I never apply but to Authors dead long ago. If any Per-

Perſons of the ſame Character are now alive, 'tis no fault of mine. It wou'd be impoſſible ever to Cenſure any Irregularities, if a Man were to ſtay till there were none to be found to whom his Cenſure might be applied. 'Tis ſufficient that he has no particular Views, and deſigns no ſuch matter.

At the end of this Collection I have only endeavoured to defend the Writings of a certain Author in whom I am intereſſed, and if I have anſwer'd the Calumnies of his Adverſaries ſomewhat ſharply, I may ſafely ſay that it was not till after ſeveral of them had for a long time abuſed his Silence, and vented their Malice in the moſt injurious manner that could be. We uſe to ſuffer him who defends himſelf to ſpeak in a higher Tone than thoſe that attack his Innocence, and the World paſſes by ſeveral Things in him which are not pardon'd in the Aggreſſors. But I here declare that I have expreſs'd my ſelf with much more Tenderneſs than thoſe who have fallen foul upon the Party whom I defend, and thoſe that have read their Libels will make no queſtion of it. I have not enter'd here into any Matter, but only contented my ſelf to touch ſome Matters of Fact, till I have a proper opportunity to explain theſe Matters, as far as I ſee convenient. In the mean time the Publick ought not to be ſurprized that the Perſon whom I here defend, has return'd no other Anſwer to thoſe who had a Mind to quarrel with him. He has been, and ſtill is taken up in ſome Occupations

that appear more useful to him, and consequently such as he ought more to mind. There are several honest and discerning Judges that will not be wanting to espouse his Party, till such time as he defends himself, if ever he thinks it necessary. If he's capable of doing the Publick any Service either in discovering or supporting any one Truth which is of general Importance, they are more obliged to him in my Opinion, than if he had formally convicted his Adversaries, of a thousand false Reasonings, and a thousand Calumnies. As he is ready to sacrifice his private Resentments to the public Advantage, 'tis but reasonable the Public should do him Justice without his importuning them upon that score.

Lately

Lately Publiſh'd,

THE Hiſtorical Library of *Diodorus* the *Sicilian*. In fifteen Books. The firſt Five, contain the Antiquities of *Egypt*, *Aſia*, *Africa*, *Greece*, the Iſlands, and *Europe*. The laſt Ten, an hiſtorical Account of the Affairs of the *Perſians*, *Grecians*, *Macedonians*, and other Parts of the World. To which are added, The fragments of *Diodorus* that are found in the Bibliotheca of *Photius*: Together with thoſe Publiſh'd by *H. Valeſius*, *L. Rhodomannus*, and *F. Urſinus*. Made Engliſh by *G. Booth*, of the City of *Cheſter*, Eſq; *in Folio*.

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The Adventures of *Telemachus* the Son of *Ulyſſes*, Part I.

All the other Parts will ſoon be publiſhed, and ſold by *A. & J. Churchil*.

PAR-

PARRHASIANA:

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THOUGHTS

ON

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CHAP. I.

Of Poets and Poetry.

ABundance of Men read the Poets, who don't know what a Poet is, or at leaſt can't expreſs what they mean by it. A Poet is one who invents, either in whole or in part, the Subject he treats of; who diſpoſes it in a certain Order proper to ſurprize the Reader, and make him attentive: In ſhort, he's one who expreſſes himſelf in a different manner from the Vulgar, not only in reſpect of the Cadence, but likewiſe of the Elocution. That is to ſay, when a Man ſets himſelf to read a Po-

What Uſe is to be made of the Poets.

em, he ought to consider, that he's going to read the Work of a Liar, who intends to entertain him with Fictions, or at least with Truths so corrupted, that 'tis no easie matter to distinguish one from t'other. We ought to remember, that by the glittering Pomp of his Expression, he chiefly designs to surprize our Reason, and by the Harmony of his Cadence to please our Ears; in order to make us admire his Subject, and give us a great Idea of himself. Such Considerations as these wou'd serve us instead of an Antidote when we read their Compositions, which perhaps may be of some Profit to those who think rightly and justly; but are only fit to seduce others whose Reason is not strong enough to pass a true Judgment upon what pleases them too much.

If it be demanded, what use a Man may make of the Poets, we are in the first place to distinguish between the Ancients and the Moderns, between those that write in the living, and those that write in the dead Languages. We must likewise take care to distinguish between the Advantage a Man may reap from the Poets alone, and which is not to be had by reading any other Compositions, and that which is common to the Writings of the Poets, and those of other Authors: For upon all these Heads a Man may say different things.

Not to speak of the Advantage, which is to be acquir'd by reading Authors in Prose as well as in Verse, 'tis certain that the ancient Poets may be serviceable to us in two respects. The first is, That they fill the Mind with admirable Lessons of Morality and Politics, with which they embellish their Works, and that their Maxims being deliver'd in handsom Terms and in Verse, not only affect us more, but make a more lasting Impressi-

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on upon our Memory. The ſecond is, That their Stile being noble and elevated, warms the Imagination of thoſe that read them, and may accuſtom them to expreſs themſelves in a lively and animated manner. For this reaſon, the ancient Rhetoricians adviſed the Reading of them to thoſe that applied themſelves to the Study of Eloquence.

Theſe are in general the greateſt Advantages that may be drawn from the ancient Poets, for I don't call Diverſion an Advantage, which is the only uſe ſome Readers make of them, ſince a Man may do that by reading of Hiſtory: Beſides, that to read merely to amuſe one's ſelf ought not to be lookt upon as a ſerious Occupation. But you will ask me perhaps, Whether the Moderns, who write in *Greek* or *Latin* Verſe, may not be of equal Advantage? To which I anſwer in the Negative, That they are inferiour in all reſpects to the Ancients. Thoſe fine Sentences we admire in their Writings, are ſcarce at all to be found in thoſe of the Moderns; and beſides, there's a vaſt difference between the Stile of the former and that of the latter.

Several of the Moderns indeed have written *Greek* and *Latin* Verſes, but reſemble the Ancients, juſt as Apes may be ſaid to reſemble Men. They copy their Vices much more than their good Qualities, and indeed 'tis as dangerous to imitate the Thoughts of the Moderns as their Stile. Inſtead of grave and noble Sentences, they give us nothing but groſs and mean Thoughts: Inſtead of Purity and Conciſeneſs, we find in them very ſuſpicious manners of Speaking, and tireſome repetitions of ſynonymous Expreſſions, borrow'd out of the Ancients, and ill applied. There is ſcarce any modern Poet, either *Greek* or *Latin*,

who may not juſtly be cenſured with a good part of what I have ſaid. For this reaſon no body recommends the Reading of them to ſuch as ſtudy the *belles Lettres*. We ſend our Youth to the Ancients, and counſel them to read over their Compoſitions, without ſo much as condeſcending to mention to them the modern Poets. In truth, it wou'd be full as ridiculous to read the Moderns, in order to inſtruct ourſelves in the ancient Poetry, as it wou'd be to read the *Italian* Verſes written by Foreigners, as for inſtance, thoſe of Monſieur *Menage*, to learn how to write in *Italian*. All the World knows, that the *Italians* laugh at them, and find very notorious Soleciſms in them. We need not doubt but that the ancient Poets, were they to riſe out of their Graves, wou'd laugh in like manner at our *Greek* and *Latin* Verſes, and be amazed to find ſo many People in the World, take ſuch mighty pains, and loſe ſo much time to ſucceed ſo wretchedly.

If the ancient Philoſophers were to come upon Earth again, and ſhould without prepoſſeſſion Study the modern Philoſophers, they wou'd honeſtly confeſs, that they are not to be compared to them in any reſpect, neither for the Art of Reaſoning juſtly, nor that of ordering and expreſſing their Thoughts with perſpicuity, nor for the importance of their Diſcoveries. We may paſs the ſame Judgment upon the ancient Critics, and the ancient Interpreters of the Holy Bible, compared with the Moderns. But as for the Poets, thoſe of latter Times (I deſire to be underſtood only of thoſe that write in the dead Languages) are only Scholars in compariſon of thoſe of Antiquity. And what may the reaſon of this be? 'Tis becauſe the Moderns are ſordid Imitators of the Ancients, and can pretend to nothing

thing that is truly original, becauſe they are only Poets by rote and by imitation, and have not penetrated into the Principles of their Art, as the modern Philoſophers, and the others, whom I juſt now mention'd, have done.

To diſengage himſelf from this ſervile Spirit of Imitation, a Man ought to write in his own Mother-tongue. By this means he will think leſs of the Expreſſions and Thoughts of the Ancients; and as he is full of modern Words and Ideas, with which he is perfectly well acquainted, he will become an Original. The Poets of this Character do the ſame ſervice to their Language and Nation, as the *Greek* and *Latin* Poets formerly did to theirs. If no one has as yet appear'd upon the Stage, who has equal'd *Homer* and *Virgil*, in the modern Languages, the Reaſon of it in my opinion is, becauſe they are too much poſſeſs'd by this Spirit of Imitation, and have not as yet dared to take thoſe Flights, which a noble Imagination, enlightned and regulated by good Senſe, might aſpire to. Beſides, they chequer their Writings too much with the poetic Ornaments of ancient *Greece* and *Italy*, which a Man ought wholly to throw aſide, who deſigns to paſs for an Original. To effect this, ſome happy Genius ought to ſtart up, of a Spirit ſuperior to the Pedantry of the Schools, who ſhould give an Example to others, and perform all that *Homer* wou'd be capable of performing, were he now alive; nay, to model Poetry a-new by the Ideas of good Senſe, which are infinitely better underſtood at preſent than they were formerly. Then we ſhould ſee Poems free from that abſurd Traſh of the Pagan Divinities, which the Ancients might well enough introduce into their Works, becauſe the People believed what was told con-

cerning them. As now a-days we believe nothing of this, 'tis impoſſible for us to reliſh theſe antiquated Decorations, without forgetting the Age wherein we live, and the Truths we are moſt aſſur'd of. We muſt, if I dare ſo expreſs myſelf, tranſplant our Minds to the paſt Ages, in order to get their Taſt and Manners, without which we can never reconcile ourſelves to theſe ſtrange Ornaments. However, thoſe Poets that have written in the modern Languages, may be of ſome uſe both for their Thoughts and Stile, as I have remarqu'd of the Ancients. I take it for granted that the *French*, and thoſe of other Nations who underſtand that Language, are no leſs obliged to *Corneille*, *Deſpreaux*, *Racine*, *de la Fontaine*, *de Fontenelle*, and others that have excell'd in ſome ſorts of Poetry, as the Ancients cou'd poſſibly be to their beſt Poets. We find in their Writings a Vein of ſtrong manly Senſe, which is not common, an elevation and delicacy of Thoughts ſet off in ſuch beautiful Expreſſions, that we cannot read them without admiration. Other Nations, even thoſe of the North, pretend to have produced ſome Poets, that equal theſe, or at leaſt are not inferiour to them, but I am not able to judge of this matter.

Having mention'd the principal Advantages that may be drawn from reading the Poets both ancient and modern, 'tis requiſite I ſhould ſay ſomething likewiſe of the Miſchief they may do thoſe People who converſe too much with them, and have not ſufficiently cultivated their Reaſon. In the firſt place, The Poets are full of falſe Thoughts, by which if we are not deceived, yet we inſenſibly loſe a good Taſt and right Judgment, which are the fineſt Ornaments of Human Nature. By reading theſe ſorts of Books too often, not only with

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Indulgence, but even with Admiration for the beauty of the Stile, we inſenſibly accuſtom ourſelves to think after the ſame manner, and to approve for juſt that which is entirely falſe. We may obſerve the ſame effects of Humane Weakneſs in the reading of Authors of a quite different Character, which for the very ſame Reaſon, never fail to produce the ſame Effects. In ſome parts of the World, they read the *Fathers* of the *Church*, but eſpecially the *Latines*, being reſolved before-hand to find them polite and ſolid, and humbly to ſacrifice their Reaſon to them: After which they don't only give quarter to falſe Thoughts and ill Reaſonings, of which their Writings are full, but by little and little they begin to admire and imitate them. They obſerve no other order in their Thoughts than what an Imagination, heated by the Enthuſiaſms of a falſe Rhetoric, ſuggeſts; and every Argument, that makes but a tolerable appearance, paſſes for a good one. The ſame thing happens to thoſe who heat their Brain too much by reading the Poets: They arrive at that pitch at laſt as to have no manner of reliſh for exactneſs of Reaſoning. A Figure of Rhetoric goes with them for a good Argument, provided it be expreſs'd in fine Terms, and the Cadence of it be harmonious. As we pardon a thouſand ſilly things at an *Opera* in favour of the Muſic, ſo the agreeable ſound of Words, and the elegance of the Expreſſion makes us at firſt forgive ſuch things in the Poets, and afterwards in ourſelves.

If we imitate the falſe Thoughts of the Poets, only by being converſant in their Writings, we muſt certainly much more ſpoil ourſelves by their Stile, but eſpecially when we are young. That which is not too ſwelling for Verſe, is inſupportable in Proſe: and after we have been accuſtom'd

to the Bumbaſt of the Poets, we are apt to think we crawl on the Ground, when we deliver ourſelves in a plain natural manner, and the moſt elevated Language of Proſe ſeems dull and inſipid. Thus while we endeavour to write ſublimely in Proſe, we fall into a poetical Affectation, which is condemned by all the Maſters of Eloquence. † *A Corruptiſſimo quoq; Poetarum*, ſays *Quintilian*, *figuras, ſeu tranſlationes mutuamur, tum demum ingenioſi ſcilicet, ſi ad intelligendos nos opus ſit ſit ingenio.* " We borrow Figures and Metaphors from the worſt of Poets, and think we " are very ingenious, when a Man muſt have " ſome Wit to underſtand us.

† In Prozem. *Lib.* VIII.

In the mean time, while we affect a Stile too figurative, we really fall into a cold inſipid one, which we pretended to avoid by taking the other Courſe. For can any thing in Nature be more inſipid than to think to ſham mean vulgar Things upon the World for great ones, merely becauſe they are expreſs'd in an elevated manner? This is the Reaſon why, while an Orator of this complexion puts himſelf almoſt into convulſive Fits that he may move his Auditory, they are either faſt aſleep, or in ſo perfect a ſtate of Inſenſibility, that 'tis near a-kin to ſleeping. And if he is ever ſo ill adviſed as to publiſh a Work of this nature, 'tis ten times worſe for him; for a Reader is infinitely more rigorous than an Auditor.

This is the Miſchief which the reading of the Poets may do ſuch as don't read them with Judgment enough. I don't here ſpeak of that it may have in common with the reading of other Works, which may corrupt the Mind and Heart, but of that Miſchief which is peculiar to itſelf, if we don't take care to prevent it.

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THERE are only three things that can pleaſe us in any Diſcourſe, the Matter of which it is compoſed, the Order in which this Matter is diſtributed, and the Stile in which it is expreſſed. Poetry pleaſes in all theſe three Reſpects; but then there are abundance of things to be cenſured in Poetry upon theſe very Reſpects. *Why Poetry pleaſes ſo much.*

The matter of Heroic and Tragic Poems, (to confine ourſelves at preſent only to them) pleaſes us for the grandeur of the Actions and Events which it comprehends, and for the Incidents which are rare and ſurprizing, or proper to raiſe the Paſſions. That Admiration and Terror, that Pity and Indignation, which they ſtir up by turns in us, employ and engage our Minds in what they repreſent, and give us a ſenſible pleaſure when we read them. The Heart of Man is made to be incited by Paſſions, it takes a delight in being moved; nothing in ſhort is ſo tireſome to it as a Calm, or ſo dull as Indolence, and 'tis upon this account that the Poets gain it over to their Party. Who can read the Adventures of *Turnus* in the *Æneis*, without being Affected by them, and without abandoning himſelf with pleaſure to an agreeable Melancholy? Nay, we cannot read, without ſome emotion, a deſcription of the Paſſions that diſorder'd the unmerciful *Mezentius*, after the Death of his Son, which *Virgil* has expreſs'd in this manner;

——— † *Æſtuat ingens*
Uno in corde pudor, miſtóque inſania luctu,
Et furiis agitatus amor, & conſcia virtus.

† *Lib. Æneid. X. v. 871.*

" Shame and Grief for the Death of his Son min-
" gled with a furious Anger, Love that provo-
ked

" ked him to the laſt degree, and a ſenſe of his " Valour incited his Soul all at once. We are no longer in a condition to judge rightly of Things, when once our Paſſions have diſcompoſed us. We pardon every thing, nay, we imagine every thing to be good in a Poet, who knows how to unhinge us.

The *Romans* who were accuſtom'd to uſe their Victories with Generoſity, and who wou'd have thought it ſtrange to ſee a parcel of poor Fellows murder'd in cold Blood about the Herſe of a General that was fairly kill'd in Battel, did not however find fault with *Virgil* for introducing his *Æneas*, the moſt pious of all Men, and the moſt beloved by the Gods, killing eight Wretches upon the funeral Pile of *Pallas*.

† *Lib. Æneid. X. v. 518. Vide & Lib. XI. v. 18.*

——— ——— † *Sulmone creatos*
Quatuor hîc juvenes, totidem quos educat Ufens,
Viventes rapit, inferias quos immolet umbris,
Captivoq; rogi perfundat ſanguine flammas.

Nothing can excuſe *Virgil*, but the Example of *Homer*, whom he has here imitated. For *Homer* makes *Achilles* commit the ſame Cruelty, who ſacrifices a dozen *Trojans* about *Patroclus*'s funeral Pile in the tweny third Book of the *Ilias*. But what may be pardon'd in an enraged brutal *Hero*; as *Achilles* really was, ought never to be forgiven in the pious *Æneas*. Beſides, *Virgil*, who was a Man of better Senſe, and lived in an Age that was infinitely more polite than *Homer*'s, is leſs to be excuſed than he for making his Hero commit ſo barbarous an Action. However, the World takes no notice of this Inhumanity, out of reſpect to the great things that he makes *Æneas* perform, and the great Idea he gives of him in other places.

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If *Virgil* has tranſgreſs'd againſt the Rules of Decency in making his *Æneas* guilty of ſo inhumane a piece of Cruelty, he has offended againſt good Senſe in changing thoſe Javelins, with which *Polymneſtor* had transfix'd *Polydorus*, into the Branches of a Tree, the Root whereof was *Polydorus* himſelf, in his third Book of his *Æneis*: in making a golden Bough to ſprout from another Tree, in his ſixth Book; and in turning the burnt Ships of *Æneas* into ſo many Sea-Nymphs, in the eleventh. † I know that the common way of excuſing *Virgil*, is by pretending, that in this he accommodated himſelf to the ancient Fables, and to the Ideas of the People, who had a great eſteem for theſe ſorts of Fictions, and thought the Poets uſed them ſparingly when they did not aſcribe things that were palpably contradictory to their Gods. Theſe Reaſons may ſerve to excuſe the ridiculous Tales of old Women, with which they rock their Children aſleep, but not a Poem deſign'd and carried on with a great deal of Art, where we ought to have nothing, but what is probable. It cannot be pretended that the *Wonderful* ſhews better in theſe ſorts of things than in thoſe that may really happen. If we muſt plainly ſpeak the truth, theſe Fictions are not wonderful, but altogether ridiculous. It will be granted me, I ſuppoſe, that if *Virgil* had let them alone, the *Æneis* had loſt none of its Beauties, and ſo he had ſaved us the Pains to excuſe them. To ſpeak impartially, our modern Romances are nothing but ſo many Poems in proſe; but ſhould the Authors of 'em ſtuff 'em with ſuch improbable Fictions, they wou'd ſoon be hiſs'd out of the World, altho' we find they introduce Heroes who lived in the remoteſt Ages. Such, in ſhort, is the famous Romance of *Cyrus*. *Scudery* had never had the

† *Voſſius inſtituti. Poet.* Lib. 1. c. 2.

the ſatisfaction to ſee the Concluſion of that bulky Romance, had he fill'd it with ſuch monſtrous Chimeras: And his Bookſeller finding not vent for the firſt Parts, wou'd ſooner have been ſent to the Gallies, than he wou'd have continued them to the twelfth Volume. For my part all the Difference I can find between the modern Romances and Poems, if we conſider the Matter of them, is no more than there is between the Pieces of two Painters, one of whom imitates Nature, and repreſents nothing but what is to be ſeen, while the other deſigns Animals that were never in Nature, as an Elephant with a Crocodile's Head, or ſome ſuch Monſter as that. Theſe laſt Paintings wou'd rather offend than pleaſe the Sight, and the Beauty of the Colours, wou'd never be able to atone for the extravagance of the Painter. I need not give myſelf the trouble to apply this Compariſon to the Subject in hand.

To come now to the Diſpoſition of a Poem, 'tis certain there is ſomething ſurprizing in it, and which at firſt ſight commands the Reader's attention, becauſe inſtead of taking up the Action at the beginning, the Poet takes it up at the middle, which keeps the Reader in ſuſpence, and makes him eager to know, how the Heroe of the Piece came into thoſe Circumſtances wherein he at firſt finds him. *Virgil* in his *Æneis* has obſerv'd this Conduct much better, than *Homer* has done in his *Ilias*. The latter begins with the Quarrel between *Achilles* and *Agamemnon*, and goes on according to the ſeries of Time without recounting any thing that had paſt before, but only by ſcraps and pieces, to which a Man muſt add a great deal to have a perfect Idea of the Trojan War, till the Death and Funeral of *Hector*, with which he concludes his Poem. 'Tis true indeed, that the *O-*

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dysſee is much better managed, but the *Æneis* is exquiſitely perfect. It begins at the ſeventh Year, and the Heroe of the Poem relates in the ſecond and third Book all that happen'd to him before. Thus the Reader, at his firſt dipping in it, finds himſelf engaged to read what follows, ſo ſoon as he has read the beginning, and that pity which the Misfortunes of the Trojans raiſe in him, and which *Virgil* at firſt ſets forth with ſo much Art, makes him extremely deſirous to know how they ſhall be delivered out of them. Altho' he knows well enough that 'tis a pure Fiction of the Poet, yet the Matter is ſo touching and ſo well diſpoſed, that he forgets that 'tis a Romance, and is not only as much affected by it as if it were a real Truth, but what is more, as if he were mightily intereſſed in it. From that very moment, as I have already obſerv'd, every thing pleaſes, and of Critics or ſevere Readers, we become zealous Admirers of him, after which we are concern'd for the Reputation of the Man whom we have admired. We cannot endure that any one, whoever he be, ſhould find any Defects in him, altho' they are never ſo palpable. This is the Reaſon why *Zoilus*, ſurnam'd the Scourge of *Homer*, made himſelf a thouſand times more deteſted for having had the preſumption to cenſure his Faults, than if he had blaſphem'd all the Gods. His very Memory was held in Horrour and Deteſtation among the Grammarians, the ſworn Partiſans of *Homer*, who fail'd not to poſſeſs their Diſciples with the ſame Hatred of him, that is to ſay, The World; for all that learnt anything paſs'd at firſt under their Hands. Theſe Impreſſions that are made on us in our Childhood are not to be effaced without ſome trouble, ſo that we are not to wonder if the World has been

ſo

ſo long prejudic'd in favour of *Homer*, even ſo far as to copy his very Faults.

Adrian de Valois, who was a very learned Man, † *Valeſiana*, p. 63. has † remark'd, that *Virgil* has committed a great fault in the Deſcription he makes of *Aſcanius*. He cou'd not well be leſs than ſeven Years old when *Troy* was taken, becauſe he was able to march along with his Father, who held him by the hand, when he fled out of that City. *Sequitúrq; patrem non paſſibus æquis*, ſays *Virgil* in the ſecond Book of his *Æneis*. Conſequently then, when *Æneas* was at *Carthage* ſeven Years after, he was at leaſt fourteen Years old. *Dido* ſpeaks thus to *Æneas* towards the end of the firſt Book:

——— *Nam te jam ſeptima portat*
Omnibus errantem terris & fluxibus æſtas.

In effect *Aſcanius* was able at this time to ſit his Horſe, and ride out a Hunting. Nay, this was not all, for no leſs Game wou'd content our young Spark, but a Boar or a Lion thundering down the Mountains. By which it appears that he was not only a good Horſeman, but that he was already Maſter of ſome Force and Courage.

† Æneid. Lib. IV. v. 156.

At puer Aſcanius, mediis in vallibus, acri
Gaudet equo, jámq; hos curſu, jam præterit illos:
Spumantemq; dari pecora inter inertia votis
Optat aprum, aut fulvum deſcendere monte leonem.

† Æneid. Lib. I. v. 722. IV. v. 84. Nevertheleſs in this very † Book, as well as in the firſt, *Dido* dandles him upon her Knees like a Child of ſome four or five Years old. 'Tis viſible that when *Virgil* put that Circumſtance into his Poem he forgot himſelf how old *Aſcanius* ought to have been according to his firſt ſuppoſition.

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However his Narration ſo takes up the Reader's Mind, that he is not ſenſible of this Contradiction, nay, and will not ſee it, when he is told of it.

The third thing that makes us take ſo much pleaſure in reading the Poets is their Stile, wherein two things are to be obſerved: The firſt is the Expreſſion conſidered in itſelf, and the other the cadence or the harmony of their Verſe. Their Expreſſion pleaſes when it is according to the Rules of Art, becauſe it is pure, proper, and ſimple, when it ought to be ſo, and figurative when it ought to be otherwiſe. The Figures above all are frequently employ'd in their Compoſitions, drawn from the moſt elevated and beautiful things, ſo that they fill the Mind with nothing but noble and ſublime Ideas.

Altho' in general Poets are obliged to follow the ſame Rules of Rhetoric as thoſe that write in Proſe, yet they are allow'd to employ much more Decoration, and to heighten all their Deſcriptions with the moſt lively Colours. There is as much difference between the ſame Subject, as it is managed by a Poet, and by an Orator, as there is between an Aſſembly of Men dreſs'd in plain ordinary Cloaths, and the ſame Aſſembly in their richeſt Apparel upon ſome ſolemn Feſtival. The Deſcriptions when finely touch'd, particularly charm the Reader, who fancies he does not read the Deſcriptions of things recounted by the Poet, but that he ſees them with his Eyes, and is preſent at all the Actions. *Homer* is excellent upon this ſcore, which occaſion'd the ſaying, That he ſurpaſs'd the Painters, who only repreſent that which ſtrikes the Eye, whereas he frequently paints the Thoughts, without ſo much as ſpeaking. Therefore we ought not to be ſurprized

if

if the Poets pleaſe us more than the Orators.

The livelineſs of their Colours ſtrikes our Eyes ſo ſtrongly, that we forget with them the Rules of good Senſe, if we are not very much upon our Guard all the while we read them. The irregular Imagination of the Poet expreſſes itſelf in ſo noble and ſublime a manner, that it eaſily overpowers ours, and gives it the ſame Movements, by which itſelf is agitated, and this makes all its Irregularities to diſappear. *For inſtance, *Virgil* in the firſt Book of his † *Æneis*, thus deſcribes the Habitation of the Winds.

* *Verſ.* 25. & *ſeqq.*

——— ——— *Hic vaſto Rex Æolus antro*
Luctantes ventos, tempeſtatéſq; ſonoras
Imperio permit, ac vinclis & carcere frænat.

" Here in a vaſt Cavern King *Æolus* commands
" the Winds that ſtruggle to get out, and the
" roaring Tempeſts which he impriſons. I wou'd not have taken notice how ridiculous it was to make the four Winds to come out of one hole of a Rock in a little Iſland near *Sicily*, becauſe it may be replied, That the Poets are full of the like Blunders, and that we ought not to be ſo ſevere with them, if ſome Interpreters wou'd not bear us down, that all this was an effect of *Virgil*'s great Learning, who knew that the Winds ariſe from ſubterraneous Vapours. For, ſuppoſe it was ſo, (altho' 'tis by no means probable) he ought to have aſſign'd to each Wind its particular Cave, and to have placed the Eaſt-wind at the moſt eaſterly part of *Aſia*, and ſo the reſt; ſince 'tis impoſſible to eſtabliſh the Source of the Winds, if there were one, any-where but towards thoſe places from whence they ſeem to come. For this Reaſon it was that the ancient

Greeks

Greeks placed the Reſidence of *Boreas* in *Thrace*, who came from thence to carry away the Daughter of the King of *Athens*; altho' I cannot comprehend what ſhift he made to get home back again, unleſs we anſwer like the Fellow, who having given the Name of the South-wind to the North-wind, defended himſelf by ſaying, *That in truth it was the South-wind, but that he was then endeavouring to get home again.* But let us ſee what follows:

Illi indignantes magno cum murmure, montis
Circum clauſtra fremunt. Celsâ ſedet Æolus arce,
Sceptra tenens, mollitq; animos & temperat iras.
Ni faciat, maria ac terras, cœlúmq; profundum
Quippe ferant rapidi ſecum, verránt; per auras.

" Angry with being locked up in this manner, " they rage with a great noiſe about the Moun- " tain that confines them: But *Æolus* who ſits " on a high Eminence, with a Scepter in his " Hand, ſoftens and moderates their Indignation. " If he did not do ſo, they wou'd carry away " with them the Sea, the Earth and Heaven like " ſo many Balls thro' the Air. This is what we may properly call, *To throw the Houſe out of the Windows.* Can it be ſuppoſed, with any manner of probability, that the Winds that ariſe from the Earth, and bruſh over its Surface, wou'd blow it the Lord knows whether, if ſome body did not look after them? Beſides, whither wou'd they blow it? What! to the imaginary Spaces, or the *Intermons of* Epicurus? What is this *Heaven* that the Winds wou'd carry through the Air? Some Interpreters ſay, That 'tis the Air itſelf: But what can be more ridiculous than to ſay, That the Wind carries *the Air thro' the Air*; that

is to ſay, that the Air moving from a certain Quarter is carried croſs itſelf? If we are to underſtand the celeſtial Bodies, to wit, the fix'd Stars and Planets, 'tis not only a groſs miſtake in Phiſics, worſe than the idle Dreams of *Epicurus*, but a monſtrous Hyperbole. I know it may be replied, That *Virgil* conſiders the Winds as Perſons, nay, what is more, as Gods; but whatever is feign'd of thoſe ſorts of Gods, whom the Mythologiſts call Phyſical Gods, ought to be founded upon the Nature of the things that are deify'd. Thus take it in what ſenſe you pleaſe, 'tis evident that we cannot excuſe this Paſſage. He ſtill adds,

Sed pater omnipotens, ſpeluncis abdidit atris,
Hoc metuens, molémq; & montes inſuper altos
Impoſuit, regémq; dedit, qui fœdere certo
Et premere & laxas ſciret dare juſtus habenas.

" But the almighty Father *(Jupiter)* fearing this,
" hid them in black Caverns, and over them ſet
" maſſy high Mountains. Beſides this, he gave them
" a King, who by his Order knew how to hold
" in, and let looſe the Reins, according to cer-
" tain Laws. As if two or three ſmall Mountains were able to keep in thoſe Deities, that with the Breath of their Mouth cou'd blow *Heaven* and *Earth* whither they pleaſed, and as if a thing ſo changeable as the Winds, ſo far as we know any thing of this Nature, cou'd be ſubjected to Laws. However theſe magnificent Expreſſions that *Virgil* uſes in this place, hood-wink the Reader to that degree, that he does not perceive the abſurdity of this Fiction. There are ſeveral more in *Homer*, which I will not examine, having no intention to make a compleat Critic upon

upon theſe two celebrated Poets, or indeed any other.

I know that what they call *Probable* and *Wonderful* in Poetry, ſignifies another thing than what we commonly call by that Name. We look upon it in *Homer* and *Heſiod* as *Wonderful*, but not exceeding the Bounds of poetical *Probability*, that there are more † Sculptures upon one Buckler, in *baſſo relievo*, than can be imagined to be crouded in a Space a hundred times as big; that theſe Sculptures move and ſpeak as if they were ſo many living Perſons; nay, that ſome of them hang in the Air and fly about the Bucklers like Flies, yet don't ſtir from it. To excuſe the Ridiculouſneſs of theſe Fictions, 'tis pretended, that theſe Bucklers were wrought by a God; but, who ever ſaw the Gods work Miracles in this nature? All this had paſs'd for abſurd idle ſtuff, had it been written in Proſe, but we admire it in Verſe for the beauty of the Expreſſion, juſt as we admire Groteſque Figures upon Marble for the fineneſs of the Sculpture. This ſet *Virgil* upon imitating theſe Poets in his deſcription of *Æneas*'s Shield, which is to be found in the eighth Book of the *Æneis*, tho' it is not altogether ſo extravagant. *Theocritus* has attempted the ſame thing upon a wretched wooden Cup, in his firſt *Idyllium*, where he likewiſe repreſents things, which Sculpture cannot expreſs.

† *Hom. Iliad.* Lib. XVIII. *Heſiod. in Clypeo Herculis.*

But that we may be the better able to conceive the Ridiculouſneſs of this poetical Probability, let us hear what *Ariſtotle* ſays of it in his Art of Poetry, altho' he pretends to defend the Poets, and to give them Rules. † *We ought*, ſays he, *to uſe the* Wonderful *in Tragedy, but much more in an Epic Poem, which, in this reſpect, goes as far as the* Unreaſonable: *For as in an Epic Poem we don't*

† Chap. XXV. *We follow the Verſion of* M. Dacier.

don't see the Persons that Act, all that exceeds the bounds of Reason, is very proper to produce the Wonderful in it. For Example, what Homer *tells us of* Hector's *being pursued by* Achilles, *won'd be ridiculous upon the Theatre, for no one cou'd forbear laughing to behold the Greeks on one side, without making any motion, and* Achilles *on the other, who pursues* Hector, *and gives the Sign to his Troops: But this is not seen in an Epic Poem. Now the Wonderful is always agreeable, and for a proof of this, we find that those that relate a Story, commonly add to the Truth, that they may better please the Hearers.* This is well enough, when we don't carry Matters farther than they'll bear; but when we go to the *Unreasonable*, we make ourselves ridiculous to those that love to use their Reason in every thing, that is, to all wise Persons. *A Poet*, says he a little lower, *ought rather to choose things Impossible, provided they have the air of Probability, than the Possible, that are incredible, with all their Possibility.* I own that all that is *Possible* is not credible; but whatever is *Impossible*, in my Opinion, is much less so. 'Tis to no purpose to say, That what is impossible to Men, is not so to the Gods; and so that when the Gods intervene, those things that are impossible to Men, become probable. A Man that has not debauch'd his Taste by a blind admiration of Antiquity, cannot digest this foolish profusion of Miracles for the sake of Trifles, of which *Homer* is so full. None but the † *Phæacians*, whom *Ulysses* banter'd as he pleas'd, without fearing to be ca'll'd a Liar for his pains, cou'd divert themselves with reading these ridiculous Miracles, were they not told with all the agreeableness imaginable, I mean as to the Expression.

† *Inhabitants, of the Isle of* Scheria, *in the Ionic Sea.*

Another thing which contributes very much to surprize our Reason in reading the Poets, is the

plea-

pleasant Cadence of their Verse, which flatters our Ears after the same manner as Music does. When an Air pleases us, we never consider the Words, as we find it by experience at an *Opera*, which we are not able to read with any tolerable patience; but when 'tis represented on the Theatre, we hear it with admiration. As Music charms our Ears, by striking them differently at several certain measur'd times; by never passing all on the sudden from one extreme Tone to another, which is quite opposite to it, by carrying no Tone too high for fear of shocking our Ears, but by employing Tones that are proportion'd to our Organs; and lastly, by making us hear the same Cadences, in the same Order, more than once: After the same manner the Poets, by using Syllables of a certain quantity (I speak of the *Latines* and *Greeks*) in certain places; by choosing Words of an agreeable Sound; by breaking their Course, which wou'd otherwise seem harsh, with *Cæsuras*; and by making us feel this Harmony some time after, fill our Ears so deliciously, that they obtain our Favour for a world of false Thoughts.

To be convinced of the truth of this Assertion, a Man need only set the finest Passages of the Poets in the natural order of Construction, and he will find nothing in them to please him. Altho' we may there discover *Disjecti membra Poetæ*, to use *Horace*'s Expression, 'tis all of it nothing but a cold heap of great Words. Let us take, for Instance, the beginning of *Simon*'s Speech in the second Book of the *Æneis*, which is assuredly the most artificial Speech that can be made, and Charms every one that reads it. *Equidem, Rex, fatebor tibi cuncta, quæcunq; fuerint vera, neque negabo me de gente Argolicâ. Hoc primum; nec si improba fortuna finxit Sinonem miserum, finget etiam vanum,*

mendacémque. Here indeed is a Latin Diſcourſe, however it does not come up to the Majeſty of Verſe. I will not give any more Inſtances of this Nature, becauſe every Man may try this Experiment, in any place hé thinks fit to ſingle out. 'Tis likewiſe eaſie to tranſpoſe after the ſame manner the deſcription of *Æolus*'s Den, and the Reader will ſoon perceive that the Cadence of the Verſe ſerves very much to help it off.

The Inconveniences of Poetry. HOWEVER there's one thing to be obſerv'd in relation to Verſe, which is, That if the Poets have ſome Advantage over thoſe that write in Proſe, by reaſon of their Cadence, there are ſeveral Inconveniences which they cannot always avoid. For Inſtance, They cannot ſay all they have a mind to ſay, neither do they ſay it in that manner as they cou'd wiſh; they are forc'd to convert the Order of the Words, tho' never ſo much againſt their Inclination; they frequently ſay that which they wou'd not ſay, and clog their Diſcourſe with ſuperfluous Epithets, and ſometimes forced ones, to fill up the Meaſure of their Verſe. There are abundance of noble ſignificant Words, that cannot ſtand in ſome ſorts of Poetry, eſpecially the Heroic, ſo that they are often forced to lay aſide good Thoughts that come into their Head, becauſe Words that are neceſſary to expreſs them fully, cannot come into the Verſe. If the Poet is not reſolved to part with his Thought, he muſt employ other Words that are not proper, and often invert them ſtrangely to make up his Meaſure. 'Tis true indeed, that in this reſpect we are apt to do the Poets Juſtice enough, in favour of their Cadence, ſince we have been ſo complaiſant as to beſtow the Name of Figures upon real Faults of Diſcourſe, according

to

to the Observation of *Quintilian* : † *Poetis quia plerumq; metro servire coguntur, adeò ignoscitur, ut vitia ipsa aliis in carmine appellationibus nominantur. Metaplasmos enim & Schematismos, & Schemata vocamus, & laudem virtutis necessitati damus.* " We " are so favourable to the Poets, because they are " confin'd to measure, that even Vices in Verse, " go under other Names. We call them Metaplasms and Figures, and praise that as a Beauty, which was the meer effect of Necessity. † Lib. I. c. 8.

But there is nothing so inconvenient, as when being at a loss how to fill up a Verse which is well begun, they are obliged to end it ill. Nothing is more common in *Homer* and *Hesiod* than these Botches of a word or more to stop up the Gap. Nay, we find whole Verses and Expressions, that return every moment upon us, rather to serve for *Passevolans*, if I may be allow'd so to speak, and to make up the number, than for any real Necessity. What they might very well express in one word or two, they frequently employ a whole Verse to do it in, and sometimes more; and all this to no other purpose than to make the Discourse more insipid and tiresome. Had I written this Book in Latin, I wou'd have cited Examples enough to justifie this Assertion, in the mean time I appeal for the truth of it to all those that have read these Poets, with a Mind disengaged from the Prejudices of the Grammarians.

'Tis very probable that the Reason why *Virgil*, who has avoided these Faults more carefully than the above-mention'd *Greek* Poets, left some imperfect Verses in his *Æneis*, was only because he cou'd not at first fill them up without making some Botches, or at least some useless Repetitions. There are some Passages in his Life relating to this Affair, which deserve our Observati-

on. However he cou'd not avoid, and that very often, to uſe ſeveral Words and Expreſſions, that only ſerve to fill up the Meaſure. Thus in the firſt Book of his *Æneis*, having aſſign'd a little before the Reaſons why *Juno* was ſo implacable an Adverſary to *Æneas*, he repeats it again about the fortieth Verſe, *Æternum ſervans ſub pectore vulnus.* " Carrying an eternal Wound in " her Soul. Take away theſe words, and you maim the Verſe indeed, but not the Senſe. A little lower *Juno* promiſes *Deiopeia* for a Wife to *Æolus* in theſe Words:

Connubio jungam ſtabili, propriámque dicabo,
Omnes ut tecum, meritis pro talibus, annos
Exigat & pulchrâ faciat te prole parentem.

" I will give her you in Marriage for ever, that " ſhe may paſs her Days with you, and make " you the Father of fine Children. There's nothing more belongs to the Senſe than theſe Words, *Connubio jungam, qua pulcrâ faciat te prole parentem.* " I will give her you in Marriage, that ſhe may " bring you fine Children, whatever the Interpreters have ſaid upon this place. *Jupiter* as he is telling *Venus* what the Fortune wou'd be of *Æneas*'s Poſterity, to let her know that *Aſcanius* wou'd Reign thirty Years, thus expreſſes himſelf, *v.* 271.

At puer Aſcanius, cui nunc cognomen Iulo
Additur, (Ilus erat dum res ſtetit Ilia Regno)
Triginta magnos volvendis menſibus orbes
Imperio explebit.

" But young *Aſcanius*, who is at preſent Sir-
" nam'd *Iulus* (he was call'd *Ilus* while the King-
" dom

" dom of *Ilion* lasted) will Reign thirty long " Years. Now nothing is essential in this Passage, but the three first Words of the first Verse, and the third Verse, *At puer triginta*, &c. Whether we put the other words in *Jupiter*'s Mouth, or the Poets, who speaks by the Parenthesis, 'tis a Botch which the necessity of the Metre extorted from *Virgil*. What is the worst on't is this, That injudicious Poets who have taken these Faults for Beauties, have often drain'd themselves to repeat the same thing in different Words, as if the Readers were to esteem their Verses not by their intrinsic Worth, but by their Number. *Ovid* and *Lucan* have been very justly charged with this Fault, altho' the latter wanted not the poetical Enthusiasm, and the former had the most easie Versification in the World.

Personal Defects of Poets.

IN the † *Scaligerana* we meet with this Judgment of *Scaliger*, *No Man ever was a Poet, or loved to read the Poets, but his Heart was seated in the right place.* He expresses it much more warmly in * *Latin.* I suppose that by having *his Heart seated in the right place*, he means, having a good Opinion of himself, for indeed there are few Poets who have not a leaning that way. Poetical Enthusiasm makes these Gentlemen believe that they are above the ordinary Race of Mankind, because they speak a Language peculiar to themselves, and when this Fury seizes them, there are certain Traces in their Countenance, which sufficiently declare that,

† *p.* 318. Edit. Col.

* Tho' our Author has not cited it, yet I thought it wou'd not be a miss to set it down, *Nunquam Poesis, aut poetarum amor in abjectum & humilem animam cadit, & omnium maxime divina sequitur ingenia, eorumq; perpetuus fere comes*, Ibid.

† *Aut insanit homo, aut versus facit* —— † *Hor.* L. II. Sat. vii. v. 117.

" This

" This Man is either a Fool or a Poet. Their ſlow walking, their diſcompoſed Air ſeems to come from this; for being accuſtom'd to make Verſes, and bite their Nails as they walk, they wou'd perſwade us that they are thinking on ſomething when they thinking on juſt nothing. To return to *Scaliger*, if he believed that Poets or Lovers of Poetry were uncapable of ſtooping to mean things, 'tis certain he cou'd never reckon thoſe for Poets or Lovers of Poetry, who have written ſo many Verſes in Praiſe of the *Roman* Emperors and their Favorites, whoſe Vices they have commended as well as their Virtues: that is to ſay, *Virgil*, *Horace*, *Ovid*, *Statius*, *Martial*, and the reſt whom I need not mention, after I have mention'd theſe five; the three firſt of which exceſſively flatter'd *Auguſtus*, and thoſe that were near his Perſon, and the other two the infamous *Domitian*. What meaneſſes in particular did not *Ovid* ſtoop to, to get himſelf recall'd from Baniſhment? Did not *Virgil* and *Horace* place *Auguſtus*, when living, among the number of the Gods? Thus we cannot excuſe this Judgment of *Scaliger*, who was no Poet, tho' he writ Verſes ſometimes, but by Virtue of the poetical Priviledge of Lying, when there was an occaſion for it.

An Examination of what Horace *ſays in Favour of Poets.*

HORACE in the firſt Epiſtle of his ſecond Book, which is addreſs'd to *Auguſtus* makes a ſort of an Apology for the Poets, upon which 'tis no hard matter to confute him:

Hic error tamen, & levis hæc inſania quantas
Virtutes habeat ſic collige; vatis avarus
Non temerè eſt animus; verſus amat, hoc ſtudet unum.

" Learn,

" Learn, ſays he, the Virtues that accompany " this Fault and this ſlight Folly. 'Tis rare that " a Poet has a covetous Soul, he loves nothing but " Verſes: this is his only Paſſion. But this Paſſion for making Verſes ſometimes agrees well enough with that of getting Mony, and there are few People that think they ought to be better conſider'd for the Pains they take than the Poets. *Horace*, to do him Juſtice, was not Covetous, as far as we can jugde of him by his Writings; but one of the *Grecian* Poets, whom he eſteem'd above the reſt, I mean the inimitable *Pindar*, was as greedy a Wretch as a Man well cou'd be. His Odes were purely written to get the Pence, and we find him all along making a Panegyric upon Riches, which ſhow'd plainly enough that he expected a Preſent for his Pains. What can be more ſcandalous than the Compliment he makes to *Xenocrates* of *Agrigentum*, in the ſecond of his *Iſthmians*. *The Muſe*, ſays he, *was not then a Friend to Gain, nor Mercenary, and it was not the faſhion to ſell the ſweet and agreeable Songs of* Terpſichore, *that have their Forehead ſilver'd; but at preſent ſhe gives leave to follow the Advice of an* Argian, *which is not repugnant to the Truth. Riches, Riches make a Man*, cry'd he, *being himſelf deſtitute of Mony and Friends: You are Wiſe, and I don't ſing to an Ignorant.* This was enough to make a Man that knew his Right Hand from his Left to comprehend, that the Poet wanted to be greas'd in the Hand. If * *Chapelain* had been comparable in any

* This is he who writ *La Pucelle*, a *French* Heroic Poem, in the compoſing of which he took up near twenty Years, which occaſion'd the following Epigram upon him:

Illa Capellani dudum expectata Puella,
Poſt longa, in lucem tempora, venit anus.

The Reaſon why he was ſo long about it, was becauſe he had a Penſion of Two Thouſand Franks a Year from the Duke of *Longueville*, which he thought wou'd be ſtopt after the publiſhing of his Poem. *See the* Menag. *Vol.* 1. *p.* 38.

any reſpect to *Pindar*, there had been another Poet too, who muſt have been turn'd out of *Horace*'s number. But *Pindar* alone is ſufficient to prove him miſtaken, and I leave to ſuch as have more leiſure than myſelf to compile a Catalogue of covetous Poets. I will only obſerve that *Horace* contradicts himſelf afterwards, where he thus rallies a Comic *Latin* Poet. *v.* 173,

Quantus ſit Doſſennus edacibus in Paraſitis,
Quàm non aſtricto percurrat pulpita ſocco,
Geſtit enim in loculos nummum demittere, poſt hac
Securus cadat, an recto ſtet fabula talo.

" How many Verſes does *Doſſennus* employ to
" deſcribe gluttonous Paraſites? How much li-
" berty does he allow himſelf in regard of the
" Meaſure? His whole Ambition is to get Mony
" in his Pocket for his Plays, and he does not
" trouble himſelf at all whether they ſucceed af-
" terwards, or not. We might join *Simonides* to *Pindar* and *Doſſennus*; and thoſe who have a mind to be more particularly inform'd of his Begging and his Avarice, need only to conſult *Phædrus*, *Lib.* IV. *Fab.* xxiv. What follows afterwards in *Horace* is full as true as what went before:

Detrimenta, fugas ſervorum, incendia ridet,
Non fraudem ſocio, puróve incogitat ullam
Pupillo; vivit ſiliquis, & pane ſecundo.

" He laughs at Loſſes, the running away of his
" Slaves, and the burning of his Houſes. He
" neither deceives his Friend, nor his Pupil; he
" lives upon Pulſe and Brown-bread. If this were true, the Poets wou'd be more diſengaged from the Vanities of this wicked World, than even the Monks

Monks themſelves, and ſuch of our Friends as we deſired to free from the Temptations of this Life, we ſhou'd not adviſe to retire into a Religious Houſe, but poſſeſs them with the Love of Poetry: By that means they wou'd be healed of all thoſe Deſires with which the reſt of Mankind are ſo violently agitated. But a Poet as Covetous as *Pindar*, or ſeveral others, wou'd be the laſt Man that I ſhould repoſe any Confidence in. I own that a frugal ſober Poet may be able to live upon Pulſe and Brown-bread, altho' he has wherewith to live better if he pleaſes; but then he does not do this by Virtue of his Poetry. *Horace* himſelf never obſerv'd Sobrietry, but according to the Maxims of *Epicurus*, that is to ſay, When he found good Cheer was incompatible with his Health, and ſo forth. If he delivers any Precepts for Temperance in his Works, there are other places where he piouſly exhorts us to drink and make much of ourſelves. There is no neceſſity to point at theſe places in order to refute him, for our Youth knows them but too well. In a word, 'Tis downright Raillery to pretend to exempt the Poets from Vices, to which they are ſubject as well as other Men. On the other hand, I think we ought not to accuſe them in particular, as if Poetry inſpired them with ill Inclinations. They are in this reſpect neither better nor worſe than the reſt of the World: But to return to *Horace*, who continues to ſpeak of them in this manner:

Militiæ quamquam piger & malus, utilis urbi.

" Altho' a bad Soldier and lazy, yet he forbears " not to be Serviceable to the State. *Horace* deſign'd without queſtion to be underſtood here of

the Poets of his own time; for he knew well enough that *Tyrtæus*, *Alcæus*, and other Poets of Antiquity had perform'd Miracles in the Field. For his own part, he fairly betook himſelf to his Heels at the Battel of *Philippi*, † *Relictâ non bene parmulâ*, leaving his Shield behind him. But let's now ſee wherein a Poet may be uſeful to the State in time of Peace:

† Ovid. VII. *L.* 2.

Si das hoc, parvis quoq; rebus magna juvari,
Os tenerum pueri balbumq; Poeta figurat.
Torquet ab obſcœnis jam nunc ſermonibus aurem,
Mox etiam pectus præceptis format amicis,
Aſperitatis, & invidiæ corrector, & iræ.
Rectè facta refert, orientia tempora notis
Inſtruit exemplis, inopem ſolatur & ægrum.

" If you will grant me that ſmall things may " be ſerviceable to great Ones; 'tis the Poet " that forms words for Children who know not " yet how to ſpeak. He turns aſide their Ears " even from obſcene Diſcourſes, and afterwards " inſtructs them in wholeſome Precepts. He cor- " rects rough Behaviour, Envy and Anger: He " relates noble Actions, and furniſhes Youth with " famous Examples: He comforts the Poor and Sorrowful. In the ſecond Verſe *Horace* alludes to the Cuſtom they had of making Children learn the Poets, almoſt as ſoon as they were able to talk; this help'd to give them ſo great a Veneration for them, that they never left it afterwards, ſo that the moſt abſurd things did not ſhock them in a more advanc'd Age. For Inſtance, They made their Childen learn *Homer*, he that ſpeaks of the Gods not only as bare Men, but even as vitious Men; after which they were diſpos'd to receive all ſorts of Abſurdities in matters of Religion,

ligion, and accordingly they did ſo. What care the Ancients took to teach their Children *Homer* may be ſeen in the beginning of *the Allegories of Heraclides Ponticus*. The Philoſophers complain'd, both before and after the time of *Horace* of this ill effect of Fables; witneſs *Plato* in his Books of the *Common-wealth*, and *Plutarch* in his Treatiſe, *After what manner young Men ought to read the Poets*.

'Tis to no purpoſe to ſay, That we find good Examples in him; for to humble that Excuſe, we likewiſe find ſome of the worſt that can be. *Homer* frequently extols Virtue, but then he repreſents very wicked Men as Favorites of Heaven. *Achilles*, for Inſtance, is protected by the Gods in a moſt extraordinary manner, becauſe he is the Son of *Thetis*, altho' he was hot and ungovernable, and more like to a wild Beaſt, than a Man. He never deſcribes the Gods as lovers of Virtue or haters of Vice, as he ought to have done, but on the contrary divided among themſelves upon the different Intereſts of Men below, and that by Paſſion merely, without any regard to good Manners, or the Juſtice of the Cauſe. As many of them eſpouſed the *Trojan*, as the *Grecian* Party, altho' the Quarrel of the firſt is really not to be defended. The ſucceeding Poets, who were blind Admirers of *Homer*, took no more care than he did to give us good Examples, as it might eaſily be made appear if it were neceſſary. We are only obliged to them for a Moral Sentence now and then interſpers'd in their Writings, for which they are beholding to the Philoſophers.

As for what *Horace* lays down, That the Poets turn aſide Youth from obſcene Diſcourſes, it wou'd be no hard matter to produce abundance of places in *Homer* and *Heſiod*, that are good for no-

nothing but to give us very villainous Ideas, and to Debauch the Minds of young People, if in producing them, I ſhould not commit the ſame Fault as they did. Let a Man not only take *Ovid* and *Catullus* into his Hands, and an infinite number of other good Poets, but even *Horace* himſelf, without caſtrating them, and then ſee what a heap of filthy Stuff he may find in them. But the Morals of the virtuous *Horace*, were not over-rigid, no more than thoſe of his Maſter *Epicurus*, and he ſucceeded infinitely better with him to preach upon the Juice of the Grape, than to meddle with a continued Body of *Ethics*.

His Satyrs are none of the fitteſt things in the World to reform Rudeneſs, Envy and Anger, no more than thoſe Satyrs of the other Poets that are ſtill remaining. They are all ſtuff'd with Paſſages that proceed from theſe; altho' there are here ſome Moral Precepts interwoven, but without connexion, and without Principles. Their Diſcourſes reſemble that of a certain Parſon who wiſhed himſelf at the Devil, yet ſwore very heartily, that if he heard any of his Pariſhioners Swear, or talk of the Devil, he wou'd excommunicate them. *Horace* himſelf ſhews us the intolerable Abuſe of the ancient Poetry in theſe remarkable words, where he ſpeaks of the ancient *Greek* Comedy:

——— *Sævus apertam*
In rabiem verti cœpit jocus, & per honeſtas
Ire minax impune domos. Doluere cruento
Dente laceſſiti; ſuit intactis quoq; cura
Conditione ſuper communi. Quin etiam lex
Pœnáq; lata, malo quæ nollet carmine quemquam
Deſcribi; vertêre modum, formidine fuſtis
Ad benedicendum, delectandúmq; coacti,

" This

" This cruel Raillery in time turn'd to down-
" right Rage, and ſawcily expoſed the moſt vir-
" tuous Families. Thoſe that ſuffer'd by their
" ſtabbing Satyrs, were not a little concern'd,
" nay, even ſuch as were not touch'd, took the
" Alarm by reaſon of the common danger. At
" laſt certain Laws were enacted, with Penalties
" affix'd to them, to hinder them from writing
" ſcurrilous Lampoons againſt any Man whate-
" ver. The Poets, for fear of a Cudgel, left off
" this way of Writing, and were forced to
" divert and ſpeak well of their Auditors. *Ariſtophanes* is ſtill extant, who was one of the principal Ornaments of this old Comedy, full of Gall and Calumny, and in *Horace*'s time abundance more were remaining upon whom he ſet a great Value, as appears by divers places in his Works. Now what cou'd a Man learn from Poets full of Scandal and Ribbaldry, ſuch as *Ariſtophanes* was, if he Read them with admiration, unleſs it were to Bite without pity and diſcretion, and talk after the moſt inſufferable rate that can be imagined? Thus the reading of theſe Poets cou'd not but be highly prejudicial, notwithſtanding *Horace* had ſo good an Opinion of them. Altho' we don't introduce People by their Names in Comedies, as the ancient *Greeks* did, yet for all that we have not left off writing ſcandalous Satyrs, where we frequently name them, or elſe deſcribe them ſo plainly, that all the World knows who it is we mean. Epigrams likewiſe, that were always in vogue, are for the generality pieces that Bite to ſome purpoſe. Thoſe that have read *Catullus*, *Horace*, *Perſius*, *Juvenal* and *Martial*, know very well that what I here advance is literally true. After this we muſt needs own that *Horace* makes merry with us, when he pretends to affirm

that the Poets are very ſerviceable to reform the Manners of young Men, and cure them of Anger, Envy, and a rude Behaviour.

But it will be objected, that theſe very Poets, whom I have mention'd, have a thouſand moral Sayings in their Writings, and are uſeful, for inſtance, to comfort Men in adverſity or any ill Circumſtances, as *Horace* ſays: I own all this, but then you muſt grant me at the ſame time, that there are a thouſand other Paſſages in their Writings, that in all probability will produce the quite contrary Effect. They frequently deſcribe Riches, Honours, and Pleaſure in ſo lively and charming a manner; and on the contrary, they paint Poverty and the ſad Conſequences of it, as ſomething ſo diſmal and inſupportable, that after a Man has read them, 'tis a hard matter for him not to be ſtrangely caſt down. Let a Man read what *Theognis* has ſaid of Poverty, and the care we ought to take to avoid it, and he will own with me that the greateſt Miſer in the World cannot ſay more. Yet he is a ſententious Poet, and we put him into the Hands of Boys for the ſake of his moral Sayings. Let a Man read in *Horace* and ſeveral other Poets, what they ſay of the pleaſure a Man finds to be conſider'd in the World, to arrive at Honour and acquire Glory, and he'll be ſatisfied that the Deſcriptions they make of Virtue, which is to be eſteem'd, altho' it is deſpiſed, are extremely forc'd in Compariſon of the Praiſes they beſtow upon Honour and Reputation. The reaſon of this difference is, that the latter Commendations pour down in a ſtream, whereas the former only come by fits and ſtarts, when they deſign'd to imitate the Philoſophers. I need not ſay any thing of Pleaſures to thoſe that have read *Horace*, who know well enough that he ſpeaks of

of them in ſo inſinuating a ſtrain, that his Eloquence upon this Head is wholly contagious. If we therefore find in the Poets ſome Paſſages that are Good, which I don't deny, we likewiſe find in them abundance that are vicious, ſo that we often find them arguing *pro* and *con*, without giving us any certain ſteddy Rules to diſcern Bad from Good. This is viſible from *Stobæus*'s Collection, wherein we may find upon ſeveral moral Subjects, Arguments on both ſides, drawn out of the Poets.

But to return to *Horace*, he goes on with this Panegyric upon thoſe of his own Profeſſion in theſe Terms:

Caſtis cum pueris ignara puella mariti
Diſceret unde preces, vatem niſi Muſa dediſſet?
Poſcit opem Chorus, & præſentia numina ſentit.
Cœleſtes implorat aquas, doctâ prece, blandus,
Avertit morbos, metuenda pericula pellit,
Impetrat & pacem, & locupletem frugibus annum.
Carmine Dii ſuperi placantur, Carmine Manes.

" Young Boys and Maids that never knew what
" Marriage was, how ſhould they learn their
" Prayers, if the Muſe had not given them Poets.
" The Chorus implores the aſſiſtance of the Gods
" and finds their favour. They ſupplicate for
" Rain, they avert Sickneſſes and Dangers that
" are to be fear'd, they obtain Peace and fertile
" Years. Verſe equally appeaſes the heavenly and
" infernal Deities.

I will not ſay that all this is pure Banter out of *Horace*'s Mouth, who did not believe that the Gods concern'd themſelves in the governing of the World, no more than *Epicurus*; ſince to demand the aſſiſtance of the Gods, and to addreſs

one's ſelf to a fortuitous concourſe of Atoms, according to, him is one and the ſame thing. I will only obſerve that in this place he alludes to the Prayer which the young Boys and Girls ſung for three Days and Nights at the *Secular* Games. But what can be more ridiculous than to affirm, that we ſhould not have known how to Pray, if there had been no Poets in the World? Were they then afraid to Pray in Proſe, or did they believe that the Divinity wou'd be ſooner affected by a pompous Diſcourſe in Metre than by a ſimple Prayer in Proſe? Did they think that the Gods were better pleaſed to hear their Praiſes in Muſic, than an Elogium recited without ſinging? Tho' this be abſurd in the higheſt Degree, 'tis nevertheleſs very certain, that the Poets endeavour'd to make the World believe it, in order to make their Art more valued. They have feign'd Miracles, and made Souls come back from Purgatory (for by the by the Pagans had their Purgatory as well as the Chriſtians,) to propagate this Belief, that the Deity took greater Pleaſure to be praiſed in Verſe than Proſe. † They have told us that *Simonides* having agreed for a certain Price with a Champion to compoſe an Ode upon his Victory, finding this Champion was too obſcure a Fellow to furniſh a Poet with Materials enough to make an Ode, he took up two thirds of it with the Praiſes of *Caſtor* and *Pollux*; upon which the Champion wou'd give him no more than a third part of what he had bargain'd with him for; but had the civility however to invite him to Dinner. *Simonides*, who no doubt on't lov'd good Cheer, when it coſt him nothing, did not fail to come to the Entertainment, altho' the Champion had broke hisword with him. As they were merry at the Table, and *Simonides* laid heartily about him, to revenge himſelf for the

† *See* Phædrus IV. *Fab.* 24.

the ſcurvy Trick the other had plaid him, two young Men cover'd with Duſt, and all over in a Sweat, as if they had rode Poſt, ſent to ſpeak with *Simonides* immediately, who was no ſooner inform'd of it, and had ſcarce got out of the Room, when all on the ſudden (Oh prodigious Miracle) the Roof of the Houſe fell upon the reſt of the Gueſts, and buried them in the Ruines: and the two Men who had ſent to ſpeak with *Simonides* were no where to be ſeen. All the World, ſays the Hiſtory, when they came to hear of this Accident, were firmly perſwaded that *Caſtor* and *Pollux* came on purpoſe to ſave our Poet's Life, for having prais'd them in his Ode. Thoſe that believed this Legend, to be ſure paid *Simonides* well, when they employ'd him. By this means he fill'd his ſtrong Cheſt, which he carried about him to put his Mony in; for he had, as he himſelf ſaid, two Cheſts, where he depoſited the Rewards that were given him, one of which was always very light, and the other pretty heavy. In the former he put the Compliments that were made him, and in the other his Mony.

What is reported of *Pindar* was no leſs ingeniouſly contrived to ſhow what eſteem the Gods had for the Incenſe of the Poets. † A little before his Death he dreamt, that the Goddeſs *Proſerpina* reproached him with having compoſed Hymns upon all the Deities except herſelf, but that ſhe expected that he wou'd write one in her Praiſe, ſo ſoon as he came to her Dominions. Soon after he was dead, he appear'd in a Dream, as the Tradition goes, to an old Kinſwoman of his at *Thebes*, and ſung to her a Song in honour of this Goddeſs, which our ancient Gentlewoman remembred ſo well, that ſhe wrote it down, as ſoon as ſhe awaked, in the very words ſhe heard it.

† Pauſan. Bœoticor. p. 515.

The Prieſteſs of *Delphos*, as the ſame Author informs us, did a conſiderable Service by *Apollo*'s Order to a Poet of ſo covetous a Soul as *Pindar* was, for ſhe commanded thoſe of *Delphos* to give him a ſhare of all the firſt Fruits, which they offer'd to *Apollo*. After this manner did the Poets and their Friends endeavour to perſwade the World, that the Gods eſteem'd their Language much more than that of other Men, and conſequently that they obtain'd of them whatever they had occaſion for, more eaſily than any other People.

This is the Doctrin that *Horace* in the abovemention'd Verſes preaches to *Auguſtus* and his Readers, as earneſtly as he was able. The credulous People actually believed it, but what wou'd not thoſe People ſwallow down, who imagined that they appeaſed the Indignation of the Gods by dancing about their Altars? A great part of the Pagan World, as a witty Man has remarked, were ſtrongly perſwaded that they paid their Gods in good Mony, when they paid them *in Dances and Songs*. As theſe two things are nearly related one to another, there is no queſtion but the Poets did all that in them lay to entertain the People in theſe Imaginations. Thus we find in the *Grecian* and *Roman* Hiſtory, that whenever they thought their Gods were angry with them, they conſecrated certain Sports and Games to them, in which Dramatical Repreſentations, Dances and Songs made a great part.

Why the Roman Law grants no Immunity to Poets.

HOWEVER it ſeems the Poets were never able to gain the *Roman* Lawyers over to their ſide. At leaſt the Emperour *Juſtinian* has inſerted into the Code a Law of *Philip*, which is not much for their Reputation or Favour. In the

fifty

fifty ſecond Title *Lib.* 10. where we find a Collection of Laws made by diverſe Emperours in favour of Grammarians, Rhetors, Lawyers and Phyſicians, in which Immunities, Privileges, and public Stipends are granted to thoſe that taught theſe Sciences or exerciſed them by public Authority; we ſee this Law of the Emperour *Philip.* *Poetæ nullâ Immunitatis Prærogativâ juvantur: The Poets enjoy not the Privilege of any Immunity.* We cannot accuſe *Philip*, as if he were the only Perſon that had not been favourable to the Poets, for if any Ordinance had ever paſſed in their Favour, *Trebonian* had not fail'd to inſert it into the Code. 'Tis probable that after *Philip*'s time, ſome Poets who had a good Opinion of themſelves, wou'd have had their ſhare in the Immunities, which the Profeſſors of other Sciences enjoy'd, and that Complaint of this being made to the Emperour, he explain'd in this manner the Laws in favour of thoſe that taught the Sciences publickly. The Interpreters of the Code have taken a world of pains to find out the Reaſon of this Law, as I have obſerv'd in thoſe whom I have conſulted, but have miſs'd it in my Opinion. However ſeveral good Reaſons may be aſſigned: The firſt is, That the public Maſters of other Sciences are ſerviceable to the State, by inſtructing the Youth in uſeful Knowledg; but a Poet whoſe chief Buſineſs it is to ſpend his time in compoſing Romances in Verſe, (for Epic Poems are the ſublimeſt Productions of Poetry) what ſuch mighty ſervice does he do the State, as to deſerve a public Recompenſe? No *Roman* Emperour ever believed it, and for that Reaſon they wou'd not grant the Poets any Immunities. In the ſecond place, If there was any Advantage in having a ſet number of Poets in the Republic, the Grammarians ought

to be thanked for it, who without being Poets themſelves, taught all that was to be taught of the art of Poetry; witneſs thoſe who have written the beſt about it, yet were no Poets. In ſhort, had any Immunities been granted to the Poets, all the Subjects of the *Roman* Empire had buſied themſelves in making of Verſes, and had pretended to paſs for Poets, only to be excuſed from other Duties of the State. Then you wou'd have ſeen,

Corvos Poëtas, & Poëtridas picas.

" Crows turn Poets, and Pies Poeteſſes. Don't tell me that they might have erected Tribunals to diſtinguiſh between good and bad Poets. What a prodigious number of ſuch Courts muſt have been erected to read and examine all the Pieces that wou'd have been brought before them, which cou'd not have been done without a vaſt Expence to the Public. Beſides that ſeveral notorious Abuſes wou'd have of neceſſity crept in, which I need not recount at large. I will only ſay, That every Fellow who thought he was able to equal *Cherilus* (a dull heavy Raſcal in *Alexander*'s time, who made him an odd ſort of a Preſent for ſome Verſes he had written in his Praiſe) wou'd have put in his Claim to theſe Privileges, it being highly reaſonable, that a Man who wou'd have been judged to be a good Poet by *Alexander*, the Diſciple of *Ariſtotle*, and Admirer of *Homer*, ſhould be recknon'd in this number. The Emperours would have been perſecuted every hour of the Day by Poets of all ſorts and ſizes, bringing their Verſes to them, and complaining of the great Injury that had been done them, to deny them this honourable Name. It cannot be replied to this, that every one is not capable of making Verſes,

for

for when ſuch Feats are to be done, but eſpecially in one's Mother-Tongue, a Million of Blockheads think themſelves able to do it, and this ridiculous Imagination wou'd ſoon over-ſpread all the World out of hopes of Gain,

† *Quis expedivit Pſittaco ſuum χαῖρε,*
Picáſq; docuit verba noſtra conari?
Magiſter artis, ingeniq; largitor
Venter, negatas artifex ſequi voces.
Quod ſi doloſi ſpes refulſerit nummi,
Corvos Poëtas & Poëtridas Picas,
Cantare credas Pegaſeium melos.

† Perſius in Prologo.

" Who was it, ſays a Poet, that taught Parrots " to cry, *Good morrow* in *Greek*, and Pies to en- " deavour to talk as we do? The Belly, which " is the Maſter of Arts, which gives Wit, and " makes them imitate Words that Nature never " taught them. If there were a deceitful Ap- " pearance of the leaſt Gain you ſhould have " Crows become Poets, and thoſe Poeteſſes the " Pies to ſing moſt admirable Verſes. I wou'd never adviſe any Prince to make this Experiment, but for fear of extinguiſhing the poetic Fire he may beſtow Rewards upon thoſe that are capable of teaching other Sciences, and give them leave to make Verſes now and then, if they have a Talent that way.

Whether Epic Poets have written with a deſign to inſtruct or to divert.

I HAVE ſaid in the beginning of this Work that the Poets are not altogether unuſeful. I don't pretend here to unſay it; but I dare affirm that the Epic Poets never propoſed to themſelves Inſtruction as the principal part of their Deſign, but only to give Diverſion to the Reader, and inſtruct him no farther than it contributed to the Orna-

Ornament of his Poem. I know indeed that those that have written about the Art of Poetry are of a different Opinion, but I am satisfy'd they have rather said that which the Poets ought to have done, than what they have actually done. To convince the Reader likewise of this, we need only examine some few of their principal Reasons.

† *Le Bossu*, L. I. c. 3.

A Man † of Wit who has written about *Epic Poetry* in *French* with a great deal of Art and Perspicuity, thus defines an Heroic Poem. *'Tis*, says he, *a Discourse invented with Art to form the Manners by Instructions disguised under Allegories of an important Action, which is told in Verse in a manner probable, diverting and wonderful.* But if we look more nearly upon it, we shall find that this Definition is only the Definition of an Idea. For in fine if I should deny, that it appears by any place of *Homer* and *Virgil*, that they had any other design than that of pleasing their Readers, no body can tell how to prove the contrary. It will be urged perhaps that we may draw certain Instructions from those Events that are related in their Poems. But I maintain that there never was any Narration in the World from which some sort of a Moral might not be deduced, altho' the Author of it never dreamt of any such thing. Take any Romance or Novel you please, and I will engage to draw some moral Instructions out of it, which the Writer of that Romance or Novel had not any intention to give us. As Man is a rational Creature, subject to Laws which regulate his Conduct, he can scarce say any thing, upon which one may not be able to moralize as much as he pleases. Therefore to be assured that any Poet had a design to give us certain Lessons, 'tis necessary that he should tell us so himself, or at least

least set it down in his Writings after such a manner that no body cou'd doubt it. Now 'tis certain that there is nothing in *Homer* or in *Virgil* that can convince us that they design'd to instruct us in certain moral Doctrines.

I take it for granted, that if by the help of our reasoning we deduce moral Instructions out of these Poets, conformable to the Ideas of Virtue and Vice which they might have (for we must judge of them by their Ideas, and not by our own) we may likewise by the like Reasonings draw quite contrary Conclusions. Now if this be true, 'tis visible that what they say in favour of Virtue, and against Vice, is of very little Advantage to the World.

Let us see what they say of the Fable of the *Iliads*, or of that which the Poet has invented, with a design to insinuate something to the *Greeks*. † We are told, That *Homer* seeing *Greece* divided into so many States as it had Cities, yet upon emergent Affairs frequently obliged to unite in one body against the common Enemy, design'd to let his Country-men see in his *Iliads* that nothing but a good Understanding between them cou'd make any of their Designs that were formed and carried on by so many Generals, to succeed; and on the contrary, that Divisions and Quarels proved always fatal to these Confederacies. Therefore *Homer*, as they pretend built his Fable upon this great Truth, that a Mis-understanding of Princes certainly Ruines their Dominions. *I sing*, says he, *the Anger of* Achilles, *so pernicious to the* Greeks, *and which has destroy'd so many Heroes, while King* Agamemnon *and this Prince quarell'd one with another.*

† *Ibid.* c. 8.

I confess indeed that such an Instruction as this may be drawn from the *Iliads*, and that *Homer* faithfully relates all the Calamities that the *Grecians*

cians ſuffer'd, during the conteſt between *Agamemnon* and *Achilles*. But let him have told this in what manner he pleas'd, yet 'tis certain we might have inferr'd a moral Doctrin from it, as I have already ſaid; and we don't find in any one place of his Poem, that he propos'd this as his end. All that is ſaid upon this Head is nothing but meer Conjecture, and we have as much reaſon to reject as to propoſe it. If we may conclude from *Homer*'s Narration concerning the *Greeks*, that in ſuch a Confederacy as theirs was, it was neceſſary to pitch upon one General, and obey his Orders, may we not inferr the quite contrary Doctrin from what he tells us of the *Trojans*; that becauſe they obey'd *Priam*, who ſuffer'd himſelf to be govern'd by his Sons; and their Captains and thoſe of their Allies blindly follow'd the Advice of *Hector*, they entirely ruin'd themſelves? Therefore *Homer* teaches us by all this, that the too great Authority of any Prince, as was that of King *Priam*, ſupported by his Sons, is the ruin of a State, which much neceſſarily be undone, let it be never ſo unanimous, when it is ill govern'd. It had been much better for this Prince and his Family that they had not had Authority enough to keep *Helen*, in ſpite of the *Trojans*, for then by delivering her to her Husband, they had avoided a War, which brought the moſt diſmal Calamities upon them, that were ever mention'd by the Poets. What may not a Man be able to ſay on this Occaſion, upon that admirable Maxim of good Policy, That in a well-regulated State there ought not to be any Authority ſuperiour to the Laws, or any ſingle Perſon who may do whatever he pleaſes, without fearing to be call'd to an Account for it? One might likewiſe make moſt excellent Obſervations upon the Counſel of

† *Po-*

† *Polydamas* to go back into *Troy* to avoid the Indignation of *Achilles*, and upon *Hector*'s Answer, where one might shew that a General ought to listen to the Advice of his principal Officers, and that 'tis much better to let slip an Opportunity of gaining some Advantage over the Enemy, than to Ruin one's self to all intents and purposes, by obeying a General who abuses his Authority, and hazards all. Besides one may say, That *Homer* had it never in his Thoughts to shew that Divisions were of fatal consequence, since in his Poem he introduces the Gods strangely † divided between themselves about the Quarel of the *Trojans* and *Greeks*, yet did not believe they were to be blamed for it.

† *See the eighteenth Book of the Ilias.*

† *See particularly the 20th. Book.*

To come now to the † *Odysses*: 'Tis pretended that the principal Design of the Poet is to make it appear, that the Absence of a Person from his own House, or his not having a vigilant Eye upon all that is done there, occasions great Disorders in his Affairs, so that the principal and most essential part of the Action is the Absence of the Heroe. It cannot be denied but that *Homer* design'd to describe the Absence of *Ulysses*, and the Irregularities it caused in his Family; but who can assure us that this was his chief Design, and that it was not rather to affect and divert the Reader, by raising his Compassion for *Ulysses* and his Fire-side, and by exciting his Admiration and Curiosity by those extraordinary Accidents that befel him? He was obliged to make *Ulysses* very prudent, and much favour'd by the Gods to get himself out of those Dangers in which he was involved, which makes him to be the more admired and esteem'd by the Reader. I confess, that among all this there is a great deal of good Instruction, but 'tis only an embroidery of the Fable,

† Bossu, *Lib.* I. c. 10.

Fable, and not the principal Deſign of the Poet. We find the like Reflexions in all our Romances, altho' the Authors of them had no other end but to amuſe the Reader, by recounting to him in an agreeable manner, a Fiction for a true Hiſtory. We cannot therefore draw from thence any Conſequence in favour of *Homer*, unleſs we likewiſe aſcribe to *Scudery* and *Calprenede* a philoſophical Deſign to inſtruct the Public by their Romances, whoſe only end was to amuſe and divert thoſe People, that are at a loſs how to employ their leiſure Hours.

Beſides, had he deſign'd to inſinuate that a Prince ought not to abſent himſelf from Home, he had much better have taken any other Perſon than *Ulyſſes*, who left his Houſe and Native-Country with great Unwillingneſs, and if he was abſent, it was only becauſe he cou'd not help it. He ought to have choſen one that went a rambling out of Indiſcretion, and loyter'd abroad meerly for want of a good Conduct, which had much more clearly diſcover'd what it was the Poet intended to teach. By ſeeing Imprudence puniſhed, we ſhould much ſooner have comprehended that a Prince is obliged in Intereſt to ſtay at Home, than in ſeeing ſome Diſorders happen in a Man's Houſe who is kept abroad in ſpite of his own Inclination, and is abſent only becauſe 'tis impoſſible for him to return home.

But ſuppoſe theſe Reaſons were not ſo ſtrong as they are, we might at one blow deſtroy the above-mention'd Hypotheſis, by offering others that carry as much probability in them. Nothing cou'd hinder a Man from aſſerting upon the ſame Principles, that the Poet's Deſign was to ſhew that no hindrance of what Nature ſoever can hinder the execution of the Decrees of Fate. This

Do-

Doctrin frequently occurs in *Homer*, and indeed the *Odysses* is nothing but a Comment upon it. We find *Ulysses* there surrounded with Pleasures and strong Temptations, to make him forget his Native-Country. We find him encompast with terrible Dangers, out of which he happily frees himself, because Heaven had decreed that he should return home in safety. *Homer* tells us † not far from the beginning of the *Odysses*, that when *the Tears* of *Ulysses*'s Absence *were over, the time was come wherein the Gods had destin'd his return to* Ithaca, *and that he did not without some difficulty find himself even among his Friends.*

† Odyss. *Lib.* I. *vers.* 16.

One might likewise pretend that *Homer* design'd to describe conjugal Love to us, by representing on one side *Penelope* not to be moved with Caresses and Menaces of her Suitors, during so long an Absence, and suffering herself rather to be ruined by these Fellows, who all the while they were Courting her, lived at her Expence, than to comply with any one of them; and on the other side, *Ulysses* who could not be overcome by the Charms of *Circe*, nor of *Calypso*, nor of the Daughter of *Alcinous*, but always passionately desired to see his dear *Penelope* again, to whom nevertheless he was not so faithful as she was to him. But even this contributes to shew his Constancy, since Goddesses themselves such as *Circe* and *Calypso* were, who refused him no Favours, were not able to detain him in their agreeable Islands, altho' they tempted him with so great a Bribe as Immortality. It is true that *Homer* mixes the Love of his Native-Country with his Desire to return, but it is not incompatible with that of his Wife. *Patria*, † says *Cicero*, *tanta est vis, ac tanta natura, ut Ithacam illam in asperrimis saxulis, tanquam nidulum affixam sapientissimus vir immortalitati*

† De Orat. *L.* I. *c.* 44.

litati anteponeret. " The Love of one's Country " is so forcible and natural, that the wisest Man " of antiquity prefer'd *Ithaca*, which is situated " like a Bird's Nest among sharp Rocks, to Im- " mortality itself.

It will be granted me, that since we can give so many different Interpretations to this pretended Allegory, which composes the *Odysses*, it is not very probable that *Homer* propos'd any of them in particular, as the end and mark of his Work, or that if he had such a Design in his Head, he has executed it very ill. An Allegory which is so obscure, that it is equally capable of different Meanings, is no longer an Allegory, but a Riddle.

† Le Bossu *Liv.* I. c. 11.

What is likewise said of the † moral Design, which *Virgil* propos'd to himself in his *Æneis*, is no better founded. Some People wou'd needs perswade us, that this Poet design'd to instruct *Augustus*, as the Founder of a mighty Empire, and to inspire him, as well as his Successors with the same Spirit and Conduct, which had made this Empire so great. A wise Roman, say they, who was an able Politician in his time ('tis *Cicero* they mean) informs us that Clemency was so peculiar to this Government, that it reign'd there even in the midst of War, and that nothing but downright absolute Necessity cou'd make them suspend the Observing of it. They maintain that this is the Instruction, which *Virgil* design'd to give the *Roman* Emperours in his *Æneis*.

But to this it may be replied in the first place, that *Virgil* indeed represents *Æneas* all along as one that was very devout, and ready on all occasions to follow the Orders of Heaven; but he does not make him exercise any extraordinary Compassion towards the Vanquished. We don't find that

that he any where ſignalizes his Clemency. On the contrary he makes him in all his Battels kill thoſe that cry'd to him for Quarter, without the leaſt remorſe.

In the ſecond place, If we had a mind to reaſon upon the Suppoſition that *Virgil* deſign'd to give us moral Inſtructions, 'tis more natural to imagine that his Intention was to demonſtrate, that we ought to ſubmit to the Orders of Providence, altho' they appear hard and difficult to execute. This is a Thought which runs through the whole *Æneis*, as it wou'd be eaſie to demonſtrate. We might likewiſe ſay, That he deſign'd to inform the *Romans*, that the Eſtabliſhment of a great Empire is not made without a particular Providence of Heaven, and to poſſeſs them conſequently with devout Thoughts. But theſe Projects are by no means fit for an *Epicurean*, and all the World knows that *Virgil* embraced the Opinions of *Epicurus* as well as his Friend *Horace*.

If we muſt plainly deliver the Truth, 'tis highly probable that *Virgil* meant nothing elſe than to flatter *Auguſtus* and the *Romans* in particular, by making a Romance about the Origine of their Empire, and of the *Iulian* Family, which he deduces from *Iulus*, the Son of *Æneas*, according to the Tradition of that Family. This was certainly the Poet's Aim, who ſeldom loſes any occaſion to flatter *Auguſtus* and the *Romans* in general, and not to exhort the Emperours to Clemency.

Thus you have beheld the moral Projects of the three fineſt Epic Poems that were ever compoſed, intirely overthrown; after which, it will not be hard to believe that Tragic Poems are not written for nobler Ends. *Ariſtotle* defines Tragedy

† Ch. IV. Of his Poetry.

thus: 'Tis, † says he, *the Imitation of a grave entire Action, which has a just Greatness, &c. which by the means of Compassion and Terrour fully purgeth in us these and the like Passions.* Thus the Tragic Poets wou'd pretend to heal the Passions of their Auditors, or at least to lessen them, by exciting Terrour and Compassion in their Souls. I won't say, that no Tragic Poet in the World ever propos'd a moral Design to himself; but I believe that for the generality they have not troubled themselves about that matter, and that the moral Passages scattered up and down in their Compositions, are rather to embellish the Subject, and please the Audience, than with a Design to calm their Passions. It may indeed sometimes so fall out, that the Spectator by seeing the Calamities of Humane Life represented on the Stage, and the incertainty of Honour and Greatness described in a lively manner, on purpose to affect him, may moderate himself a little better in his Desires and Transports; but Terrour and Pity are not healed, by being often rais'd in the Heart: On the contrary, in process of time Men accustom themselves to them so well, that the least thing at long run is capable to disturb them. After this manner all Habitudes are formed. By having the same Movements often within us they become so natural, that 'tis very difficult to disengage ourselves from them. But it will be objected perhaps, that by virtue of seeing these sad and terrible Objects, which are represented in Tragedies, we may come in time to be less sensible of the impressions of Pity and Fear; as Soldiers use to despise Dangers, wherein they frequently find themselves engaged. But this Comparison signifies just nothing, for Soldiers as often as they find themselves in Danger, do all they

they can to diſſipate their Fears, and encourage one another: whereas a Tragic Poet ſets all his Engines on work to raiſe the Paſſions of the Auditors; and as the latter takes no manner of care to oppoſe his Deſign, 'tis no wonder that at laſt they contract a habit of thoſe very Paſſions which the Poet excites in them.

It will ſtill be urged that Examples of the Misfortunes of Human Life, which we ſee in Tragedies, diſpoſe thoſe that behold them often repreſented on the Theatre, to be leſs ſurprized at them, when-ever they fall upon themſelves. † It is true that the Philoſophers endeavour to make this uſe of Tragedy, and that they frequently cite Inſtances out of them, to perſwade Men to Conſtancy. But 'tis one thing to endeavour to draw ſome Profit from a thing which is eſtabliſh'd, and another to do the ſame thing with a certain Deſign. The Philoſophers are to be commended for their Endeavours to lead Men to Virtue, by the very Objects of their Paſſions and their Pleaſures; but the Tragic Poets rather buſied their Brains to procure the Applauſe of the People and their Diverſion, than their Reformation or Amendment. Thus they oftner arrive at the firſt of theſe Ends, than at the ſecond.

† Vide *Marc. Antoninum* L. XI. n. 6. & *ad eum locum* Tho. Gatakerum.

The Comic Poets pretended alſo to have a ſhare in this Honour, and it was commonly ſaid, *To Teach Comedy* as well as Tragedy, to mean the publiſhing of any Dramatic Compoſitions. In effect, by repreſenting common Life, and rallying the Follies of the World, they might perhaps make a better Impreſſion upon their Auditors, than by pompouſly ſetting forth the extraordinary Calamities of Heroes and Princes, after the manner of the Tragic Poets. There are but few Kings, and Great Men in the World, to whom

alone the Examples of Tragedy can be well ſuited: But on the contrary, we have infinite numbers of private Men, who may, to their great Advantage, behold their Paſſions and Humours laſh'd and ridicul'd in Comedy. But before the Comic Poets can pretend to paſs for public Teachers of Virtue, 'tis neceſſary that they ſhould be firſt Philoſophers, or elſe that none but Philoſophers ſhould deal in Comedy: As we find it to be quite othewiſe, 'tis no wonder that our Comedies, being compoſed by thoſe that are not the moſt regular Men in the World, have no leſs contributed to propagate Vice, than to ſhow the Folly of it. They don't repreſent Intemperance, and divers other Vices as blamable, but when they are carried to great Exceſs, that is to ſay, never but when they may hurt the Eſtabiſhment or Fortune of thoſe People who abandon themſelves to them. Now, ſound Philoſophy demands a great deal more Virtue from us than will juſt keep us from being Scandalous, or ruining ourſelves in the World. Thus, whatever they allege for themſelves, the Comic Poets ſeem to have nothing elſe in view but to divert the Public, and to get Reputation and Mony by diverting them. To compaſs this, they were obliged to mix abundance of moral Sentences in the Converſation of their Perſons, becauſe they frequently hold ſuch ſorts of Diſcourſes; and becauſe that after they have laughed heartily, the Public is diverted with theſe Sallies of Morality, rather for the variety of the Entertainment, than for any Inſtruction. A ſufficient Proof of this is that they are not a jot the better for it, as a † Comic Poet has very well obſerv'd in theſe Verſes.

† *Plautus in Rud.* Act. IV. Sec. 7.

Spe-

Spectavi ego pridem Comicos ad iſtum modum
Sapienter dicta dicere atq; iis plaudier,
Cum illos ſapientes mores monſtrabant populo;
Sed cùm inde ſuam quiſq; ibant divorſi domum,
Nullus erat illo pacto, ut illi juſſerunt.

" I have often ſeen that after the Comic Poets
" have ſaid good things, and that they have been
" applauded for them, while they taught good
" Manners to the People, as ſoon as they were
" got home, no body was the better for their
" Advice.

I don't pretend to prove by this Diſcourſe that we cannot give very uſeful Precepts in Verſe, and that they have not been actually given in them. All that I wou'd ſhow by it is, that whatever has been ſaid of the moral Deſigns of the fineſt Compoſitions of ancient Poetry, has much more appearance than Solidity in it, when we come to examine it nearly. This does not in the leaſt hinder, but that a Poet, who has taſted the good Maxims of a Philoſophy which is ſomewhat ſeverer, than that of the greateſt Poets of Antiquity was, and who poſſeſſeth them as they did the Opinions of their own time, may not undertake a Poem with the ſame Views, that have been vainly aſcribed to them, and by this means re-eſtabliſh the Honour of Poetry, which has been defamed by the Faults we have already taken notice of. 'Tis of ſuch a Poet, that we may truely ſay what *Horace* ſays of him, whom he endeavour'd to inſtruct in his Art of Poetry:

Omne tulit punctum, qui miſcuit utile dulci,
Lectorem delectando, paritèrq; monendo.

" That Writer gains the good Opinion of the " whole World, who mixes the uſeful with the " agreeable, by diverting his Reader, and giving " him good Advice at the ſame time. But I am mightily afraid that ſuch a Poet has for a long while been nothing elſe but a pure Idea without reality.

CHAP. II.

Of True and Falſe Eloquence.

NOTHING is more eſteemed than Eloquence, not only among Men of Learning, but even the Vulgar: However, there is ſcarce any thing of which for the generality, we have a wronger Idea. 'Tis certain that 'tis the moſt uſeful thing in the World, when we really poſſeſs it; but 'tis as certain that when we only believe we poſſeſs it, and have perſwaded the Multitude of it, there is ſcarce any thing ſo pernicious. We not only take a Phantom for ſomething Real, but we frequently put off a Falſehood for a Truth, or at leaſt inſtead of illuſtrating the Truth we loſe it in the thickeſt Darkneſs. I call true Eloquence, that the Reader may not be deceived, " The Art of ſpeaking Truth, as we " ought to ſpeak it, to convince reaſonable Men, " to render them attentive, and to affect them, if " 'tis neceſſary, while we ſpeak it. On the contrary, falſe Eloquence is an Art, if it deſerves ſuch a Name, of recommending Falſehood inſtead of Truth, and of making the ſame Reſpect be paid

paid to the former, which is only due to the latter: To which we ought to add the want of Addreſs in thoſe that propoſe Truth itſelf, but do it in ſo awkward and ſilly a manner, that they make their Hearers doubt of it, and that no one liſtens to them, nor is affected by their Diſcourſe, altho' in the bottom 'tis true.

To ſhew the Excellence of true Eloquence, and the Diſadvantages of the falſe, wou'd take up a compleat Treatiſe of Rhetoric, which is far from my Thoughts at preſent. I will only make ſome general Reflexions upon the four parts of this Science, *Invention*, *Diſpoſition*, *Expreſſion* and *Pronunciation*.

I. *INVENTION* conſiſts, as every one knows, in diſcovering all that can be ſaid upon a Subject we have choſe to treat of; but as we ought not to ſay every thing that comes into our Heads, altho' it belongs to the Subject in hand, becauſe then we ſhould never make an end, we ought neceſſarily to make choice of thoſe Thoughts that are proper to the end we propoſe to ourſelves: and herein the Art and Addreſs of an Orator conſiſts. Unleſs a Man is perfectly Stupid, and has never read in his Life, 'tis impoſſible for him to be wholly unprovided of Matter, when he has any Truth or hiſtorical Fact to diſcourſe upon; but then, unleſs he underſtands the Art of Thinking juſtly, and has often made long and profound Reflexions upon it, unleſs he has a true Reliſh and Diſcernment, we find that he generally makes an ill Choice of the things that preſent themſelves to his Mind: he will enlarge too much upon things of little Importance, or dwell upon ſuch as have no connexion with the Subject in hand, while he omits thoſe that are more Important and Eſſential, or touches *Of Invention.*

them but ſlightly. This is what happens daily, but eſpecially to Preachers, who without Underſtanding the Rules of Art, learn to preach by Rote and Cuſtom.

But to talk more particularly upon this Occaſion, we are apt to commit three Faults principally, which don't appear ſo to the Eyes of thoſe who are not able to diſtinguiſh true Eloquence from the falſe, but which are not the leſs for all that, and which for that very Reaſon, produce very ill Effects.

The firſt is, that abundance of People are of the Opinion, That provided they talk a great deal, ſo that their Matter never fails them, 'tis enough to give them the Character of eloquent Men, unleſs it happens that they are altogether deſtitute of exterior Talents that relate to the Stile and Pronunciation. To be able to talk an Hour or too about a Trifle of no Conſequence, altho' without Choice and Judgment, ſeems to be the fineſt thing in the World, provided a Man does not heſitate but runs glibly on, and moves his Auditors. We fooliſhly perſwade ourſelves that we acquire the Reputation of Men of Wit, in ſpite of good Senſe, as if it were poſſible to be one without the other. 'Tis the ſame with Authors as with Orators, altho' they ought to be much more ſevere in the Choice of their Thoughts, as a Reader is infinitely harder to pleaſe, than one that hears. However, if they can ſo order Matters, as to make a large Book, and they don't want Words when they are attack'd, they think that they perfectly ſatisfie all Difficulties, and anſwer all Objections. Thus this ſort of People fall foul upon every thing without Diſtinction, which does not ſuit with their Paſſions, in a vain Preſumption, that a Torrent of

Words

Words will effectually do their Buſineſs for them, and that they ſhall never want a Supply. I knew a Man of this Character, who thought that Talking and Proving were the ſame thing; ſo that after he had talked a great deal, he fancied he brought abundance of Proofs; and on the contrary, that thoſe that talk little prove nothing. He perſwaded himſelf that the World counts the Sentences in a Book juſt as they do Soldiers in an Army, and that the more Ink a Man uſes, the more Reaſon he has on his ſide. One may apply to this Man a Saying of † *Saluſt*, *Satis loquentiæ, ſapientiæ parum*, Words enough, but little good Senſe. On the other hand, thoſe that are really Eloquent, after they have form'd a clear Idea of the Propoſitions they intend to prove, (for this in ſhort is the end of all Diſcourſes whatever they are, if they are reaſonable) make uſe only of thoſe Proofs that appear the moſt ſimple, the moſt direct, and the moſt ſenſible, and reject all the reſt. After this they adorn the Proofs they have choſen with all the Decorations that ſolid Eloquence uſes to employ, and of which I ſhall take occaſion to diſcourſe at the Concluſion of theſe Reflexions. When they have a fertile Subject, which deſerves to be enlarged upon, they talk the longer of it: But if it is Barren, and the thing in hand is not of that importance, as to require a long Examination, they ſoon diſpatch it. In a word, they lengthen their Diſcourſe according to the Nature of their Subject; whereas others amplify theirs, according to the extravagant Deſire they have to talk much, or to make a ſhow of their pretended Eloquence. The former talk when they have ſomething to communicate, which deſerves to be heard, and the latter never hold their Tongue, but when

† See *Aulus Gell.* L. 1. c. XV.

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no Body will do the Penance to liſten to them.

The ſecond Fault we may obſerve in thoſe that are only Maſters of a falſe Eloquence, and which concerns the Choice of what is proper to be ſaid, is that they believe that if they are not allow'd to ſay every thing that comes into their head, they are not however obliged to uſe no Arguments, but ſuch as are concluding. They flatter themſelves that the World ought to conſider them as Perſons of a nice Diſcernment, if they employ no Reaſonings that are palpably abſur'd, that ſhock the Imagination. The ſlighteſt Appearances and the moſt incertain Probabilities ſerve their turn. They perpetually confound the Poſſible with the Probable, and the Probable with the True. Their Diſcourſes and Works are full of Reaſonings of this Nature, which wou'd no more endure the Teſt of Logic, than a gilded Shilling wou'd endure the Touch-ſtone. If we confine them to Syllogiſm, and carefully conſider their equivocal Expreſſions, and their precarious Principles, we ſhall find at firſt ſight, that they are nothing but pure Sophiſms which are founded upon Ambiguities or Suppoſitions that cannot be defended: We ſhall find that by Reaſoning after this manner, there is nothing which we cannot attack and nothing which we cannot prove. We may meet abundance of Examples of this Nature in the Writings of the ancient Philoſophers, and Fathers of the Church, eſpecially when they Diſpute or Reaſon upon the Old Teſtament. In every Page we find Suppoſitions altogether uncertain, and which 'tis impoſſible to prove, if once we deny them, and Arguments that are wholly built upon the Ambiguity of ſome Words, which they wou'd not give themſelves the trouble to explain, to have an occaſion to Reaſon out of our ſight. It will be told me perhaps, that I

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ought to talk more reſpectfully of the Fathers, and that the conſent of Antiquity, for Reaſoning in this manner, is a ſufficient Proof that it is warrantable and good. But I have nothing to do here with Theological Doctrins, wherein their Authority uſes to be of weight: Logic, at preſent, is the Buſineſs in debate, which will not allow the Authority of Citations, but only the ſtrict Rules of Art. Whoever violates them, is to be tried before the Tribunal of Logicians, tho' it were an Oecumenical Council, confirmed by ſeveral others. There is no Authority in the World that can make Arbitrary Laws for good Reaſoning, or change a Sophiſm into a true Syllogiſm, or make a juſt Argument become a Sophiſm, without altering ſomething in it. No Perſon has power to grant Immunities to the Prejudice of the Rights of Reaſon, or to make any Exception in favour of any thing of this Nature. We muſt either obey the Rules, or undergo the Sentence. The true Rhetoricians follow upon this occaſion the Authority of the Philoſophers, or rather the inviolable Light of good Senſe. They maintain, that when a Man is to prove any thing ſolidly, he ought to employ no Reaſonings, but thoſe that are ſolid: If he will needs make uſe of probable Reaſonings, whatever he concludes from them, cannot be more certain than the Proofs he brings. All that he can make of them will only amount to a Probability. Now as there are ſeveral Degrees of Probability, a Man likewiſe ought to have a regard to that, and to make ſlight Appearances go for no more than they are really worth.

In the Civil Law, for Example, there is no Authority which can make a bad Conſequence go for a good one. When any thing is to be proved

ved by a Law or an Act, we muſt plainly ſhew that the Terms of that Law or Act cannot be poſſibly underſtood in another ſenſe. Probability, eſpecially when it is ſlight, ſerves only to ſpoil our Cauſe: For the Advocate of the other ſide, let him underſtand his Profeſſion never ſo little, will not fail to obſerve that nothing concluding has been urged in the Caſe; and the Judges demand ſolid Proofs, and not ſimple Conjectures. If any Man ſhould be ſo ill-adviſed as to Reaſon at the Barr upon the Laws, as *Origene* does upon the Bible, he wou'd be hiſs'd out of the Court, and in a ſhort time no Body wou'd retain him, unleſs he intirely changed his Method. Let People ſay what they pleaſe, ſince the Fathers never had any ſuch Privilege from Heaven, as to be exempted from following the Laws of good Logic, we lie under no Obligation to believe that thoſe Reaſonings are good in their Writings, which wou'd be exploded any where elſe.

However, in ſeveral parts of the World, thoſe that deſign for the Pulpit, read them to model themſelves upon their Eloquence, and to uſe, upon occaſion, their Words or their Arguments, and as if they durſt not employ the Rules of Logic to examin them by, they learn by little and little to Reaſon juſt as they did, and at laſt to declaim againſt Reaſon, for fear, I ſuppoſe, leſt the World ſhould find out their little Sophiſtry. This is one of the moſt crying Sins of Eccleſiaſtical Eloquence, as 'tis managed in thoſe Places where the Fathers are the Copies they write after. A Man ought to leave his Reaſon and Logic behind him in the Church-Porch to be edified with ſuch Preaching. Thus theſe arbitrary Suppoſitions, and irregular Reaſonings have made

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the *Italians* ſay of theſe ſorts of Diſcourſe, that, *il creder è di corteſia*, they believe them merely out of good Manners and Civility: And for this cauſe when they have any falſe Point, or any unjuſt Reaſoning, their Anſwer is, *guardate queſto per la predica*, keep this Nonſenſe to yourſelf till you are a Preacher. They are convinced by Experience, that abundance of things, which we patiently ſuffer from the Pulpit, wou'd be ridiculous in a ſerious Converſation of rational Perſons.

On the contrary, true ſubſtantial Eloquence ſuffers us to utter nothing for Truth, but what we prove in ſo convincing a manner, that the ſtricteſt Logicians can have nothing to object againſt it. If we have nothing, as I have already ſaid, but probable things to propoſe, ſhe will oblige us to acquaint our Auditors with it. As ſhe has no other deſign but to inſtruct, and that in a ſolid manner, ſo that the Reader ſhall not only be perſwaded upon the ſpot, but retain the Truth which has been demonſtrated to him, in his Mind; ſhe never employs any of thoſe tinſel Arguments that may glitter for a Moment, but ſoon after diſappear; ſhe only uſes the eternal and inviolable Lights of good Senſe, which appear to be ſo much the more true, the nearer we come to examine them.

However, now and then an occaſion preſents itſelf, where it is lawful for us to make uſe of weak Reaſonings for a little time. And this happens when our Hearers or Readers are more affected by them than by the beſt Arguments. In ſuch a Caſe, we are oblig'd to accommodate ourſelves to their Imbecillity, in order to gain them over to our ſide, and afterwards to be in a condition to inſtruct them better, when they can hearken to what we have to offer to them, without

out prejudice. The Mind of Man is Haughty and Jealous, and ſometimes he cannot be undeceived but by himſelf, by our making a dexterous uſe of thoſe Principles which he admits for true ones; ſo that he attributes the change, that is made in him, to his own Knowlege, and not to that of another. We muſt therefore make uſe of his Principles, which are frequently either falſe or incertain, as if they were built upon Truth, to make him draw a Conſequence from them, which he wou'd not otherwiſe admit.

If we had only honeſt ſincere Men to deal with, who ſearch after nothing but the Truth, then we need do no more than propoſe it clearly to them, in order to bring them over to us: But we are oblig'd every moment of the day to undeceive People that are govern'd by their Paſſions, and prepoſſeſs'd by a thouſand Prejudices directly oppoſite to the Truth; and therefore we muſt, as far as 'tis poſſible, Reaſon with ſuch Men either upon common Principles, or their own proper Ideas. If we let them ſee, that we are at too great a diſtance from their Opinions, or that we look down upon their Errors with contempt, they immediately take it for granted, that we deſpiſe their Perſons, and this Conſideration alone makes them ſhut their Ears to the Truth. Upon this account the Maſters of this Art inform thoſe that wou'd perſwade others, not to advance any thing that may in the leaſt wound the Imagination of their Auditors, and make them ſuſpect that we want Reſpect or Conſideration for them. We may obſerve this wiſe Precaution in the firſt Diſcourſes which the Apoſtles heretofore made to the Jews and Pagans, whom they managed with as much Addreſs as was poſſible. We may upon this Head, conſider the

Harangue

Harangue which St. *Paul* makes to the Athenians, in the 17th Chap. of the *Acts*; where he makes uſe of the Inſcription upon an Altar, and the Words of a *Greek* Poet, and gives them the beſt Meaning he cou'd, to endeavour to gain theſe Idolaters, as it were, out of their own proper Principles. We likewiſe find in his Writings that he managed the Jews with great dexterity, before they had conſtrain'd him by their ill treatment to break off with them, and addreſs himſelf to the Gentiles. On theſe Occaſions, he ſays abundance of things which ſuppoſe the vulgar Opinions, tho' he did not at the ſame time believe them to be altogether true. But we ought never to uſe this Method, but when we are compell'd, that is to ſay, when the Truth wou'd be rejected at firſt ſight, if it appeared to be ſuch, as it is really in itſelf.

The third Fault that is to be cenſured in the Eloquence of ſeveral People, is that they believe that they ought to be conſider'd as Authors or Orators of a good Judgment and Taſt, when their Reaſons are juſt and concluding, tho' they never trouble themſelves, whether they make for the Subject, or at leaſt whether what they propoſe to prove, is preciſely the ſame with what they prove. They don't explain the Queſtions in hand ſo clearly as they ought to be, and the Reaſons which afterwards they bring, don't direct the Reader or Hearer to find out thoſe Truths that they engage to prove. They chuſe certain Reaſonings which they extend by diverſe Reflexions, and embelliſh with ſeveral Examples, without concerning themſelves about any thing elſe, but that what they deliver be true in itſelf, and has ſome relation to what they treat of. Thus they put the change upon their Auditors, and

and if they don't deceive them in the bottom of things, they deceive them at leaſt in their expectation. The Authors, whom I have named, are full of this Cheat. The Title of their Works, and the fine Promiſes they make at firſt to treat of certain Matters, draw on the Reader, who is deſirous to be inſtructed in them. But ſo ſoon as he ſets himſelf to read them, he perceives that his Author ſhams him off with ſomething elſe than what he expected to find in him. He cannot then forbear to cry out, *Quò nunc ſe proripit ille?* Whither is the Man a going? It ſeems that ſo ſoon as he wou'd enter upon the Matter, the irregularity of his Imagination hurries his Reaſon whither it never intended to go; like a reſtif Horſe that runs away with a Man in ſpite of his Teeth, when he has not ſtrength or skill enough to keep him in and govern him. He gallops away with mighty ſpeed, and does not ſtumble, but goes where no Body expected he ſhould go.

On the contrary, thoſe that know how to ſpeak and write according to the Rules of Art, propoſe at firſt the Queſtion they intend to treat of, with all Perſpicuity imaginable, ſo that neither themſelves, nor thoſe that hear or read them can poſſibly be deceived. They go to their Journey's end in the ſtraiteſt and plaineſt Road, and their whole Diſcourſe conſpires, if I may uſe the Expreſſion, to prove the ſame thing. The Auditor, or the Reader on his ſide, perfectly well comprehending what he had a mind to demonſtrate, and the Proofs he brings to ſupport it, finds himſelf ſatisfied and inſtructed, ſo that he is never deceived upon the ſame Subject, ſo long as he remembers what he has heard, or read.

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THE Defects, I have remarked in falſe Elo- *The ill Effects of falſe Rhetoric.*
quence, are at leaſt in part the occaſion of ſeveral Diſorders we ſee in the World, which nothing but true Rhetoric can remedy.

The firſt is, that ſuch People as ſuffer themſelves to be born away by a multitude of Words, by falſe Reaſons, or Thoughts that make nothing to the Subject in hand, are over-whelm'd indeed with the noiſe of the Words, and the great number of the Thoughts, but they underſtand not a ſyllable of the Matter. Altho' they fancy they are much better'd by a Diſcourſe of this nature which they have heard or read, yet they cannot tell what it contains, nor reduce it to certain clear and continued Heads. Every thing is confuſed, every thing is turned upſide down in their Minds; and as Connexion and Order are of excellent uſe to the Memory, which otherwiſe is apt to be diſorder'd and to loſe what it has learnt, theſe Gentlemen ſoon forget what they have read or heard.

The ſecond Diſorder, which this pretended Eloquence produceth, is that thoſe People that are accuſtom'd to it, come to loſe their Taſt and Judgment inſenſibly, and at laſt find themſelves utterly uncapable of judging what ought to be ſaid and what omitted, what is good and what is bad reaſoning, what is to the purpoſe and what not. They are no longer able to ſeparate what is treated of from what makes nothing to the Subject, nor to diſcern the Proofs that are brought to bring about ones Ends, from what is introduced meerly for Show and Ornament, or for the ſake of ſome reſemblance.

The third Diſorder is, that if the End of the Diſcourſe be to correct the Faults of the Rea-

ders and Auditors, the multitude of impertinent Words, the weakneſs of the Reaſonings, and the judicious Choice of the Thoughts, produce but very ſorry Effects. As we are perſwaded without knowing why or wherefore, and have no clear and continued Principles to preſerve ourſelves from Errour, and to regulate our Conduct aright, our Manners will infalliby derive an unhappy Tincture from the diſorder of our Minds; we do Good and Evil without diſcerning them ſo diſtinctly as we ought to do, and our Lives become a perpetual mixture of a little Virtue and a great deal of Vice. We know the general Rules of Good and Evil confuſedly, and we apply them almoſt by meer accident to the particular Actions of Life.

Let us ſuppoſe on the contrary, that by ſome Miracle or other it ſo fell out in ſome Kingdom or Republic, that they had no public Orator (the Reader will ſoon perceive that I mean our Preachers here) nor ſo much as one Writer that exactly obſerv'd the Rules above-mention'd of good Rhetoric, I don't in the leaſt queſtion but that we ſhould ſoon behold a conſiderable change in their Diſcourſes and in their Lives. The publick Aſſemblies wou'd be excellent Schools for the Heart and Mind to take a true caſt in: We ſhould not learn the Trick there to pay ourſelves with a parcel of inſignificant words, we ſhou'd ſay nothing but what was to the purpoſe, and reaſon juſtly upon the Opinions of Religion and upon Morality, and this Knowledge wou'd ſoon diffuſe itſelf all over our Lives and Actions. We ſhould no longer ſee ſuch vaſt numbers of People, that only do Good by meer accident almoſt, and only avoid Evil by meer good luck, by reaſon of their confuſed and un-

uncertain Lights, by which they regulate their Conduct. But we must needs own, if we will speak out the truth, as we ought to do in a Matter of so great importance, that we for the most part see ten Orators that are proper to do Mischief, for one that is capable to edifie us solidly; so that we ought not to wonder if the uncertain Multitude blunder and grope their way at mid-day, without knowing what Road they should take, or implicitely follow the first Man they meet.

II. THIS is enough to be said upon the Article of Invention, which is the most important part of Rhetoric, and the foundation of all the rest, since 'tis necessary we know what we ought to say, before we think how to range and express it. Nevertheless 'tis of very great consequence to dispose the matter, we have found out by Meditation, in a right order, because the disposition is of infinite use to make others rightly understand what we intend to say, and to make them perceive the force of the Proofs which we alledge. *Of Disposition.*

The Rhetors lay down good general Precepts concerning the disposition of a Discourse, in regard to the Order we ought to observe between the parts which compose it, and what we ought to follow in each of these parts. I find nothing to censure in them as for what they teach upon this Head, and am of Opinion, that those that speak in public wou'd do very well to read over from time to time the Precepts of the Masters of this Art, the greatest part of which are founded upon good Sense. But there is one thing wanting in them, which is of that consideration, that without it all their Precepts signifie just nothing. 'Tis this, that they say almost nothing

about the eſſential ordering of the Thoughts among one another, in each part of the Diſcourſe, and which is abſolutely neceſſary, whether it be to avoid Repetions, or to inſtruct more eaſily, and to convince the Reader or Auditor. This Order is not only neceſſary in thoſe Diſcourſes which we pronounce without publiſhing them in Print; but principally in Books of what nature ſoever they be. However one may juſtly ſay that nothing has been more neglected not only by the ancient Orators, but eſpecially by the Philoſophers, the greateſt part of whoſe Diſcourſes is a mere Confuſion and Chaos. *Plutarch*, for inſtance, among the *Greeks*, and *Seneca* among the *Latins*, have written with the greateſt Confuſion in the World. The eccleſiaſtical Authors have imitated them in this particular. We ſee both the one and the other, frequently begin to treat of a Subject without taking the leaſt care to ſtate the Queſtion in Terms clear and without equivocation, and then on they gallop, without knowing from whence they ſet out or whither they are going, till ſuch time as their Imagination is perfectly founder'd, and they can run no longer. Read their Treatiſes and Diſcourſes over and over again, and you will find a vaſt number of them, wherein you can neither comprehend the principal Deſign they drive at, nor the Method they propoſed to follow, in order to execute it. The beſt are thoſe, whoſe Deſign we can perceive in groſs, and where the Matter is not too far fetch'd, altho' there is no Order in it. They heap together a world of Materials to build, as one wou'd think, a fine Structure, but afterwards they throw them one upon another without Order and any Rules of Architecture. Thus 'tis a difficult matter well to diſentangle this confuſion of Thoughts, and to form

form a clear and continued Idea of their Sentiments, which has in part proved the occaſion of ſo many Diſputes about their Doctrin.

It muſt be own'd, that thoſe that write or ſpeak now a days have much more Method, at leaſt for the greateſt part; and 'tis an undeniable Truth, that in this reſpect we very much ſurpaſs the Ancients, whatever the Admirers of Antiquity may pretend. However there are abundance of People ſtill in the World, who never made any ſerious reflexion upon a Method to diſpoſe their Reaſons, in ſuch a manner as ſhall be proper to make their Diſcourſe clear and concluding. If they ſometimes ſucceed in this, 'tis by meer hazard, for they treſpaſs oftner againſt the moſt eſſential Rules.

Theſe Rules had continued as it were hidden among the Geometricians till the time of *Deſcartes*, who firſt diſcover'd the great Uſe that might be made of them upon all occaſions. Since the Diſcoveries that have been made in our Age about them, ſeveral Perſons have enlarged and even rectified his Thoughts; as we may ſee in the *Logic* of the *Port-Royal*, and the † *Search* after Truth. The ſame Matter has likewiſe been treated with care in a *Latin* † Logic, printed twice at *Amſterdam* within a few Years, where the uſe that may be made of it in all ſorts of Diſquiſitions, is ſhown at large. Theſe Books are too common, to want any tranſcribing here.

† By F. Male Branche

† *Logica Joannis Clerici, denuo edita, anno* 1698.

I will only ſay in general, that theſe Rules teach us that we ought in the firſt place to have an exact knowledge of the Queſtion we intend to handle, and to expreſs it without Ambiguity: In the ſecond place, That we muſt divide it into its parts, if it is compoſed of ſeveral Propoſitions: Thirdly, That we muſt range theſe Propoſitions in that Order, that the moſt ſimple and moſt eaſie may march firſt: Fourthly, That the Propoſitions

that follow ought to be deduced from the preceeding ones, as far as is poſſible. There are other particular Rules with which I ſhall not meddle here. 'Tis ſufficient to remark that theſe general Rules are notoriouſly violated both in Diſcourſes and in Writings. We ſet ourſelves to compoſe, without knowing well what we are minded to treat of, and after ſome diviſion ill underſtood, we ſay in each part what we think belongs to it, without troubling ourſelves in what Order we range it. What is more, ſeveral Perſons, who affect to be thought Wits, take a pride in retailing their Thoughts without any manner of connexion, and think it enough that each Thought in particular has a relation to the Subject they treat upon. This is call'd Writing and Preaching *by Thoughts*, and after this manner it is that a good part of the Treatiſes, which compoſe the famous Collection of the *Eſſays of Morality* are written, the drift and end of which we cannot comprehend, but in a general way, and whoſe Method is exceedingly embroil'd. Altho' the Stile of them is pure and fine, and there are abundance of noble independent Thoughts in 'em; yet, to ſpeak freely what I think, theſe Works taken in the Groſs, are full of nonſenſical Stuff, and Sophiſms: The reaſon of which, in my Opinion, is only this, becauſe thoſe that compoſed them, either did not know what a good Method was, or at leaſt did not know the importance of obſerving it.

In the mean time no Man can queſtion the Excellence of the above-mention'd Rules, if it were only becauſe all the Truths of the Mathematicians depend upon them. 'Tis impoſſible to deny that the Order they preſcribe is admirable, both to enlighten the Mind, and touch the Heart of reaſonable

ſonable Perſons. 'Tis likewiſe as plain that 'tis extremely uſeful and convenient for thoſe that write; for by this means they form a Plan of what they ſhould ſay with all the eaſe imaginable, when once they are accuſtom'd to them: They avoid impertinent Repetitions, and the Pain of finding out independent Thoughts, and afterwards of connecting them together by unnatural Tranſitions. I own indeed, that ſuch as have not uſed to make themſelves a Plan, which they are to follow, and have contracted a habitude of Speaking without one, will find themſelves ſhackled by it; but thoſe that reaſon ſill, don't love, for the ſame reaſon, the Rules of good Reaſoning. Does it therefore follow, that they muſt not endeavour to reform themſelves, or that others muſt imitate them?

I know nothing that can be objected againſt this, but ſome Opinions of the Rhetors. They maintain, for Inſtance, † " That it is not good " to divide one's Matter with exactneſs, be- " cauſe it ſeems too much ſtudied, and the ge- " nerality of things are more agreeable, when " they appear to be invented on the ſudden, and " deduced from the thing itſelf, than when we " believe the Orator meditated on them at " home. *Pleraque gratiora ſi inventa ſubitò, nec domo allata, ſed inter dicendum ex re ipſâ nata videantur.* To which I anſwer, That this Remark may perhaps hold good in a Reply which an Advocate makes before the Judges, where ſome things may ſeem to have been invented upon the Spot. But on other Occaſions, when all the World knows we come prepared, in what we write and order to be Printed, this ſort of a Cheat will not paſs Muſter. Thus, 'tis plain, that *Quintilian* made this Remark upon the account of the

† *Quintil.* Lib. IV. c. 5.

Advocates only, for whoſe uſe principally he compoſed his Book of Inſtitutions. In this Occaſion, thoſe that have a bad Cauſe to defend, are often forced to make uſe of divers Artifices that are below the Eloquence I have been talking of, which will only undertake the Defence of a good Cauſe. Of this kind is the Artifice that the ſame *Rhetor* ſpeaks of in the following Words: " Sometimes, ſays he, we muſt put falſe Dice " upon the Judge, and inſinuate ourſelves into " his favour by ſeveral Artifices, ſo that he may " believe we have a different deſign from that " we have in reality. Now and then a Man is " forced to propoſe ſomething, which 'tis diffi- " cult to obtain; and if the Judge foreſees it, he " is afraid of it, before we ſpeak to the Point; " juſt as we ſee a wounded Man fears the Inſtru- " ments of a Chirurgeon, when he ſees them, " before the Operation begins. But if a Diſ- " courſe happens to make ſome Impreſſion upon " a Judge, who diſtruſts nothing, and having " had no Intimation of the Buſineſs, is not upon " his Guard; then it produces ſuch Effects, " which a Man cou'd not have believed, if they " had been premiſed him before-hand. In the " mean time we muſt not only avoid the divid- " ing of what we are about, but we muſt not " ſo much as treat of it at all. We muſt diſturb " and ruffle the Paſſions of the Auditors, and " hinder them from being too attentive to Mat- " ter of Fact: For an Orator not only propoſes " to himſelf to inſtruct, but much more to move. " Now nothing is ſo contrary to this as an ex- " act and ſcrupulous Diviſion, at a time when " we endeavour to hinder the Judge from ma- " king any uſe of his Judgment. *Interim verò tion fallendus eſt Judex, & variis artibus ſubeun-*

dus,

dus, ut aliud agi, quàm quod petimus, putet. Nam eſt nonnumquam dura propoſitio, quam Judex, ſi provideat, non aliter reformidat, quàm qui ferrum medici priusquàm curetur adſpexit, &c.

'Tis true, indeed, that we ſometimes meet with People of ſo unaccountable a Temper, and ſo averſe to Truth, that the moſt exact Diſpoſition of Reaſons, and the moſt proper to ſhew their Force or Weakneſs, ſhocks and provokes them; ſo that we are forced, in our own Defence, to take By-ways, and wheel round about, to bring them to themſelves. When we have ſuch Gentlemen as theſe to deal with, we muſt make an Exception to the General Rule, from which otherwiſe we ought never to depart without a viſible Neceſſity. As the principal End of thoſe that talk or write, is to recommend the Truth, we muſt change the order wherein it ſhines with greateſt Luſtre, if this Luſtre too much offends the Eyes of thoſe, who as yet don't love her. As the Precepts of this Art were laid down by thoſe that have written of them, only to lead us to this End, we muſt of neceſſity lay them aſide, when they no longer lead us to it. " It would " be down-right Madneſs to adhere ſuperſtitiouſly to theſe Precepts againſt the intereſt of " the Cauſe we have undertaken. † *Amentis eſt, ſuperſtione præceptorum, contrà rationem cauſæ trahi.* † *Quint.* Lib. IV. c. 2.

When this does not happen, we ought both in our Books and in our Diſcourſes to follow the moſt exact Method that is poſſible, ſo that it may be known at firſt ſight what is the general Deſign we propoſe to ourſelves, and what are the Parts of it; as likewiſe that we may ſhew the Connexion of all theſe Parts and Reaſonings, of which they are compos'd. This Order carries

Light

Light and Conviction with it, as I have already ſaid; and beſides this, the Reader or Hearer is more attentive to it, and is not ſo ſoon tired. This is the Judgment of *Quintilian*, who tells us, that " Diviſion, where it is properly uſed, gives " a great deal of Light and Ornament to a Diſ- " courſe. It not only occaſions, continues he, " that whatever is ſaid becomes more clear, in " drawing, as it were, from among a crowd of " Thoughts, that which we have a deſign to ſay, " and in ſetting it before the Eyes of the Judges, " but it relieves the Hearer alſo, in ſhewing " him the end of each part, after the ſame man- " ner as the Miles that are marked upon Stone " in the great Roads, are a refreſhment to the " Travellers: For 'tis ſome ſatisfaction to know " how far we are gone in our Journey, and we " ſurmount what remains behind with more Ala- " crity, when we know how long it is; for no- " thing can ſeem long, if we ſee the end of it.

† Lib. IV. c. 5. † *Opportunè adhibita plurimùm orationi lucis & gratiæ confert. Neque enim id ſolum efficit ut clariora fiant quæ dicantur, rebus velut ex turba extractis, & in conſpectu judicum poſitis; ſed reficit quoque audientem, certo ſingularium partium fine: Non aliter quàm facientibus iter multùm detrahunt fatigationis notata, inſcriptis lapidibus, ſpatia. Nam & exhauſti laboris noſſe menſuram voluptati eſt, & hortatur ad reliqua fortiùs exſequenda ſcire quantum ſuperſit. Nihil enim longum videri neceſſe eſt, in quo quid ultimum ſit certum eſt.* Now if Diviſion alone produces this Effect, according to this judicious Rhetorician, what may we not expect from a compleat Method, which ought to reign in each part of the Diſcourſe, and which repreſents all the Reaſonings, of which it is compos'd, in their natural Order.

There

There is ſcarce any Author or Orator to be found now a-days, that writes wholly without Diviſion, as *Plutarch* and *Seneca* have done, and as abundance of *Greek* and *Latin* Fathers have practis'd; but then there are ſeveral that divide their Subject amiſs, and obſerve no Order, neither between the general Parts, nor between the particular Reaſonings. This proceeds in the firſt place from their not having an Idea extenſive enough of what they deſign to ſay, and from their dividing their Subject, before they fully know the Parts of it; ſecondly, from their being ignorant of the Rules of Diviſion, or not thinking on them; and laſtly, from their not knowing of what Conſequence it is to place the moſt ſimple Idea, before thoſe that are more compounded. While thoſe that ſpeak and write, are ignorant of theſe general Principles of Logic, 'tis impoſſible but there muſt be a world of Confuſion in their Diſcourſe, and conſequently a world of Obſcurity, which cannot fail to leſſen the Attention of thoſe that either hear or read them, and which muſt of neceſſity diſguſt them. I ſuppoſe that the Diſcourſes are good in themſelves; and that a Man inſtructed in the Method of ordering his Thoughts, might be able to make exact and ſolid Diſcourſes of them. But 'tis much worſe, when 'tis nothing but a confuſed *Tiſſu* of ill Reaſonings, for 'tis impoſſible to do any good with it, tho' you caſt it into as good Order as you pleaſe. This Confuſion then ſerves as a Cloud to conceal the weakneſs of the Reaſons from thoſe, who will not give themſelves the trouble to examin them nearer at hand, or are not capable of doing it.

Of the Expreſſion. III. ALTHO' the *Invention* and *Diſpoſition* of Thoughts be the two firſt parts of Rhetoric, and that no one can pretend to real Eloquence, without obſerving the above-mention'd Rules relating to both, 'tis nevertheleſs very certain that if we don't add to all this, the other Rules, which the Maſters of this Art have given us about *Elocution*, we cannot paſs for Eloquent. For in ſhort, the Thoughts may be juſt and well order'd; and yet, for Example, not be intelligible, by reaſon of the ill Choice of the Expreſſions. Now a Diſcourſe, unintelligible or only difficult to be underſtood, can never paſs for Eloquent. We may ſay the ſame thing of other Faults of the Stile, upon which we may conſult the Rhetors. When a Man has nothing elſe to do but to ſatisfie himſelf in Thinking or Writing, 'tis enough for him to obſerve the Rules that relate to *Invention* and *Diſpoſition:* But when he is to communicate his Thoughts to others, they ought to be conceived in clear and proper Terms, that may make ſuch an impreſſion upon their Minds as we deſire.

We propoſe to ourſelves three Things in Speaking or Writing, or at leaſt one or two of them; that is, *to inſtruct*, *to give pleaſure*, *and to move* the Paſſions. We may likewiſe reduce to three ſorts of Things, all that we undertake to talk about: The firſt is of that which regards common Life, or things of pure Speculation, which of themſelves are not proper to excite any Movement in the Mind of thoſe that hear them: The ſecond is of that which is a little more elevated, tho' for all that it has nothing extraordinary nor great: The third is of great Things that are not common in Good and Evil. The

firſt

firſt require a ſimple and proper Stile; the ſecond an Elocution ſomewhat more raiſed, and the third a ſublime Stile. We ought to look upon it as an inviolable Law, always to ſuit our Stile to our Matter and Deſign. We are not more allow'd to uſe a low Stile when we are about great Things, nor an elevated Stile when we talk of vulgar Matters, than we can dreſs a full-grown Man in the Cloaths of a little Boy, or a little Boy in the Cloaths of a well-grown Man. We are likewiſe as much forbidden a figurative and vehement Stile, when we deſign to inſtruct, as we are to cry out Fire, when we only ſee a ſcrap of Paper on Fire. On the contrary, we ought to look upon it as unpardonable indifference to expreſs great Things in a cold and groveling Stile. This is what we may ſay in general about the Stile, and to this may be reduced the principal Rules of Rhetoric, that concern the Expreſſion.

" He is truly Eloquent, ſays a great Orator, " who ſo orders his Speech, as to prove, to " pleaſe, and to affect us. We are obliged to " prove whatever we advance. The Agree- " ment of Diſcourſe requires that it divert the " Hearer; and to make an intire Conqueſt of " him, we muſt bend him. This one thing con- " tributes more than all the reſt, to gain one's " Cauſe. There are as many different Stiles, as " there are Duties impos'd on an Orator; ex- " act Expreſſions ſerve to prove, a middle Stile " to delight, and a vehement Stile to move; " and 'tis in this that all the force of a Diſcourſe " conſiſts. * *Erit eloquens is, qui —— ita dicet, ut probet, ut delectet, ut flectat. Probare neceſſitatis eſt, delectare ſuavitatis, flectere victoriæ; nam id unum ex omnibus ad obtinendas cauſas poteſt plurimum.*

* *Cicero in Oratore, c. 21.*

mum. Sed quot officia Oratoris, tot ſunt genera dicendi; ſubtile in probando, modicum in delectando, vehemens in flectendo; in quo uno vis omnis Oratoris eſt. He afterwards ſhews that the Judgment of an Orator appears chiefly in obſerving a *Decorum* in relation to the Matter. All his Diſcourſe deſerves to be read, but I cou'd not ſet it down here.

Above all things, he ought to be a perfect Maſter of the Language he makes uſe of; that is to ſay, he ſhould know the proper and figurative Senſe of every word, and all that concerns the Grammar of that Language; which is to be learn'd by reading and conſulting the choiceſt Authors. This ought to be practis'd from our very Infancy, for fear leſt if we tarry too long, we ſhould have a Stile form'd, as it were, by hazard, before we are perfectly skill'd in our Mother-Tongue, which happens very frequently. Then we have no time to ſtudy the Language; the indiſpenſable Affairs of Life, and the Habit we have contracted of ſpeaking ill, will not permit us to apply ourſelves ſufficiently to it, to correct ourſelves of thoſe Faults to which we have been accuſtom'd for ſo many Years. If we ſay this truly of our Mother-Tongue, we ſhall find it much more when we have to do with Dead or Foreign Languages.

So ſoon as we have Taſte enough to diſtinguiſh a Diſcourſe that is written Elegantly from one that is not, and to take pleaſure in reading it, we are then fit to hear and comprehend the Leſſons of the Rhetoricians. The firſt thing we ought to do, in order to arrive one day at ſolid Eloquence, is to accuſtom ourſelves to write in proper and ſimple Terms, ſo as to commit, if poſſible, no Fault againſt the Propriety of Language,

guage, nor againſt the Preſpicuity of Stile. As the principal End of Speaking, is to be underſtood, the firſt thing we ſhould endeavour to obtain, is a Habit of Speaking ſo well, that the Hearers may not only divine our Thoughts, but likewiſe that it may not be poſſible not to underſtand them, when we have no deſign to ſpeak obſcurely.

This, one wou'd think, ſhou'd be eaſie, ſince the moſt ſimple and natural manner of Speaking ought to preſent itſelf firſt to the Mind: But we are encompaſſed from our Cradle by People that expreſs themſelves ill, and that have no reliſh for theſe ſort of things; ſo that we are forced to ſtudy for that, which Nature ought to have taught us. Among the *Greeks* they had Grammarians, to whom they ſent their Children ſo ſoon as they were able to write and read, to teach them to ſpeak their own Tongue truly, which they cou'd not get at home with their Parents, nor by the common uſe of Life. Among the *Romans* they not only taught *Greek* but *Latin* likewiſe. We ought in like manner to have Grammarians now a-days maintain'd at the publick Salary, to teach our Youth the Modern Languages; and I wonder, for my part, that no Eſtabliſhments of this Nature have been erected any where; for in ſhort, there is no Nation which does not love to hear its Language ſpoken Politely; nay ſome Nations have taken extraordinary Pains to Poliſh theirs.

They that dont't know what it is to write in pure and proper Terms, and to expreſs themſelves with Perſpicuity, imagine that there's nothing ſo eaſie as this, and that 'tis much more difficult to ſpeak in a more elevated Manner. Theſe People are of Opinion, that a ſtronger Genius

Genius is required to deſcribe ſome tragical Accident in a pompous magnificent manner than to diſcourſe of the ordinary things of Human Life, in a clear familiar way: But in this they are extremely miſtaken. 'Tis much eaſier, for inſtance, to imitate the Hydropic Sublimity of *Seneca* or *Lucan*, than the unaffected ſimplicity of *Terence*, and ſome Epigrams of *Martial*. I dare affirm that thoſe that are capable of writing like *Terence*, may reach *Lucan*'s Grandeur, if they pleaſe: but I defie a Man who has always uſed himſelf to a ſwelling Stile, ever to imitate *Terence* happily. To ſpeak of a modern Language, I am perſwaded that *Brebeuf*, who, as every one knows, has tranſlated the *Pharſalia* in Verſe as bloated, as thoſe of the Original, wou'd never have been able to compoſe two or three Pages of *Moliere*'s *Miſanthrope*; and that *Moliere* on the contrary, if he had thought it worth his while, cou'd have ſoared as high as *Brebeuf*. We have ſeveral pieces of *La Fontaine* written in as good an Heroic Stile as any by thoſe that have always practis'd the elevated Stile, but there is not one of theſe ſublime Genius's that cou'd ever come near his Fables.

What I have here maintain'd may ſeem a Paradox to thoſe that have not ſufficiently reflected upon it: However, to convince theſe Gentlemen I wou'd only deſire them to try how they can imitate any Author that has written in a proper and ſimple Stile, and is eſteem'd in his kind, and afterwards to imitate the ſublime Stile of any of our moſt elevated Writers. They will then be convinced by experience that the ancient Maſters of this Art had reaſon to judge the firſt more difficult than the ſecond, altho' the firſt does not

ſeem

ſeem to be ſo at firſt ſight. † *Orationis ſublimitas imitabilis quidem illa videtur eſſe exiſtimanti, ſed nihil eſt experienti minùs.* " The exactneſs of Diſcourſe ſeems eaſie to imitate when we content our " ſelves with judging without making a trial: But " when we have tried it, we ſhall find it to be " quite otherwiſe. *Horace* ſaid the ſame thing, ſpeaking of the natural Stile of Converſation. " I will make Verſes compoſed of known Ex- * " preſſions, ſo that in reading them every one " ſhall hope to do the like: But thoſe that will " endeavour to make the Experiment, will ſweat " and take a world of Pains to no purpoſe; ſo " much force is there in Order and Connexion, " and ſo much elegance in a Stile that is taken " from the common Language.

† Cicero in Oratore. c. 23.

† *Ex noto fictum carmen ſequar, ut ſibi quivis*
Speret idem, ſudet multùm, fruſtráque laboret
Auſus idem, tantùm ſeries junctúraque pollet!
Tantùm de medio ſumptis accedit honoris!

† Art. Poet. ver. 240.

" This Talent, ſays another, is neglected by " abundance of People, who look after nothing " but the Acclamations of the Multitude, whom " they have to applaud them, or elſe come acci- " dentally to hear them, and who cannot endure " that ſilence which Approbation produces. " They fancy that they are not Eloquent, unleſs " they deafen all that are about them with their " Cries and Clamours. They believe that it on- " ly belongs to Converſation to deſcribe what " they are talking of in vulgar Terms, and that " even ignorant People may do it; whereas no " Body knows whether they don't do that which " they deſpiſe as eaſie, either becauſe they will " not do it, or becauſe they find it impoſſible and

" out of their reach. For there is nothing in the " extent of Eloquence, which thoſe who have " tried all find ſo difficult to imitate, as that " which every one thinks he ſhould have ſaid in " the ſame manner, when he heard it: Becauſe " People don't believe that this Stile is elegant, " but that it is ſincere. An Orator never ſpeaks " better, than when he appears to ſpeak the Truth.

† *Quintil. Lib. IV. c. 2.* † *Neq; enim aliud in eloquentia cuncta experti difficilius reperient, quàm id quod ſe dicturos fuiſſe omnes putant, poſtquàm audierunt; quia non bona judicant illa, ſed vera. Tum autem optimè dicit Orator, cùm videtur vera dicere.*

If we may believe any one in his own Profeſſion, when there is no Temptation to conceal the Truth, we cannot reaſonably doubt of what the three great Maſters in the Art of writing both in Verſe and Proſe have told us. This Stile which they commend ſo warmly is compoſed only of pure and proper Expreſſions, of obvious eaſie Metaphors, and Figures that ariſe from the thing itſelf, which are never uſed but for neceſſity, and to illuſtrate their meaning. The principal Rock, which we ought to avoid in this ſimple and natural Language is Obſcurity, and 'tis for that reaſon that we carefully ſhun every thing that may produce it, as equivocal Terms, too great plenty of Figures, and an ill Diſpoſition of Words and Thoughts. This is the Stile we ſhould employ to inſtruct; this is the Language of Truth, which deſires nothing more than to appear all naked to the Eyes of Men. Thoſe who have no other Deſign but to make her appear, chuſe to expreſs themſelves in this manner, where every thing frequently is neglected, except Perſpicuity, and where Negligence, according to the Judgment of *Cicero*, " Is a Negligence which is not " diſagreeable, and which comes from a Man,

" who

" who is more ſollicitous about Things than " Words. † *Non ingrata negligentia, de re ho-minis, magis quàm de verbis, laborantis.* † In Oratore. c. 23.

Thoſe that can talk and write after this manner, avoid two Faults, which in my Opinion, are unpardonable in thoſe that value themſelves upon declaiming. The firſt is Obſcurity, the greateſt fault that a Man can commit in ſpeaking, ſince the end of ſpeaking, as I ſuppoſe, is to be underſtood. This Fault principally reigns in the Stile of Declaimers who ſpeak nothing naturally, but muffle up all in figurative Expreſſions, for fear they ſhou'd fall into a low frigid Stile, who give us a clear and diſtinct Idea of nothing, ſo that 'tis difficult to know exactly what they mean. With this Fault we may juſtly charge the greateſt part of the *Greek* and *Latin* Fathers, who are almoſt perpetually upon the Harangue, and who avoid clear and proper Expreſſions with as much care as the Athenian Orators ſought after them. Thus every thing almoſt is diſguis'd and ſwell'd in their Writings, in ſo extraordinary a manner, that a Man has all the difficulty in the World to underſtand them, when they treat of a Subject which is ſomewhat obſcure in itſelf. Sometimes they carry Matters ſo extravagantly high, that one cannot tell whether they talk ſeriouſly, or have a mind only to impoſe upon the Populace. This in truth was the Fault of the Times as well as of the Men; for the Eloquence of thoſe Ages was extremely different from that of the ancient Orators, either *Athenian* or *Roman*, as a Woman that is loaded, and encumbred with ſuperfluity of Habits is from one in a modeſt Garb. Thus we muſt excuſe this Fault in them, but we ought to take care not to imitate them in it: The Reader may ſee this

† *Vide Artem Crit.* P. 2. S. 1. cap. 15, & 16.

Subject treated more at large in † Authors that have compoſed the Hiſtory of Rhetoric.

Another Fault, which we find not in a ſimple and natural Stile, is, that there is nothing in it to make thoſe, that write ſo, ſuſpected of a ſort of Affectation, which is exceedingly prejudicial to thoſe that wou'd perſwade. I mean, the Affectation to appear eloquent, which a diſcerning Hearer is no ſooner ſenſible of, but he ſuſpects that the Orator whom he hears, or the Author whom he reads is more intent to diſplay his own Eloquence than to teach him the Truth, and give him any uſeful Inſtructions; from that very minute he believes that it may be poſſible for the Perſon that ſpeaks to believe very little of what he ſays, that he only choſe this Subject to get himſelf ſome Reputation by treating of it eloquently. Beſides, when we are heartily affected by any thing, and nothing but Nature talks, we uſe in our Diſcourſes no far-fetch'd Ornaments of Rhetoric, but only ſuch as ariſe from the Subject, without our thinking on them. The ſame thing may be obſerved in Tragedy itſelf, when it is rightly compoſed.

† Horat. de Arte Poet. v. 95.

Et † Tragicus plerumq; dolet ſermone pedeſtri.
Telephus & Peleus, cum pauper & exſul uterq;
Projicit ampullas & ſeſquipedalia verba,
Si curat cor ſpectantis tetigiſſe querelâ.

" Even the Tragic Poets ſometimes expreſs " Grief in common Language. *Telephus* and *Pe-* " *leus*, when they lye under the Hardſhips of " Poverty and Baniſhment, wholly throw aſide " affected Expreſſions and big rumbling Words, " if they have a mind to intereſt the Spectator " in their Complaints. The Reaſon of this is be-

becauſe we cannot be touched but by the natural repreſentation of a Paſſion, and that all Affectation ſhocks us. I am perſwaded that a ſimple plain Diſcourſe, provided it be naturally delivered, moves thoſe Auditors that have a true Taſte, more feelingly than the talleſt Metaphors; and that even upon Paper it is much more affecting than one that is penn'd in a more ſublime Stile.

However, I confeſs that there are cerain occaſions on which we are indiſpenſably obliged to riſe above the vulgar Stile; as, for inſtance, when we are to praiſe or condemn any thing, when we wou'd excite Admiration or Hatred; in ſhort, when our Subject is of a more elevated Character than what happens daily. On ſuch an occaſion the Reader or Auditor is very well pleas'd that we ſhould have recourſe to Rhetorical Ornaments. As it is not ſo much our Buſineſs at ſuch a time to inſtruct as to delight him, or to excite in him Paſſions more turbulent than Pity, he is ſatisfied with theſe Decorations; nay, what is more, he expects them, ſo that if we diſappoint him, we make him deſpiſe us, and no longer attend to what we ſay. He thinks it but requiſite that he that ſpeaks or writes to entertain him, ſhould be well prepared before-hand, and tell him nothing but that which does not frequently fall into every Body's Head.

When the Occaſion is extraordinary, or when the Subject is naturally ſublime, we expect a Stile of the ſame Dignity, that tranſports, that raviſhes, that governs and turns our Souls about as it pleaſes. This is the ſublime Stile, concerning which *Longinus* has written a Treatiſe, which is in every Body's Hands, eſpecially ſince it has been † tranſlated into *French*.

† *By Mr.* Boileau.

I will not dwell any longer upon these two latter sorts of Stiles, which are or ought to be properly the Stile of Sermons; if we except those places in them, where we only explain the Matter before us, without drawing any Consequences from it, or making any application to the Auditors. 'Tis sufficient to say, That those that aspire to this Eloquence cannot too often read over those Passages in the celebrated Masters of this Art where 'tis handled. An infinite number of People confound the sublime Stile with Fustian, and think they ravish all the World with Admiration, when they lose themselves in the Clouds, and are laugh'd and ridicul'd by all Men of a true Palat. The reason of this is, because they don't enough consider the Rules of this Art, and don't know that we ought to express ourselves in magnificent Terms only about those things that are Sublime in their onw Nature.

Objections against what has been said.

SOME Objections, which at first sight seem to have something in them, may be raised against what I have asserted relating to Eloquence. As for instance, That several of the Ancients, whom I have accused of having committed very gross Faults against the Rules, and several of the Moderns, whom I have imitated, did pass in their own time, and still pass in ours for Models of Eloquence, in the Opinions of a vast number of People that understand Rhetoric, and are by no means to be call'd Men of an ill Relish. One may go yet farther, and urge, That we behold every Day Books received with great Applause, and that we hear with Admiration several Discourses wherein scarce any of the above-mention'd Rules are observ'd. As Eloquence, will these Gentlemen pretend, is only for those whom

we have to do with, ſo ſoon as we have found out the Myſtery to pleaſe and to affect them in Speaking or Writing, we have Title enough to ſet up for Men of Eloquence.

Indeed if the eſtabliſh'd Rules of Rhetoric, which are for the generality of them ſupported by the Authority of the moſt famous Rhetors, were arbitrary Laws, and founded rather upon the uſage of ſome Language, which depends upon the Caprice of the Multitude, than upon Reaſon, which never changes; I confeſs that one might confront them with Examples, and counterballance the Authority, they have got, by the Reputation of thoſe who have violated them: But as they are built upon everlaſting Foundations, we can only conclude, that the Taſte of thoſe Gentlemen, who firſt admired thoſe that neglected theſe Laws, was a depraved Taſte, and that if there are any Men of Wit, who continue ſtill to praiſe the vicious Rhetoric of the paſt Ages, they only follow the Cuſtom in it, without conſulting their Reaſon, and repeat without examination what had been told them from their Infancy. We cannot make the Fathers, and Philoſophers, who lived after Jeſus Chriſt, paſs for juſt Reaſoners, nor for methodical Authors; but as they were the moſt ingenious Men of their times, nay, and ſometimes formidable by their Authority, and by their Cabals, they were exceſſively praiſed in their own and the ſucceeding Ages, which yet were darker and more ignorant than their own. Theſe Praiſes have been handed down like a Tradition to us, and we are only the Echos, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, of the moſt barbarous and groſs Centuries, without being at the pains to examine, whether what we ſay after them be true or not. We daily commend, merely out of cuſtom

ſtom, ſeveral Works, which we ſhould have been aſham'd to have written ourſelves, and which, in truth, we cou'd not write in this Age, without drawing the contempt of all the World upon us.

That which ſtill keeps up this Language, which at the bottom is not ſincere, is that every Man cites the Fathers in Theological Controverſies, and deſires to have them of his own ſide; yet this cou'd not be done with any Advantage, if People were generally perſwaded that they were bad Orators, and yet worſe Logicians. Thus we ſet as high a value on them as we are able, without being ſatisfied of their Merit, to make uſe of their Authority in Time and Place againſt thoſe who have declared againſt thoſe Opinions, which we ſuppoſe to have been favour'd by the Fathers. Were it not for Cuſtom and theſe Politic Reaſons, we ſhould make no ſcruple to treat them as a parcel of Men that ſtand in need of their Antiquity to make us bear with them.

I confeſs that even now a-days a Man may be admired by the People, and paſs for an eloquent Writer in his own Imagination, who violates every moment the Rules of good Rhetoric and of right Reaſon: But does it therefore follow, that there is no ſuch thing as true Rhetoric and Reaſon? If this were allow'd, we might ſay, That the Rhetoric and Reaſon of the *Europeans*, are good in *Europe*, but are worth nothing in *Aſia* and *Afric*, where the People neither talk, nor reaſon after the ſame manner. We ought to commend in *Aſia* and *Afric* the ridiculous and fantaſtical Thoughts of the People that inhabit thoſe two mighty Parts of the Earth, becauſe they find an infinite number of Admirers there. Now if we wou'd not fall into theſe Abſurdities,

we muſt own that we ought not to accommodate ourſelves to the Taſte of the People, any farther than good Senſe will warrant us; and that thoſe who are ſo deſirous to be applauded by them without this, abuſe their Ignorance, which they ſhould endeavour to undeceive, whereas they labour to increaſe it by their vicious manner of Diſcourſing. Thus true Judges will not be wanting to oppoſe themſelves to the Taſte of the Multitude; and tho' they don't make ſo great a noiſe as the latter, they are the true Diſtributers of a ſolid and laſting Reputation.

We may upon this Head add, what *Quintilian* has obſerv'd of the Orators of his own Time, *viz.* That we are oblig'd to accommodate ourſelves to the Humour of the People, who have no great regard for this extraordinary juſtneſs of Thought, of Order and Expreſſion. " We are " forced, ſaid they, to compoſe our Diſcourſes " according to the reliſh of others, and we muſt " often ſpeak before People who are wholly ig- " norant, and have no knowledge of other Sci- " ences. If we don't gain them over to our " Party by delighting them, if we don't per- " ſwade them by the vehemence of our Diſ- " courſe, or ſometimes by moving their Paſſions, " we cannot obtain even thoſe things that are " juſt and reaſonable. † *Nobis ad aliorum judi-* † Lib. IV. *cia componenda eſt oratio, & ſæpius apud omnino* c. 14. *imperitos atque aliarum certe ignaros literarum loquendum eſt; quos niſi & delectatione allicimus, & viribus trahimus, & nonnunquam turbamus affectibus, ipſa quæ juſta ac vera ſunt, tenere non poſſumus.*

But after all good Reaſonings propoſed in a clear and elegant manner, and thrown into a good order, are likelier to take with the People, than Fuſtian and Bombaſt, which they think they un-

underſtand, while at the bottom they know nothing of it. Beſides, the Rules that are given us don't in the leaſt hinder us from embelliſhing our Diſcourſe with what-ever may pleaſe the Auditor, provided that theſe Embelliſhments don't ſpoil the Perſpicuity. *Nullum ornatum*, ſays *Quintilian* in the ſame place, *qui modo non obſcuret, ſubtrahendum puto.* "We ought not to retrench "any Ornaments, unleſs they make the Senſe "obſcure. We may likewiſe move the Paſſions of the Auditor; but this ought not to be done till we have enlightned his Underſtanding that he may know why he is moved, and be convinced by his Judgment that he has reaſon to be ſo. But the public Orators have often incenſed the People againſt thoſe that did not pleaſe them, without informing them by any clear Reaſon why they deſerved their Indignation. They think it enough to charge them with a thouſand odious things, but don't give themſelves the trouble to prove them; but ſpeaking them in a vehement, pathetic manner, and appearing to be perſwaded themſelves of the Truth they ſay, they eaſily gain the People to their ſide, without any ſolid Reaſon. We cannot pretend that this Conduct ought to be imitated, without openly declaring oneſelf an Enemy to good Senſe and Equity.

Of the Pronunciation. IV. I SHOULD now, according to the method I propoſed to my ſelf, ſpeak of *Pronunciation*, but I cannot do better than to ſend my Reader to a little Book about the *Action of an Orator*, compoſed by *Michael le Faucheur*: 'Tis a Maſter-piece in its kind, to which nothing can be added. I will only mention two things which at the bottom comprehend all: The firſt is, That we ought to recite naturally, I mean to mo-

modulate the Tone of our Voice, ſo as the Nature of the Things, we treat about, requires, to explain or relate any thing in the ſame Pitch of Voice as we are uſed to obſerve when we relate or explain any thing, and wherein we ſhew a great concern before grave Perſons, and to expreſs the Paſſions, that may reign in the Diſcourſe, as we commonly do when we don't think of haranguing, but only follow the movement of the Paſſion by which we are animated. It ought to be with the Geſture exactly as with the Voice. The ſecond thing we ought to remark, is, That when they tell us we ought to follow Nature, they mean Nature poliſhed by a Gentleman-like Education, and by converſing with Perſons of good Breeding: Otherwiſe, if thoſe that have been meanly educated, and have contracted vitious Habits, which by length of time become natural to them, ſhould be ſo ill adviſed as to recite in Public, before they have reformed their ill manner, they wou'd certainly be laughed at by all the World. There are ſome Perſons, whoſe Behaviour is naturally ſo cold and unconcern'd, that if they did not ſhew a little more Heat and Life when they appear'd in Public, they wou'd moſt infallibly ſet the whole Company a ſleeping. Others on the contrary, are of ſo fiery a Temper, that they cry out from the beginning to the end, without having the leaſt regard to the difference of the matter of which they talk. We ought therefore to follow Nature, but Nature poliſh'd by Education and Care, if we have a mind to ſpeak in Public.

We have often ſeen a Diſcourſe, that has been neither faulty in the Matter, the Diſpoſition, nor the Expreſſion, to diſpleaſe merely for the ill Pronunciation of him that deliver'd it, but eſpecially

pecially becauſe his Pronunciation had ſomething forced and affected, which did not ſhew the Man to be in earneſt. 'Tis one of the moſt common Faults, with our Preachers, to deliver themſelves in ſuch a Tone of Voice as was never heard out of a Pulpit, and to have ſuch Geſtures with them as expreſs no Paſſion, and are no where ſeen but there. One wou'd ſwear, that ſo ſoon as they begin to talk and to toſs their Arms, they were not the ſame Men, and that they talk to a ſort of People whoſe Manners are clearly different: They complain, they are angry, they admire, in a word, they expreſs all the Paſſions which they have a mind to repreſent, after another way than the reſt of the World are acquainted with. If a Man ſhould behave himſelf ſo ridiculouſly at the Bar, there is no queſtion but that he wou'd ſet the Judges a laughing; and in a ſerious Converſation, where things of great Conſequence are to be treated off, the Tone of the Pulpit wou'd be much more inſufferable. A Man wou'd be to intrench upon a *Merry Andrew's* Province, ſhou'd he fling about his Arms, and ſhew a thouſand Geſtures that are only good to drive away the Flies. I have been told that a famous Advocate diſcourſing on a day with a very awkward Orator, of this Character, as the Orator asked him how he liked his manner of reciting, and whether he thought it wou'd not ſucceed at the Bar: The Advocate bluntly told him, That the very firſt thing, thoſe young Gentlemen that deſign'd to appear at the Bar, ought to do, was to forget all his Leſſons, and return to that natural manner which he had endeavour'd to efface inſtead of poliſhing.

I have

I have frequently heard an Orator, who was ſcarce Maſter of any one of the other Talents we quire in a Man of his Profeſſion, but who recited in ſo natural and ſo lively a manner, that he charm'd his Auditors by this ſingle Qualification, accompanied with a ſtrong articulate Voice; I never heard him, but he put me in mind of a certain Story of † *Demoſthenes*, who being asked what was the chief part of Rhetoric, anſwer'd, Pronunciation; being next asked, what was the ſecond beſt, he ſtill anſwer'd, Pronunciation; and ſo on, till they dropt the Queſtion. His meaning was, that this Talent was of the laſt Conſequence in *Athens*, where Affairs of the greateſt importance, in relation to the State and to private Men, were often determin'd in a bare Pleading, without the drawing of any Writings. 'Tis likewiſe extremely ſerviceable in our Pulpits; but 'tis only for the Reputation of the Preacher, and not for the public Advantage, when it is not join'd with the other parts of good Rhetoric. At ſuch times the People go from the Sermon, full of Admiration for the Parſon, altho' they ſcarce underſtand a Word he told them, and are not in the leaſt convinced, by Reaſon, of any one thing he wou'd have perſwaded to do. On the contrary, they ought to go out of Church full of Admiration for the Goſpel, full of a true Senſe of their own Faults, and full of a vigorous Reſolution to correct them, without thinking upon the Orator: They ought to be able to repeat whatever they have learnt, and to carry home with them an exact Idea of their Duties, without minding the Perſon from whom they learnt them. A good Judge takes no notice at all of an Advocate's Action, but of his Reaſonings, when he is to paſs a definitive Sentence

† Cicero *in Orat.* c. 17.

tence, but eſpecially if it be a matter of any importance.

We cannot blame thoſe that take a due care of their Pronunciation: On the contrary, we ſhou'd have juſt Reaſon to complain of them, if they did not do it; but then 'tis neceſſary they ſhou'd join the other parts of Rhetoric with it, and cultivate them with ſo much the more care, as they are of more importance. An Orator ought to be aſham'd to deceive the People, who only conſider the out-ſide, becauſe they have been uſed to be paid in that Mony: It ſhould make him bluſh to think that he ſends home his Auditors well ſatisfied, that he recites well, but little inſtructed in the Matter he treated of; like thoſe Orators, of whom *Quintilian* has obſerv'd very judiciouſly, "That they ſoften their "Voice, and turn themſelves in different man-"ners; that they hang down the Head, and toſs "their Arms about; that they affect a great "abundance of Things, and artificial Words; "and that at laſt (what ſeems to be monſtrous) "People commend the Action, but don't un-"derſtand a Jot of the Cauſe they have pleaded.

† Lib. 4. c. 2. † *Vocem flectunt et cervicem reponunt, et brachium in latus jactant, totoque et rerum et verborum et compoſitionis genere laſciviunt; deinde (id quod ſit monſtro ſimile) placet actio, cauſa non intelligitur.*

Thoſe that have any tenderneſs of Conſcience ought to employ this Talent of reciting agreeably; and by that means of rend'ring the Auditors attentive, only to inſtruct them better, and make them reliſh the great Truths of the Goſpel. To effect this, they ſhould vigorouſly apply themſelves to perform their other Duties that are requiſite in a public Orator, and to

ſpeak

ſpeak to the Congregation that liſtens to them; not as if they hoped the manner of their Recital wou'd make every thing paſs, but as if they ſpoke before ſevere Judges, who wou'd not pardon them one falſe Thought, who wou'd require from them an exact Order, and a Style ſuited to the Matter they talk of; and as if when they come out of the Pulpit, they were to leave the written Sermon in their Hands, to be examin'd by them at leiſure. Without this, what can one ſay of the Eloquence of the Pulpit, which he cannot at the ſame time apply to that of the Stage, which we go to hear not for Inſtruction, but only for our Diverſion? What can we think of the Office of a public Orator, but what we think of the vileſt and worſt employ'd of all Trades, the Followers of which endeavour to get what we promis'd them, without troubling themſelves whether their Work be good or no? Our Orators ought to fear theſe Reproaches with ſo much the more reaſon, as they retail to the People things of the higheſt importance; nay, and call their Diſcourſes the Word of God, upon pretence that the firſt Preachers of the Goſpel, whom God had honoured with the Gift of Miracles, and of extraordinary Revelations, gave this Name to what they preached to the People. 'Tis now a-days a ſort of Sacrilege to ſpeak in this manner of a negligent Diſcourſe, where we can neither ſee good Senſe, nor Method, nor Language ſuitable to the Occaſion, but which is delivered with a great deal of Boldneſs and Preſumption, as if it comprehended in effect nothing but heavenly Oracles.

Since God does not make himſelf known to Men, but by Reaſon and Revelation, we ought to call nothing his *Word*, but what is clearly

founded either upon one, or the other, and not a dull trifling Diſcourſe, where we find no traces of any light either natural, or ſupernatural. If we ought to endeavour to have an agreeable outſide, it is not becauſe from that moment we are in poſſeſſion of Saying all, and ſhamming every thing upon a blind ignorant Congregation, by means of their Voice and Geſture that pleaſe them; but only to accommodate ourſelves to their Weakneſs, and be in a condition to make them liſten to that which is really the *Word of God*. Formerly the Miracles, which the Apoſtles perform'd, and the great Sanctity of their Lives render'd their Auditors attentive to what they utter'd, tho' it was deſtitute of the Ornaments of Humane Eloquence. But now-a-days, when Miracles are no longer wrought, and that the Holineſs of the Lives of theſe public Orators is not ſo very extraordinary, 'tis but reaſonable, that, in order to attract our Attention, they ſhould employ, not the *ſecular Arm*, 'as is the practiſe of ſome Countries, but all that may ſerve to enlighten and touch reaſonable Men, and ſometimes even thoſe that are a little too delicate.

I am afraid I have ſaid too much upon this ſort of Eloquence; but muſt we always diſſemble, either out of fearfulneſs or intereſt, thoſe Truths that wou'd be of infinite Uſe, if one Day we ſhou'd liſten to them? If all thoſe that might profit themſelves by it, neglect to do it, perhaps ſome one may do it, and be follow'd by ſome others. *Quintilian* after having ſpoken ſcurvily enough of the Orators of his time, concludes, " That it is better to omit " theſe ſorts of things, for fear of offending more " People by reproving what is bad, than we oblige " them by giving them good Advice. † *Hæc omit-*

† Lib. IV. c. 2.

omittamus, ne minùs gratiæ, præcipiendo rectæ; quam offenſæ, reprehendendo prava, mereamur. But when ſhould we ſpeak Truth, tho' the moſt important in the World, if we were to ſtay till it wou'd make us Friends among the generality of Mankind? Perhaps never.

CHAP. III.

Of Hiſtory and the Difference between the Modern and Ancient Hiſtorians.

NOTHING is ſo entertaining and inſtructive as Hiſtory, when it is well written; and on the contrary, nothing more infamous and hurtful, when it is not written as it ought to be: that is to ſay, when it delivers Lies inſtead of Truth, nay even when it diſſembles it. The former ſupplies us with what we want in Experience, which is always ſhut up in narrow bounds, by faithfully relating all that happen'd before us, by which we may reap as great Benefit, as if we had actually ſeen them. On the other hand, the latter inſtructs us in nothing, becauſe it reports things otherwiſe than they fell out, and indeed than they commonly do fall out. The firſt repreſents a Man, ſuch as he is, with his good and bad Qualities, with his laudable Actions, and thoſe that deſerve Cenſure: The ſecond deſcribes him ſuch as the Hiſtorian wiſhes him to have been, whether bad or good, or rather it ſub-

ſtitutes a Phantome in his place. As a true and ſincere Hiſtory propoſes the Advantage of the Reader by diſcovering Truth to him: So that which is falſe and diſguiſed has no other end but the Profit of the Hiſtorian, who hopes to get ſomething by lying or by diſſembling what he knows.

Four things, in my Opinion, are requiſite to make a good Hiſtorian, and without them we cannot expect any thing conſiderable from him. The firſt is, To be well Inſtructed in what he attempts to Relate: The ſecond, To be capable of Saying without any Diſguiſe what he believes to be true: The third, To know how to Relate what he knows: And laſtly, the fourth, To be able to form a true Judgment of the Events he reports, and of the Men who contributed to bring them about. It will not be amiſs to make ſome Reflexions upon theſe four things; a general Knowledge of which may enable us to judge whether a Hiſtory be good, or bad.

Of the Matter of Hiſtory.

I. A MAN may be inſtructed two ſeveral ways in what he relates when he writes the Hiſtory of his own time, that is to ſay, either by himſelf or others. He is inſtructed by himſelf in what he ſaw and what he managed, the conſequence of which he obſerved himſelf: But it muſt be confeſſed that this does not go very far, ſince that abſolutely ſpeaking, he cou'd do but very few things by himſelf, and cou'd be preſent but in one place at a time. That which others do, they relate to us, juſt as they themſelves think fit, eſpecially if there were but few Witneſſes of their Actions, or if theſe Witneſſes are dead, or dare not contradict them. They either take care not to ſpeak of the Faults they committed, or elſe

elſe they ſtrangely diſguiſe them. If any Diſadvantageous Accident befalls them, they attribute it either to the Malice of others, or to ill Fortune, but never to their own Indiſcretion. He that queſtions this, needs only caſt his Eyes upon the *Memoirs*, which abundance of illuſtrious Perſons have compoſed of their own Life, and there he will every-where find enough to juſtifie my Aſſertion. Theſe are not Hiſtorians, who ſpeak of themſelves without Paſſion: They are rather Advocates that plead their own Cauſe, or that make their own Apology before Poſterity, as well as before thoſe who lived in their own time. What has been ſaid of theſe *Memoirs*, the ſame, and perhaps much worſe we may ſay of the Reports that have been made to Princes and Generals concerning Matters that were tranſacted in thoſe places where they were not. This occaſion'd *Aſinius Pollio* to ſay, " That the Memoirs of *Cæſar* (for ſo we ought to call his Commentaries " in *Engliſh*) were written with little Care, and " with too little regard to the Truth; becauſe " he too eaſily believed the greateſt part of what " was related to him about the Actions of other " Men, and has unfaithfully reported what he " himſelf did, either out of Deſign, or thro' " defect of Memory. † *Pollio Aſinius parùm dili-* † Sueton. *genter, parúmq; integrâ veritate compoſitos* (Cæſaris in Jul. Cæſare. c. 56. Commentarios) *putat; cùm pleraque, quæ per alios erant geſta temerè crediderit, & quæ per ſe, vel conſulto, vel etiàm memoriâ lapſus perperam ediderit.* It is not to be doubted but that thoſe that afterwards writ Memoirs in imitation of him, have been guilty of the ſame Practice. *Cicero* in one of his † Letters, wherein he teſtifies an extraordinary deſire to ſee the Hiſtory of his Conſulſhip written by *Lucceius*, ſays merrily, that if this

† *Ad Fam.* Lib. V. Epiſt. 12.

Hiſtorian refuſed him this favour, he wou'd write it himſelf, after the Example of ſeveral Perſons before him. " But as you know well enough, " continues he, there are Inconveniences in this " manner of Writing: Becauſe a Man is obliged " to ſpeak of himſelf with too much reſerved- " neſs, when he comes to recount any thing that " deſerves Commendation, and to omit whatever " is to be found fault with: *Sed quod te non fugit, hæc ſunt in hoc genere vitia; & ut verecundius de ſe ipſi ſcribant neceſſe eſt, ſiquid eſt laudandum, et prætereant ſiquid fortè reprehendendum eſt.*

The Caſe being thus, we muſt not expect to learn the whole truth exactly either from Princes, or their Miniſters, or their Generals, even tho' we might ask them any Queſtions we deſir'd to be inform'd in, and they were inclin'd fairly to anſwer them, which however but very rarely happens. What courſe then ſhall an Hiſtorian take to inform himſelf of the Truth? For my part I ſee no other way for him, than to enquire of all the People he can, to liſten to what is ſaid of all ſides, and what Enemies report one of another, to heap together all that is publiſhed in ſeveral Languages of both the Parties, and eſpecially the public Acts: And laſtly, To compare all theſe different Reports with abundance of care. By this means he comes to be convinced, that there are certain inconteſtable matters of Fact in which all the World are a greed; but that there are ſeveral Circumſtances of which a Man cannot be certain, by reaſon of all the great variety of Reports. An Hiſtorian ought to paſs over theſe doubtful Matters in general terms, for fear of deceiving his Reader by a Relation, which he cannot warrant.

In order to collect his Materials well, 'tis requiſite that he ſhould be skill'd in ſeveral Languages,

ges, that he ſhou'd know the form of Government of thoſe places, whoſe Hiſtory he writes, as alſo their Intereſts; that he be acquainted with the Genius of the People and their Forces; that he be not ignorant of the Situation of Places; and, above all this, that he be laborious, attentive, and diligent, have a good Diſcernment, a ſolid Judgment, and a ſincere Mind. If one of theſe Qualifications be wanting, 'tis enough to make an Author uncapable of ſucceeding. For Inſtance, we have ſeen ſome Years ago ſeveral Hiſtories publiſh'd in *France*, wherein are related abundance of matters of Fact, and other things relating to *England* and *Holland*. A Man will at firſt ſight obſerve that many of theſe Authors were not in a Capacity to conſult the Writings and Relations that were daily publiſhed in theſe two places, and that they were intirely ignorant of their manner of Government and their Forces, as well as of the Genius of their People. He will likewiſe find that the Difference of Opinions, concerning the Principles of Religion and Politics, has made them take things quite otherwiſe than they were. I don't at all queſtion but that on the other ſide great Faults have been committed, in relation to *France*, eſpecially by thoſe, who do not underſtand *French*, or never were in *France*, or ſuffer'd themſelves to be too much influenced by a Spirit of Partiality. It muſt however be ſaid, that the Government of *France*, and all that belongs to it, is more eaſie to be underſtood by Strangers, than the Affairs of Strangers by *French* Men.

Sometimes though we are furniſh'd with all the neceſſary Aſſiſtances to know the truth of a Fact, Negligence makes us commit abominable Miſtakes. Thus *Vittorio Siri*, in his † *Memorie Recondite*, ſpeaks of the Night, in which *Lewis* the

† *Tom.* 8. *p.* 665.

XIV. was born. *Quattro hore ſpeſe il Re in quel colloquio, ſi che l'hora trovataſi troppo tarda per ritornare quella notte nevoſiſſima (correndo il meſe di Decembre à Grobois, convenne per forzoſa neceſſità dormire) à Parige; & rimaſto il letto del Re à Grobois, la Regina colla cena li fece parte del ſuo; notte fortunatiſſima per la Francia, perche per un intrecciamento di circoſtance ſi ſtupende, s'infantò il Dolfino*, &c. Not to take notice of the nonſenſical Bombaſt in theſe words, which might ſuffer a little perhaps too thro' the Fault of the Printer; *Siri* might eaſily have known that *Lewis* the XIV. was not born in *December* but *September*, and not at *Paris*, but at St. *Germain en Laye*. So groſs a Miſtake as this muſt needs be the effect of an inexcuſable Negligence. Some have been of Opinion, that the Example alledged out of *Siri*, is not well choſen, but ſee what the Author has ſaid about it, in the *Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres* of this preſent Year, in *September*.

Perhaps it will be told me, that I require ſo many things in an Hiſtorian to judge him only capable of informing himſelf as to matters of Fact for which he has occaſion, that there are but very few, who, in my Opinion, ought to be ſuffer'd to write Hiſtory. I own it, and further add, that I look upon it to be the moſt difficult Task in the World, if a Man wou'd acquit himſelf in it as he ought. But then the Advantages, that thoſe who are now living, and thoſe that come after us, may reap from a good Hiſtory, are ſo great, we ought not to expect it from an ordinary Man.

It will ſtill be objected perhaps, that ſuppoſe an able Man, ſuch as I have deſcribed, had done all that lay in his power to inform himſelf of the Truth, he wou'd ſtill be at a loſs to find out the Springs and Motives of ſeveral very conſiderable Acti-

Actions, becauſe the Perſons concerned in them are obliged in Intereſt to keep 'em concealed, and that without this Knowledge, a Hiſtory will reſemble a Body without a Soul, all whoſe Movements appear to be forced. To this I anſwer, That by diverſe indiſputable Matters of Fact, and by the General Knowledge we have of the Intereſts and Deſigns of the ſeveral Powers that are mentioned there, we may clearly enough know the General Motives that ſet them in Action, and which are undoubtedly the moſt important and, as it were, the principal Wheels, which move the whole Machine, whoſe Motion is there deſcribed: As for the others, which we cannot penetrate into, we muſt either let them alone, and elſe relate them in a doubting manner. An Hiſtorian is not oblig'd to recount every thing, and to advance nothing but what he is poſitively certain of: He is only oblig'd not to relate any thing that is falſe for true, and not warrant any thing that is incertain.

What I have ſaid, concerns the Hiſtory of the preſent Age, or what happens during the Life of the Hiſtorian. When we undertake an Hiſtory, in which we cannot inſtruct ourſelves from the Mouths of ocular Witneſſes who are all dead, either lately, or a long while ago; all we can do, is to conſult the Writings that are remaining, whether they be Public or Private; and for this end we muſt take the ſame care, and have the ſame Knowledge and Qualifications, which I have already mention'd, in reſpect of Witneſſes and Modern Writings. Above all, we ought to bring with us a great ſtock of Diſcernment for this ſort of Reading, that we may not be ſurprized by Relations ſtuff'd with lies, or too paſſionately written.

The ancient *Greek* and *Latin* Hiſtorians, that have attempted to write the Hiſtory of the remoteſt Times, or at leaſt of the Ages which immediately preceded theirs, have often obſerv'd this Maxim very religiouſly, altho' I cannot deny that ſeveral of them have neglected it. When they ſpeak of the fabulous Times, they give us the Hiſtory of them for no more than they are worth, that is to ſay, for a Narration, where among ſome true Matters of Fact, there are an infinite number of Lies. When they come down to the Hiſtory of thoſe Ages, of which they had certain Monuments extant, they took a great deal of Pains to diſtinguiſh between the true and the falſe. Of this we find ſome remarkable Examples, in the *Roman* Hiſtory of *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſeus*, and even in that of *Livy*, tho' it is not ſo judicious nor exact. *Polybius* has given us undoubted Marks of an exquiſite Judgment in his Hiſtory; a fair Inſtance of which we may find in the † Judgment he makes of two Hiſtorians, one of which favour'd the *Romans*, and the other the *Carthaginians:* " I was ſo much the " more induced to attempt the Hiſtory of this " War, becauſe thoſe who are commonly ſup- " poſed to have written it the beſt, have not ſo " carefully follow'd the Truth, as they ought to " have done. I don't believe indeed that they " publiſh'd Lies with a deſign, when I conſider " their Life and the Party they follow'd: But in " my Opinion, the ſame thing befel them which " happens to Men who are blinded by Love. " It appears to *Philinus*, by reaſon of his Pre- " poſſeſſion for his own Side, that the *Cartha- " ginians* did every thing bravely, and the *Ro- " mans* quite otherwiſe. *Fabius* is of a diffe- " rent Opinion. He afterwards moſt admirably de-

† Lib. I. *p.* 18.

deſcribes that diſintereſſed Impartiality, in which an Hiſtorian ought always to continue, and I will cite ſome of his words a little lower. But I muſt here ſet down an Inſtance he gives us of the Paſſion of theſe two Hiſtorians, and after what manner we ought to judge of paſſionate Relations. " *Philinus*, ſays he, in the beginning " of his Narration and of his ſecond Book tells " us, that while the *Carthaginians* and *Syracuſians* " beſieged *Meſſina*, the *Romans* got into the " Town by Sea, and ſallying out immediately " againſt the *Syracuſians*, they were obliged to " turn back to the Town with a conſiderable " Loſs: That afterwards making another Sally " upon the *Carthaginians*, they were not only " ſoundly beaten, but a great number of their " Soldiers were made Priſoners. After having " related this, he ſays, that *Hiero* King of *Syra-* " *cuſe*, after this Battel became ſo extravagant that " he not only ſet Fire on his Camp that Inſtant, " and retired in the Night to *Syracuſe*, but aban- " don'd all the ſtrong Places he poſſeſs'd upon " the Frontier of thoſe of *Meſſina:* That the " *Carthaginians*, after the ſame Battel, abandon'd " likewiſe their Camp, and diſperſed themſelves " in the Towns, daring to defend nothing of " that which had not been fortified: That for " this reaſon, their Leaders perceiving the fear " of their Soldiers, reſolved not to hazard a " Battel: That the *Romans* who follow'd them, " not only plunder'd the Country, but alſo at- " tempted to Beſiege *Syracuſe*, and take it by " Force. This Narration, adds *Polybius*, ap- " pears to me ſo full of Abſurdities, that I don't " think it neceſſary to beſtow a longer Exami- " nation upon it; for thoſe whom he had re- " preſented as Beſieging *Meſſina*, and Conque-

" rors

" rors of the *Romans*, he deſcribes afterwards " flying, abandoning all Places that were not " fortified, and at laſt beſieged, and full of fears. " On the contrary, thoſe whom he had deſcrib- " ed as vanquiſhed and beſieged, he repreſents " them perſuing their Enemies, Maſters of the " Field, and at laſt Beſieging *Syracuſe*. 'Tis im- " poſſible to reconcile theſe Matters of Fact; " for it follows of neceſſity, that either what he " ſaid at firſt is falſe, or that the following Nar- " ration is falſe: But this Narration in effect is " true, for the *Carthaginians* and *Syracuſians* aban- " don'd the Field, and the *Romans* immediately " beſieged *Syracuſe*, &c. We muſt therefore " confeſs, that what he had ſaid in the beginning " was falſe, and that altho' the *Romans* came off " Conquerors in the Battels they fought about " *Meſſina*, he had repreſented them as beaten. " We ſhall find that *Philinus* does the ſame in all " his Work, and that *Fabius* comes not ſhort of " him. By this 'tis evident, that we may diſco- " ver the falſity of ſeveral Matters of Fact, by " examining what follows in the Hiſtory.

It wou'd be an eaſie matter to apply this to the different Relations we have had publiſh'd of the War, which was lately concluded between *France*, *England*, and *Holland*. One ſide deſcribes *France* to us always Victorious, acting prudently on all Occaſions, abounding in every thing, in a Condition to continue the War ſeveral Years longer: And on the contrary, its Enemies almoſt always beaten, loſing their Towns one after another for want of Proviſions, exhauſted and ready to beg a Peace at the Feet of the Conquerors. It wou'd follow naturally from hence, that the great Superiority of the Conqueror wou'd put him in a Condition to give ſuch a Peace

Peace as he pleaſed. Nevertheleſs we have ſeen the contrary, ſince he has reſtor'd all that he has taken, and more than that; after he had preſs'd in an extraordinary manner to have a Peace. On the other ſide, they have repreſented *France* as drain'd and diſpeopled to all Eternity, by the groſs Soleciſms of its Politics, and by its exceſſive Expenſes; whereas its Enemies were ſtill formidable, and in very flouriſhing Circumſtances. If this had been intirely true, the Peace ought to have been more Advantagious for them, as well as their Succeſs in the War. To ſay the truth, both Parties ought to abate very much of their Rodomantades and Calumnies. Some People perhaps will think that I have expreſs'd my ſelf too freely about an Affair ſo recent; but when I was ſpeaking of the Laws of Hiſtory, was it poſſible for me to ſpeak otherwiſe? A Man muſt have a very mean Opinion of the People that were intereſſed in the laſt War, to think they are uncapable of hearing the leaſt truth upon that occaſion. For my part, I don't believe them to be ſo unreaſonable.

'Tis a common Queſtion, whether thoſe who write ancient Hiſtory, or at leaſt a Hiſtory of which there are no living Witneſſes, ought to cite the Authors, whom they make uſe of, in every Page, or every Article. Upon this there are different Opinions; ſome believe that it is not at all neceſſary to make uſe of ſuch Citations, and that the Reader ought to rely upon the Choice and Sincerity of the Hiſtorian, without asking him from whence he took the Matters of Fact, he recounts. They ground themſelves upon the Practice of the ancient *Greek* and *Latin* Hiſtorians, who very rarely quote the Authors they make uſe of; as for inſtance, when there is ſome diffe-

difference of Opinion between them. Since therefore we truſt the Relations of theſe Hiſtorians, they maintain that we ought to ſhew the ſame Complaiſance to the Moderns. If an Hiſtorian finds it for his purpoſe, he may publiſh, ſay they, a Liſt of the Hiſtorians, whom he has conſulted, either at the beginning or end of his Hiſtory, that we may ſee from whom he has borrow'd his Materials; but he is not oblig'd to cite them for every Fact in particular.

Others maintain, that an Hiſtorian ought to cite his Authors all along, and pretend that the Ancients were in the wrong not to do it; and that we ought not ſo intirely to depend upon them for that very reaſon. Indeed, if the thing be ill in itſelf, the Example of the Ancients does not make it a jot the better, and nothing ought to hinder us from doing better than they. The Republic of Letters is at laſt become a Country of Reaſon and Light, and not of Authority and implicit Faith, as it has been but too long. Multitudes paſs no longer there for Arguments, and all Cabals are ſilenced. There is no Divine or Humane Law which prohibits us to bring the Art of writing Hiſtory to Perfection, as we have endeavour'd to bring to Perfection the other Arts and Sciences. As a Philoſoper is not to be excuſed now a-days if he ſpeaks obſcurely, or ſuppoſes incertain things for certain, after the Example of *Ariſtotle* and other ancient Philoſophers, who have committed the ſame Faults: So the Example of *Herodotus* or *Livy* is no manner of Protection to thoſe that imitate their Defects and Vices. If we commend them, it muſt always be remembred that theſe Commendations are paid to what is good in them, as the Purity and Elegance of their Style, but by no means to their

their Faults and Imperfections. Beſides, we ought to conſider that we eſteem them in part, becauſe we have no other Monuments left but theirs; and that we don't believe them but when we have no juſt Reaſon to contradict them, or for the ſake of the Probability of their Narrations, or becauſe we have no Teſtimony more ancient and more exact than theirs, to correct them. We believe in ſhort the Groſs of the Hiſtory, but we remain in ſuſpence as to the Circumſtances.

The Caſe being thus, if there are great inconveniences in making no Citations, neither the Example of the Ancients nor their Imitators, is enough to cover from Cenſure ſuch as have omitted to do it. We therefore maintain, that if a Man avoids to quote his Vouchers, the reaſon of it is, becauſe he wou'd not have any one to examine the Hiſtory, as he relates it, by comparing the Narration with that of other Hiſtorians who writ before him. For what way is there to examine what any Author ſays, in caſe he cites no one in particular, unleſs we had every Book that he conſulted, and had carefully read them, and preſerv'd them in our Memory? Not one Man in a thouſand is capable of it, and not one Man in a thouſand has all the Books which he ought to have for this purpoſe. But beſides this, we have always a juſt Pretence to think that we are impos'd upon; for it may ſo happen, that the Author whom we read, has follow'd ſome Hiſtorian, whom thoſe who have an intereſt to examine the Hiſtory, have not by them, or elſe have not read him, or laſtly, have forgotten him. But tho' we dare not immediately charge that Hiſtorian with Falſehood, who has not made his Citations, ſo neither dare we rely upon

on him. As by following this Method, 'tis eaſie for a Man to ſham a Romance upon the World without fear of diſcovery, and to give his Hiſtory whatever Turn he pleaſes, the ſuſpicious Reader does not know where to take his Word, and immediately throws aſide a Book, on which he cannot ſafely depend.

It has been affirmed, that a Modern Hiſtorian who has compos'd a very large Hiſtory concerning the Troubles of Religion, took this courſe, that he might with more ſafety invent what might make for his ſide, and ſatisfie the Facts that diſpleaſed him. For my part, I never examined him, and therefore can ſay nothing to this Buſineſs; but I muſt confeſs that the Method he has follow'd, makes him ſuſpected of all that has been laid to his Charge, and that he has no other way to juſtifie himſelf, but by fairly producing his Witneſſes; otherwiſe he will never anſwer the Objections and Complaints that have been made againſt his Books, and which without queſtion have come to his Ears before now.

Beſides this, they maintain that the Precaution which ſome Writers have taken to place the Authors whom they follow'd, at the Head of their Hiſtory, is altogether inſignificant, unleſs they had cited the particular Places, becauſe that it is liable to almoſt all the Inconveniences which we complain'd of in thoſe who don't cite at all. In effect, 'tis a very difficult matter to know what Hiſtorian a Man may have follow'd, in every Fact, even tho' he had them all: But they carry the Matter farther, and ſay, That oftentimes this pompous Catalogue of Authors is only made for Oſtentation, and that the Compiler of it perhaps never ſaw the Covers of half the Books he puts in his Muſter-Roll. 'Tis certain

that

that nothing is ſo eaſie as to compoſe a great Liſt of Hiſtorians whom we never beheld, and to place them boldly at the Head of a Hiſtory; but ſuppoſing it compos'd with never ſo much ſincerity, yet ſtill it depends upon the Reader, whether he will believe it or no. There is only one thing I know of, which can pardon this in an Hiſtorian, and that is our being aſſured of his Veracity. For this reaſon it is that we don't think the worſe of *Thuanus*, for having uſed this Conduct. Thoſe evident Marks of Sincerity and Moderation which he ſhews all along, have made us forgive him this Fault, altho' we don't forgive it in ſuch People as *Varillas*, whoſe Paſſion and Romancing Genius are conſpicuous in every Line of his Works.

II. THE ſecond thing we require of an Hiſtorian, is that after he has taken all poſſible care to inſtruct himſelf in the Truth, to have the Courage to declare it without being byaſs'd. " Who is it but muſt know that the principal " Law of Hiſtory, is that it dare to utter no- " thing which is falſe, and that it dare to ſpeak " all the truth, that it may not give the leaſt " Umbrage, that it is influenced either by Affe- " ction or Prejudice? Theſe, in ſhort, are its " Foundations that are known by all the World. † *Quis neſcit primam eſſe Hiſtoriæ legem, nequid falſi dicere audeat; deinde nequid veri non audeat; ne qua ſuſpicio gratiæ ſit in ſcribendo, nequa ſimultatis? Hæc ſcilicet fundamenta nota ſunt omnibus.* † *Cicero* Lib. II. *de Oratore* c. 15. *of Truth.*

But in order to obſerve this Law, which is without diſpute eſſential to Hiſtory, a Man before he ſets himſelf down to Write, ought entirely to diſengage himſelf from all ſorts of Paſſions

ſions and Prepoſſeſſions, without which he will certainly ſuppreſs or diſguiſe the Truth, nay and publiſh a thouſand Lies either on purpoſe, or elſe for want of taking due heed. 'Tis impoſſible to ſay any thing upon this Article more vehement, or more ſolid, or more neceſſary than what *Lucian* has ſaid in that Treatiſe, where he teaches us in what manner a Hiſtory ought to be written. I will here ſet down ſome of his words, and will follow *d' Ablancourt*'s Tranſlation, altho' it only expreſſes the Author's Meaning, and has retrench'd a great deal from the Original. "Above all, ſays he, we ought not to be devoted "to any Party; for we muſt not do like that "Painter who painted a Monarch *de profil*, becauſe "he had only one Eye: We ought to repreſent "him entire. Let not his Reſpect for his Country hinder him from relating the Loſſes ſhe has "ſuſtain'd, or the Faults ſhe has committed; for "an Hiſtorian, no more than a Player, is to be "blamed for the Misfortunes he repreſents. If "it were in our power to repair Diſorders by "diſguiſing them, or paſſing them over in ſilence, *Thucydides* had not been wanting to "have raz'd with a ſtroke of his Pen the Fortifications of the Enemy, and to have re-eſtabliſh'd "the Affairs of his Country; but even the Gods "themſelves are not able to change whatever is "paſt. Therefore 'tis the Duty of an Hiſtorian "to recount all Tranſactions, juſt as they happen'd, which 'tis impoſſible for him to do, "when he is a Dependant upon any Prince or Republic, from whom he has any thing to hope "or fear. When-ever he is obliged to ſpeak of "'em, he ought to have a greater regard for "Truth, than for his Intereſt, or Paſſion. For "ſhe is the only Divinity to whom he ought to

"Sa-

" Sacrifice, without thinking of the reſt. In " ſhort he ought always to have before his Eyes " the judgment of Poſterity, if he wou'd not ra- " ther wear the Character of a Flatterer than that " of an Hiſtorian. —— I wou'd have my Hiſtori- " an zealous to ſpeak the Truth, and that he lye " under no Temptations to conceal it; let him " make no Allowances to Fear or Hope, to Friend- " ſhip or Hatred; let him not be of any Country " or Party, and let him call every thing by its " true Name, without remembring either to of- " fend or pleaſe. And this, continues he, is the " Method which *Thucydides* follow'd, altho' he " ſaw *Herodotus* was in ſo great Eſteem, that " his Books had the Names of the Muſes beſtow'd " upon them. It is infinitely better for me, ſaid " he, to write ſomething that will laſt for ever, " than only endeavour to pleaſe for the preſent. I " ought not to take in fabulous Stories, but to tranſ- " mit to Poſterity the Truth, as it happen'd. —— " See now what ought to be the Sentiments of a " true Hiſtorian.

Theſe are ſuch evident Truths that 'tis impoſ- ſible to reject them, however it may be conveni- ent to enlarge upon them a little more, to ſhow the great Importance of them, in a more ſenſi- ble manner. I ſay then that an Hiſtorian ought at firſt ſetting out to forget that he has any Friends, Relations, or any Country; that he may be able to ſpeak of them with the ſame diſinte- reſſed Freedom as if he had no manner of En- gagements to them. The Duties of a Friend, of a Relation, or of a Citizen are one thing, and the Duty of an Hiſtorian another. The former are confined to certain Perſons and Places, whoſe ad- vantage we endeavour to procure, but the latter concerns all Mankind in general, that are able to

read History, in whatever place or time they are born. As 'tis but convenient that the Intereſts of our Friends and Relations ſhou'd give way to thoſe of our Country, becauſe 'tis much better to procure the Advantage of a great number of Perſons, or of a whole Society, than that of ſome few of its Members, ſo in the ſame manner the preſent Intereſt of one's Country ought to be leſs conſider'd, than that which is infinitely more extenſive, the Intereſt of all Mankind. † *Polybius* ſpeaking of ſome Hiſtorians who had been too favourable to their Country, ſays admirably well, " That in other Duties of Life this Diſpo- " ſition was not to be blamed. For 'tis juſt that " a good Man ſhould be a Friend to his Friend, " and to his Country, and bear a Hatred to their " Enemies, and a Friend to their Friends. But " ſo ſoon as he takes the Character of an Hiſto- " rian upon him, that very moment he ought to " forget all this. An Hiſtorian is frequently ob- " liged to ſpeak well of his Enemies, and to give " them great Commendations, when their Acti- " ons deſerve it. He muſt often cenſure his near- " eſt Relations, and cover them with Infamy, when " they have committed ſuch Faults that he can- " not ſpeak otherwiſe of them. As a Creature " which has loſt its Eyes becomes unſerviceable; " in the ſame manner, if you take away Truth " from Hiſtory, what remains is good for no- " thing. For this Conſideration he ſhou'd not " make any difficulty to condemn his Friends, and " blame his Enemies. He muſt not be afraid to " cenſure the ſame Perſons upon whom he has " beſtow'd Commendations, ſince thoſe that are " in the Government cannot always ſucceed, nor " on the other hand, commit Faults perpetual- " ly. Without having any regard to the Perſons,

" he

† *Lib.* I. *p.* 18. *Edit. Amſtel.*

" he ought to relate things by themſelves, and to " ſpeak of them in his Hiſtory, as they deſerve. Some one will ſay perhaps that theſe are fine words, and that they comprehend an excellent Leſſon, but a Man muſt be Maſter of a great deal of Courage and Reſolution, he muſt love Truth in an extraordinary manner to obſerve the Rules which this Hiſtorian has laid down. Theſe are Qualities that are not eaſily to be found; and has he follow'd the ſame Precepts himſelf, which he recommends to others?

But I ask the Gentlemen, who ſtart theſe Difficulties, Whether they imagine that to Write a Hiſtory be an Employment proper for every one that can expreſs himſelf with Facility? Whether they believe that a mean-ſpirited Wretch, that a Flatterer, that a covetous intereſſed Man is fit to inſtruct all Poſterity? A Man's Talents ought to anſwer the Greatneſs of ſuch an Enterprize; and if 'tis a rare matter to find Perſons that poſſeſs them all, 'tis equally as rare to find Hiſtories that deſerve to be read. As for *Polybius*, only thoſe that never read him, can poſſibly take him for a Philoſopher or Preacher, which People often do the quite contrary to what they recommend to others. He ſhows all along that he had a very great Eſteem for *Aratus*, the General of the *Achæans*: However, that does not hinder him from cenſuring in his Conduct, with great freedom, whatever he thought was amiſs in it. For inſtance, He deſcribes at length, in the fourth Book of his Hiſtory, the Faults, which *Aratus* committed in a Battel againſt the *Ætolians*, that was purely loſt by his means; without diſſembling any thing of, and endeavouring to excuſe what wou'd admit of no Apology. He knew what difference there is between Pardoning and

Juſtifying; and altho' he was of opinion that the *Achæans* ought to pardon *Aratus* for the Faults he had commited upon this Occaſion, in conſideration of the great Services he had done their Republic, and the Honeſty of his Intentions, yet he knew that 'twas not an Hiſtorian's Buſineſs to endeavour to Juſtifie them. But *Polybius* was by no means capable of betraying the Truth in favour of *Aratus:* he who does in no manner conceal the Faults of *Philopœmen*, nor thoſe of *Lycortas*; the latter of whom was his Father, and the former his Friend and Protector. This the Reader may eaſily remark in his † Narration of the Embaſſy of *Lycortas* in *Ægypt*, in the Name of the *Achæans*. He went thither to renew the Alliance which the *Achæans* had long before made with the *Ptolomys*, and this Deſign had been vigorouſly ſupported by *Philopœmen*. However heacquitted himſelf ſo negligently in this Employ, that he contented himſelf with making the King of *Ægypt* Swear, and with ſwearing himſelf in the Name of the *Achæans*, before he had agreed upon any Articles with him; altho' the *Achæans* had made ſeveral different Treaties with the *Ptolomys*. At his return home, *Ariſtenus*, General of the *Achæans*, who was of the contrary Faction, as he was giving his Advice in the general Aſſembly of *Achaia*, ask'd him what ſort of an Alliance he had renew'd with the King of *Ægypt*, and reckon'd up ſeveral Treaties which the Republic had made with his Predeceſſors. Upon this the Aſſembly was eager to know which of theſe Treaties he had confirmed. " Now this, ſays the Son of " *Lycortas*, was what neither *Philopœmen* himſelf, " who, as being General, had adviſed the renew- " ing of the Alliance, nor *Lycortas*, nor the o- " ther Ambaſſadors, who had been at *Alexan-*

" *dria*,

† *Excerpta Legat.* 41.

" *dria*, cou'd ſay any thing to. It was therefore " unanimouſly adjudged, that they had acquit- " ted themſelves very negligently in their Com- " miſſion. *Ariſtenus*, on the contrary, ſeemed " to be a Man of Ability, as being the only Per- " ſon who knew what he ſaid. 'Tis after this manner that *Polybius* ſpeaks of his Protector and of his Father. He obſerves the ſame Conduct, when he ſpeaks of thoſe Perſons for whom he had no Kindneſs. He lays down their Virtues with as much Impartiality as their Vices; becauſe his only pleaſure was to ſpeak Truth. I will give an Inſtance of it below.

The beſt Hiſtorians have imitated him more or leſs, according as they had more or leſs Courage, or Love for the Truth. It is almoſt impoſſible for a Man not to have an Averſion for the Enemies of his Country, or thoſe from whom he has received any perſonal Injury. He will have an Idea of Injuſtice generally before his Eyes, whenever he thinks of them, and this will ſo far influence him as to make him repreſent them for a People, or a Set of Men that are Enemies to Juſtice. The Princes that enter'd into a Cofederacy againſt *France*, (in the War which began in 1688, and ended in 1697) and their Subjects have looked upon, and do ſtill look upon *France* as an unjuſt Power, which deſign'd to make itſelf Miſtreſs of all *Europe*. In *France*, on the other hand, they have accuſed the Allies of Injuſtice, and it may be they are ſtill prepoſſeſs'd with this Opinion. Thus it happens that when Writers of theſe different Countries, undertake to ſpeak of the contrary Party, they ſeldom fail to load it with an odious Character, and to make an Apology for their own. As their Minds are poſſeſs'd by prejudice and Paſſion, their Thoughts conſe-

quently take the ſame Tincture, even without their being ſenſible of it; and this is the Reaſon why we ſee nothing almoſt upon theſe Subjects, that deſerves to be read. But as we ought to forget that we have Friends, Relations, and a Country, when we are obliged to mention them in Hiſtory, ſo we ought not to number whether others, whom we have occaſion to ſpeak of, be Enemies, whether public or private. 'Tis impoſſible to ſay any thing more proper to this purpoſe, than what *Polybius* has ſaid upon the occaſion of *Timæus* the Hiſtorian, and *Agathocles*, the Tyrant of *Syracuſe*; and this is ſo much the more worthy of our obſervation, as *Polybius* was born in a Commonwealth, and extremely tinctured with Republican Inclinations, as appears by what remains of his Works. † " As wiſe People, ſays " he, when they have a mind to be reveng'd on " their Enemies, don't ſo much conſider what " their Enemies have deſerved at their Hands, " as what Equity and good Manners will ſuffer " them to do them; in like manner, when we " are to ſay any thing diſadvantagious of them, " we ſhould not ſo much conſider what they deſerve ſhould be ſaid of them, as what is fitting for " us to publiſh; and indeed 'tis neceſſary that " we ſhou'd have a regard to this above all things. " Thoſe that meaſure every thing by their Anger and Hatred, fall unavoidably into a thouſand Faults, and ſpeak more Ill of them than " they ought to do. For this Reaſon we have " Juſtice on our ſide to refuſe our belief to the " greateſt part of thoſe things, which *Timæus* has " alledg'd againſt *Demochares*. No body can excuſe this in him, or believe him, becauſe he " has exceeded all the bounds of Juſtice, in gratifying his reviling Humour. Nay I can't en-

" dure

† *Lib.* XII. *p.* 917.

" dure the ſcandalous things he tells us of *Aga-*
" *thocles*, he who was a wicked Man: I mean what
" ſays of him towards the concluſion of his Hi-
" ſtory, where he lays the moſt infamous De-
" baucheries to his Charge, *&c.* There is no
" queſtion but Nature had beſtow'd very eminent
" Qualities upon *Agathocles*, which ſufficiently
" appears even by what *Timæus* has ſaid of him.
" For ſince he left the Wheel, the Smoke, and
" Clay of his Father's Shop, who was an ordina-
" ry Potter, being ſcarce eighteen Years old
" when he came to *Syracuſe*, yet from theſe diſ-
" advantagious Circumſtances, he was able ſome
" time after to make himſelf Maſter of all *Sicily*,
" and to involve the *Carthaginians* in very great
" Difficulties; and laſtly, ſince he had grown
" old in Tyranny, he died with the Name and
" Dignity of a King; are we not forced to own
" that he was an extraordinary Man, and that he
" was poſſeſs'd of admirable Talents for the ex-
" ecution of great Affairs? Upon this account
" an Hiſtorian is obliged to recount to Poſte-
" rity not only what was ill and blamable in
" *Agathocles*, but likewiſe whatever was worthy
" of Commendation. This ought to be the Aim
" and Intention of Hiſtory: But *Timæus* blinded
" by his natural Inclination to Calumny, reports
" the Bad with a world of Animoſity and Exag-
" geration, and paſſes over all his noble Actions
" in a few words. In all appearance he was ig-
" norant, that to ſuppreſs in a Hiſtory what real-
" ly happen'd is no leſs a Lye than to advance
" what never was.

We may joyn to *Polybius* a famous modern Hi-ſtorian, who after he had ſuffer'd exceedingly by the Injuſtice of a great Prince, yet for all that was not wanting to relate his great Exploits, with

as much care and diligence as any other Hiſtorian, and to ſpeak all along of him, as his eminent Qualities deſerv'd, without ſuffering the leaſt word to drop from him, which might ſhow that he had a juſt occaſion to complain of him. I mean the incomparable *Hugo Grotius*, who, in his Hiſtory of the *Low-Countries*, has ſpoke of Prince *Maurice* of *Naſſau*, as if he had never had any Quarrel with him. Here is now a remarkable Inſtance of Impartiality, which ſhows that it is by no means impoſſible for a Man to overcome his Paſſion, and to ſpeak honourably of his Enemies, as abundance of People imagine, who judge of others by themſelves.

Another thing that has contributed to ruine the Sincerity of ſeveral Hiſtorians, is that they undertook the writing of Hiſtory, to obtain ſome Reward, or to Advance themſelves in the Party wherein they were obliged. Suppoſe that an Hiſtorian lies really under ſuch Circumſtances that he has occaſion for ſome Acknowledgment, and that he believes to obtain it by favouring a Party, 'tis a hundred to one if his Occaſions don't prevail over his Love for Truth. There are but few Men that are able without ſome regret to behold Flatterers recompens'd for their Writings, living in Reputation and enjoying their Pleaſures, when melancholy Truth is diſcouraged and contemned, together with all thoſe that dare admire her, or ſpeak of her in public. And there are as few learned Men, whoſe Fortunes, generally ſpeaking, are none of the greateſt, whom Rewards cannot gain, or at leaſt prevail with to conceal what is Ill, if they don't invent advantagious Facts for thoſe that recompence them. From hence it follows that the buſineſs of writing modern Hiſtory, in thoſe places where a Man is any

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ways intereſſed, ought not to be an Office or Employment, by which one propoſes purely Profit to himſelf. A Man may write foreign or ancient Hiſtories, in which all the World is pleaſed to hear the truth, becauſe we are no farther concern'd in that than only to know what has happen'd. But 'tis almoſt impoſſible to write in any Government by public Order, and in conſequence of a Penſion, the Tranſactions that lately fell out in it, and at the ſame time to confine himſelf religiouſly to the Truth. After this, when we ſee throngs of People crowd and preſs to obtain the like Employments, who can forbear crying out, *Oh! Homines ad mentiendum paratos!* Here are Men that are ready to tell Lies for their Intereſt.

But may it not ſo happen that a Prince or a Government may be pleas'd for a Man to ſay the Truth, nay and even recompenſe the generous Liberty of an Hiſtorian, who has told both the good and bad without diſſembling in the leaſt? Is this Virtue impracticable, or above Humane Nature? There is no queſtion to be made but this is poſſible to God, who is able to change the Hearts of Men as he pleaſes; but I look upon it to be impoſſible to Men, in the preſent Condition wherein we find them. Flatterers are not only rewarded in all places of the World, but we look upon thoſe Perſons to be diſaffected and ſeditious, that dare proclaim any Faults that we have committed; and we are more ſevere in puniſhing ſuch People, than we are liberal in rewarding thoſe that Flatter us. Princes imagine that it is not ſo advantageous for them that we ſpeak Well of them, as 'tis dangerous to ſuffer us to ſpeak the leaſt Ill of them. Mankind is every-where violently prejudiced againſt the Praiſes

of

of thoſe, that cannot blame without expoſing themſelves to ſome Diſgrace, and eaſily believe the Ill, which it is dangerous to ſpeak. This is the reaſon why we are much more afraid of a ſincere Writer, than we love thoſe that are ready to ſay all that we wou'd have them ſay. Thus even thoſe Perſons who wou'd ſcorn to proſtitute themſelves ſo meanly as to tell Lies for a Reward, have not Courage enough oftentimes to expoſe themſelves to Perſecutions for ſpeaking the Truth.

If Sovereign Princes had a mind to inſtruct Poſterity at their own Expence, they ought ſo to manage Matters, that Hiſtorians might have nothing to fear from them, for deſcribing their Defects as well as their Virtues, and the Faults they have committed as well as their fine Actions. Thoſe to whom they addreſs themſelves to write their Hiſtory, ought to anſwer them in ſome ſuch a manner as follows. " If you wou'd have the " World believe the Good I can write of you, " give me leave not to diſſemble, whatever may " with truth be ſaid to your diſadvantage. If " you wou'd have them think that it is not out " of Intereſt that I commend you, take care that " they have not any reaſon to ſuſpect that the " fear of being Ill-uſed has not hinder'd my " Pen from writing what may be juſtly cenſured. " Otherwiſe leave me at liberty to hold my " Tongue, and reſerve your Favours for other " Perſons than for Flatterers, who are as little believed when they praiſe thoſe, to whom " they have ſold their Liberty, as when they " blame without reaſon the Enemies of their Benefactors. For my part, there are no Lies or " Diſſimulations to be bought of me, and I will " never ſell the Truth. But to make ſuch a plain-dealing Speech as this is, a Man muſt be of the Hu-

Humour of *Philoxenus* who rather choſe to drudge in the vileſt Employment, with Irons upon his Feet, than not to ridicule the wretched Verſes of a certain Tyrant of *Syracuſe*: But we have few Men of this Temper.

But it is not only Paſſion that may miſlead an Hiſtorian, for there are Prepoſſeſſions that may have the ſame Effect upon him, and equally lead him out of his way. When we have once entertained a good Opinion of a Man, we are reſolved without farther Examination to believe all that is ſaid to his Advantage; and on the other hand we readily believe all the Ill that is reported of thoſe whom we don't eſteem. However, it may ſo fall out, that Perſons, who in all Reſpects deſerve our Admiration, may commit very great Faults, and that others, who little deſerve to be eſteem'd, may ſometimes do very good Actions. Humane Nature is not ſo equal in itſelf, whatever condition it may be in, but it frequently paſſes from Good to Evil, and from Evil to Good, when we leaſt intend it. The Examples of *Aratus* and *Agathocles* which I have already cited, are an evident Proof of it. Therefore an Hiſtorian ought to diſengage himſelf from all Prevention, and to exanine in themſelves the Proofs of thoſe Facts he is going to relate: To cenſure, if there be a juſt Occaſion for it, thoſe whom he has Eſteem'd, and, on the contrary, to praiſe thoſe of whom he had a bad Opinion, if they deſerve it.

Polybius infinitely eſteem'd the *Romans* upon the ſcore of moral and military Virtues, and in truth he had reaſon to admire them upon ſeveral Accounts. It is not to be ſuppoſed that he cou'd have ſo advantageous an Idea of the *Carthaginians*, and to ſay the truth, they did not equal the

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Romans. However, this does not hinder him from publiſhing the Faults of the former, and their Violation of Faith upon diverſe occaſions, as particularly their Uſage of the *Carthaginians* after the end of the firſt Punic War. In like manner he commends the good conduct of the *Carthaginian* Generals, when they deſerved it. Thus the *Romans* had ſo great an eſteem for his Sincerity and Judgment, that *Brutus*, who kill'd *Julius Caſar*, made an Abridgment of his Hiſtory in the latter part of his Life, at which time he was moſt of all taken up with Buſineſs.

But we find few Hiſtorians ſo impartial and ſincere. The preſent Writers of *France* don't think that 'tis poſſible for the Council that governs it, to commit the leaſt Indiſcretions, ſo high an Idea they have of their wiſe Maxims, and ſteddy Conduct. I will not pretend to oppoſe this Idea of theirs, becauſe in truth it is founded upon diverſe weighty Reaſons: But they ſhould judge of Facts and their Conſequences, without having any regard to them; becauſe the moſt prudent Councils are not always infallible, but are ſubject to take falſe Meaſures, altho' this does not happen ſo often to them. It is likewiſe reaſonable that thoſe that admire the Conduct of the other Princes of *Europe*, who join'd againſt *France*, ſhould remember that the beſt Heads are ſometimes over-ſeen: We ought to do Juſtice reciprocally one to another, and to judge of Faults and great Actions, by themſelves, and by their Conſequences, and not altogether by Prepoſeſſion.

Of Eccleſiaſtic Hiſtory

THESE Precautions, in my Opinion, are abſolutely neceſſary for an Hiſtorian, if he wou'd acquit

acquit himſelf, as he ought, in his Undertaking. We may find, as already has been obſerv'd, Examples and Proofs of it in the beſt Hiſtorians of Pagan Antiquity. But there is a ſort of Hiſtory among Chriſtians, wherein, if we muſt talk Hiſtorically, that is to ſay, without being byaſs'd, all the above-mention'd Rules, that have been preſcrib'd for the Writing of Hiſtory, are neglected and violated. An *Orthodox* Author that undertakes to Compoſe an Eccleſiaſtic Hiſtory, cannot be too hot-headed and zealous for his own Party, nor have too violent an Averſion for the other Sects: He muſt ſhew this Diſpoſition of Mind all along in his Work; for therwiſe he will be defamed not only for a Man of no Abilities, but likewiſe for an impious Perſon. 'Tis but juſt he ſhould propoſe to himſelf, as a Recompenſe for his Labour, ſome Eccleſiaſtic Dignities, if he is of a Profeſſion to pretend to them, or ſome other equivalent, if he is a Laic, upon condition he all along favour *Orthodoxy*, that is, his own Party. If he be ſo ill adviſed, as to ſpeak never ſo little in favour of the *Heretics*, or ſuch as are oppoſite to his own ſide, he muſt expect to be expos'd to the fury of Zealots, to their Accuſations, and perhaps to all the Puniſhments, Eccleſiaſtic and Civil, that are inflicted in the place where he lives; unleſs he will retract theſe raſh Truths, which are to be found in him, advantageous to *Hereſy*. He ought to fore-arm himſelf with this Prejudice and never lay it aſide, *viz.* That all that may be honourable in *Heretics* is falſe, and that all that is ſaid to their Diſreputation is true: As on the contrary, every thing that can do honour to the *Orthodox* is undoubted, and all that reflects upon them is a downright Lie. 'Tis neceſſary that an *Orthodox* Hiſto-

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rian ſhould carefully ſuppreſs, or at leaſt extenuate, as far as in him lies, the Errors and Vices of thoſe that are reſpected among the *Orthodox*, altho' they are not well known by them; and on the other hand, that he exaggerate, as much as he can, the Miſtakes and Faults of the *Heretics*. Beſides, he ought to remember that any *Orthodox* may ſerve as a Witneſs againſt a *Heretic*, and ought to be believed upon his word; and that on the contrary, a *Heretic*'s word ought never to be taken againſt the *Orthodox*. All the honour that muſt be allow'd him, is to hearken to him when he has any thing to ſay in favour of *Orthodoxy*, or againſt himſelf. An *Orthodox* may be cited as a Witneſs in his own proper Cauſe, but a *Heretic* muſt not be ſo even in that of another. In ſhort, there are Maxims, which he muſt not examine but follow, if he undertakes to write Eccleſiaſtic Hiſtory, under pain of Infamy, Excommunication, Baniſhment, *&c.* After this manner the *Centuriators of Magdeburg* have written on one ſide, and *Cardinal Baronius* on the other; which has obtain'd both of them among their own Party, an immortal Reputation: But we muſt confeſs at the ſame time that they were not the firſt; and that they only imitated the generality of thoſe that preceded them, in this way of Writing. It had been the faſhion ſeveral Ages before this, to ſearch out in Antiquity, not what was really there, but what we judged ought to be there, for the good of the Party which we had eſpous'd; and to repreſent the Ancients, ſuch as we found it for our porpoſe, that they ſhould be, for the advantage of the Cauſe, which we have undertaken to defend. A Man certainly found his

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profit in writing after this manner, and danger in doing otherwise.

Sozomen, in * his Eccleſiaſtic Hiſtory, after having enumerated the Monuments, out of which he compil'd it, goes on as follows: " For fear " leſt any one ſhould condemn my Work of " Falſehood, upon my not being ſufficiently in- " ſtructed in Matters as they happen'd, becauſe " he finds the Relations in other Authors diffe- " rent from mine; he muſt underſtand that up- " on the occaſion of *Arius*'s Opinions, and thoſe " which ſprung up afterwards, the Governours " of the Church being divided, every one writ " to thoſe of his own Opinion concerning thoſe " things, which he himſelf had taken to Heart: " That having aſſembled Synods a-part, they " confirm'd whatever they had a mind to, and " frequently condemn'd their Adverſaries in " their abſence; That they made their Court to " the Emperors and the Great Men about them, " and left no Stone unturn'd to gain them over " to their ſide, and make them receive their " own Opinions; That in order to paſs for *Or-* " *thodox* in the World, each Party took a par- " ticular care to collect the Letters which fa- " vour'd their Sect, and omitted the reſt. And " this, ſays he, has given me abundance of trou- " ble in my Search after the Truth. But ſince " the Sincerity of Hiſtory requires that we ſhould " do all that in us lies to diſcover the Truth, I " thought myſelf oblig'd diligently to examine " theſe ſorts of Writings. If I relate the Quar- " rels which the Eccleſiaſtics have had among " one another, about the Preference of their " Sects; let no one believe that this proceeds from " Malice, or any ſiniſter Deſign. Beſides that, " 'tis juſt, as I have already obſerv'd, that an

* Lib. I. c. 1.

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" Hiſtorian ſhould prefer the Truth to all " things; the Truth of the Doctrins of the Ca- " tholick Church does but appear the more by " it, having been ſeveral times put to the Proof, " by the cunning Deſigns of thoſe that oppoſed " it, &c. It ſeems that he durſt not ſpeak all that he thought, for after he had taken notice of the Quarrels and Ambition of the Eccleſiaſtics, as well as of their Writings and Letters, directly oppoſite one to the other; he ought to have told his Reader what Rules he had follow'd in his Hiſtory, to diſtinguiſh the Truth from Falſehood: Beſides, he ought to have concluded otherwiſe than he has done, and have ſaid that the vitious Lives, and wicked Actions of the Eccleſiaſtics have no Connexion with the Chriſtian Religion, which condemns them, and conſequently ought not to be ſet down to her Account; That therefore for his ſpeaking Truth of the firſt Fathers of the Church, altho' it was not advantageous for them, no ſuch Concluſion ought to be drawn, as that he deſign'd to do the leaſt injury to Religion; That we ought not to confound the private and perſonal Intereſts of the Church-men with the general Intereſt of the Goſpel; That this was an Artifice which the irregular Clergy made uſe of, to authorize their ill living, or hinder others from daring to reprove it, as if what was levell'd only at their diſorders, muſt needs ſtrike directly at Religion itſelf, whoſe unworthy Miniſters they muſt own themſelves to be; That we ought likewiſe to diſtinguiſh between good and bad, between Orders that were inſtituted with Reaſon in the Church, and the Abuſe that was made of them; in order to let the World ſee that thoſe who blame the Abuſe, don't cenſure the thing itſelf, and that

thoſe who recount the ill Actions of wicked Men, don't loſe the Reſpect which ought to be paid to the Good; That it is notoriouſly manifeſt that the Truth of Opinions don't make all ſuch as profeſs them, virtuous; and that ſpeculative Errors don't corrupt the Manners of all thoſe who are engaged in them; ſo that the mixture of good and bad in the Conduct of Life, is almoſt equal between the *Orthodox* and the *Heretics*; That therefore we ought not to take all for Goſpel which the former ſay, nor yet to reject every thing as falſe that comes from the ſecond; but that we ought to examine what both of them can ſay, according to the ſame Rules which the Law preſcribes for ſifting of Witneſſes, in Civil and Criminal Affairs; That in fine, it is of the laſt importance to ſpeak out the truth freely in all this, leſt the Libertines ſhould imagine that 'tis a Belief among the Chriſtians, that the Opinions of the Mind, or Employments in the Church, change Vice into Virtue, and Virtue into Vice; and leſt Perſons of weak Judgments ſhould inſenſibly be led into it by ſeeing both one and the other equally conſecrated in the Perſon of Eccleſiaſtics, and at laſt forget that the Chriſtian Religion conſiſts in believing the Doctrins of the Goſpel, and obeying its Precepts, and not in the Reſpect that is paid to Men, who are neither made better, nor more knowing by their Dignities. This is what ought to be ſaid in a Preface to an Eccleſiaſtic Hiſtory, and what *Sozomen* perhaps wou'd have ſaid, if he had dared to ſpeak all that he thought: But it was too dangerous at that time to ſpeak thus at *Conſtantinople*, as it is ſtill ſo in the greateſt part of *Europe*.

Of the Stile of Hiſtory. III. IT is not neceſſary that I ſhould ſpeak of the Order which an Hiſtorian ought to obſerve, becauſe the Series of the Time ſufficiently directs him in that, and the Rhetors have aſſign'd Rules for the Narration, which are as ſuitable to an Hiſtorian as they are to an Orator. As for the Style, the only Qualities which it ought to have, is to be pure, clear, and as conciſe as poſſible, without becoming obſcure. 'Tis in Hiſtory where we ought principally to employ that ſimple and natural Style, which the Maſters of this Art ſo exceedingly commend. As an Hiſtorian only propoſes to himſelf to inform his Reader of what has happen'd, without any deſign to move or divert him, any farther than the Matter may contribute to it, without the Hiſtorians having any ſuch Thought; all ſorts of ſtudied Ornaments are ſuperfluous, and an Affectation of ſhewing one's Eloquence is altogether impertinent. We ought to hear what is ſaid upon this Head by *Lucian*, or by *d'Ablancourt*; for it ſignifies nothing which of the two ſpeaks, provided that the Rules are good. " Hiſtory, ſay they, is more chaſt than " Poetry, and can no more employ the Orna- " ments of the latter, than a virtuous Woman " thoſe of a Harlot; and ſo much the more as " it has no occaſion to be beholding to Fiction, " and has none of thoſe Figures and Movements " which tranſport and diſorder the Soul. If " you beſtow too much Decoration upon it, you " make it reſemble *Hercules*, when he has *Om- phale*'s Cloaths on, which is the higheſt piece " of Extravagance. They likewiſe ſay in ano- ther place, diſcourſing of an Hiſtorian; " That " his Style ought to be clear and natural, with- " out being low; for as we aſſign him Freedom

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" and Truth to regulate the Matter of his Nar-
" ration, ſo Clearneſs and Perſpicuity ought to
" regulate the Manner of it. The Figures ought
" neither to be too ſublime, nor too far fetch'd;
" unleſs when he comes to deſcribe a Battel, or
" to make an Harangue: For upon thoſe occa-
" ſions, he is allow'd to elevate his Style, and if
" I may ſo expreſs myſelf, to unfurl all the
" Sails of his Eloquence. However, it is not
" neceſſary that he ſhould raiſe himſelf in pro-
" portion to the things, of which he talks; and
" he ought to preſerve his Style altogether free
" from the Enthuſiaſm and Fury of Poetry;
" for 'tis to be fear'd that if he riſes too high,
" his Head will be apt to grow giddy, and loſe
" itſelf in Fiction———Therefore if he has
" a mind to riſe, let it rather be by the Things
" than the Words; for 'tis infinitely better that
" his Style ſhould be ordinary, and his Thoughts
" ſublime, than that his Thoughts ſhould be
" mean and his Style elevated, or that he ſhould
" ſuffer himſelf to be too violently hurried by
" the force of his Imagination. Let his Periods
" be neither too long nor too much ſtudied; his
" Style neither too harmonious, nor too negli-
" gent, becauſe one has a tincture of Barbarity,
" and the other of Affectation.

This is all that may reaſonably be ſaid in general of an Hiſtorical Style; for I am by no means of their Opinion, who pretend that the Style of an Hiſtorian ought to be more elevated than that of an Orator, and almoſt Poetical, as * *Quintilian* believed. Neither do I believe that 'tis neceſſary for a Man to be an Orator to be an Hiſtorian, as † *Cicero* has maintain'd. As Inſtruction is his main and principal Buſineſs, all that is not ſerviceable to that end, has no relation to

* *Lib.* X. c. 1.

† *Lib.* II. *de Oratore*, c. 9. & *ſeq.*

the Hiſtory, what Taſte ſoever the Ancients had of theſe Matters, who were ſomewhat too fond of the Ornaments of Rhetoric. If a Man has a mind to pleaſe his Reader by his Style, 'tis enough if it has the above-mention'd Qualities. A Narration conceiv'd in pure Terms, clear and ſhort, is ſufficiently agreeable of itſelf, and needs no Foreign Ornaments to recommend it, if the things we relate do otherwiſe deſerve to be read. So ſoon as the Reader perceives that an Hiſtorian makes it his Buſineſs to diſplay his Eloquence, he has a very juſt Reaſon to ſuſpect his want of Integrity, becauſe 'tis the Cuſtom of Declamers to alter the things they relate, that they may make a better ſhew in the Declamatory manner. *Cicero* in his *Brutus*, having compar'd the death of *Coriolanus* with that of *Themiſtocles*, as if both one and the other had been
* Cap. 11. ſlain, * excuſes himſelf for doing ſo to his Friend *Atticus*, who believed that he died of a natural Death, and accordingly had affirm'd ſo much in a Hiſtory of his own Compoſing; upon which *Atticus* anſwers him very handſomly, " That he " might uſe what liberty he pleaſed, becauſe the " Rhetors were allow'd to depart from the truth of " Hiſtory, to have a better opportunity of ſhewing " their Parts. For as for what you have feign'd " about *Coriolanus*, is no more than what *Clitarchus* " and *Stratocles* have feign'd about *Themiſtocles*. " *Thucydides*, who was an *Athenian*, deſcended from " a good Family, and a great Man; and what is " more, one that lived a little time after him, only " tells us that he died, that he was buried pri- " vately in *Attica*, and that ſome ſuſpected that " he was Poiſon'd. But theſe two Authors re- " late, how that having ſacrific'd a Bull, he re- " ceived the Blood in a Cup, and fell down dead " after he had drank it. The reaſon was, that

" they

" they were able to deſcribe this Death in a " Tragical magnificent manner, where this com- " mon Death furniſhed them with no Topics, " on which they might diſplay their Rhetoric. " Therefore ſince your Occaſions require that " *Themiſtocles* and *Coriolanus* ſhould reſemble one " another in every thing, I will, if you pleaſe, " lend you a Cup for the latter; nay, I will pro- " vide you with a Victim, that *Coriolanus* may " be in all reſpects another *Themiſtocles*. *Conceſſum eſt Rhetoribus mentiri in Hiſtoriis, ut aliquid dicere poſſint argutius.*

For this very Reaſon a Man ought to avoid all ſort of Affectation in an Hiſtorical Style: But above all things, he ought to take care that it be pure, becauſe ſince the Purity of the Style is by no means incompatible with the Truth, 'tis ridiculous to diſhearten the Reader by a barbarous Style. Such, for inſtance, is that of *Aubigné* in his Hiſtory, which we can hardly endure to read for that very Reaſon, and which nothing can excuſe, ſince it was in his power to write otherwiſe, as we may find by his other Works.

Such is likewiſe, in part, the Style of *Mezeray*, in his great Hiſtory of *France*, and likewiſe in his Abridgment. Without being a jot the worſe Hiſtorian, he might have written much better French, at a time when the Language was infinitely more pure and polite, than it ſeems to have been by his Writings. By *Purity* and *Politeneſs*, I don't mean a Style elaborately turn'd in a Declamatory ſtrain, ſuch as are the Styles of *John Baptiſt Nani*, in his Hiſtory of *Venice*; or of *Emanuel Teſauro*, in his Hiſtorical Writings; but a Choice of Words and Expreſſions conformable to the beſt uſe of the Tongue, and the connecting of them, which hath nothing

harſh nor intricate. In this way of writing, *Cornelius Nepos*, and *Julius Caſar*, excel among the Ancients; and among the Moderns, the Author of the Life of St. *Lewis* (I mean the Abbot *de la Chaiſe*) and he that writ the Hiſtory of *Theodoſius* the Great, and the Life of Cardinal *Ximenes*.

If a Man follows this Advice, 'tis almoſt impoſſible for him to be obſcure; for 'tis certain, that the good uſe of any Tongue, authorizes nothing that may make the Narration obſcure. Thoſe that talk obſcurely, don't fall into this Fault, by conforming themſelves to the general Uſe, but by affecting to talk otherwiſe than the reſt of the World do. Not one of thoſe that ſpoke well at *Athens* or *Rome*, talked ſo obſcurely as *Thucydides* and *Tacitus* have written. It proceeded from their endeavouring to riſe above the common uſe, that they have fallen into this obſcurity, which we ſo juſtly blame in their Stile. No one can deny that this ſort of Stile is not affected, and that theſe Authors thought to recommend their Hiſtories by a maſculine Eloquence, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, in which a Man thinks to expreſs abundance of things in a few words, which is above the vulgar way. I can't imagine what Charms ſome learned Men diſcover'd in this manner of writing, who have attempted to imitate them, as *Hugo Grotius*, and *Denys Voſſius* in his Tranſlation of *de Rheide*'s Hiſtory. For after all, good Thoughts need not be made obſcure to appear good to thoſe that underſtand them; and the Reader, who is forced to ſtop every moment to find out the meaning, is not at all obliged to the Hiſtorian who gives him this trouble. By this means they have brought it to paſs, that excellent Hiſtories,

ſtories, in regard of their Matter, are read but by very few People; whereas, inſtead of propoſing to inſtruct thoſe, who underſtand the *Latin* Tongue well enough to read an Hiſtorian with pleaſure, they ſhould endeavour to make themſelves underſtood, without difficulty, by thoſe who have not arrived to that perfection in that Language, and to render their Works uſeful to as many Perſons, as is poſſible. The more any Hiſtory is worthy of being Read, for the variety of Events it comprehends, the more it deſerves to be ſpread abroad. The Authority of the Ancients, who have neglected this perſpicuity of Stile, ought to be no protection to the Moderns, who have imitated them, againſt the Reaſons I have mentioned above, or rather againſt good Senſe.

All that we can ſay is, That the obſcurity of theſe Authors comes in part from the brevity of their Expreſſions and Periods, which neceſſarily carries along with it ſomething of Darkneſs, tho' it has I know not what more Majeſty and Life than a more extended Stile. I own it has, but then I maintain, that to repreſent truly the Character of theſe Hiſtorians, we muſt join to this brevity an impropriety of Terms and Expreſſions, and a perplexed Conſtruction, which without diſpute are no Ornaments to any Stile. We ought no farther to be Conciſe than Perſpicuity will give us leave, whatever Advantage we may otherwiſe find in Brevity; for indeed there is no Advantage that can equal that of being rightly underſtood, when a Man writes to be ſo. The impropriety of Terms and perplexity of the Conſtruction can never make a Diſcourſe more fit to be read, but only by thoſe who like better what they don't underſtand, than what they do, and whoſe Votes, in my opinion, it is worth no learned Man's while to obtain.

Saluſt's Stile is not ſo conciſe as that of *Tacitus*, but 'tis no leſs animated; and were it not for his Antique manner of Speaking, and the boldneſs of his Metaphors, he wou'd be infinitely more clear, without loſing any thing of his force. If we compare *Strada* to *Grotius*, or to *de-Rheide*, we ſhall find him in truth ſomewhat more diffuſive, and his Expreſſions ſometimes bordering more upon Poetry than Hiſtory. Nevertheleſs, he has nothing languiſhing in him, and if we retrench his Superfluities in ſome places, and correct the vitious *Latin* in others, there are few Hiſtorians that wou'd be more delightful to be read, in reſpect of the Stile; unleſs there were a perfect neceſſity to make him ſpeak after the manner of Oracles.

I might add ſome other things relating to the Stile of Hiſtory, but it never was in my Thoughts to write any thing compleat upon this matter. The famous *Gerard John Voſſius* has gone through all the Queſtions almoſt, that uſe to be propoſed upon this Subject, and tho' in ſome places he ſeems to have made a greater uſe of his Reading, than of his Judgment, (a common Fault, with Writers of his Character) yet I have no deſign to contradict him.

Of the Judgments that are made in Hiſtory.

IV. TO make a perfect Hiſtorian, a Man ought not only to know the Verity of the Facts which he recounts, and have a Will to publiſh and Art to expreſs it, as it ought to be; he likewiſe ought to be profoundly read in Morality and Politics, without which he will never be able to paſs a true Judgment upon Humane Actions.

† See *Voſſius de Arte Hiſtor.* c. 18.

† It is true, there are ſome Perſons, who believe that an Hiſtorian ought to content himſelf with recounting things as they happen'd, without interpoſing

terpoſing his own Opinion, and leave the Reader to take that ſide which the things themſelves will incline him to take, without endeavouring to prepoſſeſs him. But as this reſervedneſs may be juſtifiable in doubtful Matters, yet when the Events themſelves ſpeak, if I may be allow'd ſo to expreſs myſelf, who can take it ill if the Hiſtorian joyns his Judgment to them? The generality of Readers are pleaſed to read it, and indeed want ſuch helps to refreſh their Memories as to what reſults from what they have read. That Man can by no means be ſaid to prepoſſeſs them, who only judgeth of a thing which he has related, and that too upon inconteſtable Facts, which themſelves have read. Thus we find this has been the conſtant practice of almoſt all Hiſtorians, ſome of whom however judge in a more direct manner, and others more obliquely, according to their different Genius. Some intermix more Sentences than others do, and ſome again wou'd have them interwoven into the Series of the Narration, altho' others place them independently by themſelves, and out of the Deſign of the Hiſtory, that they may be the more taken notice of. In this we ought to obſerve certain Bounds, within which we ſhall not be liable to cenſure, that is to ſay, the Sentences ought neither to be too frequent, nor too far fetch'd. Otherwiſe it will look as if we had written a Hiſtory to have an opportunity of retailing Sentences, than Sentences to render the Hiſtory more uſeful. We cannot accuſe *Strada* with having had a deſign to publiſh his Collections of moral Sentences when he was compoſing his Hiſtory, but we cannot deny that he was a little too profuſe of them. Any Man may obſerve this in the Indexes of his two Volumes, where we find a great number of them upon every Letter of the Alphabet.

But

But what is of moſt importance in this Occaſion, the Judgments we make ought to be juſt, and the Sentences ſuch as may paſs for unqueſtionable Maxims. For this Effect, we ought to apply ourſelves vigorouſly to Morality and Politics, without which we ſhall be liable to make wrong Reflexions, and to utter deceitful Maxims. This is not a place to eſtabliſh the Principles of theſe Sciences. I will only remark in general, that as Hiſtory takes in all Ages and all Nations, and that an Hiſtorian ought to be an equitable Judge of ſo many different Nations, whoſe Opinions differ ſo vaſtly one from another; 'tis neceſſary he ſhould keep himſelf within the general Ideas which good Senſe will furniſh him with, about Religion, about Virtue and Vice, about the reciprocal Duties of the People, and of thoſe that govern them; and laſtly, about whatever Nations may owe one to another.

Otherwiſe, if an Hiſtorian judges of a Nation by the Principles of a Religion, which is unknown to it, or which it diſapproves, he takes a Party, and expoſes his own Religion to undergo the ſame Law, when Hiſtorians of a different Religion ſhall write the Hiſtory of a Nation whoſe Opinions he ſhall approve. For no Man upon the Face of the Earth has a right to lay down conteſted Opinions as if they were indiſputable, and if he will needs condemn others upon this Foot, he cannot in juſtice complain if others condemn him in aſſerting contrary Opinions, which they believe to be true. For example, let a Catholic Hiſtorian write a Hiſtory of the Troubles of Religion, which have happen'd in *Europe* ſince the laſt Age, he ought not, in the Judgments which he makes of the Proteſtants, to ſet up ſuch Ideas as the Mobb and thoſe that are no better inſtructed, frame

frame to themſelves of the Deity, as if it had the ſame Paſſions with the Eccleſiaſtics, and ought to deſtroy in this and to'ther World, thoſe that have had the Preſumption to find fault with their Doctrin and their Conduct. Or at leaſt if he have any ſuch Ideas, they ought never to come into his Hiſtory, where we only ſee theſe Quarels, which Men have with one another, and by no means the ſecret Thoughts of the Divinity, who does not always ſend Proſperity as a mark of his Favour, nor calamitous Accidents as a ſign of his Indignation. Whatever Sentiments a Man may have upon the Subject of Religion, we want not Examples to prove, That Proſperity as often accompanies what we believe to be Errour and Injuſtice, as what we look upon to be Truth and a a good Cauſe. There is no Party, upon which what they object to others, may not be retorted in this Caſe.

For inſtance, it was ridiculous in *Strada* to remark, as he frequently does, upon the Eve of what Feſtival, a Town was attack'd by the *Spaniſh* Army; as if the Saint to whom the Church of *Rome* has conſecrated that Day, had favoured the *Spaniards* to make them Victorious. In like manner, we ſhould laugh at any Proteſtant who ſhould affirm it to be a ſenſible Mark that the Invocation of Saints is a Practice diſagreeable to God, becauſe the Proteſtants did beat the Catholics in ſuch and ſuch Engagements, altho' the latter had recommended themſelves, before the Battel began, to all the Saints in Paradiſe. The ſame *Strada* often menaceth what he calls Hereſie, with all ſorts of Calamities, and promiſeth Victories to the Monarchy of *Spain* againſt the United Provinces, upon the ſcore of its Zeal for the Catholic Religion. We are now ſenſible how

ill

ill a Prophet he has proved in this particular; and if we are to judge of God's Designs by the Events, we ought to say that Providence had decreed that the United Provinces should become an absolute independent Republic, for the Preservation of the Crown of *Spain*, to the Interests of which it was to be as firmly devoted at the end of the XVII. Century, as it had been opposite to it till towards the middle of the same Age, and about the end of the former.

To shew how little a stress we ought to lay upon these Theological Reflexions, the abovemention'd Historian, who never fails to attribute the Advantages of the *Spaniards* to a particular Favour of Heaven, which declared itself against Heresie, is obliged shamefully to turn the Tables, when he comes to speak of the Victory, which the *English* obtained over the pretended invincible Armada of the *Spaniards*, and to reason in the following manner: † " 'Tis reported that Queen " *Elizabeth* went to Church in a Triumphal Chariot, in the midst of the Colours of the vanquished Enemy, and that she ordered the Spoils " of the *Spaniards* to be hung up there, after " she had given Thanks to God for this Victory, " who had been, as she believed, so favourable " to her upon this Occasion: Whereas at that " very time when she made it be believed that " he most favour'd her, he shew'd that he was " incensed against her, since he permitted her to " abuse this good Success, to confirm Heresie, " the Yoke of which she might have shaken off, " both for herself and for her Kingdom, to her " great Advantage, if she had been overcome. " Besides the Winds and Tempests did not give " the *English* much reason to magnifie themselves, " and they had no reason to believe themselves " bet-

† *Towards the end of* Lib. IX. Dec. 2.

" better Men, becauſe they were more fortunate,
" unleſs they conclude that we ought to prefer
" the Impiety of Saracens and Turks to the Pie-
" ty of the Chriſtians, ſince theſe Barbarians have
" often beaten the beſt prepared Forces of the
" Chriſtians. This laſt Reflexion is very true:
But if *Strada* had remembred it all along, where he ſpeaks of the Victories of the *Spaniards*, he might very well have ſpared a great deal of impertinent Rhetoric, to ſhew the favours of Heaven towards the Catholics, in the Advantages they gained over their Enemies. This it is to have two Weights and two Meaſures, to pretend that Providence favours one ſide, when it gives them Victory, and that it is angry with the other, when it treats them after the ſame manner. However I am of Opinion, that one may ſafely ſay, that in caſe the *Spaniards* had ſucceeded in their deſign'd Invaſion of *England*, *Strada* wou'd have ſaid, That God had changed the Winds in their favour, and bleſſed a Fleet, which went to exterpate Hereſie in that Kingdom.

It will perhaps be offer'd in favour of *Strada*, and other Hiſtorians, who write in this manner, of whatſoever party they are, that it is not poſſible they ſhould believe that Religion not to be true, which they follow, and conſequently that they ſhould not look upon every thing as a favour of Heaven, which ſerves to eſtabliſh it. For my part, I don't in the leaſt hinder them from thinking ſo, but I maintain that theſe Reflexions ought not to be allow'd a place in Hiſtory, when 'tis no part of our Buſineſs to render to our Religion what we owe to it, but to inſtruct all Mankind, if we are able, by Truths which cannot be conteſted on any ſide. Let them believe what they pleaſe, as for what concerns their own particular,

lar, but let them cenſure none, except it be upon Principles of good Senſe, or of Religion, that are acknowledged even by thoſe whom they cenſure. No Man ought to be blamed for not doing what he believes he ought not to do, according to his own Principles, ſo long as he retains them, altho' theſe Principles are falſe. If we can blame him, 'tis for receiving Falſities without examination, but it belongs to Divines to enter into this Diſpute and not to Hiſtorians, who don't treat of the Errours but of the Actions of Men.

Beſides this, theſe Hiſtorians, that are ſo partial in the matter of Religion, are extremely ſubject to give an advantageous turn to all the conduct of that Party, which ſupports what they believe to be the Truth, to ſay no worſe of them. I don't ſpeak of the *Varilla's* and *Maimbourgs*, and other Liers of that ſtamp, who have renounced all Truth; but even of more moderate Hiſtorians. It were to be wiſhed that when they begin to write their Hiſtories, they had forgotten the Party which they eſpouſed, in the preſent Diviſions of Chriſtendom; that they might have been able to ſpeak of their Diſputes and Differences, as Men wou'd do that were not at all concern'd in them. The Love of a Party, as reaſonable as it may appear to be, makes us always lean ſomewhat towards it, when we come to relate any thing that is diſadvantagious to the good Cauſe.

If I might here be allowed to deſcribe the Idea, which I wou'd have an Hiſtorian frame to himſelf of the Divinity, in relation to thoſe Events that are comprehended in Hiſtory, I wou'd tell him that he ought to conſider God as the common Father of all Mankind, who looks down with compaſſion upon their Errours and their Vices, but contents himſelf with giving them Laws,

which

which they may obſerve or violate, without his intervening to make them be obey'd by Rewards or by ſenſible Pains during this Life, reſerving it to himſelf to diſplay his Juſtice, when he ſhall have judged that Mankind has continued long enough upon the Earth. As theſe Sentiments can be called in queſtion by no Man, an Hiſtorian ought to look upon what we call Happineſs or Unhappineſs in the things of this Life, as Accidents that neither denote the Anger, nor the Approbation of Heaven, and to draw no Conſequences in this reſpect, either to the Advantage or Diſadvantage of any Party whatſoever.

Altho' God has diſcovered to Mankind by Reaſon and by Revelation, what is agreeable to him, yet he has accompanied neither the one nor the other with ſo great a Light, that it ſhould be impoſſible for us to take that for Reaſon or Revelation, which is not really ſo. He permits Men to diſpute upon theſe Principles, and without doubt he likewiſe looks upon them with pity, yet for all that he does not draw the Curtain, if I may ſo ſpeak, which conceals him from our Eyes, and appear in an unconteſtable manner to come to decide our Controverſies. He will do that, whenever he ſees it convenient; in the mean time 'tis every one's Duty to remember that he is a Man, ſubject to Errour as well as another, and equally ſubmitted to this laſt Judgment of the Creator of the World. None among us Chriſtians diſagree about theſe Principles, and Hiſtorians in particular ought to remember them more than any other Men. If they thought ſeriouſly of them, they wou'd not be ready to make ſuch ſharp and violent Invectives, againſt the ſpeculative Errours of other Men, even ſuppoſing them to be Errours.

Strada,

Strada, for example, had not declaimed ſo eagerly againſt Hereſie, as he does upon all Occaſions, and principally in his † Hiſtory, when he aſſigns the Cauſes of the Wars of the *Low-Countries*, where he employs all his Eloquence to perſwade the World, that Hereſie cauſeth nothing but Diſorders and Rebellions, and makes Men wicked and Atheiſts. When the Proteſtant Hiſtorians fall into the like Invectives, ſpeaking of the famous *Catholic League*, which for ſo long a time tore *France* in pieces, the contrary Party cannot endure this bitter Language, and ſay, That this is to *Preach*, and not to Write a Hiſtory. If we had any remainders of Equity left among us, we ſhould unanimouſly condemn theſe Practices, and be ſo honeſt as to own that the Vices of Men have infinitely a greater ſhare in the Diſorders of *Europe*, than Religion, in whatſoever manner 'tis explain'd. We ſhould forbear all theſe Invectives, which indeed are pardonable in no Man, but much leſs in an Hiſtorian; or if we muſt needs be venting our Malice againſt thoſe Parties whom we diſapprove, we muſt not take it ill, if they return us the ſame Language in their turn.

† *In the beginning of* Lib. II. Dec. 1.

But herein lyes our Weakneſs, to imagine that God is as partial and peeviſh as ourſelves are, and conſequently that he requires of us that we loſe no opportunity of railing and exclaiming againſt thoſe, whoſe Creator and Father he is as well as of the moſt fiery Zealots, and rendring them odious whatever it coſts us.

Hiſtorians ought to be more prudent, and thoſe that read them ought likewiſe to approve thoſe generally who come neareſt to this noble Idea, which the Maſters of this Art give us of a diſintereſſed Hiſtorian. True Judges have exceedingly com-

commended *Thuanus*, who in his Hiſtory has obſerved ſo admirable a moderation, in relation to the Party wherein he was born and wherein he died: But thoſe who cou'd not endure to hear any Truths prejudicial to their Party, have exclaimed vehemently againſt him. Such a Man was *Juſtus Lipſius*, a great Critic, but one of a ſhallow Judgment in every thing beſides, who writ to him, † *That this Hiſtory very much diſpleaſed him, and the Liberty he took in writing it, was not ſuitable for this Age.* Theſe are the Terms which *de Thou* uſes in a Letter to *Joſ. Scaliger*, dated *June* 29th. 1606. *I don't know*, continues he, *whether I ought to make him any anſwer. He is mightily changed ſince he left* Leyden *for* Louvain. *I am the very ſame I ever was, and will be, if it pleaſes God, ready to correct any thing which I have written. He exhorts me ſtrongly to this correction, but does not tell me wherein, ſo that I know not what to make of his Advice. —— I believe he wou'd ſend me to the Inquiſition, but it will be a hard matter to reconcile the* French *Liberty to that Yoke. He deſerves a ſharper Anſwer than I am in a Humour to write.* I was willing to ſet down the greateſt part of this Letter, that I might draw two Conſequences from it: The firſt is, that oftentimes even Men of Learning, who know the value of Liberty, are the very firſt to betray her infamouſly, as *Lipſius* did, altho' they know well enough that they do ill in it. This Grammarian, who bound himſelf hand and foot, like a mean-ſpirited Slave, to the Jeſuites, when he retired to *Louvain*, was well enough ſatisfied in his own Conſcience that *de Thou* had advanced nothing falſe, at leaſt out of Paſſion, and did not tax him with deſerting the Intereſt of Truth, but only with taking a liberty, which *was not ſuitable for*

† See the *Scaligerana*, *p.* 391. *Ed. Amſtel. an.* 1695.

this Age; as if we were born to be Slaves, rather than those that were born in former Ages! What Privilege of Heaven did they receive, which we have not? We are no less free than they, except it be because we are afraid of our own Shadows, and that instead of defending at least modestly those that have more Generosity than others, we not only abandon them to the fury of the Factious, who make use of the pretence of Religion to hinder Truth from being spoken, but even endeavour to destroy them, to procure to ourselves the favour of the Druids. If all the Men of Learning in *France* had been of *Lipsius*'s Humour, we had lost this illustrious President, to whom Posterity is so much obliged, and who is, if I must say it, the last of the *French* Historians, who has spoken with moderation of an opposite Party in respect of Religion. For as for *Mezeray*, he was very far from observing the Laws of History in this particular, altho' they still commend that little liberty he shows, in a Country, where it is entirely extinct.

Another Consequence which I draw from this slavish and cowardly Advice of *Lipsius*, is that we ought to be glad that he was only *Historiographer* of *Spain*; for a Man of his Temper would at least have dissembled all that he knew disadvantageous to his own Party, and have poison'd all the rest, † altho' he pretends to set up for a Philosopher, and what is more, for a *Stoic*. The King of *Spain* did very well to give him a Pension in consideration of his great Learning, but he should not give him a Farthing, in quality of an Historian, a Title for which he was altogether unfit. The History of the Miracles of the two *Notre-dames*, for which he has been so justly ridiculed, sufficiently shews what he was capable of doing, in a History, wherein Religion was any ways concern'd. The

† See his *Epist. ad Belgas Cent.* 2. *Ep.* 67.

The ſecond thing, wherein thoſe that attempt to write a Hiſtory, ought to be perfectly inſtructed, is the Principles upon which Humane Society in general, and particular Societies are founded, and principally all that has a relation to Juſtice and Injuſtice. Without this, they will never be able to paſs a ſolid Judgment upon almoſt any ſingle Action that comes before them. They will be liable to take very wicked Men for Models of Virtue, and on the other hand, virtuous Perſons for Men of a moſt flagitious Character. They will beſtow the Elogiums of Virtue upon Vice, and treat Virtue herſelf no better than a Criminal. What is Vice with ſome People, paſſes for Virtue with others, and what we approve in our own Country, we look upon as execrable in an Enemy. Thoſe that afterwards read theſe Hiſtories, and have not a better ſtock of Knowledge than the Hiſtorians, inſtead of drawing thoſe Advantages which they ought from 'em, will ſoon fill their Minds with falſe Ideas, which at long run will have but too great an Influence upon their Conduct.

An Hiſtorian therefore ought to conſider what are the Duties, which the very Conſtitution of Humane Nature has impoſed upon all Men, of what Condition or Quality ſoever, and in what place or time ſover they are born. Theſe are the Laws which all Men are obliged to obſerve one with another, which can never ſuffer any change, nor be alter'd by any form of Government whatſoever; without violating the Principles of Humanity, and conſequently without deſerving Cenſure. For example, (for it is not my Buſineſs here to treat at large of that matter) the weakneſs of Humane Nature has impoſed a neceſſity upon us of aſſiſting one another, and the leaſt experience of Life teaches us that we ought

not to do that to another, which we ſhould call Injuſtice if they did to us. This Principle being put, and 'tis impoſſible to ſhake it, it will neceſſarily follow that whatever is contrary to it, ought to be blamed, let the Perſon who did it be who he will, and under what pretence he pleaſes.

Therefore thoſe that write Hiſtory ought to condemn without partiality whatever oppoſes this Principle of Humane Society. This ought chiefly to diſcover itſelf in thoſe that write Lives, where they have an occaſion to ſpeak diſtinctly of the Virtues and Vices of thoſe Perſons whoſe Hiſtory they write. We can hardly blame the Pagan Authors in this reſpect, I mean ſuch as are of any Eſteem; for 'tis certain that they don't in the leaſt diſſemble the Vices which were known to them, and that they likewiſe beſtow upon Virtue the Commendations ſhe deſerved, according to the Idea which they had of it. This is what we may remark in the Lives of *Plutarch*, for Inſtance, and of *Suetonius*, wherein they diſtribute their Cenſures and their Praiſes with a great deal of Juſtice and Freedom. All that we can find fault in them, is that they had not the cleareſt and exacteſt Ideas of Virtue and Vice. For Example, Ambition and a Paſſion for making War, either to gain a Crown, or acquire Reputation, or to oppreſs one's Neighbour, and to be admired by the wickedeſt of Men, paſs for Virtues in their Writings, or at leaſt for the Qualities of an Heroic Soul, that is elevated above the Vulgar. We may eaſily perceive by the manner wherein theſe Authors ſpeak of their Heroes, that they took ſeveral for *Great Men*, who were indeed *Great Scourges* both of their own Country and the neighbouring Nations.

The miſchief is, that after the Revelation of the Goſpel, we are not much wiſer than before.

We

We may diſcover, by the Stile of ſome Chriſtian Hiſtorians, who have written the Lives of ſeveral illuſtrious Men, either ſeparately, or in the courſe of their general Hiſtories, that they no leſs admir'd them notwithſtanding their Injuſtices, and all the other Artifices they employ'd to advance themſelves, than if they had always obſerved the niceſt Juſtice in all their Actions. Nay, ſeveral People believe that this ſcrupulous Virtue is incompatible with that which makes what we call a great Prince, or a great Stateſman. To illuſtrate this by a famous Inſtance, we fram'd to ourſelves a high Idea of *Charles* the Fifth, as heretofore we did of *Julius Cæſar*, tho' very little Juſtice went into his Compoſition; as if the Idea of a great Man cou'd poſſibly ſubſiſt without this Virtue. Hiſtorians that are full of this vulgar Prepoſſeſſion, merely for not having ſtudied enough the Principles of Morality, deceive their Readers, who know no better than themſelves; and thus we continue from Generation to Generation to admire theſe fine People, becauſe they have had the good Fortune, if I may be allow'd ſo to ſpeak, to do a world of Miſchief to infinite numbers of their Contemporaries, without being called to an account for it.

There is however this difference between the ancient Hiſtorians and the Moderns, that the former ſpeak much more freely of the Perſons, whoſe Lives they write, and diſſemble their Vices much leſs than the Moderns have done in the like Compoſitions. At leaſt I don't remember that I ever met any Modern who writ his Thoughts with that freedom and ſincerity, which is ſo emphatically conſpicuous in the two above-mention'd Authors. The greateſt part of them endeavour to ſet off their Heroe as much as they can; as

if the Reader were more obliged to them for concealing from him the Defects of thoſe whoſe Lives they write, than for diſcovering them to him; whereas the very Eſſence of Hiſtory requires of us, that we deſcribe their Defects and the ill Conſequences occaſion'd by them, that we teach the reſt of the World to ſhun them, as well as to imitate thoſe Virtues, of which ſhe gives us the Examples. If a Man of the Genius of *Plutarch* or *Suetonius*, as far as he can reaſonably be ſo now-a-days, had written the Life of Cardinal *Richelieu*, or of Cardinal *Mazarin*, he wou'd have written it after another manner than the *Sieur Aubery* has done, who has had ſo bad an opinion of our Age, that he has endeavour'd to perſwade the World that they were pious Men, and good Biſhops. He wou'd not have forgotten their good Qualities, ſuch as were their Vigilance and Addreſs, but he wou'd not have preſumed ſo far upon his Reader as to have talk'd of their Devotion and Humility. Several Perſons are likewiſe of opinion, that it was down-right Raillery to ſtrive to make a Saint of Cardinal *Ximenes*, ſince all the Actions of his Life ſufficiently diſcovered that he was a very haughty and ambitious Man.

The *Greeks* and *Romans* have generally committed a very great fault againſt the Principles of Humanity, and that is, when they ſpeak of the Incurſions which their Generals made into thoſe Countries which they call *Barbarous*, of their manner of ſubduing them, and how they treated the People who rebelled againſt them, after they had overcome by force; they ſlide gently over theſe places, as if the *Greeks* and *Romans* had committed no Inhumanity in all this. When the *Greeks* made Depredations upon the *Perſians* and their Sub-

Subjects, to carry them into Slavery and kill'd all such as pretended to oppose them, they † call'd this *Civilizing the barbarous Nations*. Nay, they said that the *Greeks* were *naturally Enemies of the* Persians, and that *Nature* taught them to make War against them. On the contrary, when the *Persians* or any other People, whom they call'd Barbarous, that is to say, All those who cou'd not talk *Greek*, shew'd any such Civilities to them, these were a pack of Monsters that made nothing of violating the most sacred things in the World, and 'twou'd surprize you to see what † terrible Descriptions they make of their Inhumanities. The *Romans* were guilty of the same Trick, and never speak with Horrour, but when they talk of the Mischiefs they suffer'd from other Nations. When they over-run these very same Nations with Fire and Sword, and make Slaves of the Inhabitants of a whole City, for having endeavour'd to throw off their injust Yoke, or when they force the Prisoners of War to turn Gladiators, and kill one another to divert the *Roman* Mobb, all this is nothing but sport and pastime. But when the *Gauls* or the *Parthians* ill used those whom they had taken Prisoners, why then they thought no Punishment cou'd be too severe, to mortify these People as they deserved.

† See *Grotius de jure B. & P. Lib.* II. *c.* 22. *n.* 10.

† See *Isocrat. Panegyr.*

The *Greek* and *Roman* Historians are full of an excessive Indulgence for their own Nation, and forgive nothing in others; because their Ideas of Justice and Humanity were too limited and narrow, and they knew not that all Men are equal in matter of natural Right. † *Cæsar* had no more right to make War upon the *Gauls* and *Germans*, than the Pirates of *Cilicia* had to take him Prisoner, and sell him for so much Ransom. In the mean time, these Pirates are never menti-

† *See* Plutarch *in his Life.*

oned but with Deteſtation, and the Victories of *Caſar* are infinitely extolled.

Chriſtians ought not to imitate the Pagans, knowing by the Goſpel that all Men are Brothers, and are ſubject to the ſame Laws one towards another, by the Right of Nature proceeding from God himſelf who is the common Father of all Mankind. However, when they come to ſpeak of Chriſtians and Turks, one wou'd often be tempted to think that the Turks were created by the bad Principle of the *Manichaans*, whom we were not at all obliged to treat with Humanity, but when we cou'd not hurt them with ſafety to ourſelves; but that on the contrary, the Turks were obliged to obſerve all the Laws of Juſtice towards the Chriſtians, as if they were the only Creatures of the good Principle. The Turks on their ſide are not much more reaſonable towards the Chriſtians; but theſe latter as having received a fuller Light, ought to be more Wiſe and Humane. When they ſpeak of the Violences committed by the Knights of *Malta* upon the Turks, they ought to ſpeak of them in the ſame Terms, as of the Robberies of the Pirates of *Barbary* upon the Chriſtians. On the contrary, all the Ports of Chriſtendom are full of Groans and Complaints, when thoſe of *Algiers* or *Tunis* have taken a Chriſtian Prize; and all the World rejoyces when the Knights of *Malta* take any Turkiſh Veſſel. The Lives of ſeveral grand Maſters of *Malta*, and many Knights of that Order are full of that Injuſtice. There is no ſort of Puniſhment which the Robberies of theſe Turkiſh Pirates upon the Chriſtians don't deſerve: there are no Commendations which the like Civilities of the Knights of *Malta* to the Mahumetans don't challenge.

If the Turks ſhould endeavour to pervert the Chriſtians in their Empire, by Rewards, or Puniſhments; by giving Mony to ſuch as wou'd take the Turban, and by ill uſing thoſe that ſhould continue firm to their Religion, how ſhou'd we exclaim againſt this Barbarity, and what diſmal Complaints ſhould we hear in all parts of Chriſtendom upon ſo Tragical a Scene! And if the Mahumetans tired out with the Conſtancy of the Chriſtians, who obey'd them, ſhould all at once turn them out of their Habitations, and oblige them to quit the Dominions of the Grand Signior, when we ſhould ſee all Chriſtendom fill'd with Grecian Refugees, all People wou'd Curſe the Mahumetan Tyranny, and exclaim at ſuch horrid Injuſtice. And no doubt on't they wou'd have good reaſon ſo to do, becauſe there is no Authority in the World, which has a Right to impoſe a Religion upon any Man whatever, nor to perſecute thoſe that are of a different Opinion, merely upon that account.

But when Cardinal † *Ximenes* converted the Moors of *Granada* with a Purſe in one Hand and Chains in the other, ſome People will tell you that the Moors had no Reaſon to Complain. What is a deteſtable Action in a *Mufti* or an *Alfaqui*, becomes a meritorious Work when a Chriſtian Churchman does it; tho' he cannot produce any Power from Heaven, which authorizes him to treat the Mahumetans in a manner which they cannot employ againſt the Chriſtians, without Injuſtice. By what Revelation do we know that God has given certain Rules of Juſtice to the Chriſtians, and Laws altogether different to other People? For my part, I confeſs I don't know.

† *See his Life by* M. Flechier. *Lib.* I.

But

But if it ſhould be replied, That Truth has this right over Falſity, that it may perſecute thoſe that are in an Errour, by thoſe whoſe Sentiments are true, I have two things by way of anſwer to it. The firſt is, That Men ſtill diſpute what is true and what falſe; and that the Mahumetans, for inſtance, are as fond of their Opinions as the Chriſtians can be perſwaded of theirs. Thus if you lay it down for a Rule, that Truth has a right to perſecute Errour, you furniſh them with Weapons, and you cannot complain of their Perſecutions. For, in ſhort, ſo long as they are fond of Mahumetaniſm, 'tis a neceſſary Conſequence that they fancy themſelves in the right to perſecute the Chriſtians. The ſecond thing is, That altho' I ſhould allow you, that the Perſons whom you perſecute are in an Errour, yet I will always maintain that Errour is not a Crime, when thoſe that are engaged in it, in all other Reſpects obſerve the Laws of Civil Society, and are not puniſhable for any breach of good Manners. 'Tis evident therefore that there is no Power which has a right to ill Uſe, and perſecute its Subjects under a pretence of Errour in Religion; as there is no Magiſtrate that can puniſh a Mathematician for making a Miſtake in Calculation.

It follows from hence that an Hiſtorian, who ought to ground his Judgment upon Truths that are indiſputable and univerſally received, ought to ſpeak with Indignation of the Conduct of *Cardinal Ximenes*, and the *Catholic* Kings towards the *Moors*, inſtead of approving or palliating it, as ſome Hiſtorians have done. They deſcribe *Ximenes* and theſe Princes to us, as Lovers of Juſtice, yet make them commit a crying Injuſtice againſt ſeveral thouſands of *Moors*, by perſecuting

ting them, and forcing them out of their Native Country, becauſe they wou'd not turn Chriſtians. If the *Moors* that lived on the South-ſide of the *Strait* of *Gibraltar*, had uſed the ſame Cruelties towards the *Chriſtians* that had been found among them, what horrid Deſcriptions had they not made of it in *Spain!*

'Tis not only the Infidels, who have ſmarted under this ſort of Juſtice, which is never good but when it has the ſtronger ſide to ſupport it: Chriſtians have employ'd it againſt Chriſtians, I mean thoſe whom we call Heretics. The Hiſtorians of each Party being prepoſſeſs'd with this ſtrange Idea, have in ſcandalous manner extoll'd the Juſtice of Princes, who have made uſe of violent Methods to ruine thoſe that were of their own Opinion, and exclaim without Reaſon againſt the contrary party, when they take the ſame courſe. Now we muſt either condemn all thoſe that perſecute for the ſake of Opinion, or equally abſolve them. When they depoſed the *Arian* Biſhops and Prieſts, and ſent them into Baniſhment; when they uſed their Followers ill, and took away their Churches from them, then they did nothing but Juſtice, and care was taken to ſuppreſs all the Complaints which they made of theſe ill Treatments, and of the odious Circumſtances that attended them. But when the *Arians* return'd the like Kindneſs to the Biſhop of *Alexandria* and ſome others, and endeavour'd to oppreſs their Party, then there was a horrible Violation of all manner of Juſtice, and both the Eaſt and the Weſt have reaſon to riſe up in Arms, to oblige the Emperour *Conſtantius* to re-eſtabliſh them. For my part, I cannot endure the Viſions of the *Arians*, concerning their three unequal Gods, neither do I pretend to excuſe the Vio-

Violence of their Conduct; but I don't comprehend how these that were subject to Errour as well as they, and who err'd in effect, if they believed three colateral Gods, as they are accus'd to have done, which I will not examine here; I don't comprehend, I say, how they cou'd complain of their Persecutions, after they had persecuted them before. Neither can I see how the Ecclesiastic Historians can clear themselves of what we may lay to their charge, that is, of having no certain fixed Rule of Justice and Injustice; since *Eusebius* of *Nicomedia* passes for an injust Man because he persecuted, while the same thing is call'd Justice in *Athanasius* of *Alexandria*. This was the case of the other Heresies, who used the Orthodox Ill, when they were uppermost; and who were ill used in their turn, when they happen'd to be the weakest.

Thus, as the Result of the *Majority of Voices*, is call'd *Truth* in such a History; so whatever the strongest Party does, goes by the Name of *Justice*. The weakest side is always accounted Erroneous and Unjust. I believe that no such thing can be objected to the Heathen Historians. Tho' they were often partial, as I have already said; yet they never referr'd to any Assembly the care of deciding for them, what is True or False, Just or Unjust, and in so absolute a manner as to oblige Men to Sacrifice to such Decisions all the Notions they had before of Truth and Falshood, Equity and Iniquity; as the Christians have done for several Ages, and as many of them do it still to this Day.

Many other things might be said concerning the Proceedings of those Assemblies, which have often trampled on all the Rules of Equity or Justice, which the Civil Laws so wisely prescribe.

The

The Aſſemblies, which condemned thoſe they call'd *Hereticks*, have often deprived them of the liberty of defending themſelves, and were made up of Men, who could be, without any Scruple, both Judges and Parties. Notwithſtanding, moſt Hiſtorians applaud them, and ſpeak of them with an extraordinary Reſpect. Thus, what would be call'd *Injuſtice*, *Cabal* and *Oppreſſion*, in a judiciary Court, goes by the Name of *Juſtice*, *Zeal* and *Equity*, in the *Councils*. It ought therefore to be remembred that thoſe Words ſignify quite another thing in the Writings of a *Church-Hiſtorian*, than they do in another Hiſtory. The Reaſon of it, is, becauſe they who write the Hiſtory of the Church, have, for the moſt part, no true and exact *Ideas* of Virtue and Vice.

What I have ſaid, relates to the *Ideas* of Morality, which an Hiſtorian ought to have, before he undertakes to inform Poſterity; one may ſee how neceſſary they are to him; but 'tis no leſs neceſſary that he ſhould have true Notions of *Politicks*; ſince Hiſtory is not only concerned about private Mens Actions, but alſo about the reciprocal Duties of People and their Governours, and what the ſeveral Nations owe to one another, To this all Policy may be reduced, which is nothing elſe but the Art of making a People Happy, by a good and juſt Government, and by protecting them againſt their Enemies.

I will not undertake to treat here of that Science at large: I ſhall only touch upon ſome of its general Principles, which, I think, an Hiſtorian ought to kep always in mind, and which are too much neglected at preſent. The firſt is, That they, who govern Nations, ought to make the Happineſs of thoſe, whom God has committed to their Care, the chief End of their Government.

vernment. Which comprehends all the Duties of thoſe, who are at the Head of a Society, and is a Principle ſo generally received, that the moſt unjuſt Tyrants durſt ſcarce contradict it. *The Happineſs of a People*, (that there may be no Equivocation in that Word) does undeniably conſiſt, 1. In being only obliged to obey the Laws, which are approved by a long Uſe, or enacted according to the uſual manner. 2. In enjoying quietly one's Eſtate, and the Fruit of one's Labour, as long as one obeys the Laws, without being under the apprehenſion of being deprived of it by any violent Means. 3. In contributing to the publick Charges, as much as the Subjects can bear, without being over-burthened. 'Tis manifeſt, that if the Will of a fickle and inconſtant Man, ſurrounded with Flatterers, takes place of the Law; or if one is not ſure of what he poſſeſſes; or pays more than he is able, there can be no Happineſs under ſuch a Government. This we may obſerve in the *Deſpotick* Empires of *Aſia*, where the People, ſubject to thoſe three Inconveniences, are the moſt unfortunate Men in the World.

Thoſe general Principles being laid down, no manner of Government ought to be Praiſed by an Hiſtorian, but as much as it is agreeable to them; nor ought a Prince to be Eſteem'd further than he conforms himſelf to the ſame. This was the Senſe of the *Greek* and *Latin* Hiſtorians on this Matter: They Brand with the Name of *Tyranny* any ſort of Government, wherein the Laws are Arbitrary, and where no Man is ſure of what he has, and the Charges are ſo Exorbitant, that the People have much ado to live. They alſo call *Tyrants* thoſe, who govern after that manner, whether there be but one, or many.

ny. Such were their Notions concerning a good Policy; as one may ſee by a careful Reading of *Ariſtotle's Politicks.*

Tho' it is manifeſt that a People cannot be Happy under ſuch a Government, as I have deſcribed; and tho' it cannot be doubted, but that Men formed ſeveral Societies in order to their Happineſs; yet there have been ſome Men, ſince the XVI. Century, of which *Nicholas Machiavel* may be accounted the Chief, who have endeavoured to introduce a Notion of Policy quite different from that which I have deſcribed. They have had no Regard to the Natural and Inviolable End of all Rational Societies; but only enquired by what means the Heads of Societies might render themſelves abſolute Maſters of the Laws, and the People's Lives and Eſtates, and make themſelves greater at their Neighbour's Coſt, without any regard to Juſtice. This is the only thing, which the Policy of a Sovereign ought to aim at, according to thoſe Authors, and he ought to place all his Prudence in compaſſing his Deſigns by any means, provided they be ſafe. They do not concern themſelves about what is Juſt or Unjuſt, but only about that which the Supreme Power can do, without endangering itſelf. That ſort of Politicians look upon People, not as Men, whoſe Good their Rulers ought to procure, as much as they can; but as a Pack of Hunting-Dogs, which ought to be kept only as far as they can afford Sport. *Machiavel's Prince* minds only his own Good, and is no farther concern'd in the Good of his Subjects, than he can better himſelf by it. This is exactly the Notion the *Gracians* had of a *Tyrant*, according to † *Ariſtotle's* Deſinition, who ſays, That Tyranny is *a Monarchy, which aims only at the Good of a Monarch.*

† *Polit. Lib.* III. *c.* 7.

This

This is not a fit place to confute that Doctrine; which being compared with what I have said of a true Policy, will easily appear unworthy of a Man, who has not lost all Sense of Virtue. Indeed those, who are most fond of it, dare not openly own such pernicious Principles. The most Arbitrary Princes, without excepting the *Grand Signior*, endeavour to persuade their Subjects, that the Good of the State, is the only thing they aim at, to which they Sacrifice all things, if they are to be believed. Thus Tyranny and Vice make, as it were, satisfaction to Freedom and Virtue. But because there are every-where, especially among those, who are the neareſt Attendants of Princes, a great many Men, who only mind their private Advantage, by flattering Sovereign Princes, and so Reigning with them, if they can, *Machiavelism*, tho' never so detestable, has made a great Progress in the World. Those, who are infected with it, brand with the Name of Seditious Doctrine the Sentiments of those, who believe that the Power of Princes is bounded by the Laws; and they continually say, in *Europe* as well as in *Asia*, that a Prince is Master of his Subjects Lives and Estates. And because 'tis not safe in many Countries to contradict those scandalous Discourses; that Doctrine, or at least part of it, has been entertain'd by several Historians. They intimate everywhere, that a State cannot be Happy and Quiet, unless People blindly submit to the Will of a Prince; as being born, not to form, with their Fellow-Creatures, a Society advantageous to all its Members, but to be Slaves to the Prince.

Church-Men, most of whom claim a Right to a like Monarchy over the Souls of Men, have flattered the temporal Power, as much as they could; in

in hopes of being upheld by it in their Claim, and of reigning likewiſe over the Bodies, as well as the Souls of Men; becauſe of the ſtrict Connexion there is between thoſe two things. And the better to ſucceed in their Deſign, they have made uſe of the Divine Authority, as if the Chriſtian Religion was only conſiſtent with an abſolute Empire over Men's Bodies and Souls: as the *Muftis* and *Alfaquis* promiſe *Mahomet*'s Paradiſe to thoſe, who are the beſt Slaves to the *Sultan*.

This is the Reaſon why we ſee ſo many Hiſtories written by ſuch Men, full of that Spirit of Slavery towards ſpiritual and temporal Sovereigns: And herein many of our Modern Hiſtorians are much inferiour to the Heathen Hiſtorians. We may obſerve in the latter, conſtant and ſetled Principles of Equity and Juſtice, when they treat of Princes and their Subjects. Every Page of their Hiſtories contains ſuch Sentiments as become free and rational Men. But the Hiſtories of many Modern Authors are full of ſhameful Flatteries of Princes, to whoſe Will they Sacrifice all their Notions of Equity and Juſtice. They will tell you, that the leaſt Irregularities of the People towards their Sovereigns, deſerve all the Puniſhments of this Life, and the Life to come; but the greateſt Crimes of a Prince againſt his Subjects are but *Venial Sins*.

I have often obſerved, that many of thoſe, who ſpeak of the Revolutions of *England*, in Hiſtories, or in common Diſcourſe, expreſs a great Indignation againſt the Inhabitants of that Country; becauſe they have not ſubmitted themſelves to their Kings, as Slaves, in imitation of their Neighbours. The *Engliſh* are commonly accounted a wild and inconſtant Nation, for no other reaſon, but becauſe they obey their Kings, when

they do not incroach upon their Priviledges; and oppoſe their Deſigns, when they go about to deſtroy them; whereas, in other Countries, they are uſed to obey unjuſt as well as juſt Commands. That happy Nation is as Dutiful and Obedient to its Kings, as it can be, without endangering the loſs of the publick Liberty: and whilſt their Kings require nothing from them that is contrary to their Priviledges, they are ready to do any thing for them: as we have ſeen in this laſt War, ended in 1697. under the Reign of a Prince, who lets them enjoy their Liberties. But they will not make themſelves Slaves, as others have done. Their Neighbours, who are ſubmitted to an Arbitrary Power, call it Wildneſs and Inconſtancy; whereas a *Greek* or *Roman* Hiſtorian would call it *Conſtancy* and *Love of Liberty*. On the contrary a blind Obedience, ready to commit all ſorts of Crimes at a Prince's Command, is accounted by them Faithfulneſs to one's Prince and Country; whereas the *Greek* and *Latin* Authors would have call'd it *Slavery*. Thus the Change of Notions and Cuſtoms has brought in the Change of the Names of Virtues and Vices. The words of *Cato* to the Senate, as we find them in *Saluſt*, may be applied to thoſe Men: " We have loſt a " great while ago, *ſays he, ſpeaking of his time*, the " true Names of things; becauſe to give away " another Man's Eſtate, goes by the Name of Li- " berality, and Boldneſs in doing Ill is call'd " Courage. *Jam pridem nos vera rerum Vocabula amiſimus, quia bona alieña largiri Liberalitas, malarum rerum Audacia Fortitudo vocatur.*

'Tis certain that the ancient Hiſtorians very much exceed the Modern in this reſpect; but there is one thing, in which the latter do perhaps exceed the former. It ſeems that the ancient

ent Hiſtorians were ignorant of what Nations owe to one another. Juſtice and Equity ſeem'd to them to be Virtues, good for private Men, but to which a whole Nation was not bound. 'Tis for this reaſon that they deſcribe with great admiration the Conqueſts of great Empires, ſuch as the *Perſian*, and *Roman*. If at any time they find fault with the Conduct of thoſe ancient Conquerors, they do it only, when they ſhamefully broke their Promiſe, or were exceſſively Cruel. But they ſeldom blame the deſire of domineering, and enſlaving neighbouring Countries, on the firſt favourable Opportunity. Such a deſire, if it can be ſatisfied by the way of Arms, is accounted by the heathen Hiſtorians a noble and heroical Act. They very much eſteem'd thoſe, who enlarged the Bounds of the Empire, without enquiring whether it was juſt or not, provided they were ſucceſsful in their Undertakings. The *Romans*, for Example, made continual Wars, not ſo much in their own Defence, as to make themſelves Maſters, firſt, of *Italy*, and then of the neighbouring Countries; till they had ſubmitted to their Empire the beſt parts of *Europe*, *Aſia*, and *Africa*, all along the *Mediterranean Sea*. The *Greek* and *Latin* Hiſtorians ſtrived who ſhould deſcribe beſt their Wars and Conqueſts, in ſuch a manner as eaſily ſhews that they much more admired their Bravery and Skill in improving the Occaſions of making themſelves greater, than they would have admired the juſteſt People in the World, who keeping within their Bounds, would have been contented to repulſe the Injuries of their Neighbours, without endeavouring to enlarge their Territories. If at any time they blame their Ambition and Injuſtice, as they do ſometimes; 'tis nothing if compared with the

Praiſes they beſtow on them, when they mention their Victories.

The Chriſtian Religion having given us more exact and compleat Notions of *Juſtice*, than the Heathens commonly had, ſeveral Chriſtian Hiſtorians have ſpoken of the Ambition of the ancient Conquerors, in Terms more agreeable to the immutable Law of Juſtice, than the Heathen Hiſtorians ever did. I confeſs that the ancient Philoſophers have ſaid a great many things on this Point, which are almoſt as ſound as what has been ſaid by Chriſtians; but it was only the Philoſophers that ſpoke ſo, and the Hiſtorians had no great Regard to their Opinions.

† *H. Grotius.*

An † Incomparable Author hath, the firſt ſhewn, in this XVII. Century, what are not only *the Laws of Peace*, but alſo of *War*; and has ſo clearly taught what Nations owe to one another, that it can no longer be doubted whether making War out of meer Ambition be not perfect Robbing and Murdering. That great Man has reduced into an Art, and methodically proved the Truths, which were diſperſed in ſeveral Authors, on this Matter, and has confirmed them with many Examples and Quotations. So that if any Hiſtorian will give the Title of *Juſt* and *Pious* to any Prince, who made, or will hereafter make War out of Ambition; he ought not to take it ill, if he is accounted a baſe and ſhameful Flatterer. A Prince, who has reduced ſeveral Provinces to an extream Miſery and Poverty, and deſtroyed ſeveral Millions of People, out of meer Ambition, and without being provoked, will never be look'd upon as a good Man, unleſs *Paganiſm* ſhould prevail again, or *Machiaveliſm* ſhould become every-where the Religion in faſhion. The Heathens praiſed much the Clemency of *Julius Cæſar*,

to whom, what I have ſaid, might have been juſtly objected; becauſe he ſpared the Lives of many of his Fellow-Citizens, who had fought againſt him to preſerve the Liberty of their Country, and at laſt ſubmitted to his Tyranny. But no Hiſtorian, worthy of that Name, can hereafter cry up the Clemency of thoſe, who have done, or will do any ſuch thing. Princes, who little think of the Miſeries, which a War brings on their Subjects and Neighbours; or are not moved with the Calamities and Tears of an infinte number of innocent and unfortunate Families, or the great Blood-ſhed which attends a long War, will never be cried up as Merciful and Juſt, but by ſuch Men as have ſcarce any Notion of thoſe Virtues, or by Flatterers, whom no Body can bear with, but they who dare not contradict 'em.

This is what I had to ſay concerning Hiſtory. If I have ſpoken ſomwhat freely, let no Body find fault with me for it, but rather with the Matter itſelf, which admits of no Palliation. I know very well that this Diſcourſe and the like will not hinder Hiſtorians from Flattering and Lying; but I ſuppoſe thoſe Gentlemen will not take it ill, if one ſpeaks ſometimes the Truth.

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to whom, what I have ſaid, might have been juſtly objected; becauſe he ſpared the Lives of many of his Fellow-Citizens, who had fought againſt him to preſerve the Liberty of their Country, and at laſt ſubmitted to his Tyranny. But no Hiſtorian, worthy of that Name, can hereafter cry up the Clemency of thoſe, who have done, or will do any ſuch thing. Princes, who little think of the Miſeries, which a War brings on their Subjects and Neighbours; or are not moved with the Calamities and Tears of an infinte number of innocent and unfortunate Families, or the great Blood-ſhed which attends a long War, will never be cried up as Merciful and Juſt, but by ſuch Men as have ſcarce any Notion of thoſe Virtues, or by Flatterers, whom no Body can bear with, but they who dare not contradict 'em.

This is what I had to ſay concerning Hiſtory. If I have ſpoken ſomwhat freely, let no Body find fault with me for it, but rather with the Matter itſelf, which admits of no Palliation. I know very well that this Diſcourſe and the like will not hinder Hiſtorians from Flattering and Lying; but I ſuppoſe thoſe Gentlemen will not take it ill, if one ſpeaks ſometimes the Truth.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Decay of Humane Learning, and the Cauſes of it.

THERE is without doubt a Decay in the Common-wealth of Learning, in ſeveral Reſpects; but I ſhall only mention that which concerns *Philology*. 'Tis certain we have not ſeen, for a long time, in any part of *Europe*, any Men, who equal the illuſtrious Criticks, who lived in the laſt Century, and the beginning of this. For Example, We ſee no Body, who equals in Learning, Application of Mind, and Bulk as well as Number of Books, *Joſeph Scaliger*, *Juſtus Lipſius*, *Iſaac Caſaubon*, *Claudius Salmaſius*, *Hugo Grotius*, *John Meurſius*, *John Selden*, and a great many others, whom I need not name, becauſe they are known to every Body. I have a due Eſteem for many learned Men of my Acquaintance; but I am perſuaded that none of them will complain, if I ſay that I know none, who equals thoſe great Men in Learning. We have ſeen nothing for a long time, that can be compared with their Works.

I have enquired into the Reaſons of it, and I think I have found ſome ſatisfactory ones. Some of them concern thoſe, who ſhould favour the Study of Humane Learning, but do it not: and ſome concern them, that profeſs that Study, and bring Contempt upon it. I ſhall inſtance upon ſome few, to which the Reader may add his own, and what he has obſerved by his Experience.

I. To

I. TO begin with the latter, I mean, that which can be objected to the Men of Learning. The first Reason why few Men have applied themselves to the Study of Humane Learning, and consequently why fewer still have had an extraordinary Success in it, is that they who were learned in that sort of Science, did not care to make it easie to others. Because most of them attained to the Learning they had, not by a short and methodical Way, but by a vast Reading and a prodigious Labour; they did not at all care to facilitate to others the means of acquiring that Learning. Having, if I may so say, got with much ado to the top of the Rock, thro' steep and thorny Ways, they thought it just that others should undergo the same Toil, if they would attain to the same degree of Learning. But because there are few Men, whose *Genius* is so bent to the Study of Humane Learning, as to resolve upon taking so much Pains, to get the Knowledge of it; 'tis no wonder if most Men have been discouraged, almost from the Beginning, and if a great Knowledge of that sort of Learning is so scarce at present. *The Difficulties of that Study.*

Perhaps it will be askt, What those learned Men of the first Rank should have done, to facilitate that Study, besides what they have done? I answer that there are two sorts of Books, which may serve to acquire that sort of Knowledge; which have been wanting, ever since the Study of Humane Learning hath been in Vogue.

THE first Books we want are good Editions of all the *Greek* and *Latin* Authors, not only correct, but also illustrated with all necessary Notes, to make them more Intelligible. But to *Of Critical Notes upon the Latin Authors.*

come to Particulars, I begin with the *Latin* Authors, and I ſay that the learned Men, I have mentioned, or others like them, ſhould have given us at leaſt all the good *Latin* Authors, not only reviſed upon ſuch ancient Manuſcripts as we have, but alſo illuſtrated with ſhort, clear and methodical Notes on all the difficult Places, and ſuch as were not above the Capacity of young Men, and might ſerve thoſe, who have made ſome Progreſs. Whereas the learned Men I ſpoke of, have been moſt times contented to publiſh Authors with meer critical Notes, about the true Reading; to which if they have added any thing for the underſtanding of the Expreſſions, Opinions or Cuſtoms, they have done it only upon ſome few places, to make a ſhew of their great Reading, by publiſhing their common Places, or Compilations; beſides, what they ſay is often ſo much out of the way, that it is of no uſe for the bettter Underſtanding of an Author. But there are a great many other places, which will put not only a young Beginner to a ſtand, but alſo ſuch as have made a greater Progreſs, upon which they ſay nothing at all. When the Text of an Author is clear, they will often ſpeak much and enlarge upon it; but when it is difficult and obſcure, they ſay nothing at all. There are ſome Criticks, who think it beneath them to make ſuch Notes; they ſay that they are only good for young Men, and that thoſe who have made ſome Progreſs, may eaſily be without 'em: But neither of them is altogether true. There are many grave Men, who have nobler Employments, and want good Notes upon the difficult Places of ancient Authors, and would be very glad to find ſome. They have not time enough to look in other Books for the Explications they want; be-

cauſe

cauſe they read thoſe Authors only for their Recreation, when their Buſineſs is over, and not to weary themſelves in turning over large Volumes, to find the Explication of a Place they do not underſtand. Beſides, 'tis a more difficult thing to write ſuch Notes, than 'tis commonly believed. The Notes of *Paul Manucius* upon *Cicero*'s Epiſtles, which are ſuch as I would have, coſt him much more Pains than the Critical Notes of many others, tho' never ſo much eſteem'd; and it had been much better to put them under the Text, rather than ſeveral others, which are only about the true Reading. Eight Readers in ten want *Manucius*'s Notes, but ſcarce look on what is ſaid concerning the *Various Readings*. 'Tis to no purpoſe to ſay that it is an Abuſe: Such is Mens Humour, and few have time enough to examine ſo many needleſs *Punctilio*'s. The moſt Curious are contented to have recourſe to thoſe Compilations, when 'tis neceſſary they ſhould exactly underſtand the Senſe of a Paſſage; otherwiſe they would not look on them. And indeed, the Reader retains not much in his Memory, when he has read them.

Short Notes, well worded, which contain nothing without a Proof for it, or at leaſt referr the Reader to a good Author for the Truth of what they ſay, quoting exactly the place, that it may be eaſily found; ſuch Notes, I ſay, are a great Treaſure for moſt Readers. But 'tis not ſo eaſie to make 'em, as to Quibble about ſome various Readings, or to make ſome Digreſſions.

Some Men of Learning, much inferiour to thoſe I have mention'd, have undertaken in our Age, eſpecially in *Holland*, to ſupply that Defect, and to collect ſeveral Notes out of ſeveral Criticks, who

who had written upon the beſt Authors, or explained them by the by in ſome other Works. They go by the Name of Notes *Variorum:* But the greateſt part of the firſt Collections were very ill made, becauſe thoſe who went about it, were not qualified for it. They have often pitched upon the worſt, have not alledged the Proofs of the Authors they abridged, and have often miſrepreſented their Thoughts. And to inſert Notes every-where, they have been as large on the clear as the obſcure Paſſages, and fill'd their Collections with uſeleſs or unſeaſonable Digreſſions.

Every Body complaining of the Notes *Variorum*, ſome learned Men thought it neceſſary to make a Choice of the beſt Criticks, and inſert all their Notes together with ſome other good Remarks of other Authors. Such are the *Latter* Editions, *Cum Notis Variorum*, and they are without doubt to be preferred before the former. The Publick has been better pleaſed with them, and all thoſe, who love Humane Learning, have been extremely glad to have a compleat Collection out of all the beſt Criticks, to conſult it when there is an occaſion for't. Notwithſtanding, they complain ſtill of one thing, and I think they have ſome Reaſon for it. They wiſh that thoſe, who make ſuch Collections, would only put under the Text ſuch Notes as may ſerve for the underſtanding of the Expreſſions, Opinions, Cuſtoms, *&c.* Supplying what is wanting in them, as much as it can be done; and that all the compleat and full Notes ſhould be referr'd to the end of the Book, to conſult them upon occaſion. They wiſh beſides that thoſe Notes of ſeveral Authors were ſo diſpoſed, that one might find them all at once in one place; whereas one muſt run over a whole

whole Volume, to find what each Author ſays, which is too long and tedious. We have two Editions of *Cæſar*'s *Commentaries* by *Goth. Jungermannus*, wherein all the Notes are at the end of the Book, and 'tis no eaſie thing to make uſe of them, becauſe every one of thoſe Notes is by itſelf, in its order; whereas if they were mixed, one might ſee with a glance of the Eye whatever the Commentators ſay upon each Place.

They thought in *France* it were better, if thoſe, who undertook to publiſh the Claſſick Authors *for the Uſe of the Dauphin*, ſhould take out of the learned Men, who wrote before them, what they ſhould think fit. But, if I may be allow'd to ſpeak the Truth, Moſt of thoſe Interpreters have but indifferently perform'd their Part. Firſt, They made uſe of very bad Editions; whereas they ſhould have followed the beſt: which, I think, is an unpardonable Fault. Secondly, One may ſee in their Notes, the ſame Faults I have obſerved in the firſt *Holland* Editions, *Cum Notis Variorum*. However there is one thing in the *Paris* Editions, which is wanting in the *Holland* Editions. There are in the former ſome *Index*'s of all the Words, which may be of great Uſe to find out the Paſſages wanted, when one remembers but ſome words of them. But it muſt be confeſt that thoſe *Indexes* would be better and ſhorter, if laying aſide all the trivial and common Words, which no Body ever looks for, as the Verb *Sum* with all its *Tenſes*, *Conjunctions*, *Adverbs* and *Prepoſitions*, when they contain no particular Signification, that deſerves to be taken notice of, *&c.* they had inſerted not only the Words by themſelves, but alſo the *Phraſes*. The Reaſon of it is, becauſe no Body looks in an *Index* for the Verb *Sum*, for inſtance, in its ordinary Signi-

Signification; and if any Body look'd for it in an uncommon Senſe, it would perhaps take up a whole Day to find it in the *Index*, unleſs one knew near at hand where to find it. The ſame may be ſaid of a great many other Words. Whereas, if the *Phraſes* were contain'd in the *Index*, when they are not common, one might preſently find the Paſſage one looks for. 'Tis for this Reaſon we ſo much eſteem the *Indexes* of *Matthias Berneggerus* and *John Freinſhemius*, who were learned Men, and made exact and judicious *Indexes* of ſeveral good Authors, tho' they inſerted not all the Words. But it may be that thoſe who had the direction of the Editions, *For the Uſe of the Dauphin*, did not think fit to truſt the Authors of thoſe *Indexes*, and ordered them to inſert all the Words, leſt they ſhould forget ſome material thing. The Authors of the Notes ſhould have taken upon them the care of doing it; and if they were learned enough to write Notes, they ſhould have been judged capable of making good *Indexes*.

If therefore the Liberality of a great Prince and his Miniſters has had no better Succeſs; 'tis the Fault of thoſe, who have been put upon that Work: But that Project was very good in itſelf, and becoming the Generoſity of a great Prince, and the Learning of thoſe, who were intruſted with the Education of the *Dauphin*. At the ſame time that they were writing for Him, they would have done a great piece of Service, not only to *France*, but alſo to the reſt of *Europe*; if they had gone about it according to the Method, which, as I ſaid before, the Compilers of the Notes *Variorum* ſhould have followed.

H A-

HAVING ſpoken of the *Latin* Authors, I muſt now ſay ſomething of the *Greek*. The Performances of the learned Men of the firſt Rank, are here more deficient ſtill. There are but few, whoſe Tranſlations are exact, moſt of them being rather Paraphraſes, than Tranſlations, eſpecially on the difficult Places; which makes them far leſs uſeful. One would think that they, who made 'em, deſign'd they ſhould be read, by themſelves, by thoſe, who underſtood not the *Greek* Tongue: whereas ſuch Tranſlations ſhould be placed by the Text, to help thoſe, who read the Original, when they meet with ſome difficult Paſſages. The worſt of all is, that moſt of 'em are not faithful enough, and often miſrepreſent the Senſe of the Original; becauſe few of 'em were made by very learned Men. They, who were able to do it well, were diſcouraged, looking upon it as a tedious Labour, and which was beneath them; and thoſe, who undertook it, were not qualified for it. *Iſaac Caſaubon* has very well Tranſlated *Polybius*, *Æneas Tacticus*, and the *Characters* of *Theophraſt*. It were to be wiſhed, that that learned Man had Tranſlated many other Authors as well as thoſe. He would have done a much greater Service to the Publick, than by writing againſt *Baronius* concerning ſome Matters he underſtood not ſo well, and which 'twas too late for him to Study in his old Age.

Of the Tranſlations of Greek Authors, and Notes upon them.

Perhaps ſome will ſay that I inſiſt too much upon the Tranſlations of *Greek* Authors, and that ſtudious Men ſhould uſe themſelves to read the Originals without the help of a Tranſlation. But I anſwer, That to uſe ones ſelf to it, one muſt have ſome help, and that there can be none better than a Tranſlation placed by the Text. I appeal to them, who have attained to ſo great a Know-

Knowledge of the *Greek* Tongue, as to want such a help no longer. It has been useful to every Body, especially in the Reading of difficult Authors, such as the tragical Poets, and the like, as *Pindar*, *Lycophron*, *Thucydides*, &c. A good Translation is as useful as a Commentary, and no Body needs be more ashamed to consult it, than to consult some Notes. If the Translator was a learned Man, 'tis to be presumed that he took more Pains to explain his Author, than one can often take by Reading him, and certainly he deserves to be taken notice of. *Menagius* says, in the *Menagiana*, that tho' he had studied that Tongue for a long time, he could not be without a Translation; and I think several People would say the same, if they were as sincere as he was.

We have few *Greek* Authors, illustrated with Notes upon all the difficult Places, and the Notes we have are as Deficient as those that have been made upon the *Latin* Authors. However they have lately published in *Holland* three *Greek* Authors, *Cum Notis Variorum*, which one may approve of; because they contain the entire Notes of several learned Men. I mean *Diogenes Laertius*, *Longinus* and *Callimachus*. They have also within these few Years printed some *Greek* Authors in *England*, with the ancient *Scholia*, and some critical Notes; but they are not to be compared to those of *Holland*, either for Order, or the excellency of the Notes, tho' they are not at all to be despised. They should have placed all the Notes under the Text, which was an easie thing to do, because they are short enough; to save the Time and Labour of the Reader, who is unwilling to have recourse to the end of a Book, whilst he reads an Author; especially being uncertain whether he will find some Notes upon

on the Paſſage he does not underſtand. Some Criticks will frown at the Reading of what I ſay; but in this they oppoſe the Judgment of every Body, who may juſtly deſire to ſave his Time and Labour, as much as is poſſible.

I know there are ſome Men, whoſe Learning ought by no means to be deſpiſed, who will complain that what I have ſaid, tends to facilitate the Knowledge of the Sciences to Lazy Men, and even to render 'em contemptible, by making them too common. I confeſs I could wiſh that the way to Learning were made ſo plain and eaſie, that the moſt Lazy Men might become Learned: Indeeed, what ſignifies it to take much Pains, which in itſelf is of no Uſe? We eſteem thoſe, who labour hard, and apply themſelves to Study for a long time, only becauſe a great Labour and Application ſerve to acquire a uſeful Knowledge. 'Tis well to uſe oneſelf to take Pains, not becauſe it is a Meritorious thing in itſelf; but becauſe in this Life we can get nothing without Pains. This Truth, confirmed by the Experience of all Ages, ought to free our moroſe *Philologers* from the fear of being ſoon overtaken by thoſe, who go a more ſmooth and ſhorter way than they went. Which way ſoever one takes to learn the *Greek* Tongue, it will always require much time, and a great Application and Memory, without which 'tis impoſſible to attain to a conſiderable Knowledge of it.

Beſides, 'tis altogether falſe, That if the Knowledge of ancient Authors ſhould grow common, learned Men would be leſs eſteem'd. Such a fear would be well grounded, if it was a barren Science, which could afford no Pleaſure; for ſuch a Science, ought to be deſpiſed, as ſoon as 'tis known. But when a Science is uſeful and pleaſant; the better it is known, the more it is cheriſhed, and thoſe, who know it, are ſo much the more eſteem'd

ſteem'd. On the contrary, however uſeful it might be in itſelf, and whatever Pleaſure it could afford to thoſe who knew it; if it be known only to few, thoſe who are Strangers to it, are apt to doubt of its Uſefulneſs and Charms; becauſe things, that are ſeen only with another Man's Eyes, are not ſo eaſily believed. Whilſt the Learning of the *Grecians*, and the Beauty of their Language, were known at *Rome* only by the Report of ſome few Men, who had ſtudied them; others, who knew but little or nothing at all of them, deſpiſed and even hated 'em. *Cato* the *Cenſor*, in a Book of Precepts directed to his Son, ſpoke of that Nation † in theſe Terms: "I'll "tell you in a proper time what I have diſco- "vered concerning the *Grecians* at *Athens*, and "I'll demonſtrate to you that it is good to know "ſomthing of their Learning, but not to learn "it throughly. It is a very wicked and intracta- "ble Nation. Take it as the Words of a Pro- "phet: If ever that Nation teaches others its "Learning, it will ſpoil all, eſpecially if it ſends "its Phyſicians hither. The *Grecians* are ſworn "to kill all the *Barbarians* with the Art of Phy- "ſick: *Dicam de iſtis Græcis ſuo loco, Marce Fili, quid Athenis exquiſitum habeam; & quod bonum ſit illorum litteras inſpicere, non perdiſcere, vincam. Nequiſſimum & indocile genus illorum, & hoc puta Vatem dixiſſe: quandocunq; iſta gens ſuas litteras dabit, omnia corrumpet. Tum etiam magis, ſi Medicos ſuos huc mittet. Jurarunt inter ſe barbaros necare omnes Medicinâ.* There is no need I ſhould ſhew the Unjuſtice and Falſhood of that Judgment. Yet ſuch Diſcourſes were the Reaſon why a great while after the *Grecians*, eſpecially the Phyſicians, were expell'd from *Rome*, as we find it in the next words of *Pliny*. But when the *Romans* grew more

† *Apud Plinium. H. N. Lib. XXIX. c. 1.*

more Learned, and became generally acquainted with the *Greek* Tongue; they were aſhamed of their Ruſticity, and the *Grecians* were infinitely more eſteem'd. There was not one Rich Man in *Rome*, but kept a *Greek Grammarian* or *Philoſopher* in his Houſe, as we learn from *Lucian* in a Treatiſe, which he wrote a purpoſe on that Subject.

Our Humaniſts ſhould endeavour, for the ſame Reaſon, to make the Reading of the *Greek* Authors as eaſie as they can. And then perhaps Men of the higheſt Rank would take delight in the Reading of them, and upon that account be great Benefactors to thoſe, who ſhould contribute to their Diverſion. I only mention Diverſion, tho' I am fully perſuaded, that ſuch a Reading would be very uſeful; becauſe they, who have ſome Employments in the State, have not time enough, to make a formal Study of that ſort of Learning, and read the ancient Authors only for their Pleaſure. On the contrary, whilſt Men in Authority believe that it is ſo difficult a thing to read the *Greek* Authors, that it requires all the Leiſure of a *Canon*; they will look on that Study as a thing, wherein they are not at all concern'd, and at laſt will altogether deſpiſe it and thoſe, who eſteem it. It were to be wiſhed that ſuch a thing had not already happen'd; but it will be much worſe hereafter, unleſs the Lovers of the *Greek* Antiquities prevent it, by making that ſort of Learning more eaſie than it has been hitherto.

IN order to it, we ſhould have not only good Editions of the *Greek* Authors, and ſuch as I have before deſcribed; but alſo good *Dictionaries*, which ſhould contain all the Diſcoveries that have *Other Helps wanting.*

been made in the *Greek* Tongue, since *Henry Stephen* and *Robert Constantin*, who are the last who made good Dictionaries. We have only had since pitiful Abridgments, to which nothing new has been added. It were to be wished that some learned Men, well versed in the Writings of the Criticks, who have written since, as well as in the Reading of ancient Authors, would undertake to Augment *Constantin*'s Dictionary.

We want also some methodical Treatises of the *Greek* Antiquities, by the Reading of which one might learn the Opinions and Customs of the *Grecians*, without being obliged to read all the Treatises that have been published on that Subject. Notwithstanding all the Collections that have been made, we have nothing that is exact and compleat on that Matter. But if no Body will make a methodical Treatise of all those things, it were at least to be wished that in an Age, wherein Dictionaries are so much in vogue, some Body would write a good one, that should contain whatever was written on that Subject, to have recourse to it on occasion; the Collections we have, being so confused and imperfect, that 'tis a hard matter to make use of 'em, or to find in them the Solution of one's Difficulties.

What I have said of these latter Helps, for the understanding of the *Greek* Authors, ought also to be understood of the *Latin*; tho' we have greater Helps to understand the latter than the former.

Humanists praise their Trade too much.

II. THERE are some Men, who believe that the best way to have their Profession esteem'd, is to Praise it excessively; without scrupling to undervalue all the rest in comparison of that, which they would have esteem'd. They are like those Preachers, who extol the *Saints*, they will Praise on

on their Feſtival-Days, above all others. Such a Method may be good, to impoſe on the Common People for a little time; but at the bottom it is good for nothing, becauſe it never fails to offend reaſonable Men, who will have every thing to be valued according to its Worth, and take it ill when they perceive they have been deceived. They deſpiſe nothing that is uſeful, but they will not have any thing to be accounted more uſeful than really it is.

They, who have ſpent their time in the Reading of ancient Authors, are commonly guilty of that Fault. If you would believe them, they that never read 'em, are not to be compared with thoſe, that have. All other Sciences come not near this, which, they ſay, opens the way to all the Learning in the World. They, that have not ſtudied it, are deprived of ſo great a Help, that there is none like it; and they, who applied themſelves to it, are the only Men, who can raiſe the higheſt Deſigns to the greateſt perfection.

It cannot be denied but that the Reading of ancient Authors is very uſeful to us; but, if it were poſſible that we ſhould be as ancient as they are, and that they ſhould be in our place and read our Writings as we read theirs; would they get no Benefit by it? They would without doubt learn more from our Works, than we can from theirs. From whence it follows that we ought to read the ancient Authors, perfect their Knowledge by ours, and not deſpiſe thoſe, who excel in the Modern Learning. I will not meddle with the famous Diſpute, whether the ancient Authors ought to be preferred before the modern, or not; but I think, that thoſe, who are Strangers to Antiquity, have reaſon to complain that they are deſpiſed, becauſe they have no other Knowledge but ſuch as the preſent time can afford 'em.

I will readily grant that it is neceſſary to joyn the Knowledge of ancient Times with ours, and to take out of the original Authors what we deſire to know of them; but it is not juſt to cry up that Knowledge, as if it contained whatever is neceſſary to be known. *Quintilian* rightly ſaid: † *Si quid diſcere ſatis non eſt, ideo neceſſe non eſt:* " What is not ſufficient to make one Learned, is notwithſtanding neceſſary: And ſuch are the Principles of *Grammar*, which he ſpeaks of. But I would alſo invert his Thought, thus: *Siquid dicere neceſſe eſt, ideo ſatis non eſt:* " Tho' a Science " be neceſſary, yet we muſt not fancy that it is " ſufficient to make one Learned.

† Inſtit. *Lib.* I. *c.* 1.

It were much better to Praiſe the ancient Authors and the means of underſtanding them, leſs than they deſerve, and that thoſe who ſtudy them, ſhould find in 'em more than they expected; than to Praiſe them ſo much, that they who read them, may juſtly complain they were deceived. And then they will not only abate of thoſe exceſſive Praiſes, but the Diſcontent, which ariſes from their having been deceived, will make 'em apt to deprive that Science of the Praiſes it juſtly deſerves. How many Men are there, who having applied themſelves, for example, to the Reading of *Ariſtotle*, becauſe of the great *Encomiums* beſtowed on him, left it off with a great Contempt for that Philoſopher; becauſe they had not found in him the tenth part of what they were told? Whereas, had that Author been moderately praiſed, they would have read his Works with great ſatisfaction; becauſe of the great variety of the Subjects he treats of, and the occaſion he gives to think of ſeveral things, which perhaps no Body would think of, if he had not read 'em; not to mention the Knowledge of the Opinions of many other Philoſophers, which he furniſhes his Reader with.

It

It requires ſome Pains, application of Mind, and Sagacity, to make a more than ordinary Improvement in Humane Learning. The Reading of good critical Books is both pleaſant and uſeful; no Body doubts of it. But the Knowledge of *Words* ought not to be preferred to the Knowledge of *Things*; which is the Fault of ſome Humaniſts, who deſpiſe all other Sciences, and fancy they ought to be placed in the firſt Rank of Learned Men. Thus they raiſe againſt themſelves thoſe who profeſs other Sciences, and they draw Contempt on their Learning, which would be eſteem'd, if they ſpoke modeſtly of it.

III. But that which is worſe, and makes Humane Learning much more Contemptible, is, that many of thoſe, who have very much applied themſelves to it, ſhew by their own Example, that that Science, which they ſo exceſſively Praiſe, produces not the Effects one might have expected after ſo many Praiſes. When we hear any of thoſe Gentlemen ſay in a very elegant *Latin* Style, and prove by the Teſtimony of all the *Greek* and *Roman* Authors, that the Study of Humane Learning will, far better than any other Science, make a Man judicious, exact and diſcerning, ſoften his Manners, and take away his Wildneſs and Ruſticity, when, I ſay, we hear ſo many *Encomiums*, and look for the admirable Effects of that Science in its Panegyriſts, we are ſtrangely ſurpriſed to find often the quite contrary. One can hardly imagine but that if it could really produce ſo happy a Change in Men, it would chiefly be obſerved in thoſe, who profeſs it; and when one ſees there is nothing of it, all thoſe Praiſes ſeem to be groundleſs. *Perſonal Faults of the* Humaniſts.

Some Men of that Profeſſion, who cannot be rankt among the Vulgar, do often Reaſon very pitifully, and know not how to order well their Thoughts; they load their Memory with a vaſt number of *Words*, and very few *Things*; they are full of a ridiculous Pride, which makes 'em decide every thing with a magiſterial Air, which wiſe Men cannot endure; they bite every Body, quarrel with one another for Trifles, and give one another the fouleſt Language; in a word, inſtead of that charming Politeneſs, which, they ſay, is only to be found in the ancient Writers, we ſee nothing in them but a *Pedantry*, which can be endured no where but amongſt Scholars.

It would require a whole Volume, if I would enlarge upon the ſeveral Faults of the Humaniſts, aſmuch as it were neceſſary, to draw a full Picture of them. But there is no need to enlarge upon thoſe Faults, whereof we ſee every day but too many Examples; and I neither deſign to defame that Trade, nor thoſe who profeſs it. All that I could wiſh, is that thoſe, who know themſelves to be guilty of Faults, which make their Profeſſion contemptible, would ſeriouſly mend them, and endeavour to get the Affection of honeſt Men by a contrary Method. Who could forbear loving Humane Learning, if thoſe who have moſt applied themſelves to it, did reaſon with more exactneſs and clearneſs than others; if they diſplaid before their Readers not only an elegant *Latin* Style, but ſuch things as are above the Capacity of the Common People, and uſeful to be known; if they ſhewed as much Modeſty as reading, and never boldly decided any thing but what may be evidently proved; if they exceeded other Men in good Nature and Condeſcenſion for one another, and never defended themſelves, or attack'd others but with Reaſons, without Bitterneſs and Animoſity:

ſity: Laſtly, if they ſhewed in their Manners as much Politeneſs as is to be ſeen in the Style of good Authors, Who could forbear cheriſhing ſuch Men, and beſtowing upon them as many Favours as one could?

If we could ſee ſuch a Change, there would be no farther occaſion to complain of the Contempt, which Humane Learning, and thoſe who profeſs it, commonly lye under; for certainly it were impoſſible they ſhould not be valued.

Some moroſe *Humaniſts* will perhaps ſay, That 'tis ill done of me to cenſure after that manner thoſe of his Profeſſion; ſince it is certain that thoſe, who apply themſelves to other Sciences, as *Divines* and *Philoſophers*, do no leſs ſcandalize the World, by not living according to their Profeſſion. But I do not intend to excuſe or defend thoſe, of whom I ſay nothing, and ought not to ſpeak in this place. It is enough for me that I have ſaid nothing of thoſe, whom I have mention'd, but what is confirm'd by a daily experience. If other Men are guilty of the ſame Faults with us; ours are not leſs real, and we are no leſs bound to mend them, than if others were free from them; eſpecially when thoſe Faults are ſo prejudicial to a Science, and to thoſe who profeſs it.

I have heard of a rich Man, who had no tincture of Humane Learning, that having heard it very much praiſed by a Friend of his, who beſides that Knowledge, had all the Qualifications neceſſary to gain eſteem, he reſolved to carry his Son to a famous Univerſity, and to ſpare no coſt for his Education. But having very good natural Parts, and having been told too, that Scholarſhip makes one very often Pedantick and Proud; he would go himſelf and ſpend ſome time in that Univerſity together with his Son, to make choice of a good *Profeſſor*, under whoſe care he might im-

prove, without being infected with the *Pedantry* and *fooliſh Pride* which Scholars are wont to bring with them from the Univerſities. He went therefore to the Univerſity, and the better to know the Profeſſors, before he ſhould reſolve on the Choice he was to make, he often treated them together, and one after another, heard them ſpeak, and gave them occaſion to Diſcourſe of ſeveral things, eſpecially of ſuch as he was throughly acquainted with. He did the like with their beſt Scholars. He knew in a little time all the Intrigues of the Univerſity, and ſoon perceived that thoſe who profeſt the Study of Humane Learning, were exactly like thoſe, whom I have ſaid to be the cauſe of the Contempt it lies under. The Gentleman left that Univerſity very much diſſatisfied, and went to another to make a new Trial, in which he had no better Succeſs. He began then to think that the Gentleman, who had praiſed ſo much the Study of Humane Learning, had plaid him a Trick, and would hear no more on't, believing that his Friend had had a good Succeſs by reaſon of his Natural Parts, not by the Reading of ancient Authors. He thought that his Son would improve enough, by the Knowledge of the Affairs of the World, without troubling himſelf with a Science, which ſeem'd to him to be no better than a Cheat; and being a Man of great Authority, he did not a little Prejudice the Univerſities, where he had look'd in vain for ſome Men like his Friend. Nay, he came to fancy that the great Men amongſt the Ancients, whoſe Works he had heard ſo much praiſed, had been ſuch *Pedants* as he had ſeen in the Univerſity; and he was like to believe that *Demoſthenes* and *Cicero* were *Profeſſors* of Rhetorick like thoſe he had lately converſed with,

with, and that the Authors of an inferior Rank were meer *Ushers*.

Perhaps it will be said that such Censures and the like are unjust, and that Men's Faults ought always to be distinguished from the Defects of the Sciences they profess. I grant it; but such Censures have always been so common in the World, that it cannot be expected that Men should have other Thoughts concerning this Matter; and they, who, by their personal Faults, defame the Sciences they Teach, are still more to blame, than those who make a wrong Judgment of them, upon such an account. I could willingly tell those Gentlemen, what one said to the Declamators of his Time: *Pace vestrâ liceat dixisse, primi omnium eloquentiam perdidistis:* "Give "me leave to tell you, That you are the chief "Men, who have destroyed Humane Learn-"in,

IV. LET us now see what the *Humanists* have to say against others; for we must do every Body Justice, and it is certain that they, who should Honour and Reward those, who excel in the Knowledge of Humane Learning, do it no more: which without doubt is one of the chief Reasons of its decay. For there are very few Men generous enough, to Cultivate with much pains a barren Science, which is of no use in the World. Men fit for that sort of Learning would no more be wanting now than they were till the middle of this Age; but there being no Rewards, they who are qualified for it, are altogether discouraged, looking upon it as an ungrateful Work. One may say, on this occasion, something like to what *Martial* said to those, who wondered that there were no *Virgils* in their time: *Humane Learning neglected by those, who us'd to encourage it.*

† "Let

†*Lib.* VIII. *Ep.* 58. † " Let there be *Mecenas*'s, and no *Virgils* will " be wanting; your very Country-Farms will " afford you ſome.

Sint Mecenates, non deerunt, Flacce, Marones,
Virgiliúmq; tibi vel tua Rura dabunt.

† *Lib.* I. *Ep.* 108. " † You tell me often, *replied he to another*, that " I am an idle Man, and that I ſhould write ſome " noble Piece. Procure me ſuch a Leiſure as *Me-* " *cenas* procur'd to *Horace* and *Virgil*; and then " I'll endeavour to Write ſomething that will ne- " ver Die, and to immortalize my Name. Oxen " take no delight in Ploughing a Barren Ground: " A fat Soil wearies the Labourer; but the Ma- " nuring of it is Profitable.

Sæpè mihi dicis, Luci clariſſime Juli;
Scribe aliquid magnum, deſidioſus homo es.
Otia da nobis, ſed qualia fecerat olim
Mecenas Flacco, Virgilióq; ſuo.
Condere victuras tentem per ſecula chartas,
Et nomen flammis eripuiſſe meum.
In ſteriles campos nolunt juga ferre Juvenci;
Pingue ſolum laſſat, ſed juvat ipſe labor.

Humane Learning, in *Popiſh* Countries, is of no uſe in order to get Church-Dignities; which are beſtowed for quite another reaſon than to put a Man in a condition of ſerving the Publick, and illuſtrating Antiquity; and the Places of Profeſſors in Humane Learning are too few in their Univerſities, and of too ſmall an Income, to encourage many People to Study. Some Religious Orders, which teach that Science, as the *Jeſuits*, cultivate it only as much as it is neceſſary for them, to be Teachers of Rhetorick, that is, ve-

ry

ry ſlightly. Beſides they ſeldom read the *Proteſtant* Criticks, who notwithſtanding are much more Learned than theirs; at leaſt one Age ſince, or there-abouts. So that there can be but few among *Papiſts*, who make an extraordinary Progreſs in that Science; becauſe few have a *Genius* that leads 'em to it, and are under proper Circumſtances for it.

Moſt Scholars, among *Proteſtants*, are maintained by the Publick only to Preach, and are obliged to ſpend their time in making of Sermons. And as to the Places of Profeſſors of Humane Learning, they are neither more numerous nor better than in the Popiſh Countries. So that it is no wonder if there be ſo few Men, among the Proteſtants, who excel in that ſort of Learning.

But what's the reaſon, will ſome ſay, that Humane Learning is no more encouraged? Have the Defects of it been found out, and is it look'd upon now as an uſeleſs Science? No new Defects have been diſcovered in it, but it is not in Faſhion now, as it was before, no more than other things. Towards the end of the XV. Century, and the beginning of the XVI. Princes were great Encouragers of thoſe, who excell'd in Humane Learning. They beſtowed Gifts and Penſions on them, and raiſed them to ſeveral Dignities; which was the Reaſon why there were ſo many very Learned Men in *Italy* and *France*, eſpecially under *Leo* X. and *Francis* I. It was then the Faſhion, among great Princes, to encourage Learning, whether they themſelves were acquainted with it, or loved it only becauſe they heard others diſcourſe of it. The Favours they beſtowed on Men of Learning produced ſo great an Encouragement, that it laſted not only whilſt Learning was favour'd by Princes, but alſo a good while

while after. That first Impetuosity of the Mind, which is so agreeable to our natural Curiosity of knowing the Opinions and Actions of those, who lived before us; that Motion, I say, like that which the Wind raises in the Sea, could not be calmed all of a sudden, and yield every-where to the Carelesness of those, who mind only the present Time, and care as little for the Time past, as for the Time to come.

But a great many learned Men having embraced the Protestant Religion, and proclaimed every-where, That the Knowledge of Humane Learning had open'd a Way to the Understanding of Holy Scripture, and Church-History; so that the best Way to know the Errors and Abuses, which wanted a Reformation, was to Learn throughly the ancient Tongues; the Party, who had no mind to make any Alteration in the Practices, or Opinions of the latter Ages, began to suspect those who so much cried up Humane Learning, and so by degrees neglected to promote it. All Favours were only bestowed upon the zealous Defenders of the *Ecclesiastical Monarchy*; and Learning, which had been so much admired before, was look'd upon by degrees as a thing, which might do it more Harm than Good. Thus *Italy* and *Spain* ceased almost to produce any thing of that kind, and the Libraries became useless Ornaments for the Inhabitants of those Countries. That Dislike of Humane Learning spread, as a Contagion, in the neighbouring Countries, and even in those, where they should be of quite another Opinion.

'Tis reported that a great Minister of State, who was altogether a Stranger to Learning, used to call those who profest it *Seditious Persons*; in all likelyhood because they are the Men, who have

have moſt inſiſted upon the Authority of the Laws, Juſtice and Equity. Indeed in the Countries, where *Machiaveliſm* prevails, the Notions of the Ancients concerning thoſe things, do not at all agree with the ungovernable Paſſions of a Supreme Power. And this I think is one of the Reaſons, which are very Prejudicial to Learning in ſome Countries.

Thus the Defenders of the Supreme Authority of the Eccleſiaſtical Monarchy, on the one ſide, and the Defenders of the Arbitrary Power of Temporal Princes, on the other, have been of Opinion that the Reading of the ancient Heathen or Chriſtian Writers was ſo far from being neceſſary, that it was believed for ſome time, it were much better on the contrary that the Republican Notions of the *Grecians* and *Romans* ſhould be forgotten, and that the Opinions of the ancient Chriſtians both in the *Eaſt* and *Weſt*, which do not agree with the Modern Doctrine and Intereſts, ſhould be covered with the Vail of an unintelligible Language. They have look't for Men, who would obey without any Reply, and make it their Buſineſs to Maintain and Encreaſe the Spiritual and Temporal Power, without any regard to the Notions which Men had in former Times. *Soldiers*, who have no Principles, nor Senſe of Virtue, and *Clergy-men*, who are blind Slaves to the preſent Power, and examine nothing, and execute with the utmoſt Rigour whatever Orders they receive, are look'd upon as the moſt unmoveable Pillars of the Church and State; and they, who quote ancient Authors, and whoſe Principles are independent on the Will of Princes, can have no Hearing.

But

Some Reasons to cultivate Humane Learning anew.

BUT in the Countries, where they make it their Buſineſs to have no Laws but ſuch as are founded upon natural Equity, they need not fear that the Republican Antiquity ſhould contradict 'em; and therefore they ſhould encourage thoſe, who endeavour to give the Knowledge of it. They, who are not afraid to find any thing in the original Works of Eccleſiaſtical Writers, that may be prejudicial to the Notions of Religion and Virtue, which Holy Scripture affords, ſhould omit nothing, to encnourage Men to enquire after Truth. The better it is known, the greater the Authority of the Laws will be, and Juſtice more flouriſhing.

Tho' properly ſpeaking, Humane Learning includes only the Knowledge of ancient Languages, and what is neceſſary to know Antiquity; yet it puts us in a condition of knowing things themſelves, by furniſhing us with the means of Converſing, as it were, with a great many learned Men both Heathen and Chriſtians. So that it has a ſtrict Connexion with all the Knowledge we can get by the Reading of ancient Authors: And the Deſire of Knowing what they, who lived before us, believed, ſaid, or did, as much as it can be Known, cannot be ſatisfied without ſuch a Learning. The Knowledge of Dead Languages is, as it were, an Interpreter, whom we carry along with us, to Travel, if I may ſo ſay, in an *Intelligible* World, which exiſts only in Books written in Languages, that are not ſpoken at preſent. Without ſuch an Interpreter, 'tis impoſſible to know what paſt in it. And as great Princes have Interpreters of ſeveral Languages to treat with Strangers; ſo we muſt keep up that Knowledge, and make in as common, as it can poſ-

poſſibly be; unleſs we give over the Thoughts of knowing what paſt in former Times.

Theſe general Reaſons, and ſeveral particular ones, which I paſs by, ſhould engage Princes to encourage the Study of Humane Learning; and they, who apply themſelves to it, ſhould uſe their utmoſt endeavours, to make it Eaſie and Pleaſant to thoſe, whoſe Favours can make it flouriſh again, more than ever it did. I do not pretend to have ſhewn all the ways that can be taken in order to it: 'Tis enough for me that I have pointed at ſome of the chief, and given occaſion to think of it to thoſe, whom it moſt concerns.

CHAP. V.

Of the Decay of ſome States.

THERE are ſome States, which do manifeſtly Decay, in reſpect of Arts, and Strength. There is no need I ſhould name them, and ſhew their Weakneſs particularly. Every Body knows it; but every Body knows not how they come to be weakned.

The better to underſtand the Reaſons of the Decay of a State, it is neceſſary to know what can make it flouriſh; ſince it falls to Decay, becauſe it wants that which could put it in a flouriſhing Condition. There are chiefly three things, which can make a State Happy at Home, and Dreaded Abroad. The firſt is a great number of Inhabitants: The ſecond, The Revenues of the State, which ought to be great, without oppreſſing

preſſing the People: And the third is, The Union of the ſeveral Members of the State, who ought to contribute to the publick Good. Where-ever thoſe things are to be found, it may be ſaid there is Peace and Happineſs, unleſs a very violent Storm raiſed by a greater Power, ſhould fall upon ſuch a State; and where-ever they are wanting, one may certainly affirm, that the State will fall to Decay, if the Diſorder laſt never ſo little. But I muſt come to Particulars, and prove each of thoſe three things at large.

Firſt, It cannot be doubted but that the number of the Inhabitants does ſo much contribute to the Greatneſs of a State, that without it any State will be Poor, Weak and in Danger, if the Neighbouring-Countries are better ſtock'd with Inhabitants. The better a Country is Peopled, the more Induſtrious are the Inhabitants; every one ſtriving to Maintain himſelf as well as he can; which very much encreaſes Trade, brings in Money from Foreign Countries, and all the Conveniencies of Life, as much as the Situation of the Country can permit it. On the contrary, Few Inhabitants can have no great Induſtry, becauſe they conſume few Commodities, and conſequently Trade is far leſs conſiderable. They cannot bring in Foreign Money, by exporting their Manufactures, or ſuch things as grow in their Country; becauſe they have but a ſmall quantity of them. Nor can they Import what they want, but in a ſmall quantity, and conſequently it will prove too dear.

If ſuch a State happens to be attack'd by ſome Neighbours, whoſe Country is better Inhabited, it will not be able to ſend out an equal Army of its Inhabitants, and conſequently it will be ſooner or later Invaded; unleſs they ſend for Foreign Help,

Help, to ſupply their Weakneſs. But how can they ſend for it, having but ſmall Revenues, by reaſon of the ſcarcity of the Inhabitants and their want of Induſtry?

From whence it neceſſarily follows, that no greater Fault can be committed againſt Politicks, than to make ſuch Laws as hinder a Country from growing as populous as it can be. For Example, If there are ſome Laws or Cuſtoms in a Country, which do not allow Strangers to ſettle in it, or make ſuch a Settlement too difficult; ſuch Laws and Cuſtoms only ſerve to weaken the State. But if you ſuppoſe that the Country we ſpeak of, is an Iſland, or near the Sea, and that it has ſome remote Colonies, or a great Sea-Trade; it muſt be confeſt that the number of its Inhabitants will grow leſs every day, by reaſon of thoſe Colonies, and the great number of thoſe who die every Year in their Voyages; and then, if it be a difficult thing for Foreigners to ſettle themſelves in that Country, it will be unpeopled by degrees, or at leaſt never ſo full of Inhabitants as it ſhould be. There is a famous Iſland in the North, the Politicks whereof fail in that reſpect. Hence it is that it has but one half of the Inhabitants it might have, if it be compared with a Common-wealth not far from it, or with the fruitful parts of *Germany*. And therefore it has been obſerved, that in time of War it cannot make ſo great a Reſiſtance, in proportion to its extent, as that Common-Wealth can.

There is alſo in *Europe* a vaſt *Péninſula*, moſt happily ſituated between two great Seas, which is infinitely more deſtitute of Inhabitants, Induſtry, and the means of defending itſelf, when attack'd; becauſe it lies under the ſame Circumſtances as the Iſland I juſt now ſpoke of, and be-

ſides there are ſome other Cauſes of its being unpeopled. One of the chief is, that there is but one Religion allowed in it. There is beſides, a tyrannical Tribunal, which, under pretence of Religion, may deſtroy the moſt innocent Perſons. This keeps many People from going to it, who might render it the moſt flouriſhing Kingdom in the World, if they were permitted to ſettle and live ſafely there, as long as they obey the Civil Laws. Another Reaſon of it is, that it is full of *Prieſts*, *Monks* and *Nuns*, who conſume a great part of the Revenues of the Country, and do not contribute to make it flouriſh by their Induſtry, or by Propagation; becauſe, under pretence of Religion, they make a Vow of Idleneſs and Celibacy. Indeed they pretend that the State is very much obliged to them, becauſe they inſtruct the People in Religion, and are more aſſiduous than others in imploring the Bleſſing of God, who never fails to hear their Prayers. But ſome People very much doubt whether Heaven be very full of that ſort of Men, and whether they bring God's Bleſſing upon that Monarchy; at leaſt we have not ſeen it yet. It cannot be doubted but what they boaſt of, may be done as well in the State of Marriage, and that they weaken their Country by not Marrying. Thoſe, who live under their Domination, are forced to feign to believe, that by unpeopling a Kingdom, and living idly, they do it great Service; they are, I ſay, forced to it upon pain of being thruſt into a Dungeon, and ending their Life by a cruel Death. So well do thoſe Men underſtand the true Intereſt of their Country, and the Principles of a good Policy!

The *Romans* had quite contrary Maxims, which produced admirable Effects. They were ſo far from

from being afraid that their City ſhould be fill'd with Strangers, that from the very beginning they endeavoured to draw in as many People as they could, and made them Citizens of *Rome*, as well as the moſt ancient Inhabitants. I ſhall ſet down here the Words of *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſus*, who tells us by what means *Romulus* encreaſed the City he had built: † " Knowing, *ſays he*, that many † *Lib.* II. " Cities of *Italy* were ill govern'd by ſome Ty- *pag.* 88. " rants or by a few Men, who had made them- " ſelves Maſters of them; he reſolved to draw " in and receive into his City all thoſe, who had " been expell'd from other Cities; whatever " Misfortune had happen'd to them, provided " they were Free-men; to encreaſe thereby the " Power of the *Romans*, and leſſen that of their " Neighbours. Afterwards he tells us how *Romulus* made a Place of Refuge, and endeavoured to retain thoſe who fled to it, by making them Citizens of *Rome*, and giving them ſome Land to live upon; and then he adds that *Romulus* had another Maxim of State, " Which the *Grecians* " eſpecially, as he thought, ſhould have obſer- " ved, as being the beſt of all Maxims, which " proved one of the ſureſt Foundations of the " Roman Liberty, and did not a little contribute " to the Settlement of the Empire. He forbad " Killing all the Inhabitants of the Towns which " they took, or making them Slaves, or turning " their Seats into Meadows. He would have " their Lands to be divided among thoſe, who " would go and ſettle themſelves in them, and " that Roman Colonies ſhould be ſent thither. " He alſo beſtowed upon ſome Cities the Privi- " leges of the Roman Citizens. With ſuch " Maxims and the like, of a little City he made " a great one, as it appear'd afterwards. For

" thoſe, who went with him to live in *Rome*,
" were not above three Thouſand Foot, and
" three Hundred Horſe; whereas when he died,
" he left forty Six Thouſand Foot and about one
" Thouſand Horſe. *Dionyſius* ſhews that the next Kings, and the Common-wealth followed the ſame Maxims, whereby *Rome* grew ſo populous, that no City in the World exceeded it in the number of Inhabitants. " If I ſhould compare,
" *ſays he*, the Cuſtoms of the *Grecians* with theſe,
" I could not praiſe the *Lacedemonians*, *Thebans*,
" and *Athenians*, tho' famous for Wiſdom; who
" to preſerve their Nobility, without any mix-
" ture, have but very ſeldom beſtowed on Stran-
" gers the Privileges of their Cities. I will not
" mention thoſe, who expell'd Foreigners. The
" *Lacedemonians* having been defeated in the Bat-
" tle of *Leuctra*, in which they loſt ſeventeen
" Hundred Men, could never recover that Loſs,
" and were ſhamefully deprived of their Autho-
" rity. The *Thebans* and *Athenians* having been
" overcome by the *Macedonians* in one Battle at
" *Cheronea*, were deprived of their Pre-eminence
" among the *Grecians*, and the Liberty of their
" Country. But the *Romans* cumbered with
" Wars in *Spain* and *Italy*, buſied in regaining
" *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, enjoying not a full Peace
" whith the *Macedonians* and *Grecians*; when the
" *Carthaginians* endeavoured at the ſame time to
" be the uppermoſt, the greateſt part of *Italy*
" having joyned with them, and ſent for *Han-*
" *nibal*; the *Romans*, I ſay, tho' expoſed to ſo
" many Dangers, not only ſunk under ſo ma-
" ny Misfortunes, but grew ſtronger than be-
" fore, by the number of their Troops, which
" were ſufficient to reſiſt all their Enemies;
" and not at all, as ſome fancy, by the help of

" For-

" *Fortune*. Had they had no other Help, they " had been quite ruined only by the Defeat of " *Canne*, where out of ſix Thouſand Horſe, they " ſaved but three Hundred and Sixty, and out " of Eighty Thouſand Foot, whom they had " raiſed for that Expedition, there remained af- " ter the Battle but three Thouſand, and a few " more.

It has been always an eaſie thing, and is ſo to this Day for Foreigners to ſettle themſelves in the *United Provinces*, eſpecially in *Holland*, and the City of *Amſterdam*, provided they obey the Laws of the Country; which has made the Country ſo Populous, that there is none like it in all *Europe*. Whereas had they ſcrupled to receive thoſe, who fled thither, it would be a deſerted Country, and conſequently ruined and ſubject to the *Inquiſition*; for they had never been able to reſiſt the *Spaniards*, without a great number of People. But they who founded that Common-wealth, ſeeing that many People faithful to the Government, under which they lived, were perſecuted for their Religion in ſeveral parts of *Europe*, reſolved to receive all thoſe, who would retire into their Country, provided they would obey the Civil-Laws. Whereby the *States* ſo Peopled their Country, and keep it ſtill ſo full of Inhabitants, that the long Wars, they have had by Sea and Land, from the beginning of their Common-wealth, and their continual Navigations in the *Eaſt* and *Weſt-Indies*, do not at all exhauſt 'em.

Again, the better to encreaſe the number of the Inhabitants, and leſt Poverty ſhould force the Common People to retire into other Countries, they take an extraordinary care of the Poor, for whom there is ſo much Money ſpent every Year

in the Province of *Holland*, that ſeveral crowned Heads in *Europe* have not ſo great a Revenue. From whence ariſes a prodigious number of Tradeſmen of all ſorts, Seamen, and People of all Profeſſions, who are neceſſary in a Country. From thence alſo ariſes the extraordinary Induſtry of its Inhabitants, ſuch as is to be ſeen no where elſe.

That Policy, which is ſo agreeable to Reaſon and Revelation, is ſo Wiſe and Admirable, as that it is an Unjuſt and Impious thing to look upon a Man as an Enemy, what-ever his Country or Opinions may be; if he will obey the ſame Civil Laws, and uſe his Induſtry to promote the Good of the State. Nevertheleſs ſeveral great Nations of *Europe*, which think themſelves to be more Polite than the *Hollanders*, have not been able yet to apprehend a thing ſo clear, and grounded upon the moſt certain Principles of Humanity and Chriſtian Religion. They are ſo far from allowing Foreigners to Settle among them, that they even drive away their Country-men, either under pretence of Religion, or by taking no care of the Poor. They are far from admiring the Humanity and Chriſtian Charity of their Neighbours. On the contrary, they have ſo ſtrange a Notion of Morality and Religion, that to take pity of one's Neighbour, and do to him as one would be done by, is look'd upon by them as want of Religion and Virtue. But this is not a fit place to enlarge upon that Subject. After what has been ſaid, 'tis no difficult thing to ſee why ſome States in *Europe* fall to Decay, and why on the contrary others are ſo flouriſhing.

The ſecond thing, which I have mention'd as neceſſary for the Preſervation of a State, and to make it flouriſh, is that it muſt have great Revenues, without oppreſſing the People. Which may

may be done, when a Country is very full of Inhabitants, and no Body exempted from Taxes; becauſe then, tho' every Body pays but little, there will ariſe large Sums by reaſon of the great multitude of People. Again, this may be done, when there is great Induſtry in a Country; becauſe the Impoſts upon exported and imported Commodities may bring in a great deal of Money. As to the Lands, they ought to be taxed in proportion to what they yield, and they yield little, when the Country wants Inhabitants, and there is but little Induſtry in it; becauſe then there is but a ſmall quantity of the Products of the Earth conſumed either at home or abroad.

Theſe are the chief Springs of the Revenues that a State can have. There is no need I ſhould enlarge on it, becauſe it is a thing which every Body knows. For the ſame reaſon I ſhall not prove how neceſſary it is that a State ſhould have conſiderable Revenues, to be in a condition of defending itſelf againſt a Foreign Invaſion. No Man can doubt of it, eſpecially in this Age. I ſhall only obſerve ſome Faults, which they commit in ſeveral States againſt this undoubted Principle.

The Inhabitants of ſeveral Countries may be divided into three *Claſſes*. The firſt is the *Clergy*, or in general all Church-men: The ſecond is the *Nobility*, and thoſe who enjoy the ſame Privileges with them, by reaſon of their Imployments: And the third is the reſt of the People, who live by their Induſtry, without having any particular Privilege. When the Clergy and Nobility are but few, or have no Privileges, they cannot be look'd upon as a conſiderable part of the State, that is to ſay, ſo as to encreaſe or impair much the Publick Revenues. But when either of them are very Numerous, and enjoy great Immunities, as in *Spain*,

Italy, and elſe-where; they make a conſiderable part of the Inhabitants, by reaſon of their great Number and Riches.

It cannot be denied but that a great number of *Secular* and *Regular* Church-men, who uſe no Induſtry to make their Country Flouriſh, and enjoy great Revenues without paying any Taxes, muſt needs be chargeable to the Publick; ſince they conſiderably leſſen the Revenues of the State, and hinder it from being Peopled with Men, who would encreaſe them, and beſides have no Induſtry to bring in Foreign Money. So that the more the number of ſuch Men encreaſes in a State, the leſſer will its Revenues be. Beſides, it wants People to defend it in an open War; for the *Secular Prieſts* and *Monks* are not bound to defend the Lands which they enjoy; not to mention the *Nuns*, who, by reaſon of their Sex, are exempted from it. Their Buſineſs is to Eat their Revenues, and not to fight for them; whereas, did thoſe Revenues belong to Lay-men, they would think themſelves obliged to defend 'em at the hazard of their Lives. Thus the great number of ſuch Men, who think not themſelves obliged to help the State with their Money, Induſtry, or perſonal Aſſiſtance, is a manifeſt Cauſe of its Decay. 'Tis without doubt for this reaſon that we have ſeen, for ſeveral Years, ten Thouſand *Germans*, ill Diſciplined, and ill Paid, exact Contributions of five or ſix Princes, who could eaſily have raiſed Forty Thouſand *Monks*. It was alſo undoubtedly one of the great Cauſes of the Ruin of the *Eaſtern* Empire, which might have cut to pieces the *Sarazens* and *Turks*, had it been able to keep on foot half as many Soldiers as there were *Monks* and *Nuns*, not to mention other Church-men. All that can be ſaid in behalf of Church-men, is, That they conſume ſeveral Com-

Commodities, on which Impoſts are laid, and ſo raiſe the Publick Farms; but many Monks conſume but little of that ſort of Commodities, and Lay-men do the ſame, beſides what they pay in particular; ſo that Church-men cannot at all be compared with them, in that reſpect.

A great number of Nobility, and other Men, who have privileged Employments, does alſo very much leſſen the Revenues of a State; and they want Induſtry, whereby thoſe Revenues might be encreaſed. For the Nobility, and thoſe who enjoy the ſame Privileges with them, contribute but little towards the Publick Charges, and have no Induſtry, whereby they may bring in Foreign Money. They know how to get Money out of the Inhabitants, whoſe Induſtry they very often Ruin. So that the more Nobility and Privileged Imployments there are in a State, the Weaker it grows; and thoſe Princes, who encreaſe the number of them for Money, tho' they ſeem to get much by it at firſt, yet loſe much thereby afterwards. Several People believe that the only reaſon why the Empire of *Germany* has been ſomewhat perplexed in many Wars, which required great Charges, eſpecially in the War, which ended in 1697. is the great number of Men there is in that Empire, who contribute nothing towards the Charges of the War but their Perſonal Aſſiſtance. 'Tis alſo thought that *Spain* is in a great meaſure ſo weak as it is, becauſe of the multitude of Noblemen, who together with the Clergy, enjoy the beſt Lands and Imployments in the Kingdom, and contribute very little towards the Charges of the War, in proportion to their Revenues. I am not well enough acquainted with thoſe things, to be poſitive; but it is certain that ſo many Principalities and Kingdoms,

doms, of which *Germany* and *Spain* are made up, have only, for several Years in the late War, caused a meer Diversion of part of the *French* Troops on the *Rhine*, and in *Catalonia*.

'Tis said in behalf of the Nobility, that it is necessary in time of Peace and in time of War, for the Government of the State, and Conduct of the Armies; because Men of Quality have commonly greater Souls than others, and are more respected by the People. I will not answer, That very often Men of Quality have no greater Souls than several other Men, or that they may have such Faults as will make them unfit to procure the Publick Good; but granting that the Nobility is useful to what they say, I maintain that when it is too numerous, it proves Chargeable to the State, unless it be allowed to Trade. For those, who have no Share in the Government, no Imployment in the Armies, and no Industry, do but eat the Revenues of the Country, without being serviceable to it. Nay, they are very prejudicial to it, because the shameful Idleness, wherein they often live, without so much as vouchsafing to learn any thing that may improve their Minds, inclines them to all manner of Excess; and by degrees they corrupt the People, who are apt to imitate them. And then one may truly say what the *Spanish* Nobility said of the *Militia*, in *Ximenes*'s time, " That when Tradesmen leave their " Trade, and set up for Gentlemen, there's an " end of Arts and Trade, and consequently a " State is infallibly lost.

From whence it may be concluded, that where-ever the Dignities are in the Hands of the Clergy and Nobility, and where-ever they enjoy the Riches of the Country, it follows that the rest of the People are necessarily oppress by those two Par-

Parties; that they grow weary of their Condition, and that ſuch as have good Parts, and Money, endeavour to purchaſe Nobility, or to be promoted to Church-Dignities. In the mean time the Arts and Induſtry, whereby a State flouriſhes, are neglected, the Publick Revenues grow leſs, and the State weaker. After what has been ſaid, can any one wonder, if the Countries, where ſuch a Diſorder is to be ſeen, are ſo weak, that they are not able to make the neceſſary Expences for their Defence and Preſervation? They are full of uſeleſs Perſons, who are not able to ſerve their Country, and nevertheleſs enjoy all the Conveniences it can afford, and trample on thoſe, who can ſerve it, and uſe all their Induſtry towards it. That great number of Men, who do nothing, under pretence of Nobility or Church-Dignities, grow Vicious, and Debauch a great many People, who, were it not for ſuch an ill Example, would be uſeful to the Society.

Too great Exactions do alſo very much contribute to the leſſening of the Publick Revenues, tho' at firſt View they ſeem to encreaſe 'em. The Reaſon of it is, that Trade is thereby ſoon deſtroyed, and ſo that Source of the Publick Revenues comes to fail either in part, or in whole. For when there is nothing to be got by Trading, People grow weary of it, and Trade as little as they can. Being by degrees deſtitute of Money, or having no conſiderable Sum of it, they can make no great Enterpriſe; ſo that Trade is by ſteps confined to what is altogether neceſſary for Humane Life, and yields but little to the Prince.

This is what one † of the moſt ancient Poets, who lived above two Thouſand Years ago, teaches us, ſpeaking of his Brother, who had bribed the

† Heſiod. *Op. & dies.* v. 37.

the Judges, who were then ſtiled Kings, that he might have a greater Share in his paternal Eſtate: " We have formerly, *ſays he*, divided our Inheritance; but you took away from me ſeveral " things, which did not belong to you, by beſtowing many Gifts on the Kings, who are " greedy of 'em. Blind Men, who know not " that one half is better that the whole. He means that it were better for Kings to be content with one half of what they exacted from the People, than to extort from them whatever they had, and ſo incapacitate them to contribute any more to the Supply of their Wants.

Therefore the Propoſals of the publick Farmers, or thoſe who invent new Impoſts, and promiſe to bring great Sums into the Publick Treaſury, if they are permitted to raiſe new Taxes, ought to be ſo much the more ſuſpected, the greater the Sums are that they promiſe; becauſe they cannot raiſe them, without entirely ruining that Trade, on which they raiſe it. The ſame may be ſaid of all exorbitant Taxes, which yield much for the preſent, but afterwards altogether exhauſt thoſe from whom they are exacted. Let us hear *Cicero* diſcourſing on this Subject: † " If " a Farmer, *ſays he*, ſhould pay 20000 *Seſtertes* " yearly for an Eſtate in Land, which yielded " but 10000, and ſhould get by it 100000 *l.* after he had cut and ſold the Woods, and other " Goods and Cattle; the Owner of it would for " the preſent be very glad, whilſt he knew nothing of the Loſs he had ſuſtained, and would " extremely rejoyce to have a Farmer, who ſhould " ſo much improve his Land. But if he came to " know that his Farmer had ſold and alienated " that, which made his Eſtate yield ſo much as " it uſed to do yearly, he would cauſe him to be

† *Verr.* III. p. 119.

Hang-

" Hanged, and cry out that he had wronged
" him. So the *Roman* People, when they hear
" that *Verres* has raiſed the Farm of the Tithes in
" *Sicily*, more than *Sacerdos*, to whom he ſucceed-
" ed, and whoſe Conduct is unblamable, might
" be apt to think that they have found a Man,
" who has well improved the Revenues, which
" accrue to us, from Arable-Lands. But when
" they come to know that he has ſold away all
" the Utenſils of Plough-men, and whatever they
" had to pay the Taxes; that out of Covetouſ-
" neſs he has deprived Poſterity of all Hope,
" ranſack'd and plundered the Arable-Lands, and
" got a great deal by it; they will eaſily appre-
" hend, that *Verres* has very much wronged
" them, and think he deſerves to be put to Death.
Si quis villicus, &c.

If Princes and their Miniſters would think of this, they might apprehend that by extorting exorbitant Sums from their Subjects, they make 'em unable not only to pay as much afterwards, but alſo to pay moderate Taxes. Then Induſtry ceaſes together with that which keeps it up; that is to ſay, when there is not Money enough among Trading-men, and the Riches of the State are kept too long in the Hands of the Prince. Then the Subjects are diſheartned; for who would rather work for another than for himſelf? In a word, all thoſe thing produce an extreme Poverty, ſuch as that of the *Indians*, who are Slaves to their Kings, and had rather be in want of all things, than enrich them by their Labour, without getting any thing by it.

A great Miniſter of State having been told by the famous *Bernier*, who publiſhed his *Journey* to *Indoſtan*, that the People were reduced to an extreme Poverty, all over the *Eaſt-Indies*, ask'd him

him what was the reaſon of it, ſince the *Europeans* ſent thither great Sums of Money every Year, to buy ſome of their Commodities. That Traveller anſwered him, That it was an eaſie thing to apprehend the Reaſon of it; which is, that there is no *Property* in that Country, all things belonging to the Prince, ſo that the People had nothing of their own. That Miniſter of State was not very well pleaſed with that Anſwer, which gave him to underſtand, that if they ſhould continue to ſay that all things belong to the King, in the Country he lived in, a flouriſhing Kingdom would by degrees be reduced to the ſame Weakneſs and Poverty.

'Tis reported that another Traveller, not leſs known than the other, (I mean *John Baptiſt Tavernier*) having ſold the Jewels he had brought from the *Indies*, told a great Prince, That he deſigned to buy a Lordſhip in *Switzerland*; And that that Prince having ask'd him why he would not buy one in his Kingdom; the Traveller, who was no polite Man, anſwered: *Becauſe I deſire that my Lordſhip may be my own.* A clowniſh Anſwer indeed, but which plainly ſhewed *Tavernier*'s meaning: *viz.* That whoever will enjoy the Fruits of his Labour, ought to retire from a Country, where the Taxes are unlimited.

What can one think therefore of a Country, where all endeavours are uſed to leave as little Money as can be in the Hands of thoſe, to whom it belongs? Where they ſeem to be afraid that the next Generation ſhould find ſomething to live upon? All that one can think of it, is, that it is a beginning of Decay; which numerous Armies, and great Preparations of War cannot conceal from thoſe, who know what can make a State flouriſh, and what can weaken it.

There

There is a famous Common-wealth in *Europe*, where the Taxes are very great, if compared with what they pay in other Countries; and yet moderate enough, if the State of that Common-wealth be well conſidered. *Firſt*, 'Tis a Country, where the greateſt part of every one's Eſtate lies in Money, ſo that the great quantity of Money they have, leſſens its Value. *Secondly*, No Body pays a *Real*, or *Perſonal* Tax but thoſe who are able to do it, the common People paying nothing in particular; whereas in other Countries they are over-burthen'd with Taxes. 'Tis true that the moſt neceſſary things for Humane Life are dear enough, but Workmen have the better Pay. And therefore whatever Complaints be made by thoſe, who have much ado to live in it; if they be compared with them, that pay the *Tailles*, as 'tis practiſed in other Countries, it will be found that they live much more happily than their Neighbours, as thoſe, who have travelled thither, know very well. *Thirdly*, Trading Men are not much burthen'd, and it may be ſaid that thoſe, who contribute moſt to encreaſe the Publick Revenues by Trade, are moſt favoured. Trade is look'd upon in that Common-wealth as the chief thing, which makes every thing plentiful in it, and they have regard to the Hazard which Merchants run in their Commerce, for which Reaſon they are but little burthened.

It muſt be confeſt that thoſe, that cannot Trade, and who live upon their Eſtates, are very much burthened in time of War; they loſe one half of the Revenues due to them from the State, or Towns: But it is an unavoidable Inconvenience. For a War cannot be ſuſtained without Money, and Money cannot be had but where it is to be found. All that can be wiſhed by thoſe who con-

contribute ſo much to the Charges of the War, is that it be never undertaken, but when it is abſolutely neceſſary for the Preſervation of the State, that the Publick Money be well Huſbanded, and that a Peace be made, as ſoon as it can be, with Safety and Honour. That Common-wealth never fails to do it, and if at any time there is any Fault committed in this reſpect, they are ſuch Faults as are committed where-ever there are Men; and are not Steps deliberately made by the Supreme Power in order to impoveriſh the Subjects of the State, as 'tis practiſed in ſeveral Kingdoms. Beſides, 'tis a great Comfort for the Subjects of that Common-wealth, when they pay great Contributions, that they are ſure that no War is ever undertaken by the Common-wealth, but for the Preſervation of their Liberty, for the ſake of which every Body ought freely to part with his Money. How many Princes are there, who do not make War for the good of their Subjects, but only to ſatisfy their Ambition; and whoſe Victories and Conqueſts make their People greater Slaves and more unhappy than before? Which puts me in mind of a remarkable Anſwer of a Roman Senator, who at a time when the State was engaged in a dangerous War, having uſed his endeavours to get a Covetous and Intereſted Man, tho' his Enemy, to be elected Conſul, becauſe he was very well skill'd in Military-Affairs, rather than any other, who were not able to command the Armies of the Republick, anſwered thoſe, who were ſurpriſed at it: † "That they had no reaſon to wonder, if he had rather be Plunder'd than Sold: *Nihil eſt quod miremini, ſi malui compilari quàm venire.*

† A. Gell. *Lib.* IV. *c.* 8.

The

The third thing, which is absolutely necessary to make a State Flourish, is that its Members, and those who govern it, ought to agree among themselves, and entirely mind the Publick Good. If in a kingly Government, when the King can undertake nothing of Moment, nor make any alteration in the Laws, without the consent of the States, it happens that the King aims at an Arbitrary Power, and that the States on the contrary make it their Business to preserve their Laws and Liberties; such a Division will necessarily unable them to Defend themselves Abroad, and make good Laws at Home. The King is wholly taken up with the Thoughts of surprising and subduing the States, if he can do it; and the States being busied in defending their Liberty against Craft and Violence, cannot mind things of less Moment. In the mean time, a thousand Disorders are committed at Home, and no care is taken to prevent the Evils, which threaten them Abroad. Such a Spectacle has been seen Fourscore Years and more in *England*, where Kings and Parliaments were so taken up with their publick and private Divisions, that they thought of nothing else. In the mean time, a neighbouring Kingdom did whatever it pleased, and put itself in a Capacity to molest all its Neighbours. Nay, it was almost ready to Invade a Common-wealth, whose Forces joyned with its own, would have served to put in Fetters not only the Parliament, but also the King of *England*. During that interval of time, they might have enacted many Laws, which *England* very much wants, as may be seen by the Experience of its Neighbours, especially the *United Provinces*.

In a Common-wealth made up of equal Members, a good Union in procuring the common Good, is of very great use to make it Flouriſh, and Diſſenſion is the moſt dangerous thing in the World. We have ſeen it, in theſe very Provinces, when in the Year 1672. they were like to be altogether ruined. † *Samuel Pufendorf*, who was a very Great Man, has in vain enquired for ſome other Reaſons of the extraordinary Progreſs the Enemies made in ſo ſhort a time againſt that Common-wealth. There were no other but Diſſenſion, which hindred it from making the neceſſary Preparations againſt the Invaſion of its Enemies.

† *Introd. ad Hiſt.* Cap. VI. n. 21.

No Body doubts that Concord will make a State Flouriſh, and that Diſcord is very dangerous to it; but care muſt be taken to have a right Notion of the Meaning of thoſe Words. A Concord uſeful to a Monarchical or Ariſtocratical Government, is ſuch as aims at the general Good of thoſe, who live under it. If in a Monarchical State, wherein the Power of the Monarch is limited by the Laws, the chief Members of the State ſhould of their own accord, or by force agree to ſubmit all the Laws to the Prince's Will, without having any regard to the Good of the State, ſuch an Union would not be at all advantageous to it. It would change a Society of free Perſons, into a Company of unhappy Slaves. The Readineſs of the *Chineſes* to obey their King blindly, does but confirm his Tyranny, and encreaſe their Miſery. For thoſe, who depend on the Will of one Man, ſubject to a thouſand Paſſions, whoſe Fancies can be reſtrained by no Law, can be ſure of nothing. Such a Man has ſome Favourites, who have other Favourites under them, and ſuffer themſelves to be Bribed; and ſuch

a Form of Government is but a Subordination of Tyrants, every one of whom endeavours to get ſomething by the Slavery of the People.

But 'tis ſaid, That the general Obedience of the *Chineſes*, ſerves to maintain the Peace in their Country; and that they enjoy thereby all the Advantages which a good Union can procure: They mean all the Advantages, which can be enjoyed in Slavery. But there is not one Free-Man but had rather ſee more frequent Diſorders, than to undergo a perpetual Slavery. Beſides, 'tis falſe that there are no Civil Wars under ſuch a Form a Government. The moſt enſlaved People will be at laſt weary of an exceſſive Tyranny, and, at the firſt opportunity, will ſhew that the Love of Liberty is not quite ſtifled in their Hearts. Such a thing has happened ſeveral times among the *Chineſes* and *Turks*. Few People being concern'd in keeping up Arbitrary Power in a certain Family, or a certain Perſon, and the greateſt part having reaſon to complain of it; few will oppoſe a Change in the Government, and others believe that if they get nothing, they will loſe but little by it.

The ſame ought to be ſaid of an Ariſtocratical Government. The Union of thoſe, who Govern ſuch a State, would be of no uſe, unleſs it procured the Obſervation of the Laws, and the general Good of the Common-wealth. This we may learn from the Hiſtory of the *Thirty Tyrants* of *Athens*, and the *Decemviri* of *Rome*. The Union of thoſe Men ſerved only to oppreſs the People, and make 'em miſerable; becauſe their chief Deſign was to ſatisfy their Paſſions, without having any regard to the Publick Good.

Concord may be alſo conſidered with reſpect to the People, who, when the Government is ſo ſet-

led, they may quietly enjoy the Fruits of their Labour, by obeying the Laws of their Country, (which no Member of the Society can alter, or tranſgreſs at his pleaſure) ought to think themſelves happy, and to obey unanimouſly the Orders of the Supreme Power. To keep the Multitude in ſo good an Union, 'tis neceſſary not only that they be the better for it, but alſo that they ſhould know their own Happineſs. Without which, there will always be ſome reſtleſs Men, who having loſt all they had by Debauchery and Idleneſs, would attempt to recover it by ſome Diſturbance. Such Men will eaſily perſuade a People, who think they live unhappily, to riſe up againſt their Sovereign, on the firſt occaſion. On the contrary, when the People are generally perſuaded that they cannot better their Condition by a Change, and that they ſhould hazard loſing much by it, it is a very difficult thing to ſeduce them. I could make ſeveral Obſervations on this Subject; but it is not my deſign to write a general Treatiſe of Politicks.

The Union of thoſe, who govern a State, and of the People, ought to aim at the Publick Good; from whence it follows, that whatever Union hath not ſuch an Aim, is prejudicial to it. It ſhould rather be call'd a *Conſpiracy* than an *Union*; ſince the Name of a Virtue cannot be reaſonably given to a thing, which prejudices or deſtroys the Society. What has been ſaid of the Civil, may be ſaid of the Eccleſiaſtical Society, which can only Flouriſh by the great number of its Members, and by Learning (for Learning is in that Society what Riches are in the other) and Concord. Not to ſpeak now of the Number and Learning of ſuch a Society; I ſhall only obſerve that the Union of thoſe, who govern it, ought not to be a tyran-

nical

nical Conſpiracy, which deſtroys it. Such is, for Example, the Union of the *Inquiſitors* in *Spain* and *Italy*, who perfectly agree among themſelves, but to do what? To hinder *Lay-men*, as they call 'em, and Church-men, (who might diſcover ſome Errors introduced into Religion out of Ignorance, or Abuſes crept into the Diſcipline, through Ambition,) from propoſing at any time a Reformation; and conſequently to keep every Body in a profound Ignorance, or an unlawful Diſſimulation and Hypocriſy. It were much better for the Church, if there were many Diſputes rather than a perpetual Tyranny, which hinders Men from being inſtructed in the Chriſtian Religion, and convinced of the Truth of it, by good Reaſons.

I ſhall ſay no more on this Subject, becauſe I intend only to treat of the Decay of the Civil Society in ſeveral States: But I muſt anſwer an Objection. 'Tis ſaid, That it is abſolutely neceſſary to ſuppreſs Diverſity of Opinions in matters of Religion; becauſe under pretence of Religion the State is divided into ſeveral Factions, which are ſo incenſed againſt one another, that they often break into an open War, and uſe one another moſt barbarouſly. And 'tis uſual on this occaſion to heap up Examples of Diſorders and Civil Wars, which happen'd in ſeveral States, under pretence of Religion.

But what will follow from thence? Nothing but that as ſoon as a Religion, whatever it be, is eſtabliſhed in a Country, no Alteration ought to be allowed in it, for fear it ſhould cauſe ſome Diſturbance. But ſuch a Principle will juſtify all the Proceedings of the Heathens, Jews, and Mahometans againſt the Chriſtian Religion; which they have perſecuted, to preſerve the Publick Peace in the Countries, wherein their Religion

was the ſtrongeſt. Beſides, 'tis falſe that the Toleration of ſeveral Religions cauſes any Diſturbance: On the contrary, Perſecution neceſſarily produces all the Diſturbances, which follow from the diverſity of Opinions. Were all thoſe, who obey the Civil Laws, tolerated, and were Men perſuaded that Humanity, not to mention Religion, requires of 'em that they ſhould bear with one another, they would live moſt happily in the World, tho' they were of different Opinions. But when Men are perſuaded that the greateſt number has the right of deciding what People are to believe, and of perſecuting all thoſe, who will not ſubmit to their Judgment; when the ſtrongeſt Party begins to uſe ill the Weaker, till it be forced at leaſt to diſſemble its Belief; then Diſturbances begin, and Perſecutors deſtroy the Civil Society, under pretence of Defending Religion. In a word, they, who only deſire to be tolerated, commit no Diſorder; and none, but thoſe who Perſecute them, Diſturb the State.

But Church-men, ſay they, ſtir up the People to uſe one another Ill; and Great Men often take hold of ſuch an Opportunity, to raiſe dangerous Diſturbances. But that very thing ſhews that it is not Toleration, but the want of it, which diſturbs the State. Were Men perſuaded, as of a Maxim eſſential to Religion and Policy, that they ought to bear with one another, as long as they obſerve all the Duties of the Civil Society; the Diſcourſes of Church-men, or the Cabals of Great Perſons would not be able to diſturb the Peace of the State, under pretence of Religion.

But it is not out of Love for the peace of the State, or out of a deſign to do it Good, that Church-men have oppoſed Toleration, and eſtabliſhed the contrary Opinion as a Religious Doctrine: No,

No, they have done it out of a desire of Domineering, of not being contradicted, and of encreasing their Revenues, which grow more considerable in proportion to the number of those who submit to their Decisions. If Princes encroach never so little on their pretended Privileges, they will endanger the Peace and Tranquillity of the State, rather than abate any thing. If the State enjoys a profound Peace, notwithstanding the diversity of Opinions; they don't scruple to disturb it, that they may oppress such as they do not like.

If was not for any Sedition that *Ferdinand* and *Isabella* expell'd the *Jews* out of *Spain* in 1492. The *Jews* had no Authority in the *State*, and were contented to enjoy the liberty of Trading quietly: They were not accused of any illegal Practices against the Government. The zealous *Inquisitors* expell'd them, to have an occasion of Enriching themselves with the Spoils of a great many Families, and not to do the State a good Service. The ill Designs of the *Moors* might also have been very easily prevented, in the same Kingdom, after they had been subdued, without making *Spain* a desert Country, by driving them out of it. I could add more considerable and *later* Examples of People ill used, not for having committed any Disorder, but by the Suggestion and Conspiracy of Church-men; whose Divisions, in matters of Religion, have never been so prejudicial to any State, as the fatal Union of the greater Number to oppress the lesser.

One may easily conclude from what has been said, that the States, the Laws whereof tend to encrease the number of the People, and make them quietly enjoy the Fruits of their Labour, by requiring of them no more than they are able to

pay; and where they, that command, and they that obey, make the Publick Good their chief End, or do nothing at leaſt, but what contributes to it; one may, I ſay, eaſily conclude that States, which go upon ſuch Principles, muſt needs be Flouriſhing; and on the contrary, that they, which have oppoſite Maxims, muſt neceſſarily fall to Decay. Therefore any State, which expels Loyal and Faithful Subjects, and leſſens the Number of them by any means, whatever they be; any State, wherein they are oppreſt with *Tailles* and Impoſts, whereby they are ſo impoveriſhed as not to be able to exerciſe their Induſtry: Laſtly, any State, wherein they are not unanimous in procuring the Publick Good, contains in itſelf ſome Principles, which will inſenſibly deſtroy it, unleſs ſuch an Evil be timely prevented. But the Remedy neceſſary for the Cure of ſuch a Diſeaſe can be propoſed only by Men, who have nobler Thoughts than the Vulgar. For the common ſort of People mind only their private Good, and are no farther concern'd in what happens in the State, than as ſome few Perſons, whom they favour, get or loſe by it for the preſent, without caring for others, or for the time to come.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

A Vindication of Providence from the Objections of the Manichees.

MR. *BAYLE* has diſplaid, in ſeveral places of his *Dictionary*, the Objections of the *Manichees* againſt the Unity of one Holy and Bountiful God, and even furniſhed them with ſome Arguments, to attack the ſeveral Syſtems of the Chriſtians. He thinks that when they argue againſt us, they are much ſtronger than we, and that the beſt way for all the Sects of Chriſtianity is to be ſilent, and to believe what the Scripture ſays, without troubling themſelves whether what it teaches, agrees with the Light of Reaſon, or no. I am not of his Opinion, and were I at leiſure, I would undertake to ſhew at large that he is miſtaken, when he ſays that they have ſo great an Advantage over all Chriſtians, whoever they be. I ſhall only ſet down here ſome Principles, which may be made uſe of, to bring the *Manichees* from their Error concerning the *Ill Principle*, which they joyn with the *Good* one; but I muſt firſt of all make two Obſervations.

The firſt is, That by anſwering the Objections of the *Manichees*, I do not deſign to wrong Mr. *Bayle*, whom I do not at all ſuſpect to favour their Opinions. I am perſuaded that he has taken a philoſophical Liberty of Arguing *pro* and *con*, in many caſes, only to exerciſe thoſe who underſtand the Matters he treats of, and not to favour thoſe, whoſe Arguments he alledges. The Objections he makes are ſuch as may be made in

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an Auditory of Divinity and Philoſophy; wherein the greater an Objection is, the more Honour there is in reſolving it. He may with reaſon require of his Readers that they ſhould do him that Juſtice, and it cannot be denied him. For my part, I am very willing to grant his Requeſt; but I think I may likewiſe be allow'd the liberty of Anſwering his Objections, requiring that no odious Application of my Anſwers, be made to the Author himſelf.

The ſecond thing I ſhall obſerve, is, That as Mr. *Bayle* thought he might afford the *Manichees* ſuch Arms as he pleaſed; I may alſo be allow'd to ward off their Blows, as I ſhall think fit. He thought it was a great Mortification for Humane Reaſon not to be able to defend Providence, againſt one of the moſt ridiculous Sects that ever were; but I think that one of the leaſt approved Sects among Chriſtians, is able to anſwer all the Arguments of the *Manichees*. As he pretends not to defend the Syſtem of thoſe Hereticks, or approve of the Arguments which he furniſhes them with; I ought to have the ſame Liberty with reſpect to *Origen*, in whoſe Name, if I may ſo ſay, I ſhall undertake to anſwer the *Manichees*. I declare I will neither defend nor approve all that he ſaid, nor all that one of his Diſciples is going to ſay. I am not at all concern'd in his Reputation, or Doctrine; and every Body may think of 'em as they pleaſe. The preſent Queſtion is not to ſatisfy any Body on this Subject, but only to ſtop the Mouth of the *Manichees*, by introducing an *Origeneſt* diſputing with them. If ſuch a Man can ſilence a *Manichee*, what may not one expect from thoſe, who ſhould argue much better than *Origen*'s Diſciples? But I leave it to the Judgment of Divines and Philoſophers. I think

that

that an *Origeniſt*, having read all the Objections of the *Manichees*, might argue thus:

" The *Manichees* pretend they can prove that " we muſt acknowledge an *Ill Principle*, that is " to ſay, a miſchievous One, and an Enemy to " Virtue, by reaſon of two things which we ob- " ſerve in the World. The one is *Phyſical Evil*, " to which Men are ſubject; ſuch as are Diſea- " ſes, Pains, all the Inconveniences of Humane " Life; the other is *Moral Evil*, that is to ſay, " Vice, and whatever is conſequent to it. The " *Manichees* are very careful to ſet forth all the " Moral and Phyſical Evils, which happen to " Men; and then they ſay, that if the Principle, " which governs the World, is the Author of " thoſe Evils, he is neither a benign Being, nor " a Lover of Virtue; and that if he permits them, " tho' he ſees and can hinder 'em, he is altoge- " ther unconcern'd for our Miſeries, and our " good Actions. They add, that it is manifeſt, " that Goodneſs is not a Property of that Being, " ſince he has decreed to condemn the greateſt " part of Men to everlaſting Puniſhments, or at " leaſt that he hinders 'em not from running " headlong into thoſe dreadful Torments; tho' " he is not ignorant of it, and can eaſily prevent " ſo terrible a Miſery.

Our *Origeniſt* would go on and ſay, " What " the *Manichees* ſay concerning the Moral and " Phyſical Evils, which happen among Men, " cannot be denied; nor can it be doubted but " that if he, who governs them, were the Au- " thor of their Vices, he would be an Enemy to " Virtue in general, and to Juſtice in particular, " if he ſhould puniſh them for Faults which him- " ſelf cauſed them to commit.

" But

" But it is not true that Men neceſſarily commit Faults, which God puniſhes. Neceſſity is inconſiſtent with what we call a puniſhable Fault, as well as with an Action capable of Reward. Either of 'em muſt have been done freely, that is, ſo as one might not have done it, to deſerve Reward or Puniſhment. It is a Maxim acknowledged by all the Law-givers in the World, which no Body can reaſonably oppoſe. Therefore God only *permits* Men to tranſgreſs his Laws, when he has given 'em whatever is neceſſary to obſerve them.

" If he does not hinder it, tho' he ſees it, and is able to keep us to our Duty; 'tis becauſe he has made us Free, that there might be room for Virtue and Vice, Blame and Praiſe, Rewards and Puniſhments. Every one may be convinced of it by his own Experience, and his inward ſenſe of the Faculty he has of doing or not doing good or bad Actions, which deſerve to be praiſed or blamed. This all Law-givers and Magiſtrates ſuppoſe, as an undeniable Principle; ſince they reward or puniſh Men, according as they obey or break the Laws.

Our *Origeniſt* would go on ſtill, and ſay: " I confeſs that there ariſes a great Inconvenience from thence, *viz.* That Men can make an ill uſe of the Power they have of obeying or diſobeying the Divine Laws; and God could not be ignorant of it, even tho' he had not foreſeen it, ſince all Men diſobey his Laws. This is the reaſon why he does not ſtop the Current of Phyſical Evils, which overflow the World. Sinners do not deſerve that God ſhould interpoſe after a Supernatural manner, to free them

" from

" from thoſe Evils, and they cannot complain " of 'em.

" But, why, ſay the *Manichees*, has God crea- " ted Men liable to Sin, ſince he could not be " ignorant of the Evils, which would follow " from it? I anſwer, That Men cannot complain " of God upon that account, for two Reaſons. " The firſt is, That he does not require of Men, " that they ſhould be without Sin; which would " be unjuſt, as being above their Nature. The " ſecond is, That God damns no Body meerly for " having ſinned, but for having not repented. If " he has made 'em frail, he only requires of 'em " what the frailty of their Nature is capable " of.

" Beſides it was not neceſſary that God ſhould " prevent or ſtop Moral and Phyſical Evils, " which are the Effects or Puniſhments of Men's " Vices; to be accounted a benign Being, and " a Lover of Virtue. That we may be convin- " ced of it, let us examine 'em ſingly: But we " muſt raiſe ourſelves above the Notions of the " Vulgar concerning the Duration and Great- " neſs of the Evils, which happen either during " the whole Life of each particular Man, or all " the time God will be pleaſed, that this Earth " ſhall continue. To give an acount of the Con- " duct of an Infinite Being, as much as it is poſ- " ſible for us to do, we muſt, as it were, forget " that we are limited, and place ourſelves, if I " may be allowed to ſay ſo, in the room of him, " who is Infinite. Or elſe we ſhall not be able " to defend his Cauſe, or give any good account " of what he does. God does not act by the li- " mited and weak Notions of Men, which are " the Rules of their Conduct; which made him

ſay

" ſay by a Prophet, *That his Ways are not our*
" *Ways, nor his Thoughts our Thoughts.*
" The phyſical Evils we ſuffer, ſeem to us to
" be intolerably long, if they laſt as long as we
" live, or only ſome Years. We complain and
" impatiently cry out that God delays too long
" to help us; eſpecially if thoſe Evils are ve-
" ry violent. But if we put together all the
" Evils, which have happen'd, and ſhall happen
" to Mankind, whilſt this Earth ſubſiſts; our weak
" Imagination is troubled and terrified, and we
" are apt to think that he, who governs the
" World, has ſcarce any care of us, and is nothing
" leſs than a bountiful Being. But if the Almigh-
" ty ſhould all of a ſudden raiſe our Minds to a
" State of Perfection, whereby we might have a
" clear view of the Duration of the Earth, ſuch
" as it is when compared with Eternity, and ſee
" the moment it begun, and the moment it will
" ceaſe to be; that length of time, which fright-
" ens us, would diſappear, and we would ſay
" that there is an infinitely leſs proportion be-
" tween It and Eternity, than there is between
" one Minute and a Hundred Millions of Years.
" Then the Evils, which now extort ſo bitter
" Complaints from us, and ſeem to us to be ſo
" dreadful, would not move us in the leaſt, be-
" cauſe of their ſhort duration. Among Men,
" if a Child be ſick, they who have him under
" Cure, do but laugh at him, when he complains
" of the Bitterneſs of a Remedy which they give
" him; becauſe they know that in a very ſhort time
" he will be cured by it. There is an infinite
" greater diſproportion between God and the
" moſt underſtanding Men, than there is between
" 'em and the moſt ſimple Children. So that
" we cannot reaſonably wonder, that God ſhould

look

" look upon the Miſeries we ſuffer, as almoſt
" nothing; ſince he only has a compleat *Idea* of
" Eternity, and looks upon the beginning and
" end of our Sufferings as being infinitely near-
" er than the beginning and end of one Mi-
" nute.

" We ought to reaſon after the ſame manner
" concerning Vices and vicious Actions, which
" laſt not long with reſpect to God. If a Clock-
" maker ſhould make a *Pendulum*, which being
" once wound up, would go right for a Year to-
" gether, abating two or three *Seconds*, which
" would not be equal, when it begins to go;
" would any one ſay that ſuch a Clock-maker is
" no exact and skilful Artiſt? In like manner, if
" one Day rectifies for all Eternity the Diſorders
" which the ill uſe of Mens Liberty has been the
" cauſe of; will any Body wonder that God made
" 'em not to ceaſe during the moment Men lived
" on the Earth?

Our *Origeniſt* would go on ſtill, and ſay: " But
" I perceive that the *Manichees* will object to me
" the everlaſting Puniſhments, with which God
" threatens impenitent Sinners in the Scripture,
" that is to ſay, the greateſt part of Men. I
" don't deny but that Chriſt threatens the Wick-
" ed with an *Eternal Fire*, and I will not inſiſt
" on the Ambiguity of thoſe words; but how do
" the *Manichees* know that the ſupreme Law-
" giver of the World has not the Right of remit-
" ting the Puniſhments, where-with he threatens
" the Wicked, when he ſhall think fit? When
" a Sovereign Prince condemns any one to a per-
" petual Impriſonment, he always expreſſes him-
" ſelf after an abſolute manner; but he does not
" tie his hands, ſo as not to be able to remit

" the

" the Punishment of those, whom he has con-
" demned.

" When God promises something to his Cre-
" atures, his Supreme Goodness and Faithfulness
" oblige him to make it good; and notwithstand-
" ing the infinite Distance there is between him
" and us, we might justly complain that we were
" deceived, if he did not perform his Promise.
" But if, after he has threatned free Creatures,
" to keep 'em in awe, and begun to punish them,
" without giving 'em any Hopes of seeing an end
" of their Punishments; he thinks they have suf-
" fered enough, and makes 'em afterwards eter-
" nally Happy; who can complain of him? Is
" there any thing in it that is unworthy of the Di-
" vine Goodness, and is not such a Notion very
" agreeable to the *Idea* we have of an infinite
" Mercy, which consequently is not to end with
" the short duration of Mens Lives, to give way
" to an eternal Severity?

There is no need our *Origenist* should speak any longer on this Subject. What he has said, is sufficient to stop the Mouth of the *Manichees*; and I do not design to shew that his Opinion is a plausible one, by enlarging upon it, and confirming it with such Arguments, as in all likelihood *Origen* used to confirm his Opinion. I have had no other Design than to shew that the *Manichees* would have no cause to triumph over Humane Reason, if they should have to do with such Men as could but defend themselves as well as *Origen*, whose Opinion is notwithstanding rejected by every Body. After all, there is no Comparison to be made between the Opinions of the *Origenists*, as I have fairly represented 'em, and *Manicheism*, or the Doctrine of the Two Principles. The latter is altogether inconsistent with

with the Christian Religion, one Essential Article whereof is to acknowledge but one God Creator of all Men; whereas *Origen*'s Opinion may be consistent with the Belief of all the Essential Articles of Religion. That Great Man was never call'd a Heretick for it, whilst he lived; and it would be very hard to declare him Damned, after his Death, meerly because of that single Opinion. Besides, since the *Manichees* must be confuted by Reason rather than Revelation, the greatest part whereof they rejected; it must be confest that *Origen*'s Method, being not contrary to Reason, may be made use of in such a Case as this. If any one at this day could not be reclaimed any other way, as it might happen; it would not be amiss to argue with him according to this Method; since it is past doubt it were better to be an *Origenist*, than a *Deist*, an *Atheist* or a *Manichee*. For my part, I undertook this small Essay, only to take off a little of the *Manichees* Presumption, and excite Divines to treat of this Matter, which would require a whole Volume, if it were particularly examined.

CHAP. VII.

Men eaſily believe what their Paſſions ſuggeſt to them.

MEN are apt to Believe what they Deſire; and the weakeſt Reaſons, which perſuade 'em, appear to 'em like Demonſtrations. After they have thus deceived themſelves, the deciſive way wherewith they diſcourſe of what they Believe, ſerves to deceive others; or at leaſt they fancy they have perſuaded them with Reaſons, the weakneſs whereof would be palpable, if they were free from Paſſion. *Quæ volumus, & credimus libenter, & quæ ſentimus ipſi, reliquos ſentire putamus.* They are *Cæſar*'s words in his Commentaries, Book II. Chap. 27. *We willingly Believe*, ſays he, *what we Deſire, and eaſily perſuade ourſelves that others are of the ſame Mind.*

We find in the *Perroniana*, *That Cardinal* Sforza, *who did not believe the Power of the* Pope, *no more than ſeveral other things, told Cardinal* du Perron *that it was an eaſie thing to prove it at* Rome. The reaſon of it is, that they, who have a mind to get Preferments at *Rome*, muſt either believe the *Pope*'s Power, or pretend to believe it. The Ground of this Thought is not new, nor the manner of expreſſing it. *Socrates* ſaid in like manner, as *Ariſtotle* † relates it, *That it was no difficult thing to Praiſe the* Athenians *at* Athens.

† Rhet. *Lib.* II. *c.* 9.

The reaſon of it was, that the *Athenians*, out of Self-love, were ſo well pleaſed with their own Praiſes, that they admired the worſe Reaſonings, when they tended to prove ſomething, which

was

was glorious to their City. They applauded the worſe Orators, provided the Praiſes of the *Athenians* were the Subject of their Diſcourſes.

They, who only reaſon out of Paſſion and Intereſt, ſhould think ſometimes of this, and ask themſelves, whether thoſe, who have contrary Paſſions and Intereſts, would like their Reaſons? and then perhaps they would perceive that Self-love impoſes on them. For certainly no Man has a greater right than another to eſtabliſh this Rule for himſelf, That what favours him is true, and what is diſadvantageous to him, is falſe. If the *Europeans* pretend to make uſe of it, they muſt not take it ill, if the *Aſiaticks* will do the ſame; or if they diſapprove of it in the *Aſiaticks*, they ought to make uſe of the ſame Rules, which they will have the *Aſiaticks* to ſubmit to, and muſt admit of whatever can be proved by thoſe Rules. Such are the Rules of *Logick*, which cannot be neglected, in any part of the World, without reaſoning ill.

But it is as difficult to follow thoſe Principles of Reaſon, when ſome Paſſions, or a long Cuſtom oppoſe them, as it is eaſie to acknowledge the Truth of 'em, when they are propoſed in general. The *Chineſes*, for Example, would readily approve of thoſe Rules, and conſequently they ſhould acknowledge all the Truths, which can be proved by them; as this, for Example, that *Polygamy* is unlawful. Yet 'tis impoſſible to convince 'em of it, and it is the greateſt Obſtacle to their Converſion which the *Miſſionaries* meet with. † The *Mandarins*, who are forbidden to uſe moſt Pleaſures, which the People are allow'd, live, as it were, in a kind of *Seraglio*, to make up that loſs, wherein they ſpend their time, when they are free from Buſineſs. Tho' they

† *Nouv. Mem. de la Chine.* Vol. II. Lett. 4.

have but one lawful Wife, yet they are allow'd to take as many Concubines as they can maintain, and the Children born of 'em are look'd upon as Children of the lawful Wife, and bred up with equal care with them. To be admitted to Baptism, they muſt promiſe to the Miſſionaries that they will part with all their Concubines, and be contented with one lawful Wife. They often promiſe to the Miſſionaries every thing elſe; but their Paſſions and Cuſtoms are too much ſet againſt this Point; they cannot believe that God requires of Men that they ſhould have but one Wife, tho' the conformity of this Doctrine with Reaſon may be more eaſily ſhewn, than of ſeveral others, which the *Chineſes* approve of, without any Reluctancy.

" When we propoſe to the Mandarins, *ſays a* " *Miſſionary*, the other Difficulties of our Reli- " gion, they will diſpute, and endeavour to o- " vercome them, and deſpair not of doing them- " ſelves Violence; but this laſt Point diſcoura- " ges them preſently, and takes away from them " the thought of Converting themſelves. Then he alledges the Example of a *Chineſe*, who wou'd have been Baptized, but was quite out of conceit with it, by reaſon of that Article.

The difficulty of acknowledging the Truth encreaſes ſtill among the *Chineſes*, by reaſon of the Laws, which authorize that ill Cuſtom, and ſo perplex ſeveral of 'em, who would turn Chriſtians, that they know not what to do. " They, " who turn Chriſtians, are permitted to take to " Wife one of their Concubines, if the lawful " Wife will not embrace Chriſtianity; but the " Laws forbid the *Chineſes* to do it, and they are " not allow'd to Divorce their Wives, but in ve- " ry few particular Caſes. Beſides, the Relati- ons

" ons of the Wife thus Divorced by her Huſ-
" band, would not fail to Revenge themſelves,
" and force him in Law to take her again.

" The Converſion of Women is more diffi-
" cult ſtill. A Concubine, for Example, acknow-
" ledges the Truth of the Chriſtian Religion,
" and is very ſenſible of the miſerable condition
" ſhe is in. She deſires to be freed from it, and
" admitted to Baptiſm. She is told that the firſt
" thing, which her Faith requires of her, is, to
" part with her pretended Husband. She gives
" her Conſent to it, and even deſires it with all
" Heart; but ſhe ſays: *I belong to a* Mandarin, *who bought me. If I leave his Houſe, the Law impowers him to apprehend, and puniſh me as his Slave. If by chance I eſcape him, whither can I go to be ſafe? My Parents, who have Sold me, durſt not take me into their Houſe, and I cannot fail to fall into the Hands of another Man, who will draw me into the ſame State of Life, from which I deſire to be freed. I muſt therefore ſtay in the Houſe, where I am; but how can I reſiſt a brutiſh Man, who only minds his Paſſion, which he may juſtify by the Laws, and Example of the whole Empire? 'Tis in vain for me to repreſent to him the Holineſs of Chriſtianity, which I deſire to embrace; my Intreaties, my Tears, and even my Reſiſtence, and all my Endeavours are not able to move him.*

" It happens alſo ſometimes that an Idolater,
" being weary of his Chriſtian Wife, will accuſe
" her unjuſtly, and with much Money get a Per-
" miſſion to Sell her to another Man. Nay ſome-
" times he will Sell her without any other For-
" mality, and retire into another Province. How
" can this Woman, being in the Hands of an A-
" dulterer, whom the Laws authorize, avoid Sin,
" and perſevere in the Faith?

I thought fit to ſet down that Paſſage at large, becauſe ſuppoſing that a Man, in the ſame Circumſtances, ſhould be enclined to live, as he did till he heard of the Goſpel; the difficulty of getting out of that Trouble, together with the long Habit he has contracted, determines him to believe that the Goſpel is falſe; not by any Reaſons, but becauſe if it were true, he muſt preſently Condemn himſelf, and change his Inclinations and manner of Life, whatever Difficulty and Danger there may be in it. The *Jews*, in our Saviour's time, were almoſt in the ſame Circumſtances, by reaſon of Divorces, and Polygamy. They, who having divorced their Wives, had Married ſeveral times, or had many Wives at one time, and beſides were inclined to that ſort of Life, were apt to believe that the Doctrine of Chriſt was falſe, by reaſon of their Inclinations, and the difficulty of Changing their Lives. 'Tis for this Reaſon, at leaſt in part, that Chriſt and his Apoſtles told the *Jews*, as well as the *Gentiles*, That to become his Diſciples, they muſt *be born again*, *become new Men*, and forſake their neareſt Relations, when they could no longer live with them, according to the Precepts of the Goſpel: And this was without doubt one of the great Reaſons of the Obſtinacy of the *Jews*. It was a hard thing for them, not only to renounce their Inclinations, which prompted them to change their Wives, and to have many at one time; but alſo to confeſs that they had lived in Adultery, and that ſeveral of their Children were Illegitimate. Their Children could alſo hardly endure to be call'd Children of Adulterers, and to ſee their Fathers forſake their Mothers. Which cauſed very great Diviſions in the Families of the *Jews*; and perhaps Chriſt alludes

partly

partly to those Disorders, when he says, That he † *is not come to give Peace on Earth, but rather Division*, and when he describes the nearest Relations so cruelly divided: *From henceforth there shall be five in one House divided, three against two, and two against three. The Father shall be divided against the Son, and the Son against the Father; the Mother against the Daughter, and the Daughter against the Mother; the Mother-in-law against her Daughter-in-law, and the Daughter-in-law against her Mother-in-law.* They, who thought of those ill Consequences, and had no great Piety, could not resolve to embrace a Doctrine, which the most honest Men in the Jewish Nation could not receive, without defaming themselves, and falling out with their nearest Kindred. Such a Passion and many other, hindred them from perceiving the Beauty and Truth of the Gospel, which presently shines to the Eyes of those, who are not prepossest with the like Passions.

† Luke XII. 51.

It would be no difficult thing to make an application of that Truth to many Christians, who live in gross Errors still, notwithstanding all the Light of our Age. But 'tis better that every Body should do it himself, provided he takes care not to be in the same Case with those he censures.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Praiſes and Cenſures.

THERE is nothing more Equivocal than Praiſes and Cenſures; and no Eſteem or Contempt can ſcarce be grounded on either of them. To mention but one ſort of Praiſes; the *Divines* of the ſame Party praiſe one another, out of ſo many ill Motives, that one can lay no Streſs upon it. They do it commonly out of a great Conceit of their own Notions, and only becauſe of the Reſemblance of their Opinions. In ſuch a caſe, what can one inferr from ſuch Praiſes, but that they, who Praiſe one another, are of the ſame Party, and maintain the ſame Truths or the ſame Errors? Men will often Praiſe a Book out of Flattery, to pleaſe the Author of it, who is in a great Station, has great Revenues, a great Authority, and ſome other Qualities, which have no Relation with his Book. But ſuch Praiſes would ſoon ceaſe, if that Man ſhould loſe his Imployments, his Authority, his Revenues, *&c.* Some will Praiſe a Book, becauſe they underſtand not the Matter it treats of, and admire what they do not apprehend. Others do it out of Complaiſance, without having any Reaſon for't, but that they ſee others do it. 'Tis therefore to no purpoſe to talk of Approbations of Books, or other like Praiſes, and cry up a Man's Reputation, which is only grounded on ſuch deceitful Praiſes.

How-

However it must be confest that, in some Cases, Praises may be of some Weight, *viz.* when Men of Parts Praise and Esteem those that are of a contrary Party; especially when 'tis not their Interest to do so, but on the contrary, they expose themselves by doing it. A *Roman Catholick* Divine is in such a case, when he Praises a *Protestant* Writer. It may be said then of those, who are so praised, *That none but honest Men Praise them*; as *Aristotle* said in an *Elegy* he composed in the Praise of *Plato*, that he had erected an Altar to that Philosopher, *Whom ill Men were not allow'd to Praise.*

Βωμὸν Ἀριστοτέλης ἱδρύσατο τοῦδε Πλάτωνος,
Ἄνδρὸς ὃν οὐκ αἰσὺν πᾶσι βροτοῖς ἔφατο.

Few Praises of that Nature are better than whole Volumes of Approbations of Men of the same Party, or who can be suspected of Ignorance and Passion.

The contrary ought to be said of Disadvantageous Judgments, or Censures.

When Men inveigh against others, who are of different Opinions, and of a contrary Party, what can one conclude from it? Nothing, but that they have different Opinions, and are of a different Party. Men blame out of Envy, or thro' some other Passion, what they would Praise, if their Passions should cease. They inveigh, for Example, against those, who are of another Party, to set up for Zealots, and to get some Reputation; and because they may safely give up themselves to the most shameful Anger, under pretence of Zeal, and vent a thousand Calumnies, without being punished for it; they deliberately take part in Quarrels, wherein they neither ob-

serve

ſerve the Rules of Chriſtian Charity, nor Natural Equity. Then the Cenſures they paſs upon their Neighbours, ſhew only, that they Envy and Hate 'em, and have a mind to raiſe themſelves by wounding their Reputation: And if Men could ſee the Hearts of other Men, as they can hear and read their Words, they would often ſee in the Souls of thoſe, who ſpeak or write ſo angrily, a ſecret Eſteem for thoſe of whom they ſpeak Ill, which Envy and Hatred endeavour in vain to Stifle. When ſome Men blame others out of Ignorance, or to imitate thoſe who do the like, as Ignorant and Unjuſt Men commonly do; what can one conclude from it, but that Dogs never bark alone, where there are other Animals of the ſame kind? What can one ſay therefore of thoſe, who, to wrong another Man, take care to collect all the Slanders, and reviling Words of thoſe who have abuſed him? If any one, to let the Publick Know what they ought to think of *Samuel Mareſius*, heretofore Profeſſor of Divinity at *Groeningen*, ſhould gather all that *Gisbertus Voetius* ſaid to defame him; and on the contrary, to wrong the Memory of *Voetius*, ſhould make a Collection of all that *Mareſius* wrote againſt him; one might with reaſon believe that he makes ſport with the Publick, or deſigns to impoſe on ſimple Men. This has been nevertheleſs practiſed of late by a Divine of my Acquaintance againſt a Friend of mine. He has collected ſome ſilly things, which ſome paſſionate Divines have writ againſt him, as if one could rely upon the Judgment of Ignorant and Unjuſt Men! It would be an eaſie thing to beat him at his own Weapon, and publiſh what ſome Men as Orthodox as himſelf, have ſaid againſt his Opinions.

But Cenſures ought not to be minded, except when 'tis a Man's Intereſt to forbear Cenſuring. When Cardinal *Baronius* ſpeaks Ill of ſome *Popes*, his Opinion deſerves without doubt ſome Conſideration. When *Melanchton* gives but an Ill Character of ſome *Lutherans* of his time, one may reaſonably think that they gave occaſion to ſpeak Ill of 'em.

The ſame Paſſions, with which we are moved now, reigned likewiſe formerly, as all thoſe, who have carefully read the Church-Hiſtory, are convinced. We muſt therefore weigh in the ſame Scales the Praiſes and Cenſures of paſt Ages with thoſe of our time, and give 'em no more Weight than Equity requires, and a ſevere Examination will allow. If this were done, as it ought to be, how many Church-Hiſtories are there, which would deſerve to be thrown into the Fire? The beſt would ſerve only for Chronological Tables, to rank Facts according to the order of Time.

There is another thing to be obſerved concerning Praiſes and Cenſures: or, if you will, Good and Hard Words, *viz.* The Style of the time, wherein the Authors of 'em lived.

They, who lived, for Example, when the Republick of *Rome* was ſtill flouriſhing, or in the Reign of *Julius Caſar*, were wont to Praiſe thoſe of the prevailing Party, and to Blame the Unfortunate, as it has been the conſtant practice of Men; but they were much more reſerved than thoſe, who lived in the Third Century, under the Reign of the laſt Heathen Emperors, or in the Fourth, under the Reign of the Chriſtian Emperors. In *Julius Caſar* and even *Auguſtus* his time, the greateſt Flatterers could not have been endured, if they had ſaid what the Emperors ſaid of

of themſelves in their Laws and Edicts. They who know the Character of the Age of *Auguſtus* need but look on both *Codes*, to find a great many places in them, which would have been thought intolerable at that time. That, which is moſt ſtrange, is that the Chriſtian Emperors followed ſuch an ill Cuſtom, even in ſuch Laws as concern'd Religion, wherein one would think they ſhould have expreſt themſelves with more Modeſty. For Example, here is a Law of *Arcadius, Honorius*, and *Theodoſius Junior*, which was publiſhed in the Year 404. "Let all the Officers of the "Palace have warning, that they ought to ab- "ſtain from going to tumultuous Aſſemblies; "and let thoſe, who, out of a SACRILEGI- "OUS Mind, dare oppoſe the Authority of "OUR DIVINITY, be deprived of their "Employments, and let their Eſtates be confiſ- cated. *Cuncta Officia noverint tumultuoſis ſe conventiculis abſtinere, & qui SACRILEGO animo auctoritatem NOSTRI NUMINIS auſi fuerint expugnare, privati cingulo honorum proſcriptione mulctentur. Cod. Theodoſ. Lib.* XVI. *Tit.* IV. *L.* 4. The Letters they write are ſtyled *Sacred Letters*, † *Sacræ Literæ*. When the Sons ſpeak of their Father, they call him their *Father of Divine Memory*, and their *Divine Father*, † *Divæ recordationis, & divus Genitor*. They call their own Laws *Oracles* and *Heavenly Oracles*, † even when they recall 'em. *Honorius* ſpeaking of an Edict, whereby he granted Liberty of Conſcience to the *Donatiſts* in *Africa*, expreſſes himſelf thus in his Orders, which we find in the † Conference of *Carthage*: "We are not ignorant of the Contents "of a HEAVENLY ORACLE, which the "*Donatiſts*, by a falſe Interpretation, pretend to "favour their Errors, and which we recall'd "here-

† *Ibid. T.* V. *L.* 20.

† *Ibid. L.* 20. & 26.

† *Ibid. L.* 51.

† *Vid. & Cod. Theodoſ. Gothofredi. T.* VI. *p.* 300.

heretofore, tho' it mildly exhorted them to Repentance. *Nec sanè latet conscientiam nostram divino COELESTIS ORACULI, quem erroris sui posse præstare sæva Donatistarum interpretatio prodidit, qui quamvis depravatos animos ad correctionem initiis mitibus invitaret, abolere eum tamen etiam antè festinat.*

When Princes spoke thus of themselves, what would not their flattering Subjects say? They would give 'em the Title of *your Perpetuity*, and *your Eternity*, *Perennitas* and *Æternitas vestra*, as we may see in *Symmachus*'s Letters directed to several Emperors. St. *Athanasius* had reason to laugh at the *Arian* Bishops, who bestowed that Title on the Emperor *Constans*: † *They*, says he, *who deny that the Son is Eternal, call him* (the Emperor) *eternal King*. But the Emperors themselves did not scruple afterwards to assume that Title of Honor, as it appears by a † Law of *Theodosius* the Great, which begins thus: "If any "judge, having finished a publick Work, inscribes his Name on it, rather than that of "OUR PERPETUITY, let him be accounted guilty of High-Treason. *Si qui Judicer perfecto operi suum potius nomen quam NOSTRÆ PERENNITATIS scripserint, Majestatis teneantur obnoxii.* Instead of those Words, *Tribonian* inserted † these into the *Code*, without mentioning OUR DIVINITY, *sine NUMINIS NOSTRI mentione.*

† *De Synodis* p. 718. *T. I. Ed. Paris. an.* 1698.

† *Cod. Theod. L.* XV. *T.* 1. *L.* 31.

† *Lib.* VIII. *T.* XII. *L.* 10

Church-men followed the same Custom; for the Bishops were not call'd merely by their Names, but with the addition of *most Holy*, *most Pious*, *most Acceptable to God*, *most Happy*, *our most Holy Father*, and other such Titles, which the *Acts* of the *Councils* are full of, especially when they mention'd the Bishops of Great Cities. I doubt

I doubt not but that they knew very well that those Titles of Honour were not to be understood in their full Sense: However they were not bestowed without *Flattery*, nor accepted without *Vanity*.

The Censures and Invectives of that time were no less excessive. Such is the Character of the Spirit of Flattery: It inspires Men not only with a thousand mean things towards their Superiors, but also with strange and violent Passions against those they are angry with. This one may see in the XVI. Book of the *Theodosian Code*, *Tit.* V. concerning *Hereticks*, to whom the Emperors or their Secretaries give all sort of ill Language. And lest it should be thought that they speak only of the *Manichees* or other like *Hereticks*, whose Doctrine was inconsistent with Morality; *Arcadius* and *Honorius* defined what *Heresy* is, and denoted those whom they call'd *Hereticks*. " † They, " who shall be found to recede never so little " from the Sense of the Catholick Church, are " comprehended under the Name of Hereticks, " and liable to the Laws, which have been enacted against them. *Hæreticorum vocabula continentur, & latis adversùs eos sanctionibus debent succumbere, qui vel levi argumento à judicio Catholicæ Religionis, & tramite detecti fuerint deviare.* One needs only read the V. Title of the XVI. Book of the *Theodosian Code* against the Hereticks, to see that as it was then the Custom to bestow excessive Praise, so they excessively blamed those they did not love. The Hereticks are call'd there not only Men fond of erroneous Opinions, and obstinate; but also *Distracted*, *Mad*, *Prophane*, *Perfidious*, *Detestable*, and *Sacrilegious Men*, who have wickedly conspired against the Deity, &c. *Jacobus Gothofredus* has collected all those reviling Words,

† *Cod. Theod. Lib.* XVI. *Tit.* V. *L.* 28.

Words, and placed them before the Title I have mention'd.

Tho' it be as clear as Noon Day-light, that the Praiſes and Cenſures of that time are moſt of them ſtrained and exceſſive; yet ſeveral People, who read the Writings of that Age, take no notice of it; and the ancient Cuſtoms having been changed in theſe latter Ages, they fancy that all thoſe, who are ſtyled *Saints* in thoſe ancient Writings, (which was only a Title of Honour beſtowed upon all Biſhops and Prieſts,) are really *Saints*, in ſuch a Senſe as that Word is now underſtood; that is to ſay, that they enjoy the Glory of Heaven, and may be ſafely prayed to, as the Church of *Rome* holds, as being Mediators between God and Men. From whence it follows that their *Writings* ought to be infinitely more eſteem'd than thoſe of the Modern, tho' the latter are compoſed with greater accuracy, and according to all the Rules of Art. For who durſt believe that ſuch Men reaſoned ill, and wrote careleſly? They alſo conclude from it, that Men, who are prayed to, could be guilty of no dangerous Error, and that their Lives ought to be the Pattern of ours. Thus they Canonize them together with their Errors and Vices, to which they were as ſubject as thoſe, who live now. An *Order*, that has one of thoſe Saints for its Patron, is always very zealous in the Defence of his Opinions and manner of Life.

And becauſe thoſe great *Saints* condemn'd and perſecuted as much as they could thoſe, who receded from their Opinions; they, who admire their Writings, revile, in their imitation, and perſecute thoſe, who differ from them. This will always be, as long as the Praiſes and Cenſures of the Ancient are approved of without any

any examination; instead of comparing them with the unchangeable Rule of Reason and the Gospel.

CHAP. IX.

That it is a very difficult thing to Judge without Passion.

EVERY Body says, *That an Author, who writes with Passion, is not to be trusted*; and it cannot be denied but that it is a very true Maxim, and very useful to those, who follow it. But to know whether an Author writes with Passion, or no, one ought to free one self from Passion. Otherwise a Man will deceive himself more than he can be deceived by the most interested Author; because every Body mistrusts himself less, than others. He, that will free himself from his Passions, must know that he is subject to them; for he cannot get rid of a Habit, which he thinks he has not contracted. But what must one do, to know it? Men deceive themselves every Day, and believe they keep within the Bounds of Moderation and Equity. I confess that when we are actually agitated with a Passion, we are not capable of judging well of ourselves; but there is scarce any Passion but what has some Intervals. Then the general Light of Reason and Equity, which we have acquired by Study and Experience, shines in our Minds; because they cease to be fill'd with Fumes of Passions. We must then im-

improve that Time, take a ſound Reſolution, and form ſuch Maxims as we will always obſerve: as Phyſicians make uſe of the Intervals that are between Fits, to cure thoſe who are ſick of a Fever. If they don't prevent new Fits, they will at leaſt leſſen the Violence of them. In like manner, ſome Reflections made, whilſt the Mind is calm, do often prevent violent Paſſions, or at leaſt leſſen them in a great meaſure. He, who often makes ſuch Reflections, will ſooner perceive the Effects of 'em: as the effects of Remedies are better known, when they have been reiterated. But there is this difference between a Fever and our Paſſions, that we often recover of the former, without uſing any Remedies; whereas we cannot get rid of our Paſſions, without reflecting on them, and reiterating our Reflections.

If a Man therefore never Reflects he is paſt recovery. In ſome caſes every thing contributes to keep up our Paſſions, and hinder us from Reflecting on the State we are in. This may be obſerv'd in what is call'd *Zeal for Religion*, in the Sects that are moſt remote from Truth. That *Zeal* is nothing elſe but a vehement Deſire of ſetting up One's Opinions by any means. The *Divines* of thoſe falſe Religions cry it up as a Virtue, without which one cannot be acceptable to God, and look upon Peace and Toleration as a deteſtable Vice. Every Body hears this Doctrine from his tender Years, reads it in all their Books, and ſees it practiſed by the moſt eſteem'd Perſons. The *Zealots* get a great Reputation in their Party, and obtain all the Rewards; but the Admirers of *peaceable Equity* get nothing by it but Trouble and Contempt. Ask therefore no more, how it comes to paſs that ſo many People are deceived and impoſed upon.

You will ſay that you eaſily apprehend that it it is now very difficult to preſerve one's ſelf from the Illuſions of Paſſions; but that you cannot conceive how rational Men could eſtabliſh Doctrines ſo contrary to Truth. I anſwer, That Men in Authority, who ſincerely believed ſome falſe Doctrines, might have enacted ſome Laws, and introduced ſome Cuſtoms, as were fit to Authorize a falſe as well as a true Doctrine; and then it proved a difficult thing to go againſt the Stream. Some Impoſtors and Politicians might alſo have had a hand in it, ſo that at laſt the Aſſertors of a falſe Doctrin proved ſo fond of it, that it was a very hard matter to overcome their Prejudices. Thus the moſt ridiculous Opinions of the *Heathens* and *Mahometans* were introduced at firſt, and afterwards kept up by ſuch means as I have mention'd. Thoſe Nations blindly believe whatever their Writers and Prieſts tell 'em; without being aware that thoſe Men, getting their Livelyhood by thoſe erroneous Doctrines, will not fail to maintain a Party, under whoſe Ruins they would infallibly ſink. Would to God they were the only Men, whoſe Intereſt it is to maintain Errors, and oppreſs the Truth! Would to God that none but they were deceived by their own and other Men's Paſſions! But it is a general Evil, which in all likelyhood will laſt as long as there are Men in this World. However we muſt endeavour to oppoſe it, leſt it ſhould exceſſively encreaſe.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Of Mr. Le Clerc's *Works.*

NO Body can give a better Account of the Works and Studies of Mr. *Le Clerc* than I: And ſince it is neceſſary that the Publick ſhould be inform'd of it, becauſe of thoſe, who wrote againſt him, I'll ſay what I know of it. Humane Learning, Philoſophy and Divinity, with their Dependences, have been his chief Studies; and he has equally applied himſelf to them from his younger Years, ſo as one of thoſe Sciences ſucceeded the other, by turns, according to the Circumſtances he was in. He does the ſame ſtill, and 'tis likely he'll continue to do ſo the reſt of his Life. I cannot tell whether he has well ſucceeded, or no, in the Works he has publiſhed concerning thoſe three Sciences: You know the reaſon of it. But I can tell you, with all the Sincerity I am capable of, that I am perſuaded he ſearched Truth with great Application, without having any other Deſign but to find it. Firſt, in what concerns the Chriſtian Religion, and then about ſeveral Points which concern Divinity, Philoſophy, Church-Hiſtory and Humane Learning. As for the Chriſtian Religion, I know, not only by what he has written concerning it, but alſo by what he has diſcourſed, on ſeveral Occaſions, that he is fully perſuaded of the Truth of it; not out of Cuſtom, or Weakneſs, or becauſe one may ſomtimes get ſomething by feigning to be perſuaded of it, as it ſeems many do, but out of Reaſon and upon Examination. Few Men have more meditated on

the Christian Religion than he has done; and perhaps there is not one Divine, who has a greater Notion of God and Christianity than he has. He can't abide that weak or doubtful Arguments should be used in their Defence, out of Policy, because they work on the Minds of the People, and Ignorant Men. He thinks that Men thereby equal Divine Revelation with false Religions, which are kept up by such a Method, for want of a better: Whereas no other Arguments ought to be made use of, for the Proof of the Christian Religion, but such as are proper to it, and wholly distinguish it from Falshood, which cannot be defended with the same Arms. He affirms, That whoever doubts of the truth of Christianity, has not a true Notion of it, or cannot Reason well, or desires to indulge his Passions.

But to see the Christian Religion in its due Light, he thinks it ought to be considered as it was in its beginning, without mixing any Human Doctrin, or any Explication of unintelligible Things with it. Those Explications and Human Doctrins are, as he thinks, the cause of most Disputes and Errors; not to mention a thousand other Evils, which they have occasioned. Wherefore he speaks of 'em with as much Contempt as he admires what God has revealed to us by Christ and his Apostles.

Mr. *Vander Waeyen*, a *Cocceian* Divine, will notwithstanding deprive him of the Title of a Divine, in two Libels he wrote against him. But he troubles himself so little with it, that on the contrary he would be very sorry to be accounted a great Divine by such a Man as that Professor of *Franeker*. Mr. *L. C.* professes himself to be a Christian, and does nothing that contradicts his Pro-

Profeſſion; but he would not be a Divine of Mr. *Vander Waeyen*'s Stamp, and he is not the only Man of that Opinion. There are very few Reformed Divines, but deſpiſe that ſort of Divinity. Mr. *Spanheim*, Profeſſor in the Univerſity of *Leyden*, with whom the Profeſſor of *Franeker* is not at all to be compared, has ſpoken his Mind plainly enough on this Matter; and Mr. *Vander Waeyen*'s Indignation againſt him has not prejudiced his Reputation in the leaſt. Mr. *L. C.* beſeeches God, That he would teach Mr. *Vander Waeyen* what the Title of a Divine requires of them, who bear it, and will not diſhonour it.

Tho' he had early ſtudied the Philoſophy of *Deſcartes*, he follows only his general Principles, which he admires; and thinks that the only reaſon why *Deſcartes* did not keep to them, when he came to Particulars, is, That he made too much haſte, deſiring to publiſh a complete Syſtem before he died. I'll tell you more of it, when I come to Diſcourſe of Mr. *L. C*s. Philoſophical Works. The general deſign of 'em is to form the Minds of Young Men, and open them a Way to the ſearch of Truth, even in the moſt important Things. For the Author is of Opinion, That the true Method of Philoſophizing is of very great uſe to eſtabliſh the Truth of the Chriſtian Religion, and ſhew the excellency and neceſſity of its Precepts. He thinks that a Man muſt not part with his Reaſon, or ſtifle its Light, to perceive the Beauty of Chriſtianity: Such a Method ſeems to him to be the infallible way of eſtabliſhing all manner of Errors. On the contrary, the better a Man Reaſons, the more he'll be convinced of the Truth of the Chriſtian Religion.

The Study of Languages and Human Learning has taken up part of his Life, and is ſtill his greateſt Diverſion. He is perſuaded that it is of great uſe for the underſtanding of Holy Scripture, as it appears by his Works. He alſo believes, That that ſort of Study is very uſeful to improve Men's Minds, and moderate their Paſſions; if at the ſame time the Study of Philoſophy be joyned with it; for they muſt never be divided. A Man enables himſelf thereby to make his own what he finds in Ancient Authors, that deſerves it; without being in danger of admiring their Faults, as it is commonly done by ſuch Criticks as only cultivate their Memory. That Reading enables one not only to expreſs his Thoughts agreeably and elegantly, but alſo more clearly and diſtinctly; provided it be attenedd with good Logical Rules, which muſt never be neglected, and which the Criticks are moſt times Strangers to.

Mr. *L. C.* is of Opinion, That if the three Sciences, I have mention'd, were joyned together; the Knowledge, which depends on them, would very much encreaſe, and conſequently Virtue and Honeſty would not be ſo ſcarce as they are; for he maintains that Ignorance is the Mother of Vice, and that true Learning is the Fountain of the moſt ſolid Virtue. If Divines, I ſay, were alſo good Philoſophers, there would ariſe a great Advantage from it; they would lay aſide all pitiful and childiſh Arguments, which their Books are full of, and which they often vent as Articles of Faith, whereby they do a great prejudice to Religion. They would not betray it, without being aware of it, by ſaying that Men muſt renounce the moſt certain Knowledge of their Reaſon, to embrace it. They would propoſe

poſe their Thoughts in a much clearer and better Order, and convince the Minds of their Readers or Hearers after ſuch a manner as would influence their Lives. The whole Body of Divinity would be reduced into Maxims, or neceſſary Conſequences drawn from them, and the neceſſity thereof would ſoon appear, in order to live Happily in this preſent World, and be acceptable to Him, who placed Men on Earth for a ſhort time; to make 'em Happy after Death, if they will obſerve his Laws, which are very beneficial to them during this Life.

If Divines underſtanding Revelation, as they ſhould, and making a good uſe of Reaſon, were beſides ſo Skill'd in Human Learning, as to be able to read all ſorts of Eccleſiaſtical and Prophane Authors in the Original Languages; ſo many Materials joyned together, and rectified by the invariable Rules of Revelation and Reaſon, and beautified with all the ſolid Ornaments of a true Eloquence; ſo many Materials, I ſay, would have a great influence on the Hearts and Minds of Men. Solid Thoughts being attended with the Order and Light, which Philoſophy affords, and ſet off with all the Ornaments, which Reaſon allows of, would inſinuate themſelves into the Minds of the moſt Obſtinate Men, and Charm thoſe, who have a good Judgment and an upright Heart.

I will not ſay, That we ſee now the quite contrary, becauſe Things, which ſhould be inſeparable, are now divided: This I leave to the Judgment of thoſe, who are skill'd in thoſe Sciences. Mr. *L. C.* believes, That the Famous *Hugo Grotius*, whoſe Writings are above Envy, joyned together the three Sciences, I have mention'd. For, if he did not fully underſtand the Art of

thinking well, becauſe the Philoſophy of his Time was ſtill full of Darkneſs; he ſupplied that defect in great meaſure by the ſtrength of his Reaſon. If he ſhewed ſo much Senſe and Judgment, without the help of Art; what would he not have done, if he had been throughly acquainted, as we have been ſince, with the Art of Reaſoning, and ranging one's Thoughts in a good Order? Suppoſe there were now in *Holland*, many ſuch Men as *Grotius*, or more Learned than he was, (a thing not impoſſible, if Men ſtudied as they ſhould) how great an influence would their Learning have, not only in the *United Provinces*, but alſo over all *Europe!* Then indeed we might hope for ſuch a general Reformation of all Sciences, as would be worthy of Him, who has given us Knowledge, to make a good uſe of it.

Mr. *L. C.* has intimated ſeveral times, That ſo noble an *Idea* has often Charm'd him, and afforded him a thouſand agreeable *Reveries*. If the World never ſees any thing anſwerable to it; they at leaſt, who are Skill'd in thoſe Things, may innocently buſie themſelves about Thoughts, which fill the Mind with Admiration for God, and the Chriſtian Religion, and inſpire the deſire of knowing and teaching Truth, without Anger and Animoſity againſt thoſe, who are ignorant of it.

If Philoſophers were alſo Divines, and well verſed in Human Learning, how ſolid and ſublime would their Thoughts appear! How uſeful ſhould we find their Principles! As they would take out of Revelation what is wanting to Reaſon; ſo they would by degrees diſpoſe the Minds of thoſe, who learn Philoſophy, to take the right ſide in Matters of Religion, and would ſhew 'em,

on

on all occaſions, the Excellency of the Light of Reaſon. And as the Philoſophy of the Schools, which ſucceeded the wretched Rhetorick of the foregoing Ages, made an end of corrupting Men's Minds, and diſfiguring Religion; ſo a ſound Philoſophy would kindle again the Light of Reaſon, which was extinguiſhed only to introduce a thouſand Errors, and would diſpoſe Men to perceive all the Beauties of the Goſpel. If the Diſcourſes of Philoſophers were full of uſeful Examples, taken out of Eccleſiaſtical and Prophane Authors, to which the Rules of the Art of Reaſoning ſhould be applied; ſuch a Method of teaching would make one apprehend the uſe of Philoſophy, which is otherwiſe altogether confined within the Walls of an Auditory, and ſo becomes Contemptible.

I confeſs, That moſt Philoſophical Matters are not very ſuſceptible of Ornaments; but it is certain, that if they can be expreſt in proper Terms, and ſuch as agree with the uſe of the Language they are expreſt in, as much as poſſible, they become thereby much clearer and more pleaſant to every Body, and conſequently more uſeful; becauſe Men are more attentive to what they underſtand and like, than to ſuch Things as can hardly be underſtood, and have I know not what, that diſpleaſes, tho' they are good in themſelves. This has been obſerved in *France*, ſince they began there to Philoſophize in *French*. Some Books full of the moſt abſtruſe Philoſophical Enquiries, have been read by many People with Delight and Profit; becauſe they are well written, and are free from the barbarous Terms of the Schools. One might have ſeen the happy Effects of it, if the Inhabitants of that Country were not unwilling to be undeceived.

To come now to the Study of Languages and Human Learning, it is certain, That if thoſe, who apply themſelves to it, would Study Philoſophy and Divinity at the ſame time, they would be much more uſeful to the Publick. That Study concerns Things of the greateſt Moment, ſince the knowledge of the Scripture and Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory depends as much on it, as on the knowledge of the Things themſelves. A great many new Diſcoveries might be made ſtill, in thoſe Sciences, which would raiſe and enlighten one's Mind, and inſpire it with a greater reſpect for the Divine Revelation. Inſtead of which, moſt of our Criticks grow Old in the Study of *Grammatical Trifles*, which are of very little uſe, and wherein one may be miſtaken, without any danger. If they were alſo Skill'd in Philoſophy, they would judge much better of the Ancients than they do, and give us a more exact Notion of them, whereby we might be enabled to imitate them in what is good, and avoid what is not ſo. They would order their Thoughts ſo as to avoid Error, and enlighten the Minds of their Readers. For want of ſuch a Method, they oftener admire the Faults of the Ancients, than what deſerves their Admiration; becauſe they ſeldom have any certain *Criteriums*, whereby they may diſtinguiſh True from Falſe, and what deſerves to be eſteem'd from what does not. When they have a mind to Communicate their Thoughts; it proves often a confuſed heap of indigeſted Learning, which can hardly be reduced into any Order, and is full of Falſe Reaſonings. This is partly the reaſon why that ſort of Study is ſo much deſpiſed, and why ſo many People fancy that it is almoſt inconſiſtent with good Senſe and Reaſon.

Mr.

Mr. *Vander Waeyen*, who in all likelihood never troubled himself much with Philosophy and Human Learning, having first of all applied himself to the common Divinity of the *Reformed*, and then to that of *Cocceius*, seems to be angry, because others Study the Sciences I have been speaking of, and calls Mr. *L. C.* as it were out of Contempt, *Critico-Philosophus*, tho' he Complements him sometimes. Indeed it is much more easie to say any thing that comes into one's Mind, concerning the Sense of the Prophecies; as when they boldly affirm that the *Reformed* are meant by *Juda*, and the *Lutherans* by *Ephraim*, in the Prophets; than to prove every thing exactly by Critical and Philosophical Arguments. If Mr. *Vander Waeyen* is very well contented to be ignorant of those Sciences, no Body can help it; but he must not take it ill, if others value them.

If the use that is made of the knowledge of ancient Authors, may be often justly blamed; one might find out several ways of setting up again that Science, by a better Method, as I have already said here and elsewhere. But 'tis more proper here to Discourse of Mr. *L. C*'s. Works in particular, after I have laid down his general Notions of the Method of Studying, and of the use of the Sciences he applies himself to.

BEING arrived in *Holland* in the Year 1683. he published the Year following a Book, Intituled, *Davidis & Stephani Clerici Quæstiones Sacræ*, which are Critical Discourses on some Subjects taken for the most part out of the Scripture. He added to them some Notes of his own, wherein he scruples not to contradict his Uncle and Father, when he thinks they are mistaken; being

Of the Quæstiones Sacræ.

ing of Opinion that Truth is to be preferred to the ſtricteſt Ties of Blood. He publiſhed that Book not only to honour the Memory of his Uncle and Father, who had a great Skill in the Eaſtern Languages and Human Learning, and whoſe Lives he prefixed to that Book; but alſo to ſerve the Publick, which can never be done, but by telling the Truth. He did not think it inconſiſtent with the Reſpect he owed to the Memory of two Men ſo nearly related to him, if he ſhewed that they were fallible like other Men. Notwithſtanding, moſt of his Remarks do only clear or confirm what is contained in thoſe Diſſertations. Another Volume of thoſe two Brothers was publiſhed in 1682. and printed by *Weetſtein*, in Octavo. But Mr. *L. C.* added nothing of his own to it, but a Preface. It contains ſome Speeches on ſeveral Subjects, and a *Compatus Eccleſiaſticus* of *David le Clerc*, with ſome Poetical Pieces of the ſame, and ſome Diſſertations of *Stephen le Clerc* upon ſome Places of ſeveral Prophane Authors.

Of his Entretiens de Theologie.

TOWARDS the end of the ſame Year 1684. Mr. *L. C.* publiſhed a Book of a Friend of his, Intituled, *Entretiens ſur diverſes matieres de Theologie*, in Twelves, and becauſe it was too ſmall a Book, he added a ſecond Part to it, made up of five Dialogues. The three Firſt treat of *the Extent of our Metaphyſical Knowledge, and its uſe in Religion*, and contain ſeveral Examples, whereby it clearly appears, That Metaphyſicians have often obſcured Divinity, and ſtarted a thouſand Difficulties, by reaſoning about Things, of which they had no *Ideas*. The Authors thinks *that we muſt not extend the uſe of the Faculties, we have received of God, beyond the Bounds he has preſcribed*

ſcribed to them, unleſs we will fall into infinite Errors; and believes, that as our Senſes teach us no more of Bodies, than what is neceſſary for the Preſervation of our Lives; ſo the Light of Reaſon is of no farther uſe to us, than to make us obey the Laws of God, and to lead us to the Supream Felicity. So that God having beſtowed Knowledge on us only to that intent, when we will launch out beyond the Bounds of that Knowledge, and what neceſſarily depends on it; we run the hazard of wandering, and falling into many Doubts, which we cannot reſolve, as the Author ſhews at large.

The Fourth Dialogue contains an Examination, of ſeveral Places of Scripture, which Metaphyſicians make an ill uſe of. Moſt of thoſe Paſſages are taken out of the Writings of the Author of *The Search after Truth*; but there are ſeveral Things, which are common to him and other Metaphyſicians.

The Deſign of thoſe Four Dialogues is to ſhew, that in Matters of Religion, we muſt keep to Revelation, and not fancy that we have compleat and adequate *Ideas* of the Things contained in it, and that we may draw infinite Conſequences from them. If Divines had kept themſelves within thoſe Bounds, without adding any Thing to the Doctrins contained in the Scripture, and inventing *New* Terms, as if they were more convenient than thoſe which the Holy Writers made uſe of; perhaps the World had not ſeen the Fourth Part of the Hereſies, which have been broach'd from the Apoſtles to this time; and the Chriſtian Theology would be much more Beautiful, and more conducing to Piety.

The *Fifth* Dialogue contains an Explication of the IX, X, & XI Chapters of the *Epiſtle* to the *Romans*,

Romans, taken chiefly out of the Paraphraſe of Dr. *Hammond*; who is now better known in Foreign Countries, ſince Mr. *L. C.* publiſhed his Works in Latin, as I ſhall ſay hereafter. Thoſe Dialogues are the Firſt Book that he publiſhed in *French*, and one may ſee in it the Three Sciences, I have diſcourſed of, Divinity, Philoſophy, and Critical Learning, concurring to inſpire the Reader with Pious and Reaſonable Opinions concerning Religion and Morality. For he utterly diſſents from thoſe, who cry down Reaſon, that they may vent, without being contradicted, a thouſand Things which really reflect on God and Religion. One may ſee what he ſays about it, towards the End of the Third Dialogue. Reaſon and Revelation never quarrel with one another; and if we ſee the contrary in School-Divinity, 'tis becauſe what they call Reaſon, or Revelation, is often a meer Phantom, ſubſtituted in their room; as thoſe, who can conſult the Scripture, and who reaſon cloſely, will eaſily perceive.

Of the Sentimens ſur l'Hiſtoire Critique, &c.

IN the Year 1685. Mr. *L. C.* publiſhed another French Book in Octavo, Entituled, *Sentimens de quelques Theologiens de Hollande ſur l'Hiſtoire Critique du Vieux Teſtament compoſée par R. Simon.* That Book is writ by way of Letters, wherein Mr. *L. C.* ſets down the Opinions of ſeveral Perſons concerning the Critical Hiſtory of the Old Teſtament by Father *Simon*, and gives an Account of the Converſations of ſome Friends diſcourſing with great Freedom of Father *Simon*'s Book, and ſome Subjects relating to it. When we diſcourſe with ſome Perſons, whom we do not miſtruſt, we believe that we may boldly ſay what we think, eſpecially if we propoſe our Thoughts

Thoughts as meer Conjectures; becauſe we pretend not to maintain them, as our ſettled Opinion, and ſcruple not to give them up, when after a more ſerious Conſideration, thoſe Conjectures appear not to us probable enough, to be defended. This has been done by Mr. *L. C.* in that Book, wherein he has advanced ſome Conjectures of his own and of his Friends, without ever pretending to maintain them but as Conjectures, which are not deſtitute of Probability, and not as his ſettled Opinion, as if he believed they could be clearly proved.

A Digreſſion concerning Conjectures

IT is certain that there are ſeveral degrees of Likelihood and Certainty in Men's Opinions. It muſt be confeſt that the Things we believe are not equally clear, whatever the ancient *Stoick* Philoſophers might ſay to the contrary, who believed that their *Wiſe Man* never conjectured, and that whatever he believed could be demonſtrated. Neither yet is every thing uncertain, as the *Academians* held; and there is an infinite number of Things, which can be demonſtrated, or rendred very likely; as Mr. *L. C.* has ſhewn at large, in the ſecond Part of his *Logick*. We ought to ſpeak more or leſs affirmatively, according to the ſeveral degrees of Likelihood or Certainty. As it would be ridiculous to ſpeak doubtfully of a clear Mathematical Propoſition; ſo it would not be leſs abſurd to propoſe a Conjecture as a Demonſtration. Men have always been allowed to Conjecture, and ſay what ſeem'd to them to be probable; but upon condition that they ſhould remember that their Conjectures were not certain Truths. Reaſon therefore teaches a Man to act differently, when any Body writes againſt a Conjecture, which he has publiſhed,

liſhed, or when he perceives that they write against a clear Truth out of Malice, or Obſtinacy. If any one ſhews that a Conjecture may be falſe, the Author of that Conjecture muſt not take it ill; becauſe a *Conjecture* is an Opinion wherein one may be miſtaken. And if after a more careful Examination, he thinks that his Conjecture is leſs probable than it ſeem'd to be at firſt, he ought to look upon it with greater Indifferency, and even give it up, if he finds out ſomething better. A Man muſt never be poſitive in Things, which cannot at all be demonſtrated, ſo as to embrace, or defend as certain what is only probable.

This Mr. *L. C.* thought he might very well do, with reſpect to the Conjecture, which is to be found in the VI. Letter of the *Sentiments*, concerning the Compiler of the *Pentateuch*, who, as he thought, might have been an Honeſt *Iſraelite*, who collected all the Writings of *Moſes*, and added to them ſome other Facts, taken out of ſome ancient and creditable Books, for the uſe of the *Samaritans*, about the time of the Captivity. As he always call'd that Opinion a *Conjecture*; ſo he never defended it but as ſuch, and thought not himſelf obliged to maintain it as a thing he was ſure of, againſt thoſe who oppoſed it. Nay, he ſhewed ſome Years after, as I ſhall ſay in its due place, that tho' there are ſome Paſſages in the *Pentateuch*, which are later than *Moſes*; yet that can be no reaſon againſt his being the Author of it.

He was ſo much the more willing to give up that Conjecture, becauſe it is one of thoſe *Complex* Conjectures, if I may ſo ſpeak, wherein too many uncertain Things are ſuppoſed; every one of which being poſſibly falſe, it follows from thence

thence that ſuch a Conjecture is not probable enough, to ſerve as a Principle for the Explication of the *Pentateuch*. For the more doubtful Things there are in a Conjecture, the more uncertain it is, and the more danger there is in ſuppoſing it, to draw Conſequences from it. 'Tis with Conjectures as 'tis with Accounts made up of ſeveral Sums. If you make an uncertain Suppoſition concerning the value of one of thoſe Sums, in caſe you miſtake, you miſtake but in one particular; but the more uncertain Suppoſitions you make, the more doubtful will the Account be, and liable to more Errors. What muſt a Man therefore do in ſuch a Caſe? He muſt Conjecture as little as he can, and draw few Conſequences from what he has Conjectured, that he may be miſtaken as little as may be, if he is in an Error. If Learned Men had always done this, we might have had a more real and ſolid knowledge of many Things than we have, and could better diſtinguiſh what is certain from what is uncertain; whereas when Conjectures are confounded with certainties, we think we know many Things which we really know not. For Example, *Joſeph Scaliger*, who was a very Learned Man, mixed ſo many Conjectures, in his Book *de Emendatione Temporum*, with what he might have undeniably proved, and drew ſo many Conſequences from them, that a great part of his Chronology is become thereby very ſuſpicious, if not falſe, as the famous *Dionyſius Petavius* pretends. I know a Man of great Learning, who has publiſhed ſeveral Learned Books about Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory, and the Opinions of the ancient Chriſtians; but he is ſo full of Conjectures, ſome of which are grounded upon others, that

his Arguments are ſeldom cogent, and convince few judicious and attentive Readers.

'Tis much better to ſay nothing of doubtful Things, or at leaſt to draw no Conſequences from them, and run the hazard of appearing leſs knowing, than to vent too many Uncertainties. But it is a common Fault among Men of Parts: After they have wearied themſelves in ſearching after fugitive Truth, they make to themſelves a Phantom of their own Conjectures, which they ſubſtitute in its place, leſt they ſhould ſeem to have altogether loſt their time. Then to maintain that Phantom, they make other Conjectures, eſpecially when they are hard put to it; and ſo by degrees inſtead of ſolid Truths, they vent only Dreams to thoſe that hear them. When they think they have much contributed to the diſcovery of Truths unknown before their time, they often remove them farther from Men's ſight; like *Turnus* in *Virgil's Æneids*, who, the more he followed *Æneas's Spectrum*, the farther he went from the place, where the Enemies ſtood.

I think one might make a very uſeful Treatiſe concerning *the Art of Conjecturing*, which would be reduced into Maxims, the chief whereof are the following: 1. Every Conjecture muſt be probable: 2. It ought to be as ſimple as poſſible: 3. No Conſequences muſt be drawn from it: 4. One muſt ſpeak of it doubtfully, as of a thing not certain: 5. No Body ſhould think himſelf obliged in Honour to defend it, nor ſcruple to give it up: 6. He, who thinks himſelf obliged to maintain it, muſt not have recourſe to new Suppoſitions. The uſefulneſs of thoſe Maxims might be ſhewn by very good Reaſons, and ſeveral Examples taken out of the Writings of Philo-

Philoſophers and Criticks, who have neglected them, and have therefore committed great Errors, and maintained the moſt uncertain Things in the World, with ſuch a Heat and Confidence as is only to be uſed in the defence of a certain Truth.

Several People ſtand in need of theſe Remarks, to learn to be leſs poſitive about Things they are not certain of, and not to wonder if any one yields up a Conjecture, which he never took for a certain Truth. They, who have little thought of the ſeveral degrees of Probability, are wont to ſpeak of every thing with an equal aſſurance, and maintain with Obſtinacy whatever they ſay, without diſtinguiſhing what can be maintained from that which cannot. But this ought not to be the practice of thoſe, who can reaſon well, and who love the Truth, to which they muſt conſequently ſacrifice all their Conjectures.

THE XI. and XII. Letters of the *Sentiments*, &c. contain a ſmall Treatiſe concerning *the Inſpiration of the Sacred Writers*, which Mr. *L. C.* publiſhed not as if he approved of it, but with great caution, and only to engage Learned Men to write on that Subject. He ſaid ſo poſitively in ſeveral places. And 'tis for this reaſon that ſeveral Divines have examined that Subject in *Latin*, *French* and *Engliſh*. Mr. *L. C.* thinks himſelf concerned in their Anſwers, tho' he might have complained that ſome of 'em obſerved no Rules of Equity, or Sincerity, not only with reſpect to the Doctrin contained in the Treatiſe *concerning the Inſpiration*, &c. but alſo in reference to himſelf. *Of the Treatiſe concerning the Inſpiration of the Sacred Writers.*

F. Simon, who was warmly attackt in the *Sentiments*, &c. anſwered them with all the Paſſion and

Animosity, that could be expected from a Man, who could alledge no good Reasons; and he used all the injurious and unbecoming Words that he could think of, on such an occasion. He would also persuade the World that Dr. *Allix*, heretofore Minister at *Charenton*, and Mr. *Aubert de Versé*, who is now (in 1699.) at *Paris*, and has a Pension from the Clergy of *France*, were the Authors of that Book, and that Mr. *Aubert*, in particular had written the Treatise *concerning the Inspiration of the Sacred Authors.*

A short time after, (in 1686.) Mr. *L. C.* published a *Defence* of the *Sentiments*, &c. and throughly confuted *F. Simon*'s Chimerical Discoveries, which have been laughed at since by every Body; declaring to him, That he would answer him no more, tho' he should write never so many Books, because he thought the Publick was so well acquainted with their Dispute, as to be able to judge of it, without being troubled any longer with *F. Simon*'s ill Reasonings and Disingenuity. Indeed, when a Man has said all that is necessary, in order to clear and defend Truth, he needs go no farther; the Publick being not much concerned in the Reputation and personal Interests of private Men. 'Twas in vain for *F. Simon* to cry out louder than he did before, according to the custom of those, who maintain a bad Cause; Mr. *L. C.* despised alike his hard Words, and his repeated Arguments. In his *Defence*, he says, That what *F. Simon* publish'd concerning Dr. *Allix*, and Mr. *Aubert*, is a great Untruth. They know very well that it is false, and will not ascribe to themselves another Man's Work. They have both written some Books, whereby one may easily know that they have had no hand in the *Sentiments*, &c. nor in the *Treatise* con-

concerning the Inſpiration, &c. Whatever one may think of their Books, they have done nothing like this, either as to the Style, the Method, or the Matter. I do not ſay this to wrong them, or to praiſe any body, but to confute *F. Simon* the more effectually. They, who have read the other Works of Mr. *L. C.* will eaſily believe that he needs not borrow any thing of either of 'em, and that the Author of the *Treatiſe concerning the Inſpiration*, &c. is quite another Perſon than thoſe Gentlemen. They would perhaps have done well to declare themſelves, that they have had no hand in that Book; but ſince they have not done it, I hope they will not take it ill, if I do't. If they believe that their Reputation would be wrong'd, by aſcribing to them in part a Book, wherein they have no hand; they would be glad that I have ſaid ſo here. But if their Silence ſhould ariſe from ſome other Cauſe, which I will not dive into; they cannot complain that the Publick ſhould be informed of the truth of a Fact, which might wrong Mr. *L. C.* who has as little need of them, as they have of him.

Of the Judgment which ſome Divines have made of the Sentiments, &c.

In the Year 1688. *Matthias Honcamp*, Canon of *Mentz*, publiſhed in Latin a Book, Intituled, *An Examination of the Critical Hiſtory of the Old Teſtament, and of the Sentiments*, &c. Mr. *L. C.* anſwered him in the X. Vol. of the *Bibliotheque Univerſelle*; where he gives an ill Character of the Principles and Method of that Author, who perhaps deſerved to be treated more ſharply.

In 1690. Mr. *Maius*, Profeſſor at *Gieſſen*, publiſhed four Diſſertations on the Holy Scripture, wherein he undertook to refute *F. Simon*, and the Author of the *Sentiments*, &c. The latter replied ſomething in the XIX. Vol. of the *Biblio-*

theque *Universelle*, where he shews, That Mr. *Mains* ascribes to him some Opinions, which he has not, and that his Arguments are very weak and insignificant. But because he writes chiefly against the *Treatise concerning the Inspiration*, &c. Mr. *L. C.* did not think himself obliged to Dispute about it, either with Mr. *Mains*, or any body else. He could only have wished that that Author had been able to treat that Subject well, and refute his Antagonist with good Reasons, and not with hard Words, and Arguments, which prove nothing. Equity required also that he should ascribe nothing to Mr. *L. C.* but what he acknowledges, and publish no Romance about the Authors of the *Sentiments*, &c. and the *Treatise concerning the Inspiration*, &c. as he has done, by bringing again Mr. *Aubert* upon the Stage. This he may be sure of, That Mr. *L. C.* has a greater and nobler Notion of the Divine Revelation, than he himself seems to have, as well as of Christian Charity, and even natural Equity, which he has very little observed in his Refutation. He has also published some other Dissertations, digested according to the Order of Common-Places, wherein he likewise writes against Mr. *L. C.* after such a manner as will only impose upon some Young Students of Divinity in the Universities of *Germany*, but will not please those, who know what Charity and Equity require, and are not Strangers to the Rules of Reasoning well. Mr. *L. C.* might also complain that Mr. *Mains* took the pains to transcribe out of his Works the best Things he says concerning the Rolls of the ancient *Hebrews*, against Dr. *Isaac Vossius*, and *F. Simon*, and concerning the Scribes, against the latter. He should at least have been just to Him, of whose Labour he thought he could make a good

good uſe; by aſcribing to him only ſo much as he owns, and drawing no odious Conſequence againſt him. I thought my ſelf obliged to ſay thus much, not to revenge Mr. *L. C.* for the wrong that Profeſſor deſigned to do to his Reputation; which muſt needs be very inconſiderable, and only in Places, where he would be aſhamed to be very much Eſteem'd, knowing what ſort of Men are Eſteem'd there; but to ſhew that he is with good Reaſon, very little concern'd for what ſome *German* Divines have written againſt him. 'Tis their Duty to reflect on their own Conduct, whereof they are not to give an account to ſome Divines of *Wittemberg*, but to a Judge, who has taught us other Rules of Equity, by which we are to be judged by him. Mr. *L. C.* beſeeches that Supreme Judge that he would be pleaſed to change their angry and paſſionate Temper, and the Darkneſs wherewith they are ſurrounded, into a Spirit of Charity and Peace, and a Light, which may bring them again into the right Way.

Mr. *Witſius*, Profeſſor at *Utrecht*, and ſince at *Leyden*, has written againſt ſeveral Places of the *Sentiments*, in his *Miſcellanea Sacra*, printed in the Year 1691. and Mr. *L. C.* acquainted the Publick why he would not anſwer him, in one of the monthly Accounts of the *Hiſtoire des Ouvrages des ſavans* of that Year, where one may ſee what he thought fit to publiſh. Having ſince printed a Diſſertation, wherein he ſhews that *Moſes* is the Author of the *Pentateuch*, and Mr. *Witſius*'s Book having been Reprinted; the latter congratulated Mr. *L. C.* in a Preface, upon his not receeding from the common Opinion. Becauſe Mr. *Witſius* has behaved himſelf, on this occaſion, with the Moderation and Equity, which a Divine ought

to ſhew towards thoſe, whom he refutes; Mr. *L. C.* ſpoke no more of it. They, who will be allowed to Refute others, muſt not take it ill, if others Refute them. As for the reſt, wherein he diſſents from Mr. *Witſius*, he leaves it to the Judgment of thoſe, who ſhall read their Writings, and will be able to examine the Reaſons on both ſides. They are ſo clear, that whoever is only concern'd for the Truth, may rightly judge of 'em.

There was no need that Mr. *Vander Waeyen*, who is not at all to be compar'd with the Profeſſor of *Leyden*, for Learning, or Wit, ſhould aſſault him again, with meer hard Words, without alledging any Reaſon, and without having any regard to what had been written on this Subject. All that can be obſerved in his Prefaces to the Books of *Stephen Rittangelius*, which he has lately publiſhed, wherein he writes againſt Mr. *L. C.* and in his Diſſertation concerning the *Logos* mention'd by St. *John*, written againſt the ſame, which I ſhall ſpeak of hereafter, is that he has a vehement deſire of Defaming Mr. *L. C.* and making him odious to every Body: A deſire very contrary to the Spirit of Chriſtianity, which allows a Man to write againſt ſuch Opinions as he thinks to be falſe, but will have him to ſpare thoſe, who entertain them. In order to it, a Man muſt only make uſe of Reaſons, to Refute the Doctrines, which he believes to be Erroneous; and muſt forbear imputing to others ſuch Deſigns, as they no where intimate; and lay aſide whatever will make 'em odious, and not prove the falſity of their Opinions. I am ſorry that I am obliged to read a Lecture of Moderation to an old Divine; but he is to blame, for behaving himſelf as if he was ignorant of thoſe Principles

of

of Chriſtian Morality. For my part, I don't apprehend the Reaſon of Mr. *Vander Waeyen*'s Zeal, or to ſpeak more plainly, of his exceſſive Anger againſt Mr. *L. C.* who never mention'd him in his Writings, that I know of, nor had any Quarrel with him. If he has ſome Opinions, which that Divine does not approve of, let him Refute them in a civil way, and without falſifying, or diſſembling any thing. Since he exceeds Mr. *L. C.* in Reaſons, Learning, number of Diſciples, Authority, *&c.* what is he afraid of? Is he afraid that thoſe, who admire *Coccius*, ſhould like Mr. *L. C.*'s Writings better than Mr. *Vander Waeyen*'s Doctrine? If he is not afraid of it, why does he endeavour to ſtir up the World againſt a Man, who is not at all to be feared? It were much better for him to ſhew a greater Moderation; for People are apt to think that angry Men are deſtitute of good Reaſons; becauſe they, who know their Strength in this reſpect, are not wont to be angry with thoſe, whoſe Errors they may confound by the force of their Arguments. They are more apt to laugh at, or pity the Fooleries of thoſe, who oppoſe Truth, than to be angry with Opinions, which they know will never prevail, as long as they are deſtitute of Reaſon and Humane Helps. But let us ſee what Mr. *Vander Waeyen* ſays in particular of the *Sentiments*, &c.

In his Preface to *Rittangelius*'s Book, intituled *Libra veritatis*, to ſhew that he and ſome others of his Party are not the only Men angry with Mr. *L. C.*'s Works, he quotes Mr. *Mains* and Mr. *Etzard*, two *Lutherans*, who are uſed to inveigh againſt all thoſe, who diſſent from them, and whom no Body durſt compare in any reſpect with them, that have aſſerted the ſame Opinions which they write againſt; I mean *Grotius* and *Eraſmus*, who

who had more Senſe, Learning, Piety and Virtue than all the *German* Profeſſors together, and whoſe Writings on the Bible are admired by every Body. Beſides, were I willing to make uſe of Mr. *Vander Waeyen*'s Method, I could eaſily beat him at his own Weapon; for he knows very well what Cenſures have been paſt upon him by ſome Reformed Divines, with whom he has had many Quarrels. One Letter of Mr. *Spanheim*, Profeſſor at *Leyden*, would afford me more Matter than I ſhould want. But I need not take that courſe, to defend Mr. *L. C.* who, for the Reaſons I have mention'd, when I was diſcourſing of Praiſes and Cenſures, ought not to trouble himſelf much with what ſome *Lutherans* think of him. He is of opinion, that one needs only read their Writings and his, to condemn them, and that there is no neceſſity for him to anſwer 'em. The more they will inveigh againſt him, and give him hard Words, the leſs he will be perſuaded to leave off his Studies, to anſwer their wretched Books.

Mr. *Vander Waeyen* cannot ſay, that I ſpeak ſo, becauſe I am not well pleaſed with them; ſeeing he himſelf would not vouchſafe to hear 'em Diſcourſe concerning the *Ubiquity* of Chriſt's Humane Nature, or his corporeal Preſence in the Sacrament. Would he take it well, if I ſhould cite them againſt him, about abſolute Predeſtination? He would undoubtedly anſwer, That their Authority is of no weight, and he would be in the right. Let him therefore uſe no Method of rendring his Neighbours odious, which he would not that others ſhould uſe againſt him.

Mr. *Vander Waeyen* has, nevertheleſs, pitched upon two *Lutherans*, among Mr. *L. C.*'s Adverſaries, whom he believes upon their Word, adding of his own what he thinks fit; as if a Man needed only

ſpeak

ſpeak to perſuade others. † He ſays, for inſtance, † *Pag.* 3. *Diſſ. de vocabulo* Νγος. That *ſome of the Letters*, of which the *Sentiments*, &c. are made up, *bear the name of one De Verſé*; but it is altogether falſe. There is not one, that bears any Name, and the Author of the *Treatiſe concerning the Inſpiration*, &c. (who is not Mr. *Aubert de Verſé*, as I have already ſaid) is denoted by the Letter N. which has no Relation with his Name. † Neither is it true that Mr. *L. C.* owns † *Ead. pag.* himſelf to be the Author of that Treatiſe, tho' he ſcruples not to ſay, That he is the Author of the Letters, in which it is inſerted. Some few Lines after, he falſly accuſes Mr. *L. C.* of having ſaid that the *Pentateuch* was poſſibly compiled *by a Prieſt of Bethlehem*: whereas he ſaid *Bethel*, not *Bethlehem*. Mr. *Vander Waeyen* adds, as it were by a *Parentheſis*, that *that Prieſt was certainly an Idolater*, as if he knew it by a Revelation; and without intimating that the Author of that Conjecture was perſuaded of the contrary, as he plainly ſays in the beginning of the VII. Letter of his *Defence of the Sentiments*, p. 167. Laſtly, he ſays, That Mr. *L. C. did not ſcruple to affirm that the Works, which go under the name of* Moſes, *and other inſpired Authors, were written* by that Prieſt. But there are two Falſifications in thoſe Words. It is not true that Mr. *L. C.* aſcribed any thing to that Prieſt, beſides the care of collecting the Writings of *Moſes*, and ſome more ancient Hiſtories, of which the *Pentateuch* is made up; and it is alſo falſe that he ſaid that thoſe Books were written, *Scripta eſſe*, by that Man, as if he had been the Author of 'em: He only ſaid that he was poſſibly the Compiler of the *Pentateuch*.

Thus the Reader may ſee, how faithfully Mr. *Vander Waeyen* relates Mr. *L. C.*'s Conjecture about the Compiler of the *Pentateuch*, that he may brand

brand it with the Name of *Impiety* and *Prophaneneſs*; without intimating any where that the Author of the *Sentiments*, &c. ſaid over and over again, when he publiſhed that Conjecture, that the *Pentateuch* contains nothing but what was approved of by the Prieſts of *Jeruſalem*, and all the Jews who worſhipped the true God. 'Tis an eaſie thing to repreſent a harmleſs Conjecture as an *impious* and *prophane* Opinion, by ſuppreſſing part of it at pleaſure. Mr. *Vander Waeyen* ſhould know that Mr. *L. C.* is not fond of that Conjecture, as I have already ſaid, and as it appears by his *Latin* Diſſertation concerning *Moſes being the Author of the Pentateuch*. Equity required that he ſhould ſay ſomething of it, in imitation of Mr. *Witſius*, of whom he ſhould have learn'd that every Body, and eſpecially a Divine, ought to be a Lover of Sincerity. That Profeſſor of *Leyden* has been generally praiſed, upon that account; but the Profeſſor of *Franeker* is not like to encreaſe his Reputation, by taking a contrary courſe.

If he could be cured of his Prejudices, and judge without Anger of the Opinions of a Man, whom he has offended, tho' he never was injured by him; one ſhould only Appeal from himſelf to himſelf, and deſire him to read again the Books, againſt which he has ſo much exclaim'd. He would then eaſily perceive that he has tranſgreſſed the Laws of Charity and Juſtice after a ſtrange manner, and is bound to beg God's Pardon for it: I heartily pray God that he would forgive him. He would alſo learn to forbear writing Romances about other Men, as he has done in the very beginning of his Diſſertation; not conſidering that being evidently convinced of groſs Fictions concerning the Opinions he aſcribes to

Mr.

Mr. *L. C.* few People would believe him upon his Word.

To return to Mr. *L. C.*'s Works, he undertook in 1686. to write a *Journal*, in imitation of those, which were publiſhed in ſeveral parts of *Europe*. He entituled it, as every Body knows, *Bibliotheque Univerſelle*, and endeavoured to do chiefly Two Things, which are wanting in other Journals. The one is, to give larger and more exact Extracts of conſiderable Books, than were to be found in other Journals. And Secondly, to inſert into it ſeveral Pieces of his own, ſuch as are a Project of the *Fabulous Hiſtory*, in the I. Vol. an Explication of *the Fable of Adonis*, in the III; and of *the Fable of* Ceres, in the VI; an Eſſay concerning the *Poetry of the* Hebrews, in the IX; the Life of *Euſebius Biſhop of Caſarea*, in the X; the Lives of St. *Cyprian* and *Prudentius*, in the XII, and the Life of St. *Gregory Nazianzen*, in the XVIII; the *Memoirs concerning the Hiſtory of* Janſeniſm, in the XIV, *&c.* *of the* Bibliotheque Univerſelle.

He wrote the VIII firſt Volumes, together with Mr. *de la Croſe*, who followed his Advices till the VIII. But in the IX, he undertook to give his Judgment concerning ſome Books, and Mr. *L. C.* approved not of his Extracts; ſo that he was obliged to diſtinguiſh his own Extracts from thoſe of Mr. *de la Croſe*, that he might not be anſwerable for them. Mr. *de la Croſe* put alſo his and Mr. *L. C.*'s Name to the IV Volume, without his Knowledge, and againſt his Will; for he always deſigned that his Journal ſhould be *Anonymous*, as the *Leipſick* and the *Paris* Journals. But his Name having been publiſhed in one of the Volumes, he was obliged to publiſh it in the following. Afterwards Mr. *L. C.* wrote the X Volume alone, and Mr. *de la Croſe* the XI. as may

may be ſeen by the Prefaces. The remaining Volumes, to the XIX incluſively, were written by Mr. *L. C.* excepting the XIII.

It was neceſſary to come to theſe Particulars, not only to ſhew that Mr. *L. C.* ſpends his time better than thoſe, who loſe theirs in writing Libels; but becauſe ſome Perſons have unawares aſcrib'd to him one Volume, in which he had no Hand. The firſt who committed that Fault, is Mr. *Meibom*, in his Additions to a Book of *Valentinus Henricus Voglerus*, intituled, *Introductio Univerſalis in Notitiam cujuſcunque generis bonorum Scriptorum*, &c. In his Additions to the 29 Page, wherein he ſpeaks of Journals, he complains of the Judgment, which, he ſays, Mr. *L. C.* made of his Collection of *Writers of the German Hiſtory*, in the X Vol. of the *Bibliotheque Univerſelle*. 'Tis true that Mr. *L. C.* is the Author of that Volume, but there is not one Word in it about Mr. *Meibom*'s Collection, which he never ſo much as peruſed. Mr. *Meibom* meant the XI Vol. where there is a long Extract of his Collection; but that Volume having been written by Mr. *de la Croſe*, as it appears by the Dedicatory Epiſtle; it was not juſt to aſcribe it to Mr. *L. C.* who had no Hand in it. Mr. *Meibom* has formerly been told of it, in a civil and obliging manner, in the 2d part of the XXII Vol. of the *Bibliotheque Univerſelle*, Art. V. and again lately in the *Nouvelles de la Republiques des Lettres*, *May* 1699. becauſe it does not appear that he has retracted, and others have of late committed the ſame Injuſtice after him. 'Tis his Duty to acknowledge his fault; if he does not do it, one may with reaſon believe that he took delight in committing that Injuſtice, and look upon him as a Man, who commits ſuch Faults a purpoſe, and the Publick

may

may be acquainted with it upon occaſion. Had he only aſcribed that Volume to Mr. *L. C.* without complaining of him; one might think it is a ſlip of Memory, and overlook it: But Mr. *L. C.* cannot be ſilent about it, becauſe Mr. *Meibom* complains of him, though he has no ground for't.

Next to Mr. *Meibom*, the *Journaliſts* of *Leipſick* have committed the ſame fault, at the end of their *Acta*, &c. *June* 1691. Mr. *Juncker* has alſo tranſlated the Fault in his Treatiſe of *Journals*, publiſhed at *Leipſick*, about the ſame time. And here I cannot but take notice of a thing, which the *Journaliſts* of *Leipſick* affect to do, with reſpect to Mr. *L. C.* and ſeveral others. If an angry Author uſes any injurious or diſobliging Words againſt him, they never fail to obſerve it; as if the deſign of a Journal was to preſerve the Memory of injurious Words, which thoſe, who have uſed them, are often aſhamed of. However, if thoſe Gentlemen intend thereby to cry down Books full of injurious Words, and create a diſlike of 'em, they do well to take notice of ſuch Paſſages. But if they do it, becauſe they are well pleaſed with them, or think they are eſſential to the Subject, or becauſe they are moved with the ſame Paſſion; they can never be too much blamed for it. They may, when they pleaſe, inform the Publick about it; leſt they ſhould give occaſion to entertain an ill Opinion of 'em.

Dr. *Cave*, Canon of *Windſor*, was without doubt very well pleaſed with a Paſſage of Mr. *Meibom* againſt Mr. *L. C.* ſince he has lately inſerted it in his Diſſertation concerning *Euſebius*, ſuppoſing that Mr. *L. C.* had cenſured the Collection of the Authors *Rerum Germanicarum*, in the

the X Vol. of his *Bibliotheque*. Herein Dr. *Cave* has committed two Faults; one of which consists in approving of Mr. *Meibom*'s Injustice; and the other, in designing to wrong Mr. *L. C.*'s Reputation, by publishing a Passage of that Author; who, if he is an honest Man, will make him Satisfaction very soon, in the Journal of *Leipsick*, or somewhere else.

Another Author has committed the same Fault: I mean the Author of the Remarks on the *Confession of Sancy*, which have been lately printed at *Amsterdam*. One may see those Remarks on the II Chapter. It cannot be said that all the Volumes of the *Bibliotheque* were ascribed to Mr. *L. C.* because Mr. *de la Croze* was not so well known as he; since the Name of the latter is to be seen in all the Volumes in which he had a Hand (except in the Three First, which are Anonymous) and at the end of the Dedicatory Epistle of the XI Volume in question. He, that will censure any one, must take care not to mistake one Man for another, lest the Innocent should suffer for the Guilty.

Among those, who have injustly complained of the *Bibliotheque*, I must also reckon Mr. *Poiret* a Follower of *Antoinette Bourignon*; who being exasperated with a little Jest † upon his *Divine OEconomy*, did very much inveigh against Mr. *L.C.* not only in an opposite Extract, which he caused to be inserted in the *Republique des Lettres* in 1687. but also some Years after, in a long Letter, full of Bitterness and Malice, which he published in 1692. at the end of his Book *de Eruditione Solida*, &c. without giving notice of it to the Bookseller, who was very sorry for't. Mr. *L. C.* did not think himself obliged to answer it, because Mr. *Poiret* is so well known to be a Chimerical

† *In the* V. *Vol. of the* Biblioth.

merical Man, that what he says of any one, can do him no wrong. The only thing that Mr. *L. C.* might be blamed for, on this occasion, is to have been contented with a slight Jest upon a Book, which deserved a very sharp Censure; because it ridicules Religion, from the beginning to the end, by changing it into a meer Fanaticism. Mr. *Poiret* fancies that all the Fooleries of *Mystical Men*, and all the *Chimeras* he is pleased to add to them, must pass for Oracles; whereas he should be ashamed to make it his Business to seduce the Simple with his ridiculous spiritual Notions. None is imposed upon by the Fanatical Outside of *Mystical Men*, but those, that are disposed to deceive themselves, and to mistake Chimeras for Religion, instead of Morality and good Works, which are grounded on the hope of another Life, which the Gospel teaches us. As for those, who know how necessary it is to love one's Neighbour, they will not be imposed upon by Mr. *Poiret*'s *Extatical* Devotion, which is not inconsistent with the greatest *Malice*. His taking care to make an Apology for St. *Augustin*, is a great Instance of his want of Sincerity: For, tho' he is far from being of that Father's Opinion concerning absolute Predestination and irresistible Grace, yet he will justify him, to make Mr. *L. C.* odious, if he can. Such is again the Sense he puts upon St. *Augustin*'s Epistle to *Vincentius*: He maintains that St. *Augustin* did not say in that Letter that 'tis lawful to Persecute; as if no Body could read the Works of that Father but he. If Mr. *Poiret* does not care for Critical Learning, which he seems to despise, he should not meddle with what he understands not. He'll judge this is too hard a Censure, but he justly deserves it, and he must not think that Mr. *L. C.*

will enter into the Lists with him. He has a mind to pick Quarrels, to make, if it were possible, some noise in the World, and so put People upon buying his Books, which no Body reads. But Mr. *L. C.* will not give him occasion to write many Books. If any Body has any time to lose, let him read Mr. *Poiret*'s Letter, and compare it with Mr. *L. C.*'s Opinions; for he is resolved to make no other Reply to Mr. *Poiret*.

Of Mr. L.C.'s Philosophical Works.

WHILST Mr. *L. C.* was writing his *Bibliotheque*, he translated into Latin the last Books of *Thomas Stanley*'s Philosophical History, which contain the History of the Eastern Philosophy, whereof he had publish'd an Extract in the VII Vol. of the *Bibliotheque*, which pleased several People. That Book was printed in 1690.

Mr. *L. C.* having left off the laborious Work of the *Bibliotheque Universelle*, applied himself to his *Commentary on the Pentatench*, as I shall say hereafter; and in the mean time published his *Logick*, his *Ontology*, and his *Pneumatology*, which were reprinted in 1697. He dedicated his *Logick* to the late Mr. *Boyle*; but the Person, who was to present him with a Copy, could not do it, because Mr. *Boyle* died in the mean time. This is the reason why Mr. *L. C.* in his second Edition, dedicated it to Mr. *Locke*, to whom he had also dedicated his *Ontology* and *Pneumatology*. The second Edition is incomparably better than the first; especially for the Style, which the Author has very much corrected. There is at the end of his *Logick* a Dissertation *de Argumento Theologico ex Invidia ducto*, which angry and passionate Divines should read over and over, to make 'em leave off the Custom of using base and shameful Artifices, to make those odious, who will not blindly submit to their Decisions.

To

To compleat his Courſe of Philoſophy, he wrote, ſhortly after, a *Natural Philoſophy*, which he publiſhed in 1695. and was reprinted two Years after, in two Vol. in Octavo. So that all his Philoſophical Works are contained in four Vol.

Whilſt I am on this Subject, it will not be an unſeaſonable Digreſſion, if I undertake to juſtify Mr. *L. C.*'s Method of proving the Immortality of the Soul. Being of Opinion that its Eſſence is unknown to us, he thinks that its Immortality cannot be proved by any Arguments taken from its Nature, and that we muſt uſe ſuch Proofs as the Divine Goodneſs affords us, which has created Men, to make 'em eternally happy. Some think that the Certainty of the Immortality of the Soul is thereby leſſened; as if weak Arguments were to paſs for good Reaſons, becauſe we are concern'd in them; and as if we had but doubtful Proofs of the Divine Goodneſs. Had we no other Proofs of it, but thoſe which the Revelation afford us, methinks they were ſufficient to ſatisfy them, that are convinced of the Truth of the Revelation. A Learned Biſhop in *England* †† having objected to a Gentleman of great Parts, that he leſſen'd the Certainty of the Proofs, which perſuade us that the Soul is immortal, by ſaying that its Immateriality cannot be demonſtrated; he returned him an Anſwer, which I ſhall make uſe of againſt thoſe, who have cenſured Mr. *L.C.*'s *Pneumatology*. " This your Accuſation, *ſays* " *Mr.* Locke, of my *leſſening the credibility* of the " Immortality of the Soul, and the Reſurrection " of the Body, is founded on this, That the " Immateriality of the Soul cannot be demon- " ſtrated from natural Reaſon. Which Argu- " ment of your Lordſhip's bottoms on this, That

†† *Mr.* Locke's *Reply to the Biſhop of* Worceſter's *Anſwer to his Second Letter*, p. 418. & ſeq.

" Divine Revelation abates of its *credibility* in all " thoſe Articles it propoſes proportionably as " Humane Reaſon fails to ſupport the Teſti- " mony of God.——Does God promiſe any " thing to Mankind to be believed? It is very fit " and credible to be believed, if Reaſon can de- " monſtrate it to be true. But if Humane Rea- " ſon comes ſhort in the Caſe, and cannot make " it out, its *credibility* is thereby *leſſened*: Which " is in effect to ſay, That the Veracity of God " is not a firm and ſure Foundation of Faith to " rely upon, without the concurrent Teſtimony " of Reaſon, *i. e.* with reverence be it ſpoken, " God is not to be believed on his own Word, " unleſs what he reveals be in it ſelf credible, " and might be believed without him.—— What " I have above obſerved, is ſo viſibly contained " in your Lordſhip's Argument, that when I " met with it in your Anſwer to my firſt Letter, " it ſeem'd ſo ſtrange from a Man of your Lord- " ſhip's Character, and in a Diſpute in Defence " of the Doctrin of the Trinity, that I could " hardly perſuade my ſelf, but it was a Slip of " your Pen.

" Your Lordſhip ſays, *You do not queſtion whe- " ther God can give Immortality to a material Sub- " ſtance; but you ſay* it takes off *very much from " the evidence of Immortality, if it depends only " upon God's giving that which of its own nature it " is not capable of.*

" To which I reply, any one's not being able " to demonſtrate the Soul to be Immaterial *takes " off* not *very much*, nor at all from the *evidence " of its* Immortality, if God has revealed that it " ſhall be Immortal; becauſe the Veracity of God " is a Demonſtration of the Truth of what he has " revealed, and the want of another Demon-

" ſtration

" ſtration of a Propoſition, that is demonſtra-
" tively true, takes not off from the Evidence
" of it. For where there is a clear Demonſtra-
" tion, there is as much Evidence as any Truth
" can have, that is not ſelf-evident.——The
" whole of your Lordſhip's Diſcourſe here, is to
" prove, That the Soul cannot be Material, be-
" cauſe then the Evidence of its being Immortal
" would be *very much leſſened*. Which is to ſay,
" That 'tis not as credible upon Divine Revela-
" tion, that a Material Subſtance ſhould be Im-
" mortal, as an Immaterial; or, which is all
" one, That God is not equally to be believed,
" when he declares that a Material Subſtance ſhall
" be Immortal, as when he declares that an Im-
" material ſhall be ſo, becauſe the Immortality of
" a Material Subſtance cannot be demonſtrated
" from Natural Reaſon.

" Let us try this Rule of your Lordſhip's a lit-
" tle farther. God has revealed, That the Bo-
" dies Men ſhall have after the Reſurrection, as
" well as their Souls, ſhall live to Eternity. Does
" your Lordſhip believe the eternal Life of the one
" of theſe, more than of the other, becauſe you
" think you can prove it of one of them by na-
" tural Reaſon, and of the other not? Or can
" any one, who admits of Divine Revelation in
" the Caſe, doubt of one of them more than the
" other? Or think this Propoſition leſs credible,
" the Bodies of Men after the Reſurrection, ſhall
" live for ever; than this, That the Souls of
" Men ſhall, after the Reſurrection, live for e-
" ver? For that he muſt do, if he thinks either
" of them is leſs credible than the other. If this
" be ſo, Reaſon is to be conſulted, how far God
" is to be believed, and the credit of Divine Te-
" ſtimony, muſt receive its force from the Evi-

 " dence

" dence of Reaſon; which is evidently to take " away the Credibility of Divine Revelation, in " all Supernatural Truths, wherein the Evidence " of Reaſon fails.

Thoſe, who have found Fault with what Mr. *L. C.* ſaid concerning the Immortality of the Soul, need only conſider thoſe judicious Remarks, to be convinced that their Cenſures were very ill grounded. But to return to Mr. *L. C.*'s Philoſophical Works; thoſe, who read 'em, may eaſily perceive, That beſides the general Deſign of that ſort of Books, the Author endeavours to make the Study of Philoſophy profitable, by applying its Principles to the moſt ſublime Doctrins of Theology, as far as they have a Connexion one with another. He ſhews, in a thouſand places, the Origin of ſeveral Errors of School-Divinity, which ſprung from a falſe Philoſophy; and ſometimes *vice verſâ*, the Errors, which a falſe Theology introduced into Philoſophy; for thoſe two Sciences have often corrupted one another. Elſewhere he lays down a ſure Foundation, to convince one's ſelf of the Truth of the Chriſtian Religion. He proves, in his *Pneumatology*, the Exiſtence of a God, and all his Attributes, as much as it can be done by the meer Light of Reaſon. Whereby one may obſerve what are the Foundations of Natural Religion, on which the Chriſtian is built.

Mr. *L. C.* expreſſes, in his Philoſophical Works, a great Eſteem for *Deſcartes*, whoſe general Principles he follows; but he often departs from his particular Conjectures, which he confutes with Reaſons and Experiments. He often declares, in his *Pneumatology* and *Natural Philoſophy*, that he propoſes only ſome Conjectures, which might prove falſe, and he frequently ſays that a Man

muſt ſuſpend his Judgment. He carefully diſtinguiſhes every where what is demonſtrable, from that which is uncertain. Thoſe, who have a great reſpect for Truth in general, and love a Philoſophical Sincerity, are obliged to uſe ſuch a Method; and they, that are ſo diſpoſed, are better convinced than others, of the narrowneſs of their Knowledge, think more modeſtly of themſelves, and can more eaſily bear to be contradicted. On the contrary, thoſe, who diſtinguiſh not what is doubtful from what is certain, fancy they know much more than they do; and being proud of their pretended Knowledge, they maintain, with the ſame aſſurance, the moſt uncertain Things, and thoſe which they are moſt ſure of. From thence ariſe a great many hot Diſputes about Things, which no body knows, and wherein they are perhaps miſtaken on both ſides: From thence alſo ariſe all the Evils, which attend long Diſputes. Thoſe, who are uſed to diſtinguiſh their Conjectures from what they are able to prove, may more eaſily attain to a ſolid and certain knowledge of Truth, than thoſe who believe they know what they know not, and ſo give over the ſearch of that which they think they have already found. They ſubſtitute an imaginary Knowledge in the room of a real one, and ſo reſt ſatisfied with Phantoms, inſtead of real Things; and as they boldly take up Things, that have but a ſlight probability; ſo they are afraid, on the contrary, to be deceived by Demonſtrations, and ſhun them as carefully as they ought to ſhun Falſhood. But thoſe, who believe not that they know what they know not, and are not conceited of their own Merits, will be ready to embrace Truth, which way ſoever it comes.

That, which I moſt wonder at, is, That ſome Men are ſo Conceited, that they ſpeak, as if they were perſuaded that Truth depends not ſo much on Things themſelves, as on the manner of defending it. One would think they believe, That if they ſtoutly maintain an Opinion, it acquires thereby a greater degree of certainty, and at laſt happens to be true. Should we grant, ſay they, That ſuch a Thing is true, we muſt then give up our Principles. 'Tis therefore better to argue againſt it, without troubling our Selves whether it be true or not, and never to give ground; like the Man, who being no longer able to reply to what was objected againſt his Opinion, cried out with great Anger: *If what I ſay be not true, it ſhould be true.*

Of Morery's Dictionary.

BUT to return to Mr. *L. C.*'s Studies; at the very ſame time that his Philoſophical Works were Compoſed, Printed for the firſt time, and Reprinted, he was taken up with the tedious Reviſion of a Book, which gave him a great deal of trouble. Some Bookſellers of *Holland* having a mind to Print *Morery*'s Dictionary, propoſed to him in 1689. to Reviſe it; which he undertook to do, ſuppoſing, That becauſe that Dictionary had been Printed five times in *France*, it wanted but few Corrections: But having gone about that Work, he ſoon perceived that he had had a better Opinion of Mr. *Morery* than he deſerved. He perceived too late that the Reviſion of that Dictionary would be a laborious Work, of no great Honour, and leſs Profit: But he was obliged to go thro', when he had begun. One may ſee what he ſaid about it, in the XIV. Vol. of the *Bibliotheque Univerſelle*, and in the Preface before the *Holland* Editions. He has, in three

three ſeveral Reviſions, corrected a prodigious number of Faults, eſpecially in the Articles, which concern ancient Hiſtory; and after a frequent Peruſing, and a long Examination, he found that Mr. *Morery* was a Man of ſo little Learning and Exactneſs, that one cannot rely on any thing that he ſays. He, that would throughly examine his Dictionary, ſhould have almoſt all the Books, which he made uſe of; and it would take up as much time as would be ſufficient to make a New one. So that Mr. *L. C.* was forced to paſs over a great many Things, for want of Books and Time. Beſides, to ſpeak the Truth, there are a great many Articles in that Dictionary, which deſerve not to be corrected by a Man, who can ſpend his Time better. Of what uſe would it be to make a laborious Enquiry concerning ſo many wretched Authors, whom *Morery* mentions? He, that began that Work, ſhould have been Exact, ſince he undertook it. Nevertheleſs, there has been Three Editions of that Dictionary in *Holland*, from the Year 1690. to the Year 1698. and about Seven Thouſand Copies have been Sold: Perhaps ſo large a Book did never Sell ſo well before. Indeed, it is neceſſary to a great many People, who cannot have *Libraries*, nor read the Original Authors, and are contented with a general Knowledge of Things. The laſt Edition of *Holland* is much more Exact than the other, but it is not true, That *the Publick can now rely upon it*, as the Bookſellers have inſerted in the *Advertiſement* of this VIII. Edition, without Mr. *L. C*'s. Knowledge. 'Tis true, That it is more accurate than the former; but he, that will know ſomething exactly, muſt neceſſarily have recourſe to the Original Authors. I hear (in 1699.) that there is a new Edition of it coming out at *Paris*, and

and I doubt not but that they have corrected several Faults in the Articles, which concern the Modern Authors; because they have at *Paris* all the Books necessary for it, the Tenth Part of which cannot be had in *Holland*, because those Books Sell not very well there.

of Mr. L. C.'s Commentary on the Pentateuch.

Mr. *L. C.* having applied himself chiefly to the Study of the Holy Scripture, designed a great while ago to write a Commentary on the Old Testament; but being not Master of his Time, and Studies, he could not do it, before he left off writing the *Bibliotheque Universelle*. To give a *Specimen* of his Design, he published in 1690. in one Sheet in Quarto the Prophet *Obadiah*, translated by him, with a Paraphrase and a Critical Commentary. He imparted that *Specimen* to his Friends, and sent it every where, to know what the Publick thought of such an Undertaking; and having their Approbation, he willingly undertook that Work, which, tho' very great and laborious, did not frighten him, because he always took great delight in that Study. Besides, he was persuaded, that, If he should succeed in his Design, it would prove very useful to the Publick.

He published therefore his *Commentary* on Genesis, in 1693. with a Paraphrase, and Critical Notes, as he had done the Prophet *Obadiah*. And because he designed his Book for the use of all those, who apply themselves to the Study of the Holy Scripture, of what Sect or Party soever they be; he abstained from all manner of Controversie, and enquired only into the *Literal Sense*, without drawing any *Theological* Consequences from it, which might offend any Christian Society. He searched Truth as impartially as if he had been

been the first, who undertook such a Work. He agrees, in most Things, with the most Learned Interpreters; but he thinks he has made many new Discoveries, concerning Things themselves, and the manner of proving them. That Commentary was very acceptable to the Publick, as it appeared, in that not only it Sold well, but was likewise approved of by many Learned Men.

But because there are always some Men, who being not able to Compose any Thing of their own, think notwithstanding, that they are good Judges of other Men's Works; the Envy and Malice of some Divines soon broke out against him. Had he made a pitiful *Rapsody* out of the several Interpreters, who wrote before him, they would perhaps have approved, or said nothing of him. But whoever endeavours to teach 'em something new, and do better than others, cannot fail to undergo their Censure. A Divine of that Temper took care to Incense against him Dr. *Kidder*, Bishop of *Bath* and *Wells*, who published some English Notes on the *Pentateuch*, in the Year 1694. That Learned Man, being deceived by a Person, whom he did not mistrust, spoke somewhat unkindly of Mr. *L. C.* because he believed that some Places of the *Pentateuch* were not written by *Moses*; tho *Monsieur Huet*, and Mr. *Witsius*, and several others scrupled not to acknowledge the like Additions, which indeed are manifest. But Mr. *L. C.* having complained to the Bishop in a Letter, he received a more obliging Answer from him, as he has already said in his Preface before *Eusebius*. He perceived by that Answer, that some Men, who have Reason to speak well of him, and dislike not his Opinions, had given that Prelate an ill Character of him.

Mr. *Edzard* Professor of Philosophy at *Wittemberg*, an University from which no good can be expected, whilst the Spirit of *Calovius* reigns in it, wrote a very sharp Dissertation against Mr. *L. C.*'s Explication of the Prophecy concerning the *Schilo*, which he published without being positive in it, because it is an obscure Passage.

But the *German* Doctor, to whom every thing seems to be easie, made a confused Collection of most trivial things, and reviling Words, which are peculiar to himself; without caring to reason well, or understand the Author, whom he criticizes on purpose to make him odious, as if he should favour the *Jews*. He fancies that by bawling like a Porter against Mr. *L. C.* he'll make People believe that White is Black, and that by often saying that what is obscure is clear, it will be so in effect. Let any one read Mr. *L. C.*'s Explication of the *Schilo*, and compare it with the Book of that *Lutheran* Doctor, and then give his Judgment upon the matter. Mr. *L. C.* is not afraid that the Arguments of Mr. *Edzard*, and the blind Zeal by which he is acted, should do him any Prejudice; and he will not leave off his Studies to answer him. Otherwise all the Students of the Universities of *Germany* would enter into the Lists with him, after they have transcribed a pitiful common Place, or a wretched Commentary, and set it off with reviling Words. If those, who despise *Grotius*, and admire *Calovius*, do not like Mr. *L. C.*'s Works; he has no more reason to wonder at it than they have, when they see that he praises *Grotius* in his Writings, and never expresses any esteem for *Calovius* and his Imitators.

Qui Bavium non odit, amet tua carmina Mævi.

It was neceſſary that the *German* Students ſhould be informed of this, leſt they ſhould think that 'tis in their Power to diſturb, when they pleaſe, Mr. *L. C.*'s reſt with their Libels, and to get ſome Reputation by putting him upon anſwering them.

Mr. *Vander Waeyen* had likewiſe a mind to ſignalize himſelf, by writing againſt Mr. *L. C.*'s Commentary on *Geneſis*, in ſome Theological Diſputes held in the Univerſity of *Franeker*. But Mr. *L. C.* would not anſwer that Divine, becauſe his way of Diſputing ſhewed that he had no love for Truth. For Inſtance, he wondred that Mr. *L. C.* ſhould ſay, That the three Men, mention'd *Gen.* xviii. who appeared to *Abraham*, were three Angels; tho' Mr. *L. C.* followed therein St. *Auguſtin*'s Opinion, whom he quoted in his Note on that Chapter of *Geneſis*. Nay, he charges Mr. *L. C.* with *want of Sincerity*; which is a very abſurd Accuſation, and unbecoming an honeſt Man. For none can be ſuſpected of want of Sincerity, but they who maintain a ridiculous Opinion, eſpecially when they get ſomething by it: Whereas in this caſe no other Opinion can reaſonably be maintained; and Mr. *Vander Waeyen* knew very well that Mr. *L. C.* did not do this to Court any Body.

Mr. *Vander Waeyen* falls upon him again, in his Diſſertation concerning the *Logos*, and in the very beginning finds fault with ſome Paſſages of Mr. *L. C.*'s Commentary on the other Books of *Moſes*. But becauſe he does it only by the by, and to render him odious; the beſt anſwer Mr. *L. C.* can make, is, to deſire the Reader to read attentively thoſe Paſſages in the Original, if he deſigns to be a Judge between Mr. *Vander Waeyen* and Mr. *L. C.* A juſt and judicious Reader will eaſily ſee which of 'em is in the wrong. Mr.

Mr. *Vander Waeyen* here and elſe-where charges Mr. *L. C.* with favouring the *Socinians*, whom he no more thought on, when he wrote his Commentary, than if there had never been any ſuch Men in the World. If the *Socinians* ſpeak truth in ſome things, and another Man does the ſame after them, is it a Crime, and does it follow from thence that ſuch a Man believes, in all Reſpects, as they do? What would Mr. *Vander Waeyen* ſay, if he knew that Mr. *L. C.* has been very little converſant with the Writings of the *Socinians*, that he ſeldom conſults them, and never read any thing of 'em concerning *Types*; which is the thing wherein he accuſes him of favouring the *Socinians?* He could not at leaſt charge him with imitating them. But 'tis now the conſtant Practice of ſome Proteſtant Divines to call *Socinianiſm* all the Opinions they have a mind to traduce; as in *Spain* and *Italy* they call *Calviniſm* or *Lutheraniſm* the Opinions, with which they charge thoſe, whom they hate. This is *Argumentum Theologicum ex invidia ductum*, to give an odious Name to a thing, that it may be Condemned without any Examination. Mr. *L. C.* is no *Socinian*; but he is not bound to make a Confeſſion of his Faith, as often as ſome *Divines* will be pleaſed to give him hard Words, and pick a Quarrel with him about things of no moment, as Mr. *Vander Waeyen* has done.

Of his Notes on the beginning of St. John's Goſpel.

† *See the Preface of the* Edit. in 8.

WHILST Mr. *L. C.*'s Commentary on the four laſt Books of *Moſes* was a Printing, in the beginning of the Year 1695. he had † occaſion to publiſh his Thoughts concerning the beginning of St. *John*'s Goſpel; and he did it ſo much the more willingly, becauſe ſome ill Men were pleaſed to confound Mr. *Clark*, an *Engliſh* Man, who fa-

favoured the *Socinians*; ſome of whom wrote in *Engliſh* concerning St. *John*'s Goſpel, ſo as to make one believe that they doubted of its Authority. This Mr. *Clark* publiſhed, a Book intituled *Anti-Nicæniſmus*, in 1694. and died ſoon after. If to what I have ſaid you add the *Preface* of the Notes on the beginning of St. *John*'s Goſpel, you may know why Mr. *L. C.* publiſhed that little Book at that time.

Mr. *Benoit* a Miniſter at *Delft* thought fit to write againſt it, in a Diſſertation printed at *Rotterdam* in 1696. Mr. *L. C.* did not anſwer it, and will not do it for the ſame Reaſon, which hindred him from anſwering ſeveral others; *viz.* becauſe he believed that the Reader was able to judge of that Diſpute, by comparing thoſe two Books, without the help of a Reply. I don't know whether Mr. *Benoit* took it ill; for he deſired that his Book ſhould make a noiſe in the World. However he thought fit to reflect upon Mr. *L. C.* a great while after, in the Libels he wrote againſt Mr. *Jaquelot* and Mr. *Le Vaſſor*, tho' Mr. *L. C.* was not concerned in that Quarrel. Mr. *Benoit* was in hopes that Mr. *L. C.* would preſently take up the Cudgel, and that his Book, which no Body would buy, would by that means ſell the better. But he was miſtaken, and Mr. *L. C.* was as little moved with his Libels as he was with his Diſſertation, and would make no Reply out of *Prudence*, and *Contempt* for ſuch Diſputes. The firſt Reaſon he had for it, is that 'tis needleſs to write Books, in order to explain what every Body underſtands. 'Tis true that Mr. *Benoit* ſpeaks, as if he underſtood it not; but let him read again the Paſſage he wrote againſt, and then he may anſwer himſelf. Mr. *L. C.*'s ſecond Reaſon for not anſwering him is, that the

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Indignation which moſt *French Refugees* have expreſſed againſt his Libels, and the Satisfaction he has been obliged to make, after he had endeavoured to ſtir up the People againſt two of his Brethren, have ſo humbled him, that there is no need any Body elſe ſhould do it. Inſtead of writing againſt thoſe, who don't meddle with him, he ſhould anſwer the Complaints of ſeveral of his Country-men, who openly charge him with want of Sincerity in his Hiſtory, which many People look upon as a Book fitter to Defame than Honour the Party. His crying down People as Hereticks will not put an end to their Complaints: On the contrary, he will perhaps force ſome great Perſons to publiſh what they heard him ſay ſome Years ago: They remember very well that he profeſt himſelf at that time to be a moderate Man.

The next Year 1697. Mr. *Vander Waeyen* publiſhed his Diſſertation concerning the *Legos*, which I have already mention'd, and that it might ſell the better, added to it a Book of *Stephen Rittangelius*, who had been a Jew, and turned Chriſtian; wherein he endeavours to prove, that the *Chaldee Paraphraſts* meant by the *Word of God* the ſame thing that St. *John* did. For my part, I don't believe it, and in my Opinion *Rittangelius* has very ill confuted his Adverſary; but this is not the Queſtion in hand. Mr. *Vander Waeyen* being not contented to confute Mr. *L. C.* omits nothing to make him odious. He had a great while before acquainted the World that he was about a Diſſertation, wherein he would prove that Mr. *L. C.* had not faithfully cited *Philo*. Mr. *Van Limborch*, Mr. *L. C.*'s Collegue, hearing of it, undertook to compare all the Paſſages of *Philo* quoted by Mr. *L. C.* in his Notes on the beginning of St.

St. *John*'s Goſpel; and finding that he had truly cited them, he told ſome Body of it, who acquainted Mr. *Vander Waeyen* with it. Whereupon Mr. *Vander Waeyen* inveighed ſo furiouſly againſt him, as to accuſe him of a baſe Calumny. Mr. *L. C.* was at that time ſo buſy about a Book, which is lately come out, and of which I ſhall ſpeak hereafter, that he could not anſwer Mr. *Vander Waeyen*; but Mr. *Van Limborch* did it with great moderation, and ſo as to ſtop the mouth of any other Man but him. A *Cocceian* Divine, who, for ſeveral Years, has been uſed to Quarrel, does not eaſily bluſh, tho' he be clearly convinced; or at leaſt his inward Shame is not to be ſeen in his Writings. But there is one thing in them, which is very viſible, *viz.* a great Confuſion, whereby it plainly appears that he knows not what he ſays, tho' he makes as great a buſtle as he can. This one may obſerve in Mr. *Vander Waeyen*'s Reply, intituled, *Reſponſionis Limborgiana Diſcuſſio*, which, from the beginning to the end, is an exact Picture of an Angry Man. As for the matter of it, it is a confuſed heap of uſeleſs Quotations, and pitiful Arguments, without any Connexion, and Order, and ſometimes the Reader is at a loſs to find any ſenſe in it. His Diſſertation concerning the *Logos* is no better; but becauſe he took a little more time to compoſe it, he ſeems to be more ſedate, whereas he is quite out of his Senſes in the other. When a Man takes ſuch a courſe, the Diſpute is at an end; for to what purpoſe ſhould any one anſwer him? Were he convinced of Calumny a hundred times one after another, he would go on ſtill, without minding what the Publick will think of it. For Inſtance, Mr. *Vander Waeyen* having accuſed Mr. *Van Limborch* of want of Sincerity, and having been convinced of it

himſelf, as clearly as that two and two make four, ſays notwithſtanding with his wonted Boldneſs, † that the *Remoſtrants* ſhew a greater moderation to I know not whom, than to the *Reformed*; as if the Books of the former were not full of Proteſtations, whereby it appears that they are ready to live in the ſame Communion with the *Reformed*, provided their Opinions be tolerated. But whilſt they require from the *Remonſtrants* that they ſuppreſs or renounce their Opinions, when at the ſame time they canonize and preach up ſuch Doctrines as the *Remonſtrants* believe to be erroneous; how can the latter re-unite themſelves with a good Conſcience? A re-union, whereby a Man ſuppreſſes what he thinks to be true, to give place to what he believes to be falſe, (if there was nothing elſe,) is unworthy of a pious Man; and there is not one honeſt Man, among the *Reformed*, who would approve of ſuch a Reunion with the *Lutherans*. Mr. *Vander Waeyen* cannot be ignorant of the Sentiments of the *Remonſtrants* on this Matter, ſince they are known even to Children in the *United Provinces*. What ſignifies it to diſpute with a Man, who is poſitive and confident about the moſt uncertain things, and ſcruples not to deny what is as clear as Noon-day? Beſides the Publick is not at all concern'd in perſonal Diſputes, and will not read Books that contain nothing elſe.

† *Diſcuſ.* p. 48.

Mr. *L. C.* ſhould therefore loſe his time, if he took the Pains to confute the Calumnies and injurious Words of that Profeſſor of *Franeker*; eſpecially if it be conſidered that he has expreſt in his Works a greater reſpect for Divine Revelation in general, and the Chriſtian Religion in particular, than his Adverſary. 'Tis in vain for Mr. *Vander Waeyen* to call *Impious* and *Prophane*, ſome

ſome Paſſages of the *Treatiſe concerning the Inſpiration of the Sacred Writers*. The Publick knows very well that Mr. *L. C.* does not own himſelf to be the Author of that Treatiſe, and that there is ſcarce any thing in it but what was ſaid before by *Grotius*, whoſe Works have been ſo often reprinted, and who is look'd upon as the moſt excellent Interpeter of the New Teſtament. Mr. *Vander Waeyen* ſhould have written againſt him, and he would without doubt have done it, were it not that the meer Name of *Grotius* will weigh down all the malice of his Adverſaries.

But Mr. *L. C.* will do well to publiſh a *Latin* Book, wherein he'll examine ſome Queſtions, which Mr. *Vander Waeyen* has only entangled; For inſtance, *Whether* Philo *took out of* Moſes *what he ſays concerning the* Logos; *Whether the* Platonicks *meant the* Word *by it*; *Whether* Plato *took out of the Old Teſtament what he ſays concerning the three Principles*, &c. He may ſhew by the by that Mr. *Vander Waeyen* has but ſlightly ſtudied that Matter, and that it had been more for his Honour not to meddle with it. He may alſo eaſily prove that he cited *Philo* with great Sincerity and Exactneſs; and that his Adverſary ſhews no Sincerity in what he ſays on that point. But the Profeſſor of *Franeker* muſt not be too impatient. He ought to be contented, now that he has fully vented his Spleen againſt Mr. *L. C.*

As for Mr. *Van Limborch*, he has ſo perfectly confuted Mr. *Vander Waeyen*'s Objections, and ſo well ſatisfied the Publick in that matter, that it would be needleſs to do it again after him. The things, which the latter has collected againſt the *Remonſtrants*, are ſo inconſiderable, and confuſed, and ſhew ſo much Anger, that every Body may

be ſenſible of it. Mr. *Vander Waeyen*'s Accuſations are ſo unjudicious, and he is ſo well known by reaſon of his Quarrels and paſſionate Carriage towards other *Reformed* Divines, that he can do them no prejudice. He has encreaſed the Reputation of thoſe, againſt whom he wrote, at the coſt of his own. I'll Inſtance upon Mr. *Spanheim*:

† See *Frid. Spanhemii Ep. ad Amicum, Ed. Ultrajecti* 1684. *pag.* 71. & *ſeq.*

† Mr. *Vander Waeyen* was ſo ridiculous as to teach him how to confound the Degrees of Longitude and Latitude, and to laugh at him, becauſe he had ſaid that the *New World* reaches above 180. Degrees. He could not forbear ſaying, with a magiſterial Air, That Mr. *Spanheim* ſpoke very ignorantly, *ignorantiſſimè*, and that Geographers reckon only 180. Degrees from one Pole to the other, as if Mr. *Spanheim* had meant Degrees of Latitude. Mr. *Vander Waeyen*'s Diſſertation being printed and publiſhed, the late Mr. *Anſelaar*, a Miniſter at *Amſterdam*, gave him notice of his Blunder; but it was too late. Mr. *Spanheim* and ſeveral others had already got ſome Copies of it; and that Paſſage was only mended in thoſe, which remained in the Bookſeller's Hands. Mr. *Van Limborch* hinted by the by at that groſs Miſtake, to oblige Mr. *Vander Waeyen* to be more modeſt and reſerved in cenſuring others. † But he feigns to know nothing of it; whereas he ſhould make a good uſe of ſuch a warning, to leave off inſulting ſo proudly thoſe, who are not of his Mind.

† *Vid. Diſcuſ.* p. 68.

We may learn from thence, that Boldneſs and Confidence in ſpeaking prove not that a Man is ſure of what he ſays. Mr. *Vander Waeyen* affords us an inſtance of it; for he has committed a childiſh Fault, at the very ſame time that he was inſulting and laughing at Mr. *Spanheim*, without any reaſon for it. 'Tis a piece of Craft, which has been practiſed a thouſand times; and tho' the Fallacy

lacy of it has been detected as many times, yet the common People are ſtill deceived by it, † " And " a great boldneſs in defending a bad Cauſe, is " look'd upon by many as a ſign, that a Man " truſts the goodneſs of his Cauſe:

† *Juvenal. Sat.* XIII. *v.* 109.

Nam cùm magna mala ſupereſt audacia cauſæ,
Creditur à multis fiducia.

Mr. *Van Limborch* muſt not trouble himſelf with what the Profeſſor of *Franeker* thinks of his Works. A Man, who is well pleaſed with precarious Explications of Prophecies, and fills his Head with ſo many *Chimæras*, cannot but diſlike good and methodical Explications of the Holy Scripture, and ſuch as are grounded on the clear ſenſe of the Words, and Grammatical Rules. But all thoſe, who are acquainted with the Principles of the Reformers, and know that, in matters of Religion, every thing muſt be proved by the Scripture, literally expounded, without any mixture of Humane Doctrines, will always ſet a great value on Mr. *Van Limborch*'s Books, whatever *Allegorical* Divines may think of 'em.

However I believe, as well as Mr. *Vander Waeyen*, that Knowledge ſhall be encreaſed among Chriſtians; but it will not be by ſubſtituting in the room of Reaſon and Critical Rules, the wandering Fancy of thoſe, who expound the Holy Scripture, as they do the Chiming of Bells. God on the contrary will make uſe of Reaſon and Critical Learning, (which are now cultivated more than ever) to produce that Change. The Divines of the Church of *England* are much eſteem'd, becauſe they Reaſon better, and make better uſe of the Knowledge of Languages, than others do in many other Countries. 'Tis true that

Mr. *Vander Waeyen* has no Kindneſs for them, becauſe they cannot abide the *Cocceian* Explications of Holy Scripture, but approve of thoſe of *Grotius*, and other like Interpreters. But how can they help it? They muſt, as well as ſo many other Reformed Divines, patiently bear the misfortune of not pleaſing him.

Of the Treatiſe concerning the Cauſes of Unbelief.

NEXT to the Commentary on the *Pentateuch*, Mr. *L. C.* publiſhed his *French* Treatiſe *concerning the Cauſes of Unbelief*, wherein he examines the Motives and general Reaſons, which induce Unbelievers to reject the Chriſtian Religion. He publiſhed it in 1696. and promiſed to tranſlate it into Latin, and to add ſome Notes, in confirmation of what he ſays. He is ſo perſuaded that the better a Man reaſons, the better he may be convinced of the Truth of the Chriſtian Religion, and the Beauty of its Morality, that he conſtantly ſays in that Book that Men fall into Unbelief for want of reaſoning well. Nay, † he affirms that whoever ſays we muſt renounce Reaſon to believe Religion, betrays it; for aſſoon as we lay aſide the Light of Reaſon, we can apprehend nothing in Revelation, and are not able to underſtand the Proofs it is grounded upon, which ſuppoſe that we can reaſon. He thinks that thoſe, who have cried down Reaſon, deſigned to deceive the People, and make 'em believe any thing.

† B. 2. Ch. VI. n. IV.

But on the other ſide, Mr. *L. C.* believes not that we ought to have clear and compleat *Ideas* of all the Doctrins contained in Revelation, and perfectly underſtand whatever it ſays. He is far from thinking ſo. He believes, as well as all thoſe who are not deprived of Common Senſe, that there are a great many Things in God and his Revelation, which we do not at all comprehend,

hend, and which we very imperfectly understand. But such an Obscurity ought not to be confounded with Contradiction, which cannot consist with Truth. Neither must we pretend to know more than what has been revealed to us, but must be content with that, adding nothing to it. There are some Mysteries in Things that concern God, which we shall never be able to dive into, and which, nevertheless, we are sure of by Revelation, and sometimes too by Reason, as Mr. *L. C.* has shewn in his *Pneumatology*. For Instance, the Apostles speak of the *Messias*, not only as of a Man, but also as they use to speak of God the Father, and ascribe to him the Creation of the World; whereby it appears that they did not look on him as a meer Man, but as being so closely united to the Divinity, that what God did a long time before he was born, may be ascribed to him. But no Man can define the manner of that Union, and form to himself a clear *Idea* of it. What must we do therefore in such a case? We must be content with the general and confused *Idea*, which the Scripture gives of that Matter, and not go about to explain what we understand not, or impose on others the necessity of believing our private Explications. † Reason teaches us that God created the World out of nothing, but no Man can know the manner of it. † *See* P. 2 Ch. VII n. VI.

There are a great many other Things, which are true *Mysteries*, and have been always acknowledged to be such by Mr. *L. C.* both in Natural and Revealed Religion; so that he is far from thinking that there are none at all, as Mr. *Vander Waeyen* unjustly lays to his Charge. 'Tis true that he is no great Admirer of the Mystical Explications of Prophecies; which the *Cocceians*

give us; but if it be a Crime, all the other Reformed Divines will be guilty of it. If any one likes them, let him enjoy the great Knowledge he thinks to have; but he muſt not be angry with thoſe, who think they ought rather to meditate the clear Precepts of the Goſpel, and endeavour to imprint the love of them in themſelves and others.

All thoſe, who attentively read that Treatiſe of Mr. *L. C.* will perceive not only that Unbelievers cannot be convinced by any other Reaſons, but alſo that the Author of it is fully perſuaded of the Truth of the Religion he defends, not out of Credulity or Intereſt, but by good and clear Reaſons, and ſuch as no reaſonable Man can oppoſe. This is the uſe he made of his Philoſophical and Theological Studies, as all thoſe, who have read his Works, may obſerve in a thouſand Places.

Dr. *Cave* is the only Man, that I know of, who has publickly cenſured the Treatiſe *concerning the Cauſes of Unbelief*. He was ſo bold as to ſay, in his Diſſertation concerning *Euſebius*, That Mr. *L. C.* ſhews himſelf to be ill affected to *Chriſtian Divines*. If theſe Words, a *Chriſtian Divine*, ſignifie in Dr. *Cave*'s Dictionary, a Vicious Man, who looks upon his Profeſſion as a good way to enrich himſelf, to live a voluptuous Life, and domineer over the Conſciences of other Men; 'tis paſt doubt that ſuch *a Chriſtian Divine* is not acceptable to Mr. *L. C.* who has ſharply cenſured thoſe *Chriſtian Divines*, who diſhonour Religion by their ſcandalous Lives. But if Dr. *Cave* means by a *Chriſtian Divine*, a good Man, who lives according to the Religion of Chriſt and his Apoſtles; 'tis a baſe Calumny in him to ſay that Mr. *L. C.* is ill affected to ſuch Divines. One may

may ſee the VI Chap. of the 2d Part of his Treatiſe concerning the Cauſes of Unbelief, wherein he gives a deſcription of thoſe Church-men, who, by reaſon of their vicious Lives, contribute to confirm Unbelievers in their Obſtinacy. There is not one honeſt Man, but will ſay as much as he; none but Atheiſts will confound the Vices of Church-men with the Maxims of the Chriſtian Religion; and none but Debauchees can deſire that Vice ſhould be tolerated for the ſake of a Profeſſion, which they diſhonour.

If Mr. *L. C.* had ſaid that *all Church-men* are debauched, and live a ſcandalous Life, it were a Calumny; but when he ſays that *there are but too many*, who do ſo, what does he ſay but what every Body knows, and which all good Men lament every where? Thoſe, who complain of the Faults of Clergy-men, are really their Friends, ſince they endeavour to reclaim them; they are alſo Friends to Chriſtianity, and would do it great Service, if their Complaints were able to produce a happy change in the Lives of Vicious Church-men. On the contrary, thoſe, who cannot abide that ſuch Men ſhould be cenſured, and who omit nothing to palliate, and conſequently to perpetuate their Faults, which the People imitate or abhor, and which give occaſion to Unbelievers to reject the Chriſtian Religion, thoſe, I ſay, are truly Enemies to Chriſtian Divines and Religion, and only Friends to *Church-Preferments* and *Eccleſiaſtical Authority*.

I could eaſily ſhew that Mr. *L. C.* has not ſaid the fourth part of what was ſaid by St. *Gregory Nazianzen* and *Iſidorus Peluſiota* on this Subject; yet no Body was ever offended at it. But Dr. *Cave* will underſtand better a Latin Book, wherein Mr. *L. C.* will make him ſenſible how much

much he is to blame for having uſed him as he has done, upon this account.

Mr. *L. C.* is perſuaded that thoſe, who will carefully examine his *Treatiſe concerning the Cauſes of Unbelief*, will be convinced that the Study of true Philoſophy is of great uſe, to reclaim Unbelievers, and vindicate Religion from all the Objections that can be raiſed againſt it, provided it be attended with the Study of the Holy Scripture. Indeed, thoſe, who cannot reaſon well, nor expound Scripture according to good Critical Rules, do but expoſe Religion to the Railleries of Unbelievers, when they undertake to defend it; and 'tis their Fault, if Unbelievers think they have better Reaſons than Chriſtian Divines.

Of his Ars Critica.

IN the beginning of the Year 1697. Mr. *L.C.* publiſhed his *Ars Critica* in 2 Vol. which was ſoon after reprinted in *England*. I ſhall ſay nothing of it, becauſe the *Journaliſts* have lately publiſhed ſome Extracts of it; beſides 'tis a Work well known by reaſon of its Subject. I ſhall only obſerve that it contains a *Specimen* of what might be done, if the Study of Philoſophy and Divinity was attended with the Study of Humane Learning. The Philoſophical Turn, which the Author has given to ſeveral Things relating to Humane Learning, and the uſeful Examples he has quoted out of Sacred and Prophane Writers, ſhew the Connexion of thoſe Sciences, and how much they help one another. Mr. *L.C.* expreſſes as much Sincerity and Fairneſs in this Work, as in all his other Books: He diſſembles no Truth, becauſe, in the Judgment of ſome, it may be prejudicial. He believes that Diſſimulation in Matters of moment is of a moſt dangerous

ous Conſequence, and that thoſe, who practiſe it, have no great love for Truth, and know not how to defend it. He can't abide that any one ſhould boaſt of having Truth on his ſide, and fear at the ſame time that it will be deſtroyed by another Truth; as if two True Propoſitions could be contrary to one another. In effect, when the Unbelievers perceive that a Truth is concealed, and a Falſhood ſubſtituted in its place; they never fail to exclaim againſt ſuch a Pious Fraud, and, ſo, to bring all the reſt into Suſpicion. 'Tis in vain for any one to ſay, that, nevertheleſs, he maintains Truth; for 'tis plain that ſuch a Man does not aſſert it, becauſe he loves and is clearly convinced of it, but out of an ill Principle; ſince he maintains a Falſhood, which he thinks to be uſeful in the Defence of Truth, with the ſame Confidence and much greater Heat than he is uſed to maintain Truth it ſelf. It is a ſcandalous Conduct, which ſhews the factious Humour of a Man, who only regards what is uſeful to him, and could maintain *Mahometiſm* in *Aſia* with as great a Zeal as he maintains Chriſtianity in *Europe*. Such a Man knows not what Truth and Falſhood are, ſince he believes that the one ſtands in need of the other; and he diſhonours Truth, by acting as if he were afraid it ſhould deſtroy it ſelf. Such are the Proceedings of ſome *Ignorant Zealots*, who wrangle, as much as they can, about ſome various Readings which Mr. *L. C.* mentions in the 3d Part of his *Ars Critica*, Sect. III. c. 8. & c. 14.

A certain *Engliſh* Anonymous Author, who ſtyles himſelf *Maſter of Arts in the Univerſity of* Cambridge, has maliciouſly cenſured Mr. *L. C.*'s *Ars Critica*, out of the ſame Principle. But Mr. *L. C.* has already confuted him in a Latin Letter,

which

which has been translated into English, and is printed before his Additions to Dr. *Hammond*'s Notes on the New Testament. I shall speak no more of that Libel, because that Letter will be shortly publish'd in Latin.

Mr. *Vander Waeyen*, who endeavours to find fault with all the Books of Mr. *L. C.* has likewise censured some Passages of his *Ars Critica*. For instance, he blames † him for having said that the Efficacious and Irresistible Grace taught by St. *Augustin* is a Thing, of which we have no *Idea*, and undertakes † to tell us what it is; but he does it so odly, that what he says confirms Mr. *L. C.*'s Opinion. *Ille actus*, they are Mr. *Vander Waeyen*'s Words, *qui conversionis primus est, totus tantus quantus liberè exseritur ab eo qui se convertit; totus ille actus præstat divina cura, providentia, gratia ut exseratur, adhibitis iis prædicationis, seu verbi docendi mediis, quæ omnes agnoscimus. Totus ille actus est Dei, est hominis, est mediorum effectus, qualibet earum causarum operante suo modo & ordine.* GRATIA *autem dicitur tum Dei, voluntas, cujus virtute sistitur effectus, qui effectus habet rationem boni citra demeritum præstiti: Tum effectus ipse, qui multiplex est*, &c. First, It is not true, That when St. *Augustin* spoke of the inward and irresistible help, which he thought God bestowed on Men for their Conversion, he meant thereby the effect of Grace, or Conversion it self. Secondly, I will freely own, That Mr. *L. C.* is to blame for saying that the Word *Grace* is very obscure; if any one, that understands Philosophy or Divinity, will sincerely affirm that he clearly apprehends Mr. *Vander Waeyen*'s meaning in the Words, which I have just now quoted. For my part I have no *Idea* of an Action, which irresistibly forces a Man to *Will*, and yet leaves him at liberty not to *Will*.

† *Diss. de voc. Aug.* P. 164. P. 167.

But

But our *Coccejan* Divine accuſes Mr. *L. C.* of acknowledging an irreſiſtible Grace in that place of his *Ars Critica*, † wherein he ſhews what's meant by theſe Words, *to open the Heart*. Mr. *L. C.* maintains, That there is no *Emphaſis* in them, and that when 'tis ſaid, *Act.* xvi. 14. That *the Lord opened the Heart of* Lydia, *that ſhe attended unto the Things, that were ſpoken of* Paul, the meaning of it is only, That it came to paſs by God's Providence, that *Lydia* heard attentively St. *Paul*, whatever means God was pleaſed to uſe to that end. Becauſe nothing happens in the World, without the Divine Providence, and we are beholden to God for every Thing; St. *Luke* ſaid, That God *opened the Heart of* Lydia, without any Deſign of teaching us thereby, that ſuch a Grace, as St. *Auguſtin* ſpeaks of, wrought efficaciouſly at that very moment on the Mind of that Woman. One may ſee what Mr. *L. C.* ſaid in that place of his *Ars Critica*. 'Tis plain he ſpoke there of no irreſiſtible Grace. Nay, to ſpeak in a ſtrict Senſe, the Converſion of *Lydia* is not mention'd in that place, but only her attention to what St. *Paul* ſaid, which proved afterwards the cauſe of her Converſion. St. *Luke* ſays nothing of it, becauſe he ſuppoſes, that to be attentive to the Goſpel, and to believe it, are two Things which commonly go together. Thoſe, who are not ſtrongly prepoſſeſs'd againſt the Goſpel, and have no Vices that are inconſiſtent with it, need only be attentive, to acknowledge, love and obey it. The Jews themſelves uſed ſuch an Expreſſion, as *Ludovicus Cappellus* has obſerved on *Luke* xxiv. 45. But the preſent Queſtion is not about the Thing it ſelf, but only about what Mr. *L. C.* ſaid in his *Ars Critica*.

† Part 2. §. 1. C. 4. n. 11.

Mr.

Mr. *Vander Waeyen* maintains, That Mr. *L. C.* acknowledges in the ſame Book as well as he, that the ancient Jews meant by the *Word* the ſame thing with the Chriſtians. Let us ſee what Grounds Mr. *Vander Waeyen* has for this Aſſertion. Mr. *L. C.* has a Chapter in his *Ars Critica*, *concerning the Language of Sects*, which often ſeem to agree, but yet denote quite different Things, tho' they uſe the ſame Expreſſions. He gives a remarkable Inſtance of it, in this Propoſition, *There is but One God.* The ancient Jews meant by it, That there is but one Divine Subſtance in *Number*, as all Chriſtians underſtand it now. But St. *Athanaſius*, and other *Conſubſtantialiſts*, if I may ſo call 'em, uſed the ſame Words in a quite different Senſe; only to denote, That there was but one *Specifick* Divine Eſſence, tho' they acknowledged Three Equal and Co-eternal Subſtances. This has been proved by many Learned Men of this Age, and amongſt others by Dr. *Cudworth*, in his *Intellectual Syſtem*, which Mr. *Vander Waeyen* commends, and is really a very Learned Work, tho' it contains a Doctrin very different from his. This being ſo; Mr. *L. C.* ſays, " That by reaſon of that Ambiguity of " Words, it may be, as *Grotius* thought, that " thoſe who ſeem'd to agree, were not of the " ſame Opinion, and that by degrees, tho' they " uſed the ſame Words, they put another Signi- " fication upon them. *He adds*, That this might " ſo much the more eaſily happen, as to the " Queſtion concerning *the Unity of God*, becauſe " the Chriſtians of the latter Times believed that " the Fathers of the Church were of the ſame " Opinion with the Jews, who acknowledged a " *Numerical Unity* of the Divine Eſſence. But " as the *Conſubſtantialiſts* entertained a different

" Opi-

" Opinion, under the cover of the ſame Words,
" which the Jews uſed, and they durſt not part
" with: So now our Divines make uſe of the
" Terms conſecrated by the Fathers, but they
" ſeem to put another Signification upon 'em.
Verùm uti Homoouſiani ſub iiſdem verbis, quibus Hebræi utebantur, aliam abſcondebant ſententiam, cùm non auderent ab iis diſcedere: Ita noſtri hodie Theologi à Patribus verba quidem conſecrata retinent, ſed alias iis ſubjicere poteſtates videntur. How does it appear now, That Mr. *L. C.* grants that the ancient Jews meant by the *Word* the ſame thing that St. *John* did? Nevertheleſs, Mr. *Vander Waeyen* ſays ſo poſitively, as if no Body but himſelf could read a Book, whereof above Two thouſand Copies have already been Sold. Who will believe him, when he cites Books leſs known, and accuſes others of Diſingenuity?

Our *Cocceian* Divine continues to find fault with Mr. *L. C.* in ſeveral places of his Rapſodies; but there is no need I ſhould loſe my time in confuting him. Let him read a Book of *Epiſcopius*, which he wrote, if I miſtake not, againſt a Profeſſor of a neighbouring Univerſity, and intituled *Vedelius Rapſodus:* It contains very good Advice, which Mr. *Vander Waeyen* ſhould follow. By what has been ſaid, one may judge of the remaining part of his Book, and be ſatisfied that no Body can rely on what he ſays, and believe him upon his word. If any one will take the pains to read his Diſſertation, let him look for the Paſſages which he writes againſt, and compare them with his Anſwers, and then give his Judgment about it. I ſhould tire the Reader's Patience, and have an ill Opinion of him, ſhould I ſhew at large how many ill Reaſonings, and impertinent Quotations, and how much Diſingenuity there is in thoſe Diſſertations.

ſertations. This has has been clearly made out, in reſpect of ſeveral Points; and thoſe, who know the long Diſputes he has had with other *Reformed* Divines, are well enough acquainted with his *Genius* and manner of Writing.

However, I muſt ſay ſomething ſtill about the concluſion of his Diſſertation concerning the *Logos*. He ſays, *That he has done nothing out of Hatred, or thro' any ill Paſſion.* But I cannot apprehend what might be the cauſe of ſo many paſſionate and angry Expreſſions, Lies and Calumnies; unleſs it were *Hatred*, and ſome other like Paſſion. Certainly theſe are not the Fruits of Chriſtian Charity, nor the Effects of any Zeal for Truth, ſince Zeal for Truth has nothing to do with Lies and Calumnies.

He adds, *That he did not propoſe to himſelf, as his chief Aim, to reclaim* Mr. *L. C.* I believe it; for 'tis manifeſt that his chief Aim is to Quarrel, and give himſelf up to his prevailing Paſſion, and then to prejudice Mr. *L. C.*'s Reputation by all the means he can think of. 'Tis in vain for him to deny it; ſince God and Men judge of our Words by our Actions, and not of our Actions by our Words.

However he ſays, *That he very much wiſhes he might reclaim Mr.* L. C. *and that he heartily prays that God would do it.* But what would he reclaim Mr. *L. C.* from? Would he bring him to the State that he himſelf is in, and of which he ſhould make haſte to get out, by begging God's Pardon for having had ſo many Quarrels with ſo many honeſt Men, without any reaſon for it, and for having endeavoured to blemiſh their Reputation by his Calumnies?

He upbraids Mr. *L. C.* with *His Prejudices, his manner of Philoſophizing, and rejecting the true Key of*

of Knowledge, the Myſtery of the Father and Son. Let the Publick judge who of them two is more blinded with Prejudices, and whoſe Method of Philoſophizing is more agreeable to Piety and Reaſon. I don't know what he means by the *Myſtery of the Father and Son*, but I gueſs he underſtands by it *Cocceius*'s new Method of explaining the Covenant of Grace, which Mr. *L. C.* does not believe, no more than the other Reformed Divines. He is very willing to leave that *Key of Knowledge* to Mr. *Vander Waeyen*, and thoſe who like it. Other Chriſtians believe, that it is a proper Inſtrument to barr Men from the true Knowledge of Holy Scripture, and Mr. *L. C.* is of that Opinion. But if they mean by it the Divinity of the Son, his Diſtinction from the Father, and the Redemption of Mankind; Mr. *L. C.* is better convinced of 'em than the moſt zealous *Cocceians*; but he can't abide that any one ſhould add to thoſe Doctrines any thing that is not contained in Scripture.

Our Profeſſor of *Franeker* ſeems to be angry, becauſe Mr. *L. C.*'s Writings are eſteem'd; and he ſays, that the reaſon why they are valued, is, Becauſe they favour *Prophane Men*, that is to ſay, thoſe who laugh at *Cocceianiſm*; for whoever deſpiſes it, can expect no Quarter from Mr. *Vander Waeyen*, as being *a prophane*, and *an impious Man*, &c. Such is the Language of thoſe godly conceited Divines, who place Religion in Chimerical Speculations, which they endeavour to confound with the Doctrines revealed in the Holy Scriptures; as 'tis practis'd by Mr. *Vander Waeyen* and Mr. *Poiret*, who are good Friends, when they are concern'd to defend Fanaticiſm in general, (for as ſoon as a Man abandons Reaſon, he muſt neceſſarily fall into Fanaticiſm) but will prove

cruel Enemies, when the Queſtion ſhall be, Whether *John Cocceius*'s Fanaticiſm is to be preferr'd to that of *Antoinette Bourignon*, or *vice versâ*. 'Twould be a good ſport to hear 'em diſcourſe together, with their uſual Moderation, of their Explications of the *Revelations*, Purgatory, Predeſtination, *&c.* Mr. *Poiret* would then ceaſe to be *clariſſimus*, and would be *obſcuriſſimus Tenebrio*, to ſay no worſe; and God knows what noble Epithets he would in his turn beſtow on the Doctor of *Franeker*.

The latter ſays, That Mr. *L. C.* is one of thoſe Men, who reduce Religion to a few Heads, concerning the Knowledge of God, and ſome practical Moral Duties, in order to live quietly in this World. But Mr. *L. C.* neither leſſens nor encreaſes the Articles of Faith; he takes 'em out of Holy Scripture, ſuch as they are without making any alteration in them: As for Morality, he approves of no Remiſneſs in it. Mr. *Vander Waeyen* knows it very well, and I pray God forgive him for having ſo wilfully tranſgreſt his moſt ſacred Laws.

Of ſome other Books of Mr. L. C. and of his Adverſaries.

NEXT to the Books I have mention'd, Mr. *L. C.* publiſhed a ſhort *Abridgment of Univerſal Hiſtory*, in the Year 1697. in 8. and Dr. *Hammond*'s Paraphraſe and Notes on the New Teſtament in 1698. *in Folio*, and *a Harmony of the Goſpels* in *Greek* and *Latin* in 1699. Thoſe, who have ſeen theſe two laſt Books, and will think of the other which I have ſpoken of, cannot doubt, whatever Judgment they make of his Opinions, but that he ſpends his time as well as he can, and they will grant that a Man, who is ſo buſy in expounding Holy Scripture, and ſerving the Publick the beſt way he can think of, ſhould deſerve

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at leaſt to live quietly. It is a ſhameful thing to publiſh new Libels every Day againſt a Man, who makes no anſwer, and whoſe Opinions are now ſo well known, that 'tis in vain for any Body to miſ-repreſent them. Some Divines will ſay that they don't look upon 'em to be *Orthodox*; but they know very well that none but God is a Supreme Judge of true *Orthodoxy*, as to ſpeculative Doctrines; and that all Men being equal in this reſpect, they have no other Right but that of anſwering one another Civilly, and with good Reaſons. They ſhould be aſhamed to uſe Lies and Calumnies, to defame thoſe who don't ſo much as think of 'em.

But perhaps ſome, who are not acquainted with the way and humour of Divines, will wonder how ſo many People came to inveigh againſt Mr. *L. C.* and may ſuſpect that it is his fault, and that he has given occaſion for it. But they will be ſoon undeceived, if they conſider what I am going to ſay.

Firſt, they ought to remember that ſome Divines will preſently break out into a violent Anger, if any one is not of their Mind in every thing, and ſcruples not to ſay that ſome of their Arguments are not convincing. They will have the liberty of exclaiming againſt the *Pope*, who is a greater Man than they; but they cannot abide that others ſhould not look upon them as *Popes*, that is to ſay, Infallible Men. How many Cenſures did *Eraſmus* and *Grotius* undergo, two incomparable Men, who do more Honour to *Holland* than all the *Coccians* will ever do! They were obliged to write *great* Volumes *in Folio*, to make their Apology *in few Words*; but they ſhould have written twenty times more, had they been willing to confute at large the *Vander Waeyens*

and the *Benoits* of their time. And if any one would undertake now to make their Apology in due Form, and anſwer all the Impertinences and Calumnies, that have been vented againſt 'em, after their Death; it would perhaps require as many Volumes as there are in the laſt Edition of the *Bibliotheca Patrum*.

Secondly, Thoſe who might wonder at the great number of Mr. *L. C.*'s Adverſaries, muſt know that they ought to reckon but one in every Society; for thoſe Men are like *Jays* or *Mag-pies*, that know but one Tune, that is, one of the ſame Syſtem, which they are not allow'd to examine, but muſt follow, to avoid their Puniſhments, wherewith Church-men, who change their Mind, are commonly threaten'd. Mr. *Poiret* is the only Man, who being of no Society may ſafely vent his Chimerical Notions, and is as good as a whole Batalion of *Lutherans*, againſt whom he has often ſignalized himſelf.

Thirdly, Mr. *L. C.* has written a conſiderable number of Books, and conſequently may be allowed to give his Judgment concerning ſeveral Subjects relating to Critical Learning, Philoſophy, and Divinity, about which Men of Letters are wont to diſpute; ſo that 'tis no wonder if many will contradict him, ſince there are ſo many of a paſſionate Temper and contradicting Humour.

Laſtly, If to what has been ſaid you joyn Envy and Jealouſy, which are very common among Men of Learning; you may eaſily apprehend that ſome of 'em are out of Humour, becauſe Mr. *L. C.*'s Works are not ſlighted. Mr. *Vander Waeyen* gives us to underſtand, in ſeveral places of his Libels, that he has no kindneſs for thoſe who buy them, eſpecially for the *Engliſh*. He bitterly complains that *Arminianiſm* is got among the *Engliſh*,

Engliſh, but the *Arminians* cannot complain that *Cocceianiſm* is entertained by them. To ſpeak the Truth, Mr. *L. C.* ſets a greater value upon the Judgment of that Free and Learned Nation, than upon all the ſlaviſh and careleſs Divines of the reſt of *Europe*. However he could reſt ſatisfied with the Teſtimony of his Conſcience, and the certain hopes that God will protect Truth, and thoſe who maintain it in ſuch a manner as is agreeable to the Precepts of the Goſpel.

Whether Mr. L. C. muſt leave off his Studies, to anſwer thoſe, who write againſt him.

Hitherto I have given an Account of Mr. *L. C.*'s Studies, ſince he came to *Holland*. Some Men would divert him from them, and put him upon writing another ſort of Books. They have aſſaulted him ſometime ſince, as violently as they could: They have not been ſparing of odious Terms, Lies and Calumnies, to exaſperate him, and force him to anſwer them. But he is not ſo imprudent as to grant 'em their Deſire, and lay aſide the uſeful Subjects he is upon, to be at the trouble of laying open their Malice and Ignorance. The Publick knows well enough what ſort of Men they are. Indeed 'tis in vain for an Author to ſet up for a zealous Man, and to vail his Anger or Malice with the moſt ſpecious Pretences; for diſcerning Men will ſoon find out his Paſſion; and as for others, 'tis no great Matter whether they judge right or wrong of it. 'Tis no new thing to ſee Divines tranſported with Anger, and their *Hatred* has occaſion'd a Proverb. 'Tis well that they are now to be feared no where, but in Places where they are both Judges and Parties.

It was well obſerved by Mr. *Menage*, † That *Some Men are never refuted, unleſs they be alive; and that they are not conſiderable enough, after their death, to oblige any Body to be at that trouble.* But there

† *Menagiana*, vol. 2. p. 236.

there are ſome, who deſerve not to be refuted, whether they be dead or alive: I mean thoſe, who pick Quarrels for quarreling-ſake, or to be ſpoken of, and can make no ſolid Objections. It would be too great a Pleaſure and Honour for them, to ſee their Satyrs or Declamations anſwered. I know ſome among thoſe, that wrote againſt Mr. *L. C.* who heartily wiſh that he would in his turn write large Volumes againſt 'em. They are not afraid of good and ſolid Arguments, as it appears by their way of Reaſoning; and they are not aſhamed to publiſh the moſt palpable Abſurdities, with the greateſt confidence in the World. But they are vexed, when an Author takes no notice of their Books, and if they can't quarrel abroad, they will quarrel at home with their Collegues.

Mr. *L. C.* deſigns to write a Latin Diſſertation, wherein he'll examine this Queſtion, *When a Man muſt anſwer the Calumnies of Divines?* It is not leſs neceſſary than that which was printed at the end of his *Logick*, *De Argumento Theologico ex Invidia ducto.* Thoſe, who endeavour to encreaſe their Reputation by ſpeaking ill of him, will ſee what his Reaſons are for not anſwering them.

In the mean time, he muſt apply himſelf to the Search of Truth, and publiſh it, as carefully as he has done hitherto, but with the Caution which Chriſtian Prudence requires on ſuch an occaſion. Who can be entruſted with the care of ſpeaking and maintaining Truth? Not thoſe, who don't enquire after it, becauſe they don't love it, and ſtand not in need of it, to raiſe themſelves in the World: Nor thoſe, who have not the neceſſary Qualifications to find it out, and to publiſh it:

Nor

Nor thoſe, who know it, but dare not ſpeak it out, for fear of expoſing themſelves. For, it muſt be confeſt that in ſeveral Chriſtian Societies, they have not the liberty neceſſary to explain Holy Scripture and Religion. There is but one Chriſtian Society, in *Holland*, that can do it; and tho' it be inconſiderable, it has already afforded ſeveral Great Men. In all others, they don't often think as they ſpeak, nor ſpeak as they think.

Indeed many Learned Perſons on this ſide of the Sea and beyond it, among the *Roman* Catholicks and Proteſtants, look a great while ſince upon the Writers of that ſmall Party as the Interpreters of the Thoughts, which they themſelves dare not publiſh in Places where they live, and, as the Aſſertors of Truth and Liberty, which are oppreſt almoſt every where elſe. I will not make their *Encomium*, but I ſhall only ſay that thoſe, who are in ſuch Circumſtances, ought to ſpeak freely, whilſt they can do it, and want not People that will hear them. Time will come, when we ſhall reap the Fruits of the Seeds of Piety, Charity, and all other Chriſtian Virtues, which their Works ſpread over all *Europe*; and hereafter it will be a Subject of Wonder, how Men, who ſo much deſerved Thanks, could be ſo traduced, and ill ſpoken of. They are the only Men, to whom we are beholden for the *Moderation*, which is every day more and more entertained by the moſt knowing and judicious Proteſtants; and for a great many general and particular Truths, which would not have been heard of yet, or been well proved, if thoſe Authors had been ſilent.

There is no need I ſhould inſiſt longer on this Subject, nor ſay that Mr. *L. C.* took care of the Edition

Edition of ſome Books written by other Hands. Neither is it neceſſary that I ſhould mention thoſe, which he wrote, as it were, to divert himſelf, whilſt he was compoſing ſome others, which required more attention. Such is his ſmall French Treatiſe *concerning the good or ill Luck of Lotteries*, which he publiſhed in 1696. when Lotteries were ſo much in vogue in the *United Provinces*. He alſo took care of the Edition of the *Fathers of the Apoſtolick Age*, in 1698. in 2 Vol. *in Folio*, and added ſome few Notes of his own, as it appears by the Prefaces he prefixed to it. If thoſe, who have more time, a greater *Genius*, more Learning and Conveniences than he (as there are without doubt a great many in *England* and elſewhere) would take as much Pains for the Publick as he has done; the great number of good Books, which would come out in a few Years, would perhaps create a diſlike of ſo many bad ones, which are publiſhed every day. But, beſides the abovementioned Reaſons, they, that could write more commodiouſly than others, are not commonly ſo inclined to it, as thoſe, who have leſs Conveniences.

F I N I S.